This commentary critically examines the Makkah Accord signed between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan, questioning its designation as a collective security alliance. Analysing structural ambiguities, divergent national interests, and conflicting military postures—particularly regarding the conflict with Ansar Allah in Yemen—the article argues that the pact lacks a unified threat perception and genuine mechanisms for mutual assistance. Instead of a cohesive geopolitical alliance, the accord functions as a transactional arrangement: Türkiye offers select military hardware while Pakistan supplies personnel, primarily driven by economic incentives and bilateral patronage rather than collective defence. Ultimately, the agreement exposes the limits of traditional military pacts in addressing elusive, asymmetric modern conflicts.
More than the development of 7 August, in which three large Muslim countries— Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan— signed a defence agreement in the holy place for the Muslim across the world, Makkah, the announcement that Pakistan and Türkiye would deploy troops in Saudi Arabia was more critical in the sense that it was portrayed as a sign that the alliance had taken the first step towards its military materialisation.
On 5 October, after an emergency meeting of the Strategic Political and Defence Committee (SPDC) of the Makkah Defence Alliance in which threats facing Saudi Arabia were discussed, the Foreign Office of Pakistan stated that “The committee decided to move immediately to the practical implementation of the collective defence commitments and to take the necessary measures to provide the agreed military forces and capabilities and ensure their rapid deployment in the kingdom.”
The figures, role and purpose of the deployment? Ambiguous. Did Türkiye send its troops? Unlikely. As a report carried by Reuters quoted a Turkish official saying that Ankara was only there to provide “military equipment, intelligence sharing, and weapons systems, adding that no other form of deployment had taken place as part of the alliance so far.” Besides, Türkiye’s position is not clear. It remains a NATO member and has to evaluate the implications of joining any adventure that would demand its military’s involvement, which it has ruled out so far. Furthermore, why would Türkiye pick a fight against Ansar Allah (supporters of God, derogatorily called the Houthis) in Yemen when the Palestinian issue is gaining public support within the country; Ansar Allah claims to be standing with the Palestinians.
More than Türkiye, it is Pakistan and its assumed “powerful military” that is considered crucial for the Makkah agreement: In other words, if there is a war involving any of the members, it’s the Pakistan military that is supposed to lead, if and when it comes to fighting.
It is argued that the defence agreement is powered by the distinct, complementary strengths of its members: Saudi capital, Turkish defence manufacturing, and Pakistani military might. While a shared Islamic religion provides a foundational bond—regardless of specific denominations—the primary engine driving this collective defence pact is the strategic integration of their unique national assets.
Empirical evidence, however, suggests otherwise. Economic ties between Ankara and Islamabad remain weak, with trade stagnating at $1.1 billion. Additionally, Riyadh's defence procurement historically favours the United States, whose sophisticated defence industry eclipses Türkiye's capabilities. Given that even advanced American hardware has struggled to intercept Iranian missile threats against the kingdom during the United States-Israel war on Iran, the strategic value of a less advanced Turkish defence partnership remains unproven; more so against guerrilla warfare tactics where inflicting economic costs may not account for much.
Symbolic or strategic deployment
The prompt decision by the Makkah signatories to deploy troops in Saudi Arabia was taken against the backdrop of Ansar Allah intensifying its attacks, including hitting major Saudi cities: it was a standalone strike, without any larger strategic calculation than incurring some loss on the Saudi economy. After making the announcement that troops were being deployed, Islamabad didn’t give details about its troop deployment or in what specific capacity against Ansar Allah.
In an interview, the Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) said that “I can confirm that the forces of Pakistan are already there (Saudi Arabia).” However, the subsequent part of the statement that qualified Pakistan’s position is important. The spokesperson said that “The Makkah alliance is not something that has come out in a vacuum. … So, I can share with you that Pakistani forces, in multiple capabilities and domains, are already there.” They have been there for a long time, helping to strengthen economic relations.
Given the ambiguous and disparate positions of the three members of the Makkah Pact, what was the deployment meant to do? One of the core arguments of an alliance is that its formation accrues the power of the allies so that they can collectively deter any potential threats to any of the countries. As Glenn Snyder has argued, alliance formation takes place for two reasons mainly: “(1) some states may not be satisfied with only moderate security, and they can increase it substantially by allying if others abstain; (2) some states, fearing that others will not abstain, will ally in order to avoid isolation or to preclude the partner from allying against them.” None of these arguments applies to the Saudi-Ansar Allah dyad. Not only that, Saudi Arabia has no clear threat/enemy in its neighbourhood, but the Yemen of Ansar Allah can’t stand Riyadh’s economic and military clout.
After the deployment announcement, the major escalation came from the Ansar Allah side when they struck, in which 12 were killed and over 300 were wounded. Strong condemnation statements were issued by the three countries. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif reiterated that “In accordance with the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement and the enduring bonds of brotherhood between our two countries, we reaffirm our steadfast commitment to Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and security.” When troop deployment had already taken place just a few days ago, what did the new commitment signify?
First and foremost, when it comes to economic or military power, Ansar Allah is no match for the Saudis. In fact, Pakistan has been seeking bailouts from Riyadh, one of the reasons also that the former seeks to maintain its ties with Saudi Arabia. Secondly, Ansar Allah has been under attack since 2016 from the Saudi-led military campaign, and it has not been able to find any supporter to accrue the power to deter, let alone threaten the Saudis from attacking it. The latter have been consistently attacking Ansar Allah and the areas under its control; the result has been a severe humanitarian crisis. How Pakistan and Türkiye tip the balance further when it already is heavily, unmatchably, in Riyadh’s favour.
Moreover, one of the biggest questions that was raised about the possible credibility of the agreement was that it was an “alliance” against what? As the core of any security alliance, the Makkah agreement did state “that any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all.” Even the very statement created more confusion than offering clarity. What was the common threat that these countries share that threatens them equally? How does the war of Saudi Arabia against Ansar Allah concern Ankara and Islamabad?
These are some basic, glaring structural issues that the Makkah Pact has no answers. How can a defence agreement roll out a structural outlook that will depict its potential trajectory when it is unable to identify its main goals? Therefore, when the agreement was announced, more energy was spent on assuring countries like Iran what it wasn’t than what it was or meant for. Even after the alleged attacks on a power plant in Madina, Islamabad tried to portray a bilateral nature of the defence agreement, saying that Iran had no role in the Ansar Allah’s actions. With so much ambiguity and no modalities to operate, is it worth being called an alliance? All it seems to claim is that they are bent to stand with Riyadh in its punitive policies against Ansar Allah.
In The Origins of Alliances, Stephen Walt posits that the forces driving states to integrate or separate ultimately dictate their security by defining both the scale of threats and the availability of mutual assistance. It is this expectation of mutual aid that typically underpins alliance formation. However, the Makkah Pact lacks both a well-defined shared threat and a clear mechanism for mutual assistance. Consequently, it appears to be an ambitious but hollow initiative without concrete objectives. Presenting Ansar Allah as a potential threat doesn’t seem to justify the economic and military resources that any adventure would need: if Saudi Arabia decides to halt its attacks, Ansar Allah may reciprocate accordingly.
Consequently, recent developments fail to provide a convincing case for calling the Makkah agreement an alliance. It remains evident that the pact represents an ambitious, short-term reaction to geopolitical uncertainty rather than a sustainable, institutionalised security alliance. Despite the initial political fanfare and subsequent reports of troop deployments, it remains unclear whether retaliatory strikes by Ansar Allah constitute an existential threat to Saudi Arabia, much less to Pakistan and Türkiye.
The primary incentive for Turkey and Pakistan to assist Saudi Arabia is limited to transactional security services: Turkey supplies military hardware, while Pakistan provides the personnel to operate it within Saudi territory. Beyond this specific exchange, neither nation possesses the capability to decisively contain Ansar Allah or alter the strategic balance against missile strikes from Yemen—an effort in which the larger Saudi-led military operation has failed for the past ten years.
Deep structural obstacles, consequently, severely limit the potential for long-term collaboration. This complication underlines the reality that alliance formation must develop mechanisms and modalities to deal with the radically changed dynamics of international politics. Threats have not only changed, but their nature has also become elusive and fragmented, making them hard to locate and counter through traditional economic or military measures.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the longevity of agreements like the Makkah Accord will not be determined by grand geopolitical posturing or hurried troop deployments, but by their capacity to survive the friction of diverging national ambitions. As modern statecraft shifts away from traditional interstate warfare toward asymmetric friction and networked proxy dynamics, rigid security pacts risk becoming hollow liabilities rather than shields. True regional stability will not emerge from transactional security outsourcing or symbolic alignments designed to project manufactured strength. Instead, it requires durable diplomatic frameworks that address the root socio-political grievances fuelling localised conflicts, transforming fragile ceasefires into sustainable architectures of regional accommodation.
Nazir Ahamd Mir, PhD, is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Peace Studies (CPS), New Delhi.
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