Between Ambition and Reality: The Paradox of Pakistan’s Shuttle Diplomacy

Pakistan is attempting to broker a ceasefire in the US-Israel war on Iran to protect its own economic stability, which relies heavily on Gulf oil and remittances. Leveraging improved ties with President Trump and Chinese facilitation, Islamabad is engaged in "shuttle diplomacy". However, the analysis argues this role is paradoxical; Pakistan lacks significant leverage and suffers from internal security failures, such as its ongoing conflict with Afghanistan and sectarian tensions. Ultimately, the author views Pakistan’s efforts as ambitious and opportunistic, rather than reflecting its capacity as a regional stabiliser.

Following the failure of the first phase of talks between the United States (US) and Iran in Islamabad on 12-13 April, Pakistan has continued its efforts to bring the two sides back to Islamabad for the second round of talks. With Islamabad continuing its efforts, President Donald Trump has extended the ceasefire, citing a request from Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Gen. Asim Munir. 

Pakistan is keen to broker a deal and stop the war that was initiated by the US-Israel alliance against Iran on 28 February. Different arguments are put forth for Islamabad’s interests in facilitating and mediating talks between the US and Iran. Pakistan is directly impacted by the US-Israel war on Iran. The war has deep implications for Pakistan’s economy as it is overly dependent on oil imported from the Gulf region. Since the Gulf countries lend bailouts to Pakistan and remittances worth billions of dollars are sent back home by the millions of Pakistanis working in the Gulf region, disturbances in these countries will naturally affect its economy.

Yet another reason is that President Trump has built a rapport with Field Marshall Asim Munir. After hitting serious bumps under the Joe Biden administration, President Trump’s second term has led to significant improvement in Pakistan’s relations with the US. Trump has praised the Pakistani Army chief quite a few times. Munir seems to enjoy Trump’s goodwill, which has emboldened him to undertake efforts to end the war.

With Iran, Pakistan has balanced its relations. Islamabad has avoided burning its bridges with Iran by not taking sides in the West-Asian regional issues. On the issue of Yemen, when the Saudis asked Islamabad to join Riyadh’s war against the Houthis, who are supported by Tehran, Pakistan simply declined. Rather than obliging the Saudis on the Yemen question, it would choose to sign a defence agreement with Saudi Arabia in 2025 to please them. 

Pakistan enjoys quite a bit of credibility among countries in the region. On the one hand, it enjoys the goodwill of President Trump and the Gulf countries not having good relations with Teheran; on the other, it has manageable ties with Iran. It is also true that such goodwill does not translate into leverage that Pakistan can use to push the two sides to reach an agreement.

Pakistan’s Diplomatic Tightrope

The efforts made by Pakistan to bring two belligerent countries, the US and Iran, to the negotiating table in Islamabad are being lauded in many countries. It is, indeed, an interesting development, given the reality that Pakistan neither has a political capital to woo other countries to trust its political heft; nor has it economic or military clout to impose costs on the countries that are engaged in war.

Some other factors, however, create an environment for Pakistan to initiate a process to mobilise those factors that can help, at least, in bringing the US and Iran to the negotiation table.

The first important factor is the present status of the US-Pakistan ties. Although the ties had been cold in the last few decades, Pakistan has managed to improve its ties with the US in the last couple of years. It seems, Donald Trump, like many populist leaders, rewards people who like to massage his ego. Pakistan has realised this well. Not only did the rulers in Pakistan praise President Trump last year for stopping the war between India and Pakistan, but the rulers of the country were leading the campaign that President Trump should be awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. Trump has rewarded Islamabad in his own way. He has let it make efforts to facilitate talks between the US and Iran.

The second important factor is China. China has been playing a crucial, behind-the-scenes role in the situation. And this was accepted by President Trump. China has persuaded the Iranians to talk to the US, not once but twice. This, on the one hand, serves China’s interest to improve its global image; on the other, it helps it reduce the costs of the war on its “Ironclad brother”, Pakistan, which has suffered and can suffer even more severely if the war continues.

The third factor is the predicament of Pakistan’s Arab allies. Despite the fact that these countries have all along wanted a weaker Iran and, if reports are true, instigated President Trump to attack and continue attacking Iran, the war has imposed a cost on them, mainly economic, and impacted their image. That makes them open to work closely with Pakistan to bring peace to the region.

Pakistan seems to be well aware of these factors. That is why it is involved in shuttle diplomacy with the countries that can play a role in brokering a deal between the US and Iran. In the latest such efforts, while the Army Chief visited Iran and met with the Iranian President and other top officials in Tehran, the delegation led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif visited Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Qatar to create an environment in which the US and Iran would be brought to the negotiation table and there would be pressure on Israel too not to disrupt the reconciliation process.

It is arguable that Pakistan has been at the right place, at the right time and has smartly utilised the situation to its benefit. If it succeeds in stopping the war and breaking a deal between the US and Iran, Pakistan would benefit both in the short term and long term.

In the short term, it would receive financial support from the US, and also from the Gulf countries, which are bearing huge economic losses because of the war. In the long term, its overall economic situation may improve if the country uses the money efficiently to reform its abysmal economic system.

At the internal level, in Pakistan, the mediation efforts have paid off. The hybrid Shebaz-Munir rule has managed to ward off potential disruptions from a charismatic Imran Khan, whose incarceration in jail is no longer the big news in Islamabad. Even the opposition Jamaat is enthused about the duo hugging international limelight. Commentators in Pakistan are singing paeans of praise to Munir and Shehbaz in that order, ignoring their earlier concerns about the sinking health of democracy in Pakistan. Moreover, the perception that Pakistan has trumped India in its mediation efforts has boosted the image of Munir-Shehbaz duo further.

Facing the Reality: The Vulnerable Intermediary

Despite all these, it will be too ambitious to say that Pakistan will be able to make the deal possible. Pakistan does not enjoy any leverage either with either President Trump or the Iranians. It has so far been, and will continue to be, rather difficult for Pakistan to build a bridge between Washington and Tehran, given the fact that the latter would find it hard to trust President Trump, who had unilaterally withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, and has betrayed Iran twice by attacking the country within a year while negotiations were going on.

Pakistan’s role as a mediator for peace also does not sound convincing when one turns one’s attention towards the reality closer home. Although Pakistan is proactively making efforts to bring the countries at war in the idle East to the negotiation table, it is itself waging a now-overt-now-covert war with Afghanistan, its western neighbour and it has so far failed to negotiate a deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan. This seems paradoxical: How come a country that is unable to address its issues with its immediate neighbour can be a stabilising force in the region? It is especially so because Islamabad has failed to work out a deal even with thev Taliban, who are at the helm in Kabul today, the very same forces who were nurtured by Pakistan for a long time. 

One more related fault line, apart from internal security challenges, was exposed by the Field Marshal Asim Munir himself during the ongoing US-Israel war on Iran. It was interesting to find him pinpointing and targeting the Shi’ites of the country. While addressing Shi’ite leaders in Rawalpindi recently, Asim Munir got carried away and reportedly told them that if they were supporting Iran, they should go to Iran to fight for the country. The statement invoked a serious response from the Shi’ite community of the country, and from others as well.

Pakistan’s immediate goal is to contain the war and limit its adverse impacts on the country. Beyond that, it will be too early to say whether Pakistan will be a stabilising force in the region or whether its role in mediating talks will help it to overhaul its global image. Improving the image and cultivating political legitimacy may take a long time. As of now, Pakistan will have to ensure its internal security, revive its economy and make peace with it immediate neighbours. It can simultaneously pursue peace elsewhere.

*Dr. Nazir Ahmad Mir is a PhD in Conflict Analysis and Peace Building, andNon-Resident Fellow at Hong Kong Research Center for Asian Studies (RCAS).