Date
06-07-2026
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 stands as an anachronism, negotiated in a bygone geopolitical era and rendered unsustainable by modern security realities, ecological distress, technological advancements, and acute developmental costs. While India has historically maintained unprecedented strategic patience and non-reciprocal generosity—voluntarily allocating over 80% of the basin’s waters to a lower riparian state—Pakistan has systematically undermined this goodwill by weaponising cross-border terrorism and employing nuclear blackmail. Today, the treaty acts as an economic stranglehold on the Union Territories of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh, locking away over 80% of their hydropower potential and restricting vital irrigation. Furthermore, rapid Himalayan glacier depletion has exposed the treaty’s lack of climate-adaptive mechanisms, while Pakistan uses anti-India water rhetoric to mask its severe domestic mismanagement, 50% canal seepage losses, and human rights crises in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK). By serving formal modification notices and holding the treaty in abeyance, India is rightfully conditioning hydro-cooperation on a terror-free environment, signalling that the future of the Indus Basin must be dictated by modern ecological realities and state responsibility, rather than outdated frameworks and state-sponsored violence.
Pakistan has been using extensive rhetoric and making provocative statements and using undiplomatic language against India, but it has itself undermined the very spirit of the Indus Waters Treaty by continuously perpetrating cross-border terrorism against India and repeatedly imposing wars on the country. India signed this treaty out of goodwill and generosity in 1960, expecting good neighbourly conduct from Pakistan. The agreement was signed in Karachi by Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan, under which the six rivers of the Indus basin were divided between the two countries. Indeed, India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, himself described India's far-reaching concessions under the treaty as the "price of peace" for Pakistan, reflecting India's willingness to make extraordinary sacrifices in the hope of fostering lasting peace and stable bilateral relations. However, Pakistan's subsequent conduct has stood in sharp contrast to the spirit of the treaty.
Recently, Pakistan’s Climate Change Minister, Musadik Masood Malik, issued provocative and aggressive remarks against India in a press conference, saying, “Whoever touches our water, their hands would be cut off.” Moreover, Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, leader of the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) also declared, “The Indus is ours and will remain ours. Either our water will flow through it, or their blood will.” In a similar vein, Pakistan’s military spokesperson (DG ISPR), Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, reportedly warned India, “If you block our water, we will choke your breath.” Earlier, extremist rhetoric attributed to Hafiz Saeed included the statement: “If you stop the water, we will stop your breath, and blood shall flow in these rivers.
The circumstances under which the Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960 were very different, and today they have fundamentally changed. Moreover, Pakistan often cites this agreement as a perfect example of transboundary river cooperation between the two countries. However, if it survived all these years, it was because India honoured it in good faith and showed extraordinary generosity despite the wars imposed by Pakistan in 1965, 1971, and 1999 (Kargil), and its continued sponsorship of cross-border terrorism against India. India has been so generous under this treaty that it has itself suffered hugely because of it. This treaty can be called an exceptional case in which India, an upper riparian state exhibiting non-reciprocity, voluntarily agreed to forego more than four times the amount of water to Pakistan, a lower riparian state, and imposed stringent restrictions on its own water use—an act of unprecedented goodwill undertaken in expectation of good neighbourly conduct.
In effect, Pakistan, under this treaty, has been receiving nearly 80.52% of the waters of the six-river Indus system, whereas India, despite being the upper riparian state and having the larger basin area, has been allocated only 19.48% of the waters. As a result, India has suffered significant losses in terms of economic growth, agricultural development, hydropower generation, irrigation expansion, and infrastructure development. However, due to Pakistan’s continued cross-border terrorism, especially after the Pahalgam terror attack, India has now linked the future of the Indus Waters Treaty to terrorism, making its restoration contingent upon Pakistan ending its support for cross-border terrorism. India has not suspended the treaty; rather, it has kept it in abeyance, meaning that it can be reinstated if Pakistan stops sponsoring terror against India. From international law perspective, one can cite the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus (fundamental change of circumstances) under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), whereby it can be argued that state-sponsored cross-border terrorism fundamentally alters the “essential basis” of the 1960 agreement.
Pakistan’s water mismanagement and narrative-building
Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of violating the treaty, but what has Pakistan done since this treaty was signed in 1960? What steps has it taken to build storage facilities, dams, and reservoirs since then? For instance, under the treaty, India contributed a huge amount of money—£62.06 million, which amounts to around ₹50 billion in present-day value—to the Indus Basin Development Fund, to help Pakistan build dams, reservoirs, and other replacement works. While India's financial contribution of £62.06 million to the Indus Basin Development Fund is a historical proof of Indian goodwill, Pakistan has squandered it through its reckless behaviour grounded in anti-India sentiment, which the power elite in Pakistan repeatedly churned over the years to stay in power.
What has Pakistan done with this money at the internal level from 1960 to today? It did build projects such as the Mangla Dam and Tarbela Dam, but its overall expansion of storage capacity and its broader water management efforts have remained limited over the decades. In the past, ministers in Pakistan have gone on record saying that it is because of poor management of water rather than stealing of water by India, Pakistan has a water crisis at the internal level. In comparison, India has built many projects despite the fact it too has limited resources and a huge population to cater for. Pakistan is now scapegoating India instead of addressing its own long-term mismanagement and failure to strengthen its water infrastructure.
India has not stopped water from flowing to Pakistan in the way it is being portrayed in the media. Water continues to flow to Pakistan. There is also no publicly available evidence to show that India has significantly changed the flow of the waters at present. It is true that India has started projects, but they will take at least 7 to 10 years to complete, yet Pakistan is blaming India now. In the meantime, Pakistan can also focus on building storage facilities and strengthening its water infrastructure to account for the natural variability and unpredictability of river flows.
As people protest over water shortages in Sindh, home to Karachi, Pakistan’s financial capital, where political leaders, farmers, and water experts are increasingly raising alarm over these issues, these shortages are actually the result of years of mismanagement, inadequate water storage capacity, poor governance, an inefficient irrigation system, significant seepage and leakage losses in canals, and the failure of Pakistan’s ruling elite to address these challenges. Studies estimate that more than 40% of irrigation water is lost in parts of Pakistan’s canal system before it even reaches farms, while some studies have found losses approaching 50% in certain irrigation channels due to seepage and poor maintenance. These shortages are further aggravated by the unsustainable over-extraction of groundwater across the Indus Basin. The fact that there is a 40–50% canal seepage loss cannot just be a case of an operational failure, but it is a structural neglect and a national security risk of its own making.
As the World Bank noted in its March 2021 report, Groundwater in Pakistan’s Indus Basin:Present and Future Prospects, unregulated groundwater pumping has led to groundwater depletion and the drying up of wells in parts of Punjab, while inadequate regulation, weak policy frameworks, and insufficient investments have compounded Pakistan’s long-term water security challenges. Instead, Pakistan is blaming India for its own mismanagement, corruption, decades of neglect of its water infrastructure, and failure to manage its water resources sustainably.
Right now, huge protests are going on in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), where the military has unleashed brute force against the protesters and demonstrators. Reports indicate that more than 70 civilians have been killed and over 200 injured during the crackdown. People are seeking their civil, political, and economic rights, which have been denied to them since 1947. Large numbers of people have gathered at the Rawalakot Eidgah, and essential supplies such as rice, wheat, milk, and medicine have been stopped from reaching the region. The bodies of those killed by the Pakistani forces have not yet been returned. Witnessing the atrocities there, many international human rights organisations have criticized Pakistan for its actions.
Therefore, this huge rhetoric about the Indus Waters Treaty by Pakistan is merely intended to divert the attention of the international community away from the PoJK issue. This is the strategic toolkit that the Pakistan Army has always used.
Framing the Indus Waters Treaty as a Regional Security Issue
During the so-called international seminar recently on 3 June 2026 in Islamabad titled, “Indus Waters Treaty: An Instrument of Peace and Regional Stability,” Pakistan made an attempt to internationalise which Pakistan recently held, the timing of the seminar is very important, as Pakistan is facing both internal problems and external challenges, particularly on its western border with Afghanistan, where it has repeatedly carried out cross-border airstrikes that have killed innocent civilians and has even recently faced international condemnation for its actions, especially from the UN.
This seminar brought together senior Pakistani government ministers, legal experts, water experts, diplomats, and foreign delegates to project Pakistan’s narrative on the Indus Waters Treaty before the international community. At this seminar, Pakistani officials were saying that India should uphold international law and other norms. As Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar stated, “Shared waters must never be weaponized. They should remain a bridge between nations, guided by cooperation, dialogue, and respect for international law.” He also described India’s decision to keep the treaty in abeyance as “illegal” and said that “international agreements must be implemented in good faith.” But does international law not also apply to the cross-border terrorism that Pakistan continues to perpetrate against India, through which innocent civilians have repeatedly been killed, along with members of the security forces? Moreover, its ministers and various other officials have now started the same script of attributing this issue to regional peace and stability.
The seminar itself was strategically titled “Indus Waters Treaty: An Instrument of Peace and Regional Stability,” clearly framing the issue as part of a broader South Asian security narrative, and signaling urgency for wider regional attention in an attempt to sensitize the international community and convey that a sensitive development has occurred requiring immediate attention, as Pakistan has often done in similar cases through narrative framing and psychological signalling. As its Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar further said that the Indus Waters Treaty is not merely a water-sharing arrangement but a vital instrument of regional peace, stability, and cooperation, and that the shared waters must remain a bridge between nations guided by cooperation, dialogue, and international law.
Just as Pakistan has long propagated the narrative by linking the Kashmir issue with stability in South Asia and calling South Asia a nuclear flashpoint, it has now, in the same way, started linking the observance of the Indus Waters Treaty with regional peace and stability. Moreover, Bilawal Bhutto has invoked Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, stating that any attempt to restrict Pakistan’s water rights under the Indus Waters Treaty could fall under extreme national security scenarios and be viewed within Pakistan’s nuclear response framework. Thus, Pakistan has now introduced nuclear blackmail and nuclear escalation framing into the Indus Waters Treaty issue as well.
Constructing the Indus Valley Narrative
To lay further claim to the rivers of the Indus, Pakistan has now started a new propaganda campaign and narrative, claiming that its people are the children of the Indus Valley Civilization. As Pakistan’s Information and Broadcasting Minister, Attaullah Tarar, recently stated, “We are the people of the Indus Valley Civilization. The people of Pakistan have an ancient relationship with the Indus River.” However, Pakistan was created on the basis of the Two-Nation Theory, which its leaders have repeatedly reiterated. As its Field Marshal, Asim Munir, stated just days before the Pahalgam terror attack, “We are two nations, not one.” They have also long claimed that their ancestors were Arabs who came from Arabia through figures such as Muhammad bin Qasim who invaded India in 711 CE. Pakistan has also recently attempted to restore several pre-Partition names of localities and roads in Lahore, such as Krishan Nagar, Sant Nagar, Dharampura, and Jain Mandir Chowk, acknowledging their historical roots. So why is it now claiming to be the inheritor of the Indus Valley Civilization? It is nothing but a drama driven by the Indus Waters issue. It is using this propaganda to associate itself with the Indus river system by claiming that its people are the descendants of the Indus Valley Civilization (IVC). However, it cannot sustain this claim for long because it challenges the very basis of the Pakistani state’s existence under the Two-Nation Theory, the entire ideological framework of otherness through which it has sought to distinguish itself from India.
Ironically, Pakistan’s claim to the Indus Valley Civilization is a fatal ideological contradiction going by its emphasis on Pakistan as a the ideological ‘other’ of India based on the Two Nation theory. By claiming IVC heritage to assert its ownership of the Indus river system, Pakistan’s ruling elite effectively invalidates the ‘Two-Nation Theory’ and the foundational “otherness” that justifies the existence of the Pakistani state.
Developmental Costs of the Indus Waters Treaty
Moreover, the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh have borne the brunt of this unequal treaty since 1960. As the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Omar Abdullah, also recently stated, “The Indus Waters Treaty has been the most unfair document to the people of Jammu and Kashmir,” adding that “we have never been in favour of the Indus Waters Treaty.” He has repeatedly argued that the people of the region were never consulted before the treaty was signed and that it deprived them of the opportunity to fully utilise their own water resources. Many projects were envisaged and could have been completed, and they would have changed the destiny of the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh if this unequal treaty had not existed. For instance, many hydroelectric projects, if completed, could have provided much cheaper electricity to Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, the existing hydroelectric projects are only run-of-the-river projects with very limited storage capacity. According to the Jammu and Kashmir Government’s reply in the Legislative Assembly (March 2025), only about 19.7% of the Union Territory’s estimated 18,000 MW hydropower potential has been harnessed so far, with around 3,540 MW of installed capacity, leaving about 80.3% of its immense hydropower potential untapped. As a result, a vast hydropower potential of the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh has remained untapped.
Importantly, the area under cultivation could have increased because irrigation development in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh is significantly constrained under the Indus Waters Treaty framework, which places strict limits on irrigation from the western rivers. Under the treaty, India is permitted a maximum irrigated cropped area of 400,000 acres in the Jhelum basin, 225,000 acres in the Chenab basin (of which not more than 100,000 acres may be in the Jammu district), 70,000 acres in the Indus basin, and 6,000 acres west of the Devak River outside the Chenab basin. Both agricultural and horticultural productivity would have been much higher, and there could also have been river transportation on the Jhelum, which historically has a navigable stretch and supported local movement and trade, providing cheap transport and contributing to the overall economy if this unequal treaty had not existed. A very important example is the Tulbul Navigation Project. Initiated in 1984, its construction was halted in 1987 after Pakistan raised objections under the Indus Waters Treaty, claiming that the Wullar Barrage—as it refers to the Tulbul Project—exceeded the permissible storage limits. Although India suspended work as part of bilateral discussions and proposed technical compromises, Pakistan did not agree to the project design. Several rounds of negotiations held in 1998, 2004, 2006–07 (as part of the Composite Dialogue), 2011, and 2012 also failed to resolve the dispute, with both sides maintaining divergent interpretations of the treaty provisions. Thus, every time the Indian government proposes any project, Pakistan raises objections under the treaty framework, and the projects often get delayed or stalled through prolonged legal and technical disputes.
Case for Reassessing the Indus Waters Treaty
If India has kept this treaty in abeyance, it is important to note that it did not do so abruptly. India has been saying for a long time that this treaty is unequal and needs to be renegotiated. For example, in January 2023, India formally issued a notice seeking the modification of the Indus Waters Treaty, citing Pakistan’s repeated objections and disputes over Indian hydroelectric projects and the need to revisit the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms. This was followed by another formal notice in September 2024, in which India sought the review and modification of the treaty by invoking Article XII(3), citing fundamental and unforeseen changes in circumstances, including demographic shifts, climate stress, energy needs, and security concerns in Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, India’s decision to keep the treaty in abeyance did not come suddenly but was the culmination of a sustained effort since 2023 to seek the review and modification of the treaty and revisit its dispute resolution mechanisms and other constraints.
Moreover, whenever India initiates a project permitted under the treaty, Pakistan unnecessarily creates hurdles by raising objections, pursuing legal challenges through the treaty's dispute resolution mechanisms, and repeatedly attempting to internationalise these issues. Article IX of the treaty provides a three-tier dispute resolution mechanism under which issues are first taken up by the Indus Commissioners of both countries, then referred to a World Bank-appointed Neutral Expert, and finally to the Court of Arbitration at The Hague. For a long time, Pakistan has repeatedly invoked Article IX to delay India's dams and hydroelectric projects by misusing the treaty's dispute resolution mechanism to stall projects that are otherwise permitted under the treaty. As a result, projects are delayed or stalled for years.
It is also because of climate change that there have been water shortages and changing patterns of water flow into Pakistan. The Himalayan glaciers, which contribute more than half of the Indus River system’s summer flow, are shrinking rapidly, and studies estimate significant long-term mass loss across the basin. A 2019 study found measurable glacier mass loss in the Indus Basin between 2001 and 2013, confirming sustained ice depletion over time. Similarly, research by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) shows that glaciers across the Hindu Kush–Karakoram–Himalayan region have experienced accelerated mass loss since 2000, with rates increasing significantly compared to earlier decades. Recent assessments also indicate that glacier ice loss in the region has nearly doubled in the 21st century, reflecting a clear acceleration of climate impacts. Extreme weather events, prolonged droughts, and devastating floods are becoming more frequent across South Asia. At the same time, rising populations and growing demand for water are placing unprecedented stress on existing river systems.
Therefore, these factors must also be taken into account. Instead of engaging in propaganda, Pakistan should focus on building dams, reservoirs, and other infrastructure that it can develop in view of climate change and the other challenges it faces. Ultimately, the future of the Indus Basin cannot be shaped by narrative building or political rhetoric, but by adapting to ground realities of security, climate stress, and developmental imperatives that define the region today. Moreover, the 1960 IWT framework is hydro-politically obsolete today. A treaty based on fixed volumetric or percentage allocations cannot withstand the ecological realities of the 21st century, where accelerated Himalayan glacier melt demands data-sharing and dynamic, climate-adaptive management rather than rigid geopolitical partitioning.
In conclusion, the arguments presented demonstrate that the Indus Waters Treaty is the product of a bygone strategic era, now fundamentally challenged by modern security realities, severe climate stress, and acute developmental costs borne heavily by the people of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh. While India has historically exhibited unprecedented generosity and strategic patience by honouring the treaty despite multiple wars and persistent cross-border aggression, Pakistan has consistently neglected its own water infrastructure, choosing instead to weaponize anti-India rhetoric, resort to nuclear blackmail, and internationalise the issue to divert attention from its internal mismanagement and human rights crises. Therefore, India’s decision to hold the treaty in abeyance underscores that it is not that India is adopting an inhumane approach vis-a-vis the people of Pakistan, it is putting pressure on the regime that uses terrorism as an instrument, thus legitimising terror and affecting the security architecture of the extended region, which is posing a challenge to people in the entire region spanning from Central Asia to Southern Asia and beyond. Ultimately, a sustainable future for the Indus Basin cannot rely on political propaganda or outdated frameworks; it demands that Pakistan abandon state-sponsored terror and adapt to the pressing ecological and security realities defining the region today.
*Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at CPS. He is a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Kashmir and specialises in Indo-Pacific studies and South Asian security issues. The views expressed here are his own.
