Date
03-09-2026
The Houthi campaign in the Red Sea has shifted from symbolic attacks linked to Gaza into a sustained strategy of maritime coercion. By targeting shipping and Saudi-linked interests, the Houthis project regional influence, gain bargaining leverage, and impose economic costs. While Iran enables their military capabilities, the group retains independent agency, using maritime disruption to strengthen legitimacy and deter adversaries. Military and diplomatic responses have contained but not eliminated the threat. Emerging regional security initiatives may bolster deterrence, yet persistent insecurity remains likely, with the gravest risk being simultaneous disruption of Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz.
Executive Summary
The Houthi campaign in the Red Sea has evolved from attacks linked to the Gaza war into a broader strategy of maritime coercion threatening commercial shipping and Saudi-linked interests. By demonstrating their ability to impose costs beyond Yemen, these actions have enhanced the group’s regional profile and created bargaining leverage. Iran remains an important military enabler for Houthis even as the group’s decision-making reflects its own political and strategic interests, giving it significant agency. While military operations have degraded Houthi capabilities and protected shipping in specific instances, they have not compelled the group to cease attacks altogether. Diplomatic efforts have similarly delivered only temporary periods of calm. Emerging regional security arrangements involving Saudi Arabia and its partners could strengthen deterrence and improve maritime coordination, although their operational credibility remains untested. The most likely outcome is persistent maritime insecurity rather than sustained closure of the Bab el-Mandeb. The principal strategic concern is simultaneous disruption of the Bab el-Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz, with potentially wider consequences for energy markets, global trade and regional stability.
Introduction
The Red Sea crisis has entered a more consequential phase. What began in late 2023 as a Houthi campaign ostensibly linked to the Gaza war has evolved into a broader instrument of maritime coercion. The ’movement’s July 2026 declaration of a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, followed by attacks on Saudi-linked shipping and energy infrastructure, has widened the stakes beyond the protection of commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea.[1] At the same time, severe constraints on shipping through both the Bab el-Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz have raised the prospect of a wider dual-chokepoint crisis.[2]
The central question is therefore no longer simply whether the Houthis can disrupt shipping, but what they seek to achieve through maritime coercion and whether their objectives have evolved. The evidence suggests that the ’movement’s maritime strategy combines political signalling, regional status-building, bargaining leverage and deterrence, with a possible emerging interest in economic extraction. Iran remains an important enabler, but the Houthis possess sufficient agency that their actions cannot be understood simply as an extension of Iranian policy. This issue brief examines the evolution of Houthi maritime coercion, the strategic objectives underlying it, and the limitations of military and diplomatic responses to date. It assesses whether recent regional security initiatives can alter the strategic calculus and considers the most plausible trajectory of the crisis, including the risk that simultaneous disruptions to the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz could transform a regional security problem into a wider maritime and economic shock.
From Domestic Struggle to Maritime Coercion
For much of their armed struggle, the principal objective of Houthis movement was to consolidate power within Yemen. By 2023, however, the conflict reached an uneasy stalemate with the Shia group controlling Sana’a and substantial parts of northern and western Yemen while the Saudi-supported and Aden-based Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) government also retained authority over parts of the war-torn country. Though the 2022 truce and subsequent Saudi–Houthi engagement did reduce violence and raised the possibility of a negotiated settlement, a resolution has eluded.[3] Against this background, Israel’s war in Gaza after the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, provided an opportunity to redirect attention beyond Yemen and reposition the Houthis as a regional actor, something which has been reinforced by the ongoing war between United States/Israel and Iran.
The decision to target Israel and subsequently merchant shipping was therefore more than an expression of solidarity with Palestine. The attacks offered the Houthis a means of externalising a conflict in which further territorial expansion within Yemen appeared to offer diminishing returns. They could divert attention from domestic pressures, demonstrate military reach, strengthen their credentials within the wider ‘resistance’ camp and enhance their bargaining position vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.[4] The maritime campaign thus served both an ideological purpose and a broader strategy of projecting influence beyond Yemen.[5]
The maritime domain was particularly attractive because it offered leverage without requiring territorial expansion. Years of conflict had provided the Houthis with anti-ship missiles, UAVs and other stand-off capabilities, while their control of Yemen’s western coastline placed them close to the Bab el-Mandeb. They could therefore threaten a major artery linking the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and Suez Canal without possessing a conventional navy. The subsequent diversion of shipping demonstrated the disproportionate effect of such attacks: relatively modest military capabilities could generate wider economic and political consequences.6
The Gaza war provided the political opening; Yemen’s domestic stalemate contributed to the incentive; accumulated capabilities and geography supplied the means. Consequently, maritime disruption became a means for the Houthis to project power beyond Yemen without seeking conventional military dominance.
The Strategic Objectives of Houthi Maritime Coercion
The Houthis’ objectives at sea extend beyond demonstrating solidarity with Palestine. The attacks have raised the movement’s political profile, reinforced its credentials as a regional actor and demonstrated its ability to impose costs on actors considerably more powerful than itself. This can strengthen both domestic legitimacy and bargaining leverage, particularly vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, while also serving as a deterrent through punishment: pressure on the Houthis can generate consequences beyond Yemen.[7]
There is also an emerging economic dimension. Maritime disruption imposes costs through rerouting, insurance and longer voyages; more recently, reports that the Houthis are considering fees for vessels transiting the southern Red Sea suggest a possible attempt to convert coercive control of access into direct economic extraction.[8] This development should be approached with caution: evidence of a systematic Houthi toll regime remains limited, and financial extraction should not be regarded as the principal explanation for the campaign.
The broader strategic objective may therefore be less about sinking ships than controlling access. The Houthis do not need to close the Bab el-Mandeb completely. If they can make passage uncertain, costly or conditional, they can influence the behaviour of governments and commercial actors. Their actual targeting, however, has not always matched their declared criteria—the UN Panel of Experts found evidence of indiscriminate attacks.[9] The value of maritime coercion lies in the uncertainty it creates and the choices it forces upon others.
Iranian Proxy or Houthi Strategy?
Iran’s role in building Houthi military capability is substantial. Iranian assistance has contributed to the development of the Houthis’ anti-ship missile and drone capabilities, while weapons and components have continued to reach Yemen through maritime smuggling networks. The relationship has therefore given the Houthis capabilities that would otherwise have been difficult to acquire or develop.[10]
Yet material dependence should not be equated with strategic control. The Houthis retain their own political interests: consolidating their position in Yemen, managing their relationship with Saudi Arabia, maintaining domestic legitimacy and establishing themselves as an influential regional actor. Their decision-making can therefore converge with Iranian interests without being dictated by Tehran. Recent behaviour is instructive: when the 2026 Iran conflict began, the Houthis initially refrained from direct involvement and subsequently calibrated their participation, suggesting they weighed their own exposure and interests against their commitment to Iran’s regional camp.[11]
This distinction matters for the prognosis of the Red Sea conundrum. If the Houthis were simply an Iranian instrument, a change in ’Tehran’s strategic calculations could be expected to produce a corresponding reduction in maritime attacks. But if Iran primarily enables rather than controls Houthi behaviour, the relationship is more complicated. The Houthis may continue to employ maritime coercion when it advances their own objectives, even when it does not perfectly align with Iranian preferences.
The most useful characterisation of Houthis is therefore neither proxy nor a fullyindependent actor, but an Iran-enabled actor with significant strategic agency. Iranian support expands what the Houthis can do; Houthi calculations influence when, where and why they choose to act.[12]
Why Has Houthi Maritime Coercion Defied Resolution?
The international response, thus far, has demonstrated that the Houthi threat can be contained, but not readily eliminated. Kinetic operations have degraded launch sites, weapons and supporting infrastructure, while naval forces have intercepted missiles and drones and protected individual merchant vessels. Yet these tactical successes have not consistently translated into durable behavioural restraint. US-led military action, including earlier UK participation, has demonstrated the ability to degrade Houthi capabilities and impose costs, but this has not translated into sustained restraint.[13]
Maritime defence presents a different challenge. Naval forces can reduce the vulnerability of individual vessels to some extent, but they cannot eliminate a threat generated from dispersed positions ashore. The fundamental asymmetry remains: the Houthis can threaten shipping with relatively inexpensive stand-off weapons, while defending every vessel requires sophisticated sensors, interceptors and sustained naval deployments. The problem is therefore one of scale, cost and persistence, rather than simply the ability to intercept an individual missile or drone.[14]
Diplomacy has also produced only partial results. The 2022 Yemen truce substantially reduced large-scale fighting and created space for Saudi–Houthi negotiations, while subsequent mediation produced periods of restraint. Yet these arrangements have not resolved the competing interests underlying the conflict, nor have they prevented the re-emergence of maritime coercion when the Houthis perceive strategic advantage in using it.[15]
The challenge is therefore not simply to degrade Houthi capabilities, but to reduce the strategic value they derive from their use—a task that military pressure has not achieved and that diplomacy has yet to accomplish. The problem is consequently one of converting tactical containment into durable behavioural change.
Can the Emerging Regional Security Architecture Change the Equation?
The regional response has now begun to evolve beyond the earlier reliance on external naval protection and episodic military strikes. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan establishes a framework of mutual defence and greater political and military coordination, although its operational commitments remain to be defined. Its potential significance for the Red Sea lies primarily in strengthening the deterrent dimension of Saudi security: an attack on Saudi interests could increasingly prompt a wider regional response. Yet the agreement remains new, and its practical implications for a Houthi attack have not been demonstrated.[16]
The parallel Saudi initiative for a multinational maritime defence coalition is more directly relevant to the Red Sea. Fourteen countries have formally supported a framework intended to enhance maritime security, intelligence sharing, joint operations, and the protection of shipping around the Bab el-Mandeb, Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden.[17] Such regionalisation could improve coordination and maritime awareness while reducing dependence on ad hoc external deployments. It could also give greater political legitimacy to efforts to protect freedom of navigation.
Neither initiative, however, fundamentally addresses the underlying Houthi incentive structure. The Mecca Pact may raise the potential cost of attacking Saudi Arabia, while the maritime coalition may reduce the effectiveness of attacks on shipping. But neither, at least so far, has demonstrated an ability to persuade the Houthis that continued maritime coercion is less advantageous than restraint. Indeed, Houthi attacks on Saudi interests have continued following the creation of the new arrangements, although it is too early to determine whether these represent a deliberate test of the emerging deterrent or simply the continuation of an already escalating campaign.[18]
The significance of these initiatives should therefore be viewed as a potentially important change in the strategic environment rather than as a solution to the Houthi problem. Their ultimate effect will depend on whether regional deterrence, maritime protection and diplomacy can be made mutually reinforcing.
Prognosis: Managed Insecurity—and the Risk of a Dual-Chokepoint Crisis
The most likely trajectory is not necessarily permanent physical closure, but rather managed and persistent maritime insecurity in which commercial access remains possible but becomes increasingly costly, selective and uncertain. The Houthis have demonstrated the ability to disrupt shipping, while states and commercial operators have shown considerable capacity to adapt. Intermittent attacks, selective avoidance of exposed routes, higher security and insurance costs, and continuing naval protection are therefore more likely than a sustained physical closure of the Bab el-Mandeb. Yet this baseline should not obscure a more serious possibility: simultaneous disruption of the Bab el-Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz.[19]
This would represent a qualitatively different crisis. Hormuz carries around 20 million barrels of oil a day and a substantial share of global LNG trade, with limited alternative export capacity. The Red Sea–Suez route, meanwhile, provides a major connection between Asian and European markets. Disruption at both ends would therefore constrain not only energy supplies but also the ability of shipping to reroute around a single affected corridor. The resulting shock would not simply be the sum of two disruptions: simultaneous constraints at Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb would sharply reduce the system’s ability to absorb disruption through rerouting and substitution. Recent assessments already show sharply reduced traffic through Hormuz alongside declining flows through Bab el-Mandeb.[20]
Such a scenario need not require the two waterways to be physically sealed. Sustained uncertainty sufficient to deter commercial passage could produce many of the same economic effects. It could also create a dangerous feedback loop: disruption raises energy prices and commercial costs; economic pressure encourages stronger military responses; military escalation could in turn widen attacks on shipping and infrastructure. The interaction between Iran’s ability to constrain Hormuz and the Houthis’ ability to threaten Bab el-Mandeb therefore constitutes the principal strategic risk to the regional maritime system.
A more benign trajectory remains possible. De-escalation in the wider Iran conflict, Saudi–Houthi accommodation and credible regional maritime security arrangements could progressively restore predictability. But even then, commercial actors are unlikely to forget the vulnerabilities exposed since 2023. The central prognosis is therefore one of persistent maritime insecurity, with the possibility of a dual-chokepoint crisis representing the critical downside risk.
Policy Options: Managing Coercion and Building Maritime Resilience
The preceding analysis suggests that the objective cannot realistically be to eliminate the Houthi threat through military means, nor can maritime security be restored through diplomacy alone. The more practical objective is to reduce the strategic return from maritime coercion while increasing the resilience of the maritime system. This requires a combination of measures that address the immediate threat, strengthen regional deterrence, preserve diplomatic avenues and prepare for wider disruption. Four mutually reinforcing priorities follow.
The first priority should be to reduce the effectiveness of Houthi coercion without assuming that every attack can be prevented. Maritime protection should therefore combine persistent maritime-domain awareness, intelligence-sharing and selective naval protection with greater coordination between governments and commercial operators. The objective should be to improve warning, reduce vessel vulnerability and preserve sufficient confidence for commercial transit when conditions permit. Existing multinational mechanisms should be strengthened rather than replicated through competing coalitions.[21]
Second, the emerging regional security architecture should be made operational. The Mecca Defence Agreement and the proposed Red Sea maritime coalition can strengthen deterrence and regional ownership, but their credibility will depend on clearly defined responsibilities, information-sharing, interoperability and the ability to respond collectively to attacks. The priority should be to connect regional initiatives with existing international maritime security mechanisms rather than create parallel structures.[22]
Third, military deterrence should remain calibrated rather than open-ended. Kinetic action has demonstrated that Houthi capabilities can be degraded, but repeated strikes without a credible political objective risk becoming an attritional cycle. Military action should therefore be linked to clearly defined objectives: protecting navigation, imposing proportionate costs for attacks and preventing the Houthis from establishing a durable system of maritime coercion. The aim should be to reduce the strategic return from attacks rather than pursue the unrealistic elimination of Houthi military capabilities.
Finally, the possibility of simultaneous disruption of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb requires contingency planning beyond the Red Sea itself. Governments and shipping companies need greater redundancy in energy supplies, transport routes, port capacity and maritime insurance. The experience of 2026 demonstrates that a chokepoint crisis can rapidly spill over into another maritime theatre; resilience therefore cannot be organised around individual straits in isolation.[23] Diplomacy remains indispensable, particularly for separating the maritime issue from wider regional escalation and creating incentives for sustained Houthi restraint. The objective should ultimately be to make restraint more advantageous to the Houthis than continued maritime coercion.
[1] “Yemen’s Houthis Declare Naval Blockade against Saudi Arabia,” Reuters, 20 July 2026; “Saudi Red Sea Oil Exports Go Dark as Houthi Attack Threat Grows,” Reuters, 12 August 2026.
[2] Nitya Labh, “The Next Strait of Hormuz Crisis Could Be Even Worse,” Chatham House, 17 June 2026.
[3] Wolf-Christian Paes, Edward Beales, Fabian Hinz, Albert Vidal Ribe, Navigating Troubled Waters: The Houthis' Campaign in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden , International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, December 2024), pp.4–5. Available at https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2024/12/navigating-troubled-waters-the-houthis-campaign-in-the-red-sea-and-the-gulf-of-aden/
[4] See note 3, Wolf-Christian Paes et al., Navigating Troubled Waters, p.6.
[5] Mohammed Ali Thamer and Betul Dogan Akkas, “Red Sea Hostilities: Local, Regional, and International Implications,” Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 January 2024.
[6] See note 3, Paes et al., Navigating Troubled Waters, 5–8; Parisa Kamali, Robin Koepke, Alessandra Sozzi, and Jasper Verschuur, “Red Sea Attacks Disrupt Global Trade,” IMF Blog, 7 March 2024; OECD, Risks and Resilience in Global Trade (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2024), 36–39.
[7] Betul Dogan Akkas, “Red Sea Hostilities: Local, Regional, and International Implications,” Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 January 2024.
[8] “Yemen's Houthis Considering Fees for Ships Sailing through Red Sea, Sources Say,” Reuters, 29 July 2026.
[9] United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2024/731, paras. 53–54, October 2024.
[10] See note 3, Paes et al., Navigating Troubled Waters; Fabian Hinz, “Houthi Anti-Ship Missile Systems: Getting Better All the Time”, Military Balance Blog, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 8 January 2024. at https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/01/houthi-anti-ship-missile-systems-getting-better-all-the-time/
[11] Saeed Thabet, “Yemen’s Houthis Coordinate with Iran, but Retain Independence, Despite War,” Al Jazeera, 2 April 2026.
[12] See note 3, Paes et al., Navigating Troubled Waters.
[13] See note 3, Paes et al., Navigating Troubled Waters.
[14] Sam Cranny-Evans and Sidharth Kaushal, “Securing the Red Sea: How Can Houthi Maritime Strikes Be Countered?,” Royal United Services Institute, 10 January 2024.
[15] United Nations, “Secretary-General's Press Encounter on a Nationwide Truce in Yemen,” 1 April 2022; “Oman Says It Has Mediated Ceasefire between US, Yemen's Houthis,” Reuters, 6 May 2025.
[16] “Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan Will Form Political, Military Mechanisms to Coordinate,” Reuters, 13 August 2026.
[17] “Saudi Arabia Unveils Plans for Multinational Maritime Defence Coalition,” Reuters, 30 July 2026.
[18] “Yemen’s Houthis Say They Attacked Saudi Aramco Refinery in Jazan with Two Drones,” Reuters, 13 August 2026.
[19] See note 3, Paes et al., Navigating Troubled Waters; Reuters, “Shipping Slows through Strait of Hormuz after Tanker Attacks, Data Shows,” 16 August 2026.
[20] International Energy Agency, “Strait of Hormuz,” updated February 2026; UN Trade and Development, “Hormuz Shipping Disruptions Raise Risks for Energy, Fertilizers and Vulnerable Economies,” 10 March 2026; “Shipping Slows through Strait of Hormuz after Tanker Attacks, Data Shows,” Reuters, 16 August 2026.
[21] Nitya Labh and Farea Al-Muslimi, “The Houthi Red Sea Blockade: Will Collective Maritime Security Be Defended, or Break Down?,” Chatham House,24 July 2026.
[22] “Saudi Arabia Unveils Plans for Multinational Maritime Defence Coalition,” Reuters, 30 July 2026.
[23] See note 1, Nitya Labh, “The Next Strait of Hormuz Crisis”.
