Date
07-02-2025
Abstract
The fall of the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government has triggered a series of developments that have inadvertently contributed to the potential rise of Islamic radicalism in Bangladesh. While the Mohammad Yunus-led interim government’s promotion of Islamist parties and factions may be interpreted as an attempt to gain broader legitimacy, such actions risk disrupting the country’s social fabric. These policies exacerbate tensions between the majority and minority communities within Bangladesh and have the potential to strain its diplomatic and strategic relations with India.
Introduction
The Constitutional Reform Commission (CRC) of Bangladesh headed by Professor Ali Riaz submitted its report to Mohammad Yunus, the chief advisor to the interim government in Bangladesh on 7 January 2025. The CRC proposed several significant reforms, including introducing the sought-after two-term limit for the offices of the president and prime minister, facilitating no-confidence motions, and removing Articles 7A and 7B, which were introduced in 2011 vide 15th amendment to the Bangladesh Constitution to prohibit constitutional amendments of certain articles and provisions (Preamble, Parts I, II, III, and Article 150). Under the proposed framework, all parts of the Constitution can be amended and constitutional amendments must now be approved by a two-thirds majority in both legislative chambers and ratified through a public referendum.
What emerged as particularly noteworthy was the proposal to eliminate the principles of secularism, socialism, and nationalism (mentioned in the preamble and part II of the Constitution), a development that has generated substantial concern among various stakeholders.[1] This proposal emerges against the backdrop of escalating intolerance toward religious minorities in the country, particularly following the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s regime in August last year, which also drew criticism from New Delhi.[2] However, it is important to note that Hasina’s government itself did not quite make Bangladesh a sanctuary for religious minorities.
According to data released by India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in December 2024, Bangladesh witnessed 47 reported incidents of violence against Hindus in 2022, which increased to 302 in 2023 and surged dramatically to 2,200 in 2024.[3] Furthermore, the Ahmadiyya community in Bangladesh has also continued to experience targeted violence and persecution. In March 2023, Ahmadi leaders reported that law enforcement agencies and government officials remained passive as hundreds of individuals attacked the Ahmadi community during its annual convention in Ahmednagar, Panchagarh district, Bangladesh on March 3, 2023. A mob incited by extremist clerics attacked the convention, resulting in the destruction of homes, shops, and a mosque belonging to the Ahmadi community. The violence resulted in two fatalities, numerous injuries, and looting and destruction of hundreds of Ahmadi homes.[4] These incidents underscore the increasingly hostile environment for religious minorities in Bangladesh even when Hasina was there in power and advocated protection of minority rights. Since the fall of her regime the socio-political environment in Bangladesh has become even more conducive for Islamist radicals to propagate and manifest their extremist ideologies, capitalising on the instability and rising intolerance in the country.
The primary actors in this scenario are various Islamist parties and factions within the country and their perceived control over the state apparatus today under the interim government. This has raised concerns regarding its potential impact on social cohesion within Bangladesh, as well as its influence on the country’s foreign policy priorities and dynamics vis-a-vis neighbouring India. After the fall of the Awami League government, which at least claimed to have a secular and liberal orientation, the minorities are worried about their future especially because the other major political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has had political alliance with the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) and despite their political differences at the moment and BNP’s call for communal harmony, they could strike an alliance again after elections in future, resulting in an atmosphere where the minorities could continue to face the wrath of the conservative forces in the country.
Islamist Radicals in Bangladesh: From Periphery to Power
It is important to acknowledge that the current proposals by the CRC to remove the state principles of secularism, socialism, and nationalism are not without precedent, as similar changes have occurred historically. Notably, General Ziaur Rahman, who assumed power through a military coup by ousting President Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem and later founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), had removed ‘secularism’— one of the four foundational principles of Bangladesh’s Constitution— in 1977. This historical precedence underscores the recurring challenges to the constitutional framework and ideological identity of the state.
In the current context, several observable trends point toward the potential rise of Islamist radical entities in Bangladesh. One prominent indicator is the incorporation of radical Islamist political organisations, such as Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) and like-minded groups, into the interim government soon after the fall of Hasina government. Soon afterwards, the interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus lifted the ban on BJI, its student wing Islami Chhatra Shibir, and “all associated organisations”.[5] This development mirrors the events under the government led by General Ziaur Rahman (1975–1981). BJI, the largest Islamic political party in Bangladesh, is widely criticised for its unwavering support of the Pakistani Army during the 1971 Liberation War and its involvement in war crimes against the freedom fighters of East Pakistan. Although BJI intermittently held political power during 1991-1996 and 2001-2006 through alliances with the BNP, its political influence diminished significantly following the initiation of the War Crimes Tribunal in 2008 during the time Sheikh Hasina held sway in Bangladesh politics. This tribunal, established by the Awami League government as part of its electoral promises, effectively removed BJI from the political scenario in Bangladesh.
Today, the political landscape has changed. The BJI is now wielding palpable influence on the interim government and its former political ally, BNP, has been actively pushing for early general elections. There are even signs of BJI enabling a third political force consisting of the forces that led the movement against Hasina to weaken BNP. Even then, there is a view among the minorities that despite the political engineering to postpone the elections to make it difficult for the BNP to win a majority, it is likely to be the front runner in the next elections and in case it falls short of majority, the it is likely to strike an alliance with the BJI, given their collaboration in the past, which would further reinforce the potential for rise in Islamic radicalism. There is also a view that even if BNP comes to power with a majority, it would like to keep BJI and other Islamists in good humour, which would boost their morale. Notably, their shared opposition to the Hasina-led Awami League government was also evident in the months leading up to the 2023 general elections of the country.[6]
Another significant factor contributing to the rise of Islamist radicalism is the deliberate or inadvertent integration of individuals or groups affiliated with Islamic fundamentalist organisations into the political or administrative structures of the state. A notable example is the appointment of Nasimul Gani as Home Secretary by Bangladesh’s interim government in December 2024.[7] Gani, a founding member of the Bangladesh chapter of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) or “Party of Liberation,” established the organisation’s Bangladesh chapter in collaboration with Kawsar Shahnewaz in 2000 under the guidance of Syed Golam Maula, a former faculty member at Dhaka University. Gani, a 1982-batch administrative cadre officer, had earlier assumed the position of Senior Secretary to the President’s Office in August 2024.
Adding to these developments, in October 2024, hundreds of students in Dhaka participated in a procession allegedly orchestrated by HuT under the banner of “Conscious Teachers and Students.” The participants carried flags that resembled those of the Islamic State and vocally demanded the establishment of a caliphate in Bangladesh.[8] Such activities highlight the organisation’s capacity to mobilise youth and intellectuals under its ideological framework, presenting a serious challenge to the authority of the State and its efforts to curb radicalisation. The involvement of educated individuals and the overt participation of students and teachers underscore HuT’s deep societal penetration and its ability to exploit ideological grievances to galvanise support.
It is also being observed that Dr Mohammad Yunus has no hesitation in introducing Mohammad Mahfuz Alam, with known sympathies for Islamists, as the “intellectual architect” of the movement that removed Sheikh Hasina from power. Alam has since been appointed as a Special Assistant to Yunus, holding a contractual status equivalent to that of a secretary. Alam has consistently denied any affiliation with Islamist or secular ideologies, asserting his identity as a believer and a Bengali Muslim. However, a Facebook post he made on 16 December 2024, reveals his anti-minority sentiments. In this contentious post, which he later deleted due to backlash, Alam asserted that “the cultures of Northeast India and Bangladesh share a common heritage and history” that he claimed, have been marginalized by “Hindu extremists” and the “anti-Bengal sentiment” of upper-caste Hindus. He further accused India of implementing a strategy of “control and colonization” over these areas. Alam proclaimed, “To achieve genuine freedom from India, we must replicate the events of 1975 and 2024,” referring to two pivotal moments in Bangladesh’s political landscape. The mention of 1975 pertains to the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding leader of Bangladesh, along with 18 members of his family during a military coup. Additionally, Alam drew comparisons to the ousting of Mujibur Rahman’s daughter, Sheikh Hasina, from the prime ministerial position in 2024, which he characterized as occurring through “undemocratic means.”[9] The subsequent burning and bulldozing of the private house of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at Dhanmondi 32, on 5 February 2025, in the presence of police and law enforcement agencies, who looked the other way, signals the way the Bangladesh society has been radicalised in the aftermath of the students’ movement of July-August 2024. The house is where Mujibur Rahman lived and was killed with most members of his family on 15 August 1975 and had been converted into the Bangabandhu Memorial Museum. Needless to mention, this is the 1975 spirit that Alam had invoked in his face book post.
The demolition was triggered by a social media call for a “Bulldozer Procession” in response to a scheduled virtual address by Sheikh Hasina from exile in India. Thousands of protesters gathered at the site, vandalizing the property and setting it on fire. The situation escalated, and heavy machinery was brought in to demolish parts of the house. The spectre of vengeance and intolerance haunting Bangladesh today does not augur well for democracy and restoration of order and harmony in the country. It is, in fact, creating the condition for re-emergence of radical forces in the name of wiping out the legacy of Hasina and her father, who had played a stellar role in the creation of the very country he had fought for.
It is worth noting that HuT, a pan-Islamist and fundamentalist organisation is back in action again, even when the new government has clarified that it has not lifted the ban on it. It was banned in Bangladesh in 2009 by the Awami League government because of its alleged involvement in anti-state, anti-government, anti-people, and anti-democratic activities over an extended period. Furthermore, several leaders and activists of HuT Bangladesh have been implicated in terror attacks that have claimed dozens of lives, underscoring the organisation’s destabilising impact on national security. However, HuT remains quite influential, according to many observers in Bangladesh, both in the military-bureaucratic circles and among the educated intelligentsia. Evidence of this influence was apparent in the days following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster when HuT supporters organised a rally at the Baitul Mukarram North Gate in Dhaka[10]. At the rally, participants demanded the establishment of a caliphate in Bangladesh governed by Sharia law, claiming it would ensure “true justice and welfare” for all citizens. They further called for the expulsion of foreign companies operating in the country and the annulment of strategic agreements with non-Muslim states, framing such measures as essential for national sovereignty and Islamic governance. HuT’s resilience can largely be attributed to its membership and composition, which predominantly comprises highly educated individuals who hold influential positions across various sectors, including academia. This enables the organisation to maintain its ideological momentum and mobilisation capabilities despite the continuing official ban on it.
Notably, in October 2024, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in India designated HuT as a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).[11] The decision was based on HuT’s stated objective of establishing a global Islamic state and Caliphate, including within India, by overthrowing democratically elected governments through terrorist activities. A similar move had been undertaken earlier in the year by the then Sunak administration in the United Kingdom, which banned the UK chapter of HuT in early 2024, highlighting a growing international consensus on the group’s threat to democratic governance and global security.[12]
Governance Issues: Leniency Towards Convicted Militants
Another alarming trend indicative of the rising influence of Islamic radicals in the country is the interim government’s lenient approach toward convicted militants and felons, many of whom have been released from imprisonment. This flexible stance not only undermines judicial accountability but also emboldens extremist factions by signalling a lack of political will to uphold anti-terrorism measures.
A notable instance of this trend was the release of Jashimuddin Rahmani, the chief of the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), an Al-Qaida-affiliated militant outfit, in late August 2024.[13] Though Rahmani faced conviction for the murder of a prominent blogger, he has also been involved in several cases under the country’s anti-terrorism laws. Meanwhile, Mohammad Yunus was observed engaging with Mamunul Haque, a prominent leader of the Islamist organisation Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI), along with other members of the group in Dhaka.[14] Established in 2010, Hefazat-e-Islam advocates for the preservation of conservative Islamic values and has consistently opposed constitutional principles and progressive societal reforms. The group’s leadership has frequently been at odds with progressive factions in Bangladesh, further intensifying political and ideological divides within the country. Its 13 point demands made in April 2013 point to its rigid Islamist orientation with its emphasis on amending Constitution to reinstate the phrase “Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah” in the Constitution as one of the fundamental principles of state policy, proclaim capital punishment for maligning Allah, Islam and Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) and smear campaigns against Muslims (blasphemy), declare Qadianis non-Muslim and stop them from publicising their faith, and Stop anti-Islam activities by NGOs, evil attempts by Qadianis and conversion by Christian missionaries at Chittagong Hill Tracts and elsewhere in the country.
An equally troubling incident took place under Yunus’ caretaker government when a Bangladesh court granted relief to Abdus Salam Pintu, a former junior minister and prominent member of the BNP,[15] who had been sentenced to death for orchestrating a grenade attack aimed at former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, releasing him in December 2024. Reports suggest that Pintu had actively supported the banned militant group Harkat ul Jehadi Islami- Bangladesh (HuJI-B) by facilitating the collection of funds and the procurement of arms intended for activities against India. These actions, whether deliberate or politically motivated, enable extremist ideologies to gain legitimacy, undermine progressive reforms, and destabilise the country’s already fragile socio-political equilibrium.
BNP’s Political Manoeuvring: Will it decide to stem the Tide
The caretaker government appears resolute in its efforts to eliminate the Awami League from Bangladesh’s political landscape. Several key figures associated with the interim administration, have explicitly stated that the Awami League would not be permitted to “rehabilitate” itself within the country’s political framework. With the Awami League barred from participating in elections, attention has shifted to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which has attracted the attention of political observers inside and outside Bangladesh.[16] It has the right credentials to usher in a new political culture, given its emphasis on liberal democratic politics and advocacy of restraint in the face of provocation by its leader Tarique Rahman.[17] It is also aware the BJI and other conservative elements in the government are trying their best to weaken BNP’s prospects of coming to power by delaying the dates of elections as much as they can, which suggests some rupture in the relationship between BNP and BJI at the moment. However, many Bangladeshis, one interacts with, are sceptical about BNP’s approach to BJI and other conservative radical elements. The question therefore remains as to whether it will make a sincere effort to stem the tide or paly along?
Although no formal ties currently exist between the BNP and the BJI, the BNP has long been criticised for its association with Islamist ideologies and its history of collaborating with various Islamist factions at different points in time. These associations have been evident since the BNP’s inception, raising concerns about the potential for renewed alliances with Islamist elements under the present circumstances. Such dynamics not only heighten political polarisation but also risk entrenching the influence of radical ideologies.
To go back in history, following the 2001 general elections in Bangladesh, Khaleda Zia had assumed power as the leader of the Four-Party Alliance, comprising the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, Jatiya Party (Manju), and Islami Oikya Jote. This political shift was accompanied by a surge in violence against non-Muslim minorities, particularly Hindus, who faced widespread attacks. Hindu places of worship were ransacked, villages were destroyed, and numerous cases of sexual violence against Hindu women were reported. While there is no conclusive evidence directly implicating BNP’s coalition partners in these attacks, their inclusion in the government certainly emboldened radical elements. The perception that these groups had renewed protection under the current interim administration has created an environment of impunity, allowing extremist factions to act without fear or accountability.
The BNP is currently making concerted efforts to strengthen its political position in the country, particularly in light of the setbacks it has faced in recent years due to the sustained persecution of its top leadership and party cadres under the previous Awami League-led administration. As part of this strategy, the BNP has reportedly initiated renewed engagement with Islamist parties in Bangladesh to expand its support base. BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir recently met with leaders of Khilafat Majlis.[18] This far-right political party was previously a member of the BNP-led 20-party alliance. Khilafat Majlis had exited the coalition in 2021, reportedly under pressure from the Awami League government. During the recent discussions, one of the key areas of consensus between the BNP and Khilafat Majlis was the commitment to “playing a positive role in upholding Islamic values”. This alignment reflects the BNP’s broader strategy of appealing to Islamist groups to consolidate its political base. However, this development also raises concerns about the potential reintroduction of conservative agendas. Based on the observed trends, the integration of ideologically extreme factions into governance structures poses a significant risk of indirectly legitimising and enabling violence against religious minorities in Bangladesh.
The Pakistan Factor: Fishing in Troubled Waters
In August 2024, the student movement in Bangladesh was reportedly hijacked by Islamist groups such as BJI, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), and Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT). A notable commonality among these groups is their transnational linkages with Pakistan in various ways. This connection raises the possibility of potential collaboration between these extremist organisations and like-minded groups in Pakistan to strengthen their operational capabilities and consolidate their influence in Bangladesh. Such collusion could enable these groups to utilise Bangladesh as a base for advancing their agendas, as has been observed in the past. For example, in 2022, the Pakistan-based militant outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) worked in coordination with ABT to establish a foothold in West Bengal. This base was intended to facilitate attacks in India, reportedly in response to an isolated incident of mosque vandalisation in Tripura. According to some reports, Pakistan-based LeT collaborated with ABT to execute terrorist attacks in India’s northeastern region.[19]
Reports from last month indicate that ABT and the Pakistan-backed Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen (TuM) are attempting to expand their influence in the Indian State of West Bengal by leveraging the vulnerabilities of economically marginalised populations.[20] Similar potential for collaboration exists between the HuT chapters in Bangladesh and Pakistan, particularly as HuT in Bangladesh seeks to regain and expand its hold and influence by recruiting and radicalising educated youth to replenish its cadre strength.
Another significant radical group that came into prominence during the August 2024 unrest in Bangladesh is Harakat-ul-Jihad-I-Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B), also known as the Movement of Islamic Holy War. An affiliate of Al-Qaida, HUJI-B has largely remained dormant in recent years but retains strong historical ties to Pakistan. It operates independently yet shares an ideological and organisational lineage with Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI), an early jihadist group with roots in Pakistan. A key figure in HUJI-B’s operations, Mufti Abdul Hannan, who was implicated in the plot to assassinate then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in July 2000, underwent training in Peshawar. After his arrest in October 2005, Hannan admitted to having been educated at an Islamic seminary in Pakistan, highlighting the transnational connections that continue to shape the activities of such groups.
The latter half of 2024 witnessed several reports indicating Bangladesh’s eagerness to procure ammunition and explosives from Pakistan. Bangladesh is set to receive a substantial quantity of defence materials, such as 40,000 rounds of ammunition, 2,000 units of tank ammunition, 40 tons of RDX in wax consistency, and 2,900 high-intensity projectiles, scheduled for delivery between September and December 2024.[21] These developments, already a cause for concern in New Delhi, were further compounded by allegations of weapons being supplied to Rohingya militants in refugee camps in Bangladesh, alongside reports of recruits receiving training, allegedly under the supervision of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).[22]
This scenario highlights the second critical possibility: renewed efforts by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan to foster anti-India sentiments and destabilise India’s northeastern states and beyond by arming and training militants. This claim gains further traction with reports of ISI top officials’ visit to Bangladesh on 21 January 2025, ostensibly to establish an intelligence network between the two nations, with the broader aim of facilitating unrest in India.[23] These activities are not without precedent, as the ISI has historically employed similar tactics. The ISI has been known to provide military training to Bangladeshi youths in the use of advanced weaponry and explosives. After completing their training, these individuals have often infiltrated India, dispersing across West Bengal and northeastern states, including Assam, to carry out disruptive activities. These developments underscore the continuing transnational dimensions of militancy in South Asia, with Pakistan’s ISI playing a central role in leveraging its networks for strategic purposes.
Escalating Challenges for India
India’s current relations with its eastern neighbour, Bangladesh, appear increasingly strained, as recent developments have begun to impact bilateral dynamics. These tensions manifest through hostile statements, executive actions, and a growing number of arrests of militants linked, directly or indirectly, to Islamist radical organisations in Bangladesh. In December 2024, the social media post by Mahfuz Alam (discussed above), also displayed a map of Bangladesh that included Indian territory, raising significant concerns. Alam has previously made similar statements challenging India’s sovereignty, further exacerbating tensions.[24]
The growing military ties between Bangladesh’s top military officials and Pakistan’s ISI have emerged as a significant concern for India. A recent example of this deepening relationship was the visit of Lt. Gen. SM Kamr-ul-Hassan, Principal Staff Officer (PSO) of the Armed Forces Division of Bangladesh and the second-in-command of the Bangladeshi Army, to Islamabad.[25] During his visit, Lt. Gen. Kamr-ul-Hassan held separate meetings with Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Syed Asim Munir, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen. Sahir Shamshad Mirza where the discussions centred on strengthening bilateral military cooperation and strategies to withstand “external influences.” Such developments underscore the growing strategic alignment between Bangladesh and Pakistan, raising apprehensions for India, particularly in the context of regional security dynamics and counter-terrorism efforts.
The arrest of individuals linked to Bangladeshi militant groups in India has also highlighted the spillover effects of radical activities across borders. For instance, on 19 January 2025, authorities arrested a cadre of the ABT from Assam’s Dhubri district which shares a border with Bangladesh.[26] This arrest is part of a broader pattern of cross-border militant activity. A notable success in counter-terrorism efforts occurred in December 2024, when Assam’s Special Task Force (STF), under “Operation Praghat”, apprehended eight ABT operatives across Assam, Kerala, and West Bengal.[27]
Concluding Observations
In the absence of the Awami League (AL) from Bangladesh’s political landscape, the prospects of containing the rise of Islamist radicalism in the near to medium term appear minimal. While it is important to note that the AL was also pandering to the conservative constituency in its own way, its departure from the political setting has created a vacuum that is likely to give a boost to the radical Islamist forces. The BNP has been actively pursuing alliances with Islamist factions, and BJI has already begun negotiations with other Islamist parties. Regardless of which political entity assumes power following the general elections, expected to take place in late 2025 or early 2026, historical precedent suggests a likely rise in radicalism within the country.
This poses a severe threat not only to the country’s non-Muslim minorities but also to Muslim communities that differ in their devotional practices. Religious radicalism, when at its peak, tends to homogenise practices, marginalising diverse expressions of faith. As per the latest reports, over the past six months, approximately 80 Sufi shrines have been attacked, vandalised, looted, or set on fire in Bangladesh.[28] Given that many Islamist hardliners in the country are products of Deobandi madrassas, it is reasonable to infer that these attacks were likely perpetrated by adherents of Deobandi, Wahhabi, or Salafi ideologies, who often oppose veneration of saints and the graves associated with them. Considering this, the spread of the Salafi ideology (to which the Islamic State adheres), which advocates a specific interpretation of Islam, through various propaganda channels should not be surprising. The Islamic State has already been linked to numerous attacks on Sufi shrines in Pakistan and Afghanistan, for they view veneration of saints as contrary to the principle of Tawhid (the oneness of God). A pro-Islamic State propaganda outlet has already urged Muslims in Bangladesh to target “Kuffar” (non-believers) and take control of the country to establish a caliphate.
To put it in context, according to the Salafist-Takfiri Jihadism ideology that the Islamic State (IS) holds and assertive sections in Bangladesh are now subscribing to, a Muslim who does not agree with Salafi-Wahabi interpretations is liable to be deemed as a “Kuffar”.[29] The concept of Takfir, which involves declaring other Muslims as kafir (non-believers) or infidels and legitimising acts of violence against them, was significantly developed by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. He permitted the use of Takfir against Muslims who rejected his rigid interpretations of Islam and condemned those who venerated saints as kuffar.[30] The foundation of this principle, however, was originally elaborated in detail by the 13th-century Damascene scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, who is considered the ideological predecessor of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.
Additionally, the radical Islamist organisations that have been banned in the country may seek to renew their demands for the removal of the existing ban and are likely to continue pursuing their agenda. If the ban is lifted, considering the way the current political dispensation is functioning, Bangladesh is in for a conservative turn in the coming days.
In addition to the domestic challenges posed by the rise of Islamist radicalism, these developments are likely to strain Bangladesh’s relations with India further. The increasing influence of radical elements in Bangladesh not only threatens regional stability but also presents significant challenges to Indian security agencies and they will need to intensify their efforts to mitigate cross-border threats. The evolving political and ideological landscape in Bangladesh thus carries profound implications for its internal cohesion, its minority populations, and its regional relationships, particularly with India in future.
*Mohammed Shoaib Raza is a PhD scholar at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The views expressed here are his own.
[1] Bangladesh commission proposes dropping ‘secularism’, ‘socialism’ from Constitution, The Indian Express, 16 January 2025
[2] Abhishek Chakraborty, “Concerns Over Extremist Rhetoric”: India On Bangladesh Violence, NDTV, 29 November 2024
[3]QUESTION NO- 4366 VIOLENCE AGAINST HINDUS IN BANGLADESH, Ministry of External Affairs, 20 December 2024
[4]Vicious And Fatal Attack Against the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community’s Annual Convention in Bangladesh, International Human Rights Committee, 4 March 2023
[5]Bangladesh: Interim Govt lifts ban on Jamaat-e- Islami and Islami Chhatrashibir, DD News, 28 August 2024
[6] Snigdhendu Bhattacharya, Protests, Crackdowns, Boycott Calls Complicate Bangladesh’s Election Scenario, The Diplomat, 24 November 2023
[7]Nasimul Gani new senior home secretary, The Daily Star, 22 December 2024
[8]Students March with “ISIS Flags” in Bangladesh, Firstpost, 11 October 2024
[9] “Bangladesh Adviser’s Provocative Comments on Victory Day Spark Controversy“, The North East Chronicle, 18 December 2024.
[10] Yeshi Sali, Rising influence of Hizb ut Tahrir in Bangladesh could have spillover effect in India, The New Indian Express, 28 August 2024
[11] Mukesh Ranjan, MHA designates Hizb-Ut-Tahrir as terrorist organization under UAPA, The New Indian Express, 10 October 2024
[12]Home Secretary declares Hizb ut-Tahrir as terrorists, UK GOV, 15 January 2024
[13] Md Raihanul Islam Akand, Ansarullah Bangla Team chief released on bail from Kashimur jail, Dhaka Tribune, 26 August, 2024
[14]Dr. Yunus meets political parties: Election reforms and term limits for PM proposed, Bangla Outlook, 31 August, 2024
[15] Shankhyaneel Sarkar, Bangladeshi Court Frees Minister Who Helped Terrorists Attack India, News 18, 24 December 2024
[16]Awami League won’t be allowed to contest Bangladesh polls: Yunus’ key adviser, The Hindu, 26 January 2025
[17] "I urge my fellow Bangladeshis to show utmost restraint and not fall prey to any provocation," he said in a post on X (formerly twitter) following the attack on the Bangladeshi consulate in Agartala, cited in Dailyobserver,3 December 2024.
[18]BNP, Khelafat Majlis agree on calls for polls within this year, The Daily Star, 23 January, 2025
[19] Shivani Sharma, Bangladesh unrest gives rise to threat of terror organisations to India, India Today, 12 August 2024
[20]Operation Praghat: STF nabs 2 more members of al-Qaeda-linked Ansarullah Bangla Team, Times of India, 25 December 2024
[21] Manish Shukla, Bangladesh Seeks to Boost Defense Capabilities with Artillery Ammunition from Pakistan, Financial Express, 29 August 2024
[22] Sumaila Zaman, Pakistan’s ISI back in Bangladesh?, India .com, 27 December 2024
[23]Pak’s ISI team visits Dhaka to strengthen intel-sharing ties with Bangladesh, Hindustan Times, 23 January 2025
[24]India ‘strongly protest’ Bangladesh aide Mahfuz Alam social media post, The Hindu, 20 December 2024
[25] Kamran Yousaf, Senior BD general in Pakistan on a rare visit, The Express Tribune, 16 January 2025
[26]Another Member Of Bangladesh-Linked Terrorists Arrested In Assam, NDTV, 19 January 2025
[27]Assam STF arrests eight members of Bangladeshi terror group, The Hindu, 20 December 2024
[28]80 shrines, Sufi centres attacked in last 6 months, The Daily Star, 24 January 2025
[29] Jamileh Kadivar, Exploring Takfir, Its Origins and Contemporary Use: The case of Takfiri Approach in Daesh’s Media, Contemporary Review of the Middle East, 2020
[30] Simon Ross Valentine, Force and Fanaticism Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Beyond, Hurst, 2015
