Highlights

1. Indonesia's Geopolitical Significance: Indonesia, as Southeast Asia's largest economy, plays a pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific region due to its strategic location, economic power, and natural resources.
2. Tensions with China in the South China Sea: Indonesia faces challenges from China's maritime claims and incursions into its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Islands, driving Jakarta to enhance its military presence and assert its sovereignty.
3. Economic Ties with China: Despite geopolitical frictions, China is Indonesia's largest trading partner and a key source of investment, particularly in infrastructure, energy, and technology sectors.
4. De-hyphenation Policy: To balance economic interests and sovereignty concerns, Indonesia adopts a "de-hyphenation" policy, engaging with China economically while opposing its maritime claims.
5. BRICS Membership: Indonesia's accession to BRICS is seen as a strategic move to diversify its economic partnerships, access alternative markets, and amplify its influence in global geopolitics.
6. ASEAN Leadership: Indonesia leads ASEAN with a focus on autonomy and collective security, leveraging the platform to mediate regional disputes and uphold norms against external coercion.
7. Strategic Balancing: Indonesia faces a dilemma of balancing economic reliance on China with the need to preserve sovereignty in the Natuna Sea, reflecting its broader struggle to harmonize economic and strategic interests.
8. Implications for Regional and Global Diplomacy: Indonesia's actions and policies influence its regional leadership within ASEAN and broader alignments with partners like India and the United States.

Abstract

As Southeast Asia's biggest economy, Indonesia has significant political, diplomatic, and economic clout in the area. However, China’s geoeconomic rise is increasingly influencing Jakarta's strategic thinking. China's aggressive militarization and expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea have resulted in revisionist manoeuvres that have directly impacted Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Natuna Sea. Because of the resulting conflict, which has taken the form of Chinese vessels engaging in illegal fishing in these areas on a regular basis, Indonesia has increased naval patrols of its maritime domains, which has resulted in the militarization of the area. Despite these geopolitical tensions, Beijing has become Jakarta's biggest trading partner and a significant source of foreign direct investments in a number of its economic sectors. Indonesia has implemented a de-hyphenation policy with China in order to safeguard its economic interests and has simultaneously emphasised on its political sovereignty in order to negotiate this complex geopolitical-economic dilemma. This Issue Brief looks at Indonesia's participation in the BRICS framework as a means of advancing its business ties with China and other emerging global economies. At the same time, it examines how the nation uses these multilateral forums to express strategic concerns, strengthen its diplomatic flexibility, and maintain its strategic independence in a changing multipolar world. 

Introduction

Indonesia was the first Southeast Asian state to formally recognise the People’s Republic of China (PRC), with diplomatic relations officially established in 1950. While bilateral engagements were initially underpinned by shared anti-imperialist principles within the broader framework of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), this diplomatic engagement was severed in 1967. The estrangement was precipitated by Jakarta’s allegations of Beijing’s undue interference in Indonesia’s domestic political affairs—specifically, its political and financial patronage of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). The PKI’s involvement in the abortive coup attempt of 1965, aimed at toppling President Sukarno’s administration, further exacerbated geopolitical tensions. Following the ascension of General Suharto, who played a crucial role in suppressing the coup, to the presidency in 1967, these tensions culminated in the formal suspension of diplomatic relations. This prolonged period of estrangement persisted for over two decades, with bilateral interactions confined to the periphery of international engagements, marking what is often characterised as a protracted phase of geopolitical wilderness. Diplomatic normalisation was only reinstated in 1990, ushering in a new era of pragmatic engagement between the two nations.

Notwithstanding the protracted diplomatic stasis, economic interactions between Beijing and Jakarta experienced a substantive resurgence from the 1990s onward, particularly between 1991 and 1998. This revival highlighted the significance of economic pragmatism in reconfiguring their bilateral engagements, even in the absence of full political rapprochement.^[1] However, despite the intensification of economic cooperation, Sino-Indonesian relations have remained subject to periodic strategic discord, primarily stemming from their divergent interpretations of maritime jurisdiction in the contested South China Sea. These underlying tensions were further exacerbated by Beijing’s formal promulgation of its contentious nine-dash line claim in 2009—an assertion of expansive maritime sovereignty that has since reintroduced strategic frictions into the bilateral equation, challenging Jakarta’s efforts to maintain a balanced and autonomous regional posture.

As such, the evolving trajectory of Sino-Indonesian relations highlights the intricate balance that Jakarta is required to maintain in navigating its regional policy. While the normalisation of diplomatic ties in 1990 brought economic pragmatism in this relationship, however, Indonesia’s broader strategic calculations extend beyond its bilateral interactions with China. As a key actor in the Indo-Pacific, factors such as its geographic position, economic potential, and security considerations collectively influence its strategic imperatives and approach to regional and global affairs. In this context, this Issue Brief examines how Indonesia has navigated its relations between economic cooperation and strategic autonomy, particularly emphasising its use of multilateral platforms for securing its interests in the contentious and evolving geopolitics of the region.

Indonesia’s Strategic Importance in the Indo-Pacific

Indonesia’s strategic significance in the Indo-Pacific region is underpinned by its strategic geographical location, demographic dividend (most populous in SE Asia), volume of economy (largest in SE Asia), and vast resource base, which collectively accord Jakarta substantial geopolitical and geoeconomic influence within the region and beyond.^[2] Its location at the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and between the Asian and Australian continental spheres provides Jakarta with significant geostrategic leverage over the global maritime trade through its control of a number of major and smaller maritime chokepoints.^[3]

Most notably, Indonesia wields dominance over the critical maritime chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca that links the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This vital passage constitutes the shortest and most economically significant sea route connecting the hydrocarbon-rich regions of West Asia with the industrial and commercial hubs of Southeast Asia, thereby underlining its geostrategic indispensability in global trade and energy security dynamics. For instance, in 2023, Malacca Strait facilitated global trade worth approximately USD 3.5 trillion, encompassing two-thirds of China’s maritime trade volume^[4]. Moreover, Jakarta also controls two other alternative smaller yet significant chokepoints of the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait in the Indonesian archipelago.

Indonesia’s strategic leverage is further enhanced by its vast natural resource base. Aside from being the leading fish producer globally,^[5] the country also holds substantial hydrocarbon reserves, such as 2.41 billion barrels of crude oil and 35.3 trillion standard cubic feet of natural gas.^[6]

Against this backdrop, Indonesia’s strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific cannot be overstated, with its dominance of critical maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait, and the Lombok Strait highlighting its role as a key stakeholder in global trade and regional stability.  Its geopolitical leverage is further enhanced by its substantial natural resource reserves and a growing economic footprint. However, Indonesia’s strategic agency is not solely derived from its geoeconomic assets—it is also reflected in its diplomatic leadership within ASEAN, where Jakarta plays a crucial role in shaping regional norms and multilateral initiatives to navigate the complexities of great power rivalries.

ASEAN Leadership and the Free and Active Foreign Policy Doctrine

A key mechanism through which Jakarta asserts its strategic agency is through its leadership within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Within ASEAN, Indonesia has long championed the principles of autonomy and collective security, leveraging its leadership role to promote regional stability and strategic neutrality. During the Cold War, Indonesia, as a founding member of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), sought to align ASEAN with the bloc’s anti-imperialist and non-interventionist principles by advocating for the minimisation of external interventions in regional affairs. Jakarta’s diplomatic activism was exemplified in its mediation efforts during the Cambodia-Vietnam conflict (1979–1991)[7] and its formulation of the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), which enshrined the commitment of ASEAN member states to preserve regional security and stability from extra-regional influences.^[8]

As the end of the Cold War led to a shift in the global power dynamics, pushing most of the states to reconfigure their international outlook, Indonesia’s foreign policy also underwent a shift towards a multi-alignment strategy, symbolised by its deepening engagements with major global actors such as the United States, China, Japan, and India. At the core of Jakarta’s diplomatic reorientation was the doctrine of bebas aktif (free and active foreign policy), originally articulated by Jakarta’s first Vice President, Mohammad Hatta.  This doctrine provided Indonesia with a strategic bandwidth to manoeuvre its relations with multiple states, thereby fostering regional peace, stability, and cooperative multilateralism while concomitantly safeguarding the country’s strategic autonomy.^[9] It became a guiding principle in shaping Indonesia’s foreign policy outlook, particularly in addressing contemporary security challenges, including the ongoing contestation in the South China Sea. Therefore, amidst persisting tensions due to Beijing’s expansive maritime claims, Jakarta’s efforts to assert its territorial sovereignty, particularly around the Natuna Islands, highlight its determination to uphold international legal frameworks and defend its national interests against encroachments.

The South China Sea Dispute and Indonesia’s Position

The South China Sea constitutes one of the most geopolitically volatile and strategically contested maritime domains in contemporary global affairs. Bordered by Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore, the region is of immense geoeconomic significance, as it facilitates approximately one-quarter of global maritime trade flows. Consequently, the South China Sea remains a focal point of strategic competition, attracting the geopolitical ambitions of multiple state actors vying for control over its lucrative maritime corridors and resource-rich waters. This contestation has manifested in overlapping territorial and maritime claims asserted by Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and China^[10]. Unlike the other claimants, whose assertions of sovereignty are confined to specific islands or maritime features, China has advanced an expansive claim to approximately 90% of the South China Sea through its so-called nine-dash line. This claim, encompassing various landmasses and maritime zones, is purportedly rooted in historical narratives tracing back to the Han Dynasty.

Although the nine-dash line does not directly intersect with Indonesian sovereign territory, it encroaches upon its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna Sea—a maritime entitlement delineated under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982.^[11] The Natuna Islands, sprawled across 262,000 square kilometres of maritime space between the two geographical segments of Malaysia, consist of 154 islands, only 27 of which are inhabitable.^[12] These islands, along with the surrounding waters, constitute a critical linchpin of Indonesia’s economic security and national defence strategy.^[13] The region holds substantial strategic value due to its vast reserves of marine resources and hydrocarbons; for instance, Tanjung Datuk Natuna, a small island in the Natuna archipelago, holds abundant fisheries and oil deposits. Additionally, Jakarta’s extensive natural gas fields containing an estimated 46 trillion cubic feet of recoverable reserves are situated in the waters north of the Natuna Islands.^[14] Moreover, the archipelago’s status as Indonesia’s outermost island chain renders the Natuna Sea a crucial maritime frontier and a strategic gateway to the Indonesian heartland.^[15]

However, these strategic assets have also rendered the Natuna region a focal point of contestation, particularly as an energy-hungry China seeks to secure vital resources to sustain its vast industrialisation. Beijing has repeatedly encroached upon Indonesia’s EEZ in the North Natuna waters under the pretext of historical fishing rights. Notably, in 2016, the Chinese vessel Kway Fey 10078 was apprehended by an Indonesian maritime patrol ship for engaging in unauthorised fishing activities in the region. Beijing responded by asserting that the waters constituted part of its “traditional fishing grounds”—a claim unequivocally dismissed by Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi and Minister for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs Susi Pudjiastuti, who emphasised that such assertions were devoid of legal standing and lacked recognition under the 1982 UNCLOS framework.^[16] A similar incursion transpired in 2019 when a fleet of 63 Chinese fishing vessels, escorted by two Chinese Coast Guard ships, breached Indonesia’s Natuna EEZ.^[17]

In this context, Indonesia has dealt with the South China Sea dispute through a dual approach of balancing economic cooperation with China while safeguarding its maritime sovereignty. Consequently, Indonesia’s approach to the South China Sea dispute highlights its overarching diplomatic posture wherein it seeks to maintain economic engagement without compromising its strategic autonomy or territorial integrity.

Indonesia’s Response: Legal, Military, and Diplomatic Countermeasures

1. Legal Rebuttals Against China’s Maritime Claims

Indonesia’s legal position regarding the Natuna waters remains unchanged in the face of China’s expansive claims under the nine-dash line framework. Jakarta has consistently rejected Beijing’s assertions over the South China Sea. It has emphasised the absence of any overlapping territorial claims between the two states, thereby affirming Indonesia’s exclusive sovereign rights over the Natuna waters. This juridical stance has been formally articulated through diplomatic instruments on multiple occasions. The first instance occurred in 2016 when Indonesia submitted an official diplomatic note to Chinese authorities, protesting the incursion of a Chinese fishing vessel into the North Natuna waters.^[18] The second and more consequential diplomatic démarche was addressed to United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres in 2020, wherein Jakarta categorically denounced the nine-dash line as devoid of legal legitimacy under international law.^[19]

2. Militarisation of the Natuna Islands

In response to the 2016 incursions, then-President Joko Widodo sanctioned the construction of military installations on the Natuna Islands as a strategic countermeasure.^[20] Consequently, the Indonesian Air Force established two aircraft hangars and stationed Air Squadron 52 at the newly constructed base. Furthermore, these military outposts were fortified with integrated combat units, an air defence battery equipped with short-range Starstreak missiles to counter aerial threats and additional defensive systems against cruise missile and strike aircraft incursions. Simultaneously, the Indonesian Navy initiated the development of a submarine base and maintained a continuous maritime presence in the region, deploying three frigates and multiple corvettes. Following renewed provocations in 2019, Jakarta further escalated its strategic posture, dispatching four F-16 fighter jets, four frigates, two corvettes, a submarine, and a landing platform dock accompanied by 600 marines to the contested waters. In 2021, Indonesia was compelled yet again to mobilise its air and naval assets to counter the presence of Chinese survey ships operating within the Tuna Block, an offshore gas exploration area falling squarely under Indonesian jurisdiction. This response included the deployment of a warship, a maritime patrol aircraft, and a CH-4 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to monitor the movements of a Chinese Coast Guard vessel encroaching upon the Indonesian-administered gas exploration zone.^[21]

3. Diplomatic Efforts within ASEAN and Beyond

Beyond military countermeasures, Indonesia has also pursued diplomatic and multilateral strategies to mitigate Chinese assertiveness by leveraging regional forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to offset any potential risks. As the de facto leader of ASEAN, it actively mobilises the platform, especially its economic enticements, to advance its national interests and reinforce regional norms against external coercion. During the 2022 ASEAN Summit, President Widodo unequivocally asserted that the organisation must remain a “region of peace and stability” and intensify efforts to resolve the South China Sea dispute through diplomatic channels. Furthermore, the country has played a pivotal role in the ongoing negotiations for a legally binding Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN member states, which aims to institutionalise a framework for maintaining regional stability, security, and conflict de-escalation in the contested maritime domain.^[22]

Aside from ASEAN, Indonesia joined BRICS as a full member in 2025, which could be seen as a means to shore up its diplomatic heft. BRICS is an intergovernmental organisation founded in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China under the original acronym “BRIC.” Following South Africa’s accession in 2010, the bloc evolved into a prominent coalition of emerging economies within the Global South and was subsequently rebranded as BRICS. The organisation underwent its most significant expansion to date during the 2024 Russia Summit, admitting Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. In January 2025, Indonesia became the first Southeast Asian nation to join BRICS, further solidifying the bloc’s influence in the global economic and geopolitical landscape, which has been renamed as BRICS Plus.

Indonesia’s accession to BRICS as a full member is driven by a confluence of economic, strategic, and geopolitical considerations. From an economic standpoint, BRICS provides it with access to a vast and diverse market, thereby facilitating the deepening of trade relations with the member states of the bloc. Its significance can be observed by the fact that as in 2024, Indonesia’s trade volume with BRICS nations reached nearly $150 billion, highlighting the bloc’s significance as a critical economic partner. Additionally, BRICS membership affords Jakarta new avenues for foreign direct investment (FDI) and technological collaboration, particularly in the domains of energy, artificial intelligence, and digital innovation.^[23]

Beyond these economic imperatives, Indonesia’s BRICS membership also boosts its geopolitical profile by positioning the country as the foremost representative of Southeast Asia within the forum. Such an enhanced status enables Jakarta to voice regional concerns, advocate for ASEAN’s strategic interests, and exert greater influence in shaping the organisation’s agenda. Moreover, Indonesia’s alignment with BRICS’ de-dollarisation initiative aligns with its broader vision of mitigating reliance on Western financial systems and reducing exposure to fluctuations in the US dollar. This strategic recalibration reflects Jakarta’s long-term objective of fostering greater financial autonomy and promoting alternative economic architectures that support multipolarity in global trade and finance.^[24]

Indonesia’s Economic Ties with China: Opportunity or Strategic Risk?

Despite continuing geopolitical frictions, Jakarta and Beijing maintain a robust multidimensional economic partnership. In terms of trade, China remains Indonesia’s foremost trading partner, accounting for approximately 16% of the nation’s total exports.^[25] Chinese foreign direct investments (FDIs) have emerged as a driver of Indonesia’s industrial expansion, particularly within the manufacturing sectors of metals, energy, and automotive production. In 2023, Indonesia secured approximately $7.3 billion in Chinese FDI, positioning itself as the principal recipient of Chinese investment in Southeast Asia.^[26] 

Chinese capital has also played an instrumental role in the transformation of Indonesia’s infrastructure, particularly the transport sector. A landmark development in this regard is the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway, a flagship project of Sino-Indonesian cooperation that has significantly enhanced regional connectivity by reducing travel time between the two cities to merely 40 minutes.^[27]

Beyond infrastructure, bilateral collaboration extends to the energy sector. In 2023, the two countries formalised eleven strategic agreements amounting to $12.6 billion at the Indonesia-China Business Forum in Beijing, primarily focusing on electric vehicle battery production and renewable energy initiatives.^[28] Additionally, in 2021, both nations signed an MoU on the “Two Countries, Twin Parks” initiative which aims at establishing industrial zones in Fujian Province, China, and in Bintan, Aviarna, and Badung, Indonesia. This initiative, centred on the food processing industry, is expected to reinforce bilateral trade ties, stimulate cross-border investment, and further integrate the two economies.^[29]

On November 10, 2024, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto and Chinese President Xi Jinping formalised a bilateral agreement valued at $10 billion, encompassing joint initiatives in fisheries, oil and gas exploration, and maritime security.^[30] However, this accord elicited apprehension among analysts and policymakers, who caution that it may inadvertently undermine Indonesia’s sovereign authority in the Natuna Sea and exacerbate illicit fishing activities in the region.^[31]

In response to these concerns, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs unequivocally asserted that the agreement neither acknowledges nor legitimises China’s contentious nine-dash line claim. The ministry has reiterated that Jakarta and Beijing have no overlapping territorial claims, emphasising that “Indonesia reiterates its position that those (Chinese) claims have no international legal basis” and affirming that “the partnership does not impact sovereignty, sovereign rights, or Indonesia’s jurisdiction in the North Natuna Sea.”^[32] Thus, Indonesia continues to delineate a strategic balance between advancing economic cooperation with China while simultaneously upholding and safeguarding its sovereign rights over the Natuna Sea.

Strategic Balancing: Indonesia’s Geopolitical Dilemma

Jakarta’s economic dependence on China places it in a precarious position. Jakarta’s growing economic reliance on Beijing has introduced complex strategic considerations in Indonesia’s regional outlook, including heightening concerns over the potential erosion of its strategic autonomy. While the country asserts its sovereignty in the Natuna Sea, the evolving scenarios point out that severing economic ties with Beijing would jeopardise its long-term developmental aspirations to accelerate economic growth through strategic investments in key sectors, particularly infrastructure, under former President Joko Widodo’s Golden Vision of 2045.^[33] In order to achieve this growth, Jakarta is required to bolster its critical industries, such as nickel production, while simultaneously fostering the development of emerging sectors, including electric vehicle manufacturing. As a major investor, Beijing plays a pivotal role in funding these projects. Several Chinese companies have already made huge investments in agriculture, mining, metallurgy, and other strategic industries.[34]

This intricate economic entanglement presents the Indonesian leadership with a significant geopolitical dilemma, and the challenge lies in balancing economic imperatives with geopolitical considerations. On the one hand, Jakarta remains steadfast in its commitment to safeguarding its sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Natuna Sea amid recurrent Chinese incursions. On the other hand, severing or constraining economic ties with its largest trading partner would pose a considerable risk to Indonesia’s long-term economic aspirations. Consequently, Indonesian policymakers face the imperative of formulating a nuanced strategy that ensures a delicate equilibrium between fostering economic expansion and preserving national sovereignty.

This duality underlines Indonesia’s pragmatic approach to its foreign policy wherein it leverages its economic opportunities even as it resolutely asserts its sovereign rights, such as exemplified by the $10 billion Sino-Indonesia bilateral agreement. While the partnership promises mutual economic benefits, anxieties over China’s potential encroachment in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone continue to impact this bilateral engagement. Nevertheless, Jakarta’s firm diplomatic response through its unequivocal rejection of any implied recognition of Beijing’s nine-dash line claim highlights its approach to navigating such challenges without compromising its sovereignty.

Regional and International Implications

At the regional level, Indonesia is widely regarded as the de facto leader of ASEAN. However, Jakarta’s deepening economic and diplomatic engagement with Beijing risks causing discord and disharmony within the bloc, particularly given that several ASEAN member states are direct claimants in the South China Sea dispute. Enhanced cooperation with China, particularly through bilateral treaties and agreements, may be perceived as a tacit endorsement of Beijing’s maritime claims, thereby undermining ASEAN’s collective stance on the territorial dispute.

The recent maritime agreement between Indonesia and China has already been met with scepticism, with some regional actors interpreting it as implicit support for Beijing’s controversial nine-dash line claim despite categorical refutations by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^[35] Should such perceptions persist, Indonesia risks losing its credibility among ASEAN counterparts, thereby diminishing its strategic influence as a regional middle power and constraining its ability to shape the regional security architecture in accordance with its national interests.

At the international level, Indonesia’s membership in BRICS presents it with an opportunity to voice the concerns of Southeast Asian nations while simultaneously strengthening its economic and diplomatic engagements with key emerging economies on a global platform. However, Jakarta’s policy decisions vis-à-vis Beijing will have significant implications for its broader geopolitical alignments, particularly with strategic partners such as India and the United States.

Should Indonesia continue deepening economic ties with Beijing at the expense of its sovereign rights in the Natuna waters, it risks straining its political and security relations with New Delhi and Washington—both of whom view Chinese maritime expansion with increasing apprehension. Conversely, should Indonesia adopt a more assertive stance in countering Chinese incursions in the Natuna Sea, it may find strategic convergence with these partners, fostering closer defence and security cooperation to pre-empt Beijing’s broader assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. Consequently, Indonesia’s foreign policy calculus must balance its economic imperatives with its long-term strategic autonomy to ensure it remains a pivotal actor in the evolving geopolitical landscape.

Conclusion

Moving forward, Indonesia is expected to navigate its bilateral relationship with China with strategic prudence. As an ascending global power, China continues to consolidate its influence over geopolitically significant regions, including the South China Sea. While nations with direct territorial disputes stemming from Beijing’s expansive nine-dash line claim stand to incur the most immediate repercussions, Indonesia, too, faces substantial risks should this claim gain further traction.

The part of the Natuna Sea within China’s claimed maritime domain under the 9-dash line constitutes a critical resource base, hosting some of the world’s most productive fishing grounds. Any erosion of Jakarta’s jurisdiction over these waters would deal a severe economic setback, particularly given Indonesia’s status as the world’s largest fish producer. Additionally, the region harbours substantial untapped reserves of oil and natural gas, essential to sustaining Indonesia’s economic trajectory. Safeguarding its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is thus not merely an economic imperative but a fundamental prerequisite for preserving the country’s political sovereignty and territorial integrity.

However, Indonesia’s growing economic reliance on China, particularly in infrastructure development and industrial expansion, may constrain its capacity to confront Beijing’s maritime assertiveness in the Natuna Sea decisively. Such a predicament carries far-reaching implications. Any perceived accommodation of China’s claims could undermine Jakarta’s regional leadership within ASEAN, fostering discontent among fellow member states that regard Indonesia as a stabilising force in Southeast Asia. Therefore, Indonesia expected to formulate a calibrated policy approach that harmonises its economic imperatives with its broader geopolitical and strategic interests, ensuring that it retains its influence and autonomy in the evolving regional order.

* Mohmad Waseem Malla is a Research Fellow with the International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi, India, where he also serves as the Assistant Editor of its quarterly peer-reviewed Journal of Peace Studies. He has a PhD in International Studies (specialising in Middle Eastern Studies) from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and works at the intersection Middle East and South Asia.

** Durdhana Haq is pursuing a Master of Arts in Political Science at the School of Government & Politics, Central University of Kashmir, Ganderbal, Jammu & Kashmir. She completed a research internship at the International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi, India, in January 2025.

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[1] Sukma, R. (2009), “Indonesia-China Relations: The Politics of Reengagement,” In: Tang, S., Li, M., Acharya, A. (eds) Living with China. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 89-93

[2] Gill, D. M. (2023), “Indonesia’s triumphs and limitations as it stakes claim to leadership in Southeast Asia,” Observer Research Foundation, Issue Brief No. 621 (March, 2023), p. 3-6. Available at: https://www.orfonline.org/research/indonesia-s-triumphs-and-limitations-as-it-stakes-claim-to-leadership-in-southeast-asia

[3] Laksmana, E. A. (2011), “The enduring strategic trinity: explaining Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 7(1), p. 96. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2011.587333

[4] Dent, T. (2023), “The Strait of Malacca’s Global Supply Chain Implications,” Institute for Supply Management, 21 November 2023, Available at: https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/news-publications/inside-supply-management-magazine/blog/2023/2023-11/the-strait-of-malaccas-global-supply-chain-implications/

[5] “Fishing Industry by Country 2024,” World Population Review, 27 January 2025, Available at: https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/fishing-industry-by-country

[6] Mona Siahaan (2023), “Total proven natural gas reserves in Indonesia 2019-2023,” Statista, 23 October 2024, Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/755095/indonesia-total-proven-gas-reserves/

[7] Op. Cit. 2., p. 3-6.

[8] Putra, B. A. (2015), “Indonesia’s Leadership Role in ASEAN: History and Future Prospects,” International E-Journal of Advances in Social Sciences, I: p. 190, Available at: 10.18769/ijasos.82584

[9] Op. Cit. 2., p. 3-6.

[10] Majumdar, M. (2021), “Beijing Raising the Ante in the Natunas: The Next Flash Point in the South China Sea?,” India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, 77 (3): p. 2, Available at: doi:10.1177/09749284211027249

[11] Darmayadi, A., & Purnamasari, E. N. (2022), “The Indonesia – China Relations in the Natuna Sea Dispute Resolution: Struggle for Sovereignty,” Journal of Eastern European and Central Asian Research (JEECAR), 9(1): p. 41, Available at: https://doi.org/10.15549/jeecar.v9i1.870

[12] Op. Cit. 10, p. 2.

[13] Op. Cit. 11, p. 45.

[14] Op. Cit. 10, p. 3.

[15] Darmayadi, A., & Purnamasari, E. N. (2022), “The Indonesia – China Relations in the Natuna Sea Dispute Resolution: Struggle for Sovereignty,” Journal of Eastern European and Central Asian Research (JEECAR), 9(1): p. 45, Available at: https://doi.org/10.15549/jeecar.v9i1.870

[16] Op. Cit. 10, p. 2-6.

[17] Suryadinata, L. (2020, February 24). Recent Chinese moves in the Natunas rile Indonesia. ThinkChina. Available at: https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/recent-chinese-moves-natunas-rile-indonesia

[18] Op. Cit. 15, p. 46.

[19] “In Letter to UN Chief, Indonesia Takes Stand on South China Sea,” Radio Free Asia. 28 May 2024, Available at: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/indonesia-southchinasea-05282020190946.html

[20] Op. Cit. 10, p. 6.

[21] K Chang, F. (2024), “Indonesia’s New Military Bases in South China Sea,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 11 July 2024, Available at: https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/07/indonesias-new-military-bases-in-the-south-china-sea-preparing-for-friction/

[22] Wisnugroho, A. M. (2024), “Through the ‘ABC Triangle Conflict Model,” Modern Diplomacy, 22 June 2024, Available at: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/06/22/south-china-sea-conflict-indonesias-goals-and-strategies-through-the-abc-triangle-conflict-model/

[23] Medina, A. F. (2025), “Indonesia joins BRICS: opportunities and economic impact,” ASEAN Briefing, 19 January 2025, Available at: https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/indonesia-joins-brics-unlocking-new-economic-opportunities/

[24] Ibid.

[25] Chongbo, W. (2024), “China-Indonesia economic relations to strengthen in seven areas,” ThinkChina, 12 June 2024, Available at: https://www.thinkchina.sg/economy/china-indonesia-economic-relations-strengthen-seven-areas

[26] Interesse, G. (2024), “China’s investments in Indonesia: 2024 Outlook,” ASEAN Briefing, 5 June 2024, Available at: https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/chinas-investments-in-indonesia-2024-outlook/

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Op. Cit. 25.

[30] “China, Indonesia seal US$10 billion in deals focused on green energy and tech,” The Business Times, 10 November 2024, Available at: https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/international/china-indonesia-seal-us10-billion-deals-focused-green-energy-and-tech

[31] Faridz, D. (2024), “Experts: Indonesia’s $10 billion deal with China could undermine sovereignty, increase political tensions,” Voice of America, 16 November 2024, Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/experts-indonesia-s-10-billion-deal-with-china-could-undermine-sovereignty-increase-political-tensions/7866078.html

[32] Widianto, S. (2024), “Indonesia says it has no overlapping South China Sea claims with China, despite deal,” Reuters, 11 November 2024.

[33] Nan, H. (2025), “Indonesia joins BRICS: A strategic step towards global south empowerment,” ThinkChina, 14 January 2025.

[34] Interesse, G. (2024), “China’s investments in Indonesia: 2024 Outlook,” ASEAN Briefing, 5 June 2024.

[35] Op. Cit. 31.