A few months ago, Pakistani rulers reportedly approached Tajikistan's government and the Tajik-led National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF/erstwhile Northern Alliance) (indirectly) with a proposal to create an alternate commerce and transit route to the Central Asian Republics. This direct route to Tajikistan via Chitral could enable Pakistan to avoid the present Kabul-Baghlan-Mazar-Sharif corridor.
The Pakistani military intends to assist the NRF in recapturing Wakhan, Badakhshan, Panjshir, Baghlan, and other neighboring provinces in order to establish land contiguity between Pakistan and Tajikistan. Pakistan believes that the apprehension of losing Kabul to NRF may drive the ruling Afghan Taliban (TTA) to reconsider their support for the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), which has increased attacks on Pakistani soldiers since NATO's withdrawal from the region.
There are about fifty million Pashtuns in Pakistan, with the vast majority residing in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, which borders Afghanistan. Given the high political, economic, and cultural stakes, Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns reject deteriorating neighbourly relations, border closure, and the expulsion of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. Choosing the Tajik-dominated NRF over the Pashtun-Taliban may incur a strategic cost that the Pakistani army cannot bear in the current situation.
Nonetheless, Pakistan requires China's full support to make this policy successful. However, China does not see pragmatism in risking diplomatic and economic relations with the Kabul regime. The ongoing Pakistan-TTA conflict threatens billions of dollars in Chinese investment in natural resource extraction in Taliban-controlled areas. Recent attacks on Chinese workers in Tajikistan demonstrate how dangerous the situation may become if China joined Pakistan's anti-TTA campaign.
China has a direct land access to Kabul via Wakhan. Enabling NRF to control Wakhan and Badakhshan will impede China's access to the rest of Afghanistan. This will also have a negative influence on China's efforts to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan in collaboration with the TTA.
China's deteriorating relations with the TTA also hampers the viability of CPEC-related projects in Pakistan-occupied Balochistan. China does not want the Taliban to increase their assistance for the Baloch rebels, who, according to Pakistani sources, in collaboration with the TTP, have already slain hundreds of Pakistani and Chinese citizens. Disturbing relations with the Taliban may further exacerbate the precarious situation in Xinjiang, where Islamist extremist groups such as ETIM seek global Muslim support to resist Chinese occupation.
China fears that picking the NRF over the Taliban will drive the Kabul regime closer to the United States. In the long run, China would want to see a robust Taliban government exercising autonomy and effectively denying US forces space in its backyard.
Despite Pakistan's incentives and pressure, Kabul's leadership has refused to forsake the TTP, as the TTA and TTP rely on each other for refuge, logistics, and cadre recruitment. TTP wields considerable power in the districts around Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. As history has shown, the TTP offers the TTA a safe haven in their strongholds when forced to evacuate Kabul following military losses. They also assisted the TTA in recruiting militants and stockpiling weapons and ammunition during their campaigns to reclaim Kabul. Furthermore, abandoning and weakening the TTP would invite ISIS to fill the void, which spells political doom for the TTA.
The TTA and the TTP share religious leadership and political doctrine, and both seek Sharia law, not just in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. They are fighting a difficult and drawn-out battle against a hypocritical Pakistani leadership that encourages Sharia law in Afghanistan, while their own families enjoy alcohol and dance parties.
The Trump administration, like China, is concerned about the Pakistan-TTA conflict. The United States believes that war with Pakistan has weakened and isolated the TTA, hence revitalizing ISIS's strategic foundation for expansion and recruitment. According to analysts, certain factions inside the Pakistani military would want to employ and strengthen ISIS to punish the Taliban. The Taliban's refusal to collaborate has also diminished the cash accrual that Pakistani military generals derive from drug smuggling. Furthermore, the crisis is also pushing the Taliban towards Russia, providing a chance for Moscow to recruit fighters from Afghanistan.
Given the looming situation, President Trump wishes to recapture the Bagram airbase. Previously known as "Obama's GITMO," the Bagram base served as an efficient holding cell for terrorists.
For the time being, the TTA is perhaps withholding the US proposal on Bagram and using it as a bargaining chip to secure formal recognition. The Taliban believe that western governments' unwillingness to recognise them damages their sense of success and sovereignty. They argue that such lack of recognition denies them fair respect and strengthens the adversaries. Despite all this, the TTA believes that it could be an effective partner of the West to eliminate ISIS.
Many American experts exclaim that Trump is boosting Pakistani military generals to combat terrorism, although Pakistan remains a source and breeding ground for terrorism in the region. Paradoxically, Trump's support to Pakistan promotes China's expansion, which is the genuine long-term rival of the United States.
Patronising nations with long-term Islamist ambitions, such as Pakistan, Qatar, and Turkey, emboldens the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamat Islami who are determined to undermine western liberties, democracy and security. Perhaps it is time for President Trump to reconsider his policies if he claims to be the custodian of such ideals.
Senge Sering is founder of Institute for Gilgit Baltistan Studies based in USA. The views expressed are his own.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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