In the realm of realpolitik, ideological beliefs and religious connections frequently become secondary, while national interests emerge as the primary focus. Given the current state of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, there exists a tangible risk of further deterioration in their relationship, potentially leading to an increase in hostilities between the two nations.
Pakistan initiated retaliatory actions against neighboring Afghanistan under Taliban rule in response to attacks attributed to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). There were 182 operations in December 2024 against Pakistani security forces. In January 2025, the TTP claimed 110 attacks. As per figures given out by TTP on Telegram, the TTP conducted 1758 attacks in the year 2024. It has to be noted that after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the TTP, who have reportedly taken refuge in Afghanistan, have intensified their attacks against Pakistan. According to Pakistan, these attacks are being carried out from within Afghan territory. The Afghan Taliban have denied such allegations and said that the attacks are being conducted inside Pakistan and it is an internal affair for Pakistan.
Initially, it was expected that the return of the Afghan Taliban would benefit Pakistan’s strategic interests. However, the opposite has happened. The geopolitical landscape is shifting, with Afghanistan aligning more closely with China and India, while Pakistan appears to be leaning towards Tajikistan in opposition to Afghanistan following the US withdrawal. Contrary to expectations, bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan deteriorated after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, as the TTP stepped up terrorist attacks inside Pakistan.
In 2021, when the Afghan Taliban came into power in Kabul, both the establishment and the Federal Government under Imran Khan celebrated it as a crucial victory but 2024 proved to be the worst year for Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and the air strikes by Pakistan targeting the TTP hideouts on 24 December 2024 within the Afghan soil led to further deterioration of bilateral relations between the two. The Taliban regime responded officially labelling it as brutal bombing and a clear act of aggression violating international principles. Later, the Afghan Taliban claimed that they retaliated on 28 December in un-specified locations near the Pakistan border. The recent clashes show that the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are intensifying with each coming day.
The strike on 24 December followed a TTP attack that killed 16 Pakistani security personnel further intensifying the tensions. On 21 December 2024, TTP militants launched an overnight attack on a Pakistani army outpost in the Makeen area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, near the Afghan border. The assault resulted in the deaths of 16 soldiers and left five others critically injured. The attack involved around 30 militants who used light and heavy weapons Beijing’s growing pressure on Islamabad to protect Chinese nationals and investments, targeted by the TTP, might have accelerated Pakistan’s decision to resort to military action.
The TTP, poses a grave threat to Pakistan. On 5 January 2025, the TTP threatened attacks on military-linked businesses and financial institutions and asked the civilians working with them to disassociate from them. The TTP attacks will likely intensify further in the coming months as Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban remain deadlocked on how to deal with the militant group, portending a looming threat of attacks in urban centres across the country and greater instability along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in northwest Pakistan.
Taliban’s Tilt towards India
The Taliban have shown their inclination to work with India, contrary to Pakistan’s expectations. India has adopted a pragmatic approach and started upgrading its relations with the Taliban government. India condemned the December 2024 air strikes by Pakistan in Afghanistan. On 8 January, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri traveled to Dubai to meet the Afghan interim government’s foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi. Both countries agreed to maintain regular contact at various levels, as stated by the Indian ministry. The Afghan delegation underscored its sensitivity to India’s security concerns. Muttaqi assured the Indian delegation that his government was pursuing a “balanced and economy-oriented foreign policy”. He desired enhanced political and economic relations with India, recognizing its significance as a prominent economic power in the region.
On the one hand, India wants to protect its interests in Afghanistan, and on the other hand it is eyeing partnership with Afghanistan on the Chabahar Port which is extremely important for it. Afghan Taliban have also kept their option open and the speed at which the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are deteriorating, it seems, they regard India as a fallback option. Experts in Pakistan believe that if Pakistan blocks the border and uses coercive methods to control the influx of refugees, it might be reducing Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan, and hence Pakistan will lose its bargaining chip. After the India-Afghanistan Ministers’ meeting in Dubai, there was news doing rounds in Pakistani media about a possible annexation of the Wakhan Corridor by Pakistan. It also indicated that Pakistan and China will increase their military presence in this corridor, which will threaten India’s presence in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban government denied any such move. There is no denying the fact that a power vacuum was created when the US packed its bags and left Afghanistan for good; this vacuum is now being filled by China and India.
The bad blood between the two countries has been exacerbated by the forced migration of almost half a million Afghan refugees following a directive by the Pakistani government to deport ‘illegal foreigners’ residing in the country last year. At the root of the hostilities is the intractable issue of the disputed Durand Line, which marks the 2,600km border between both countries. This is not a new issue. Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations in 1947 on the grounds of this boundary dispute. There is a strong view in Afghanistan, cutting across ethnic groups that the real frontier of Afghanistan in the east extended up to the Indus, encompassing areas inhabited by the Pashtun-speaking population in Pakistan!
The uptick in India-Taliban relations is a significant development. This serves as a valuable lesson for individuals in Pakistan who invoke Islamic sentiments regarding the Taliban, as it highlights the functioning of realpolitik in international relations. Additionally, it should act as a cautionary note for those in Pakistan who were excessively optimistic about the Taliban's triumph and hastily proclaimed their success. In the realm of realpolitik, ideology, and religious affinities often take a back seat and national interest swims to the fore. As relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan stands today, there is a very real possibility of the relationship dipping further and an escalation of hostilities between the two.
*Dr Zainab Akhter is a Zainab Akhter is Research Analyst with Pakistan Project at Manohar Parrikar Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi, India. The views expressed here are her own.
