The Iran ceasefire reflects US strategic recalibration and Pakistan’s constrained diplomatic role. Washington sought a managed exit from an escalating conflict that threatened energy security, strained alliances, and fuelled domestic opposition. Pakistan acted as an intermediary, not an autonomous negotiator, driven by fears of regional destabilisation, economic fragility, and obligations to Gulf partners. While the episode gave Islamabad visibility, it underscored its dependence on external powers and risked straining ties with Gulf states. India, rejecting mediation, benefited indirectly from de-escalation, safeguarding energy and remittance flows. Ultimately, Pakistan’s role highlights visibility without substantive strategic influence.
Any attempt to understand Pakistan’s actions on the global stage—particularly in moments like the current ceasefire—must not be done in isolation. Pakistan’s foreign policy behaviour is closely linked with the strategic posture and broader regional calculations of the United States, as it has historically served American interests in the region, making it essential to situate Islamabad’s role within Washington’s evolving priorities.
In this context, the current ceasefire should not be viewed as an independent diplomatic achievement of Pakistan alone. Rather, it reflects a situation in which the United States was seeking a managed de-escalation from an increasingly costly and complex conflict that had become strategically, economically, and geopolitically counterproductive. The absence of clear objectives, along with shifting goal posts, exposed a lack of consistency in US policy.
Escalation Dynamics and the Shift in Strategic Calculus
Iran’s retaliation was far greater than anticipated. It struck not only Israel but also military bases and economic assets across the region linked to US allies, significantly raising the costs of the conflict. By targeting US-linked commercial infrastructure in Gulf states—including firms such as Amazon and data centers—it introduced an unexpected economic dimension to the war. The escalation also disrupted shipping and heightened risks around the Strait of Hormuz, a key global energy chokepoint, fuelling fears of an energy shock and broader economic instability. Washington had initially expected a swift, Venezuela-style operation, but the scale and multi-domain nature of Iran’s response quickly undermined that assumption.
This conflict also carries broader geopolitical implications, benefiting both China and Russia in different ways. Russia has gained strategic relief as global attention and resources have been diverted toward the Middle East, easing pressure on other theatres such as Ukraine. At the same time, higher oil prices have provided short-term revenue gains, and certain energy-related restrictions have been temporarily relaxed in response to global market disruptions caused by the war, further benefiting Moscow. For China, the situation is also advantageous, as renewed US focus on the Middle East reduces attention on the Indo-Pacific, thereby giving Beijing greater strategic space.
Domestically, the pressure on Trump was increasing. Both Republicans and Democrats were increasingly critical of the war, recognising a recurring historical pattern in which the United States becomes drawn into Middle Eastern conflicts and then finds itself strategically trapped, as happened in Iraq, diverting its focus from its priority regions, like the Indo-Pacific. Trump’s declining popularity and growing internal dissent, including discussions among some lawmakers around extreme constitutional measures such as the 25th Amendment, reflected increasing concerns over his leadership and decision-making.
The mood of the American people was also different this time. They had seen enough body bags in the past and did not want forever wars. When they elected Trump, they did so on the promise that he would not again indulge in such wars. His MAGA supporters were strongly against this, as reflected in the recent “No Kings” protests in the US against the war. Therefore, the American public appeared largely opposed to such conflicts, reflecting a broader sense of war fatigue that had built up over years of prolonged interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the past, when the US intervened in these regions, there was significant initial public support, which declined over time; however, this time there was no such support from the very beginning.
Moreover, unlike previous interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US lacked strong support from European allies. NATO countries did not fully back the intervention, and European media was largely critical, making it difficult for Washington to sustain a favourable international narrative.
Trump himself was also getting frustrated, as can be observed from the statements he made before the ceasefire. He used aggressive and unbecoming ‘slanguage’ against Iran, and even a day before the ceasefire warned that “a whole Iranian civilisation will die tonight, never to be brought back again.” This growing pressure further reinforced the need for a controlled exit, as the war was not aligning with broader strategic or domestic political interests.
Converging Interests and Illusion of Pakistan’s Agency
In this context, the US needed an intermediary—someone who could facilitate communication without direct engagement. Historically, Pakistan has played such roles in the past (for example between China and the US in 1971). Once again, Pakistan was used as a channel to convey ceasefire messages to Iran. This also suited US interests, as by using Pakistan, Washington could indirectly adjust and shape certain positions while maintaining distance, thereby using the channel strategically.
At the same time, Pakistan itself had strong reasons to support an early end to the conflict. Given its Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia, which contains a NATO-type collective defence clause treating an attack on one as an attack on both, a prolonged war could have raised the possibility of Pakistan being drawn into the conflict alongside Riyadh if escalation had continued.
Moreover, given its proximity to Iran and its internal vulnerabilities—particularly in Balochistan—this war could have led to serious destabilisation. Pakistan also fears that if the existing regime in Iran collapses, it could create further complications, as hostile actors might exploit and intensify Baloch insurgency on both sides of the border, especially on the Iranian side, given the presence of Baloch population across both countries. Moreover, Pakistan has the second-largest Shia population after Iran; if Pakistan had been dragged into this war, it would have been disastrous internally.
Additionally, Pakistan’s economic fragility made continued regional instability highly undesirable. One should not forget that Pakistan remains heavily dependent on Gulf countries for energy, remittances, and other economic support. It gets oil from Saudi Arabia on deferred payments, and given its economic condition, it cannot procure oil from other countries. It is the only country right now that has imposed lockdowns, shutting down markets, businesses, schools, and colleges—such is the situation in Pakistan. Therefore, it wanted an immediate end to this conflict, as it was affecting it severely.
Thus, both the US and Pakistan had converging interests: Washington wanted an exit, and Islamabad wanted stability. Pakistan, therefore, acted as an intermediary—but not as an independent negotiator. This is also reflected in the tweet by Shehbaz Sharif, when he posted a “draft” ceasefire message mistakenly on X; the label “draft” before it was edited, suggests that the message may have originated from a pre-coordinated or pre-scripted communication process rather than an entirely autonomous public announcement. This interpretation is further supported by reports such as the Financial Times, a British newspaper, titled,“White House pushed Pakistan to broker temporary Iran ceasefire,” as well as The New York Times article titled,“White House Knew About Pakistan’s Cease-Fire Post on X Before It Was Sent,” which indicate prior awareness and coordination regarding Pakistan’s public messaging. These developments collectively indicate that Pakistan was functioning primarily as a channel for US diplomatic messaging rather than acting as an autonomous negotiator.
This reading is also consistent with Iran’s National Security Council statement on the ceasefire, which reads that “they so constrained the field on all fronts that not only were none of the enemy’s main objectives realised, but the enemy realised approximately 10 days after the start of the war that it would in no way have the capability to win this war. For this reason, it began attempting to establish contact with Iran and requesting a ceasefire through various channels and methods.”
The ‘I’-factor
The most important question here is: who shall rein in the Israel now? While the US and Iranian delegations—represented by Vice President JD Vance and Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—are engaging in "proximity talks" in Islamabad, Israel has explicitly decoupled the Lebanese theatre from the broader Iran-US ceasefire.
The 'Israel factor' remains an undervalued variable in the current crisis, despite the state’s decisive and often provocative role in the regional escalation. By adopting a unilateral interpretation of the ceasefire—viewing it as non-binding regarding its relentless campaign in Lebanon—Israel has effectively undermined the diplomatic groundwork laid by the Vance and Ghalibaf delegations. This strategic divergence creates a profound obstacle for the peace process in Islamabad; Pakistan’s lack of direct diplomatic channels with Tel Aviv, combined with its limited leverage to compel Washington to restrain Israeli aggression, remains a structural inhibitor to any meaningful regional de-escalation.
A Loss for India?
The answer is clearly no. First, India has consistently rejected third-party mediation, and backed dialogue between parties to the conflict. Had India played even a limited intermediary role in this case, it could have opened the door for external actors to justify mediation in issues involving India.
Second, as rightly pointed out by Indian parliamentarian Shashi Tharoor in his article in The Indian Express, these mediation efforts by Pakistan should not be viewed as a zero-sum game, as there are indirect benefits for India. A prolonged war in the Middle East would have severely impacted India’s economy, particularly through disruptions in energy supplies such as LPG and broader macroeconomic instability. A large number of Indians work in the Gulf, and they send substantial remittances, while the region also remains a key market for India. The conflict had already begun affecting India’s economy, with LPG supply disruptions creating domestic pressures, forcing people to return to villages and requiring adjustments in consumption patterns, alongside downward revisions in growth forecasts, thereby impacting livelihoods and economic stability.
Third, India’s current stance, though criticised by some, must be understood as pragmatic. The conflict directly impacted Gulf countries, where India has significant economic and strategic stakes, including energy dependence, remittances, and employment for millions of Indians. As these Gulf states were primary targets of Iranian drone and missile attacks, with countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) facing particularly serious impacts, India had to factor these developments into its policy considerations while taking its stand. India today maintains strong partnerships not only with the US and Israel but, more importantly, with key GCC countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and others, which were directly affected by the escalation. Its position was therefore shaped not merely by alignment with the US or Israel, but by a careful balancing of its deep-rooted ties with Gulf partners and its long-term strategic and economic interests in the region. In the long run, India’s approach is likely to be viewed more favourably.
There is an argument within India that it could have engaged in quiet diplomacy, leveraging its strong ties with regional actors, and advocated more visibly for de-escalation; that such steps would have reinforced India’s image as a responsible and emerging global power without compromising its core strategic interests. While such arguments that India could have played a more proactive diplomatic role, maintaining its principled position against third-party mediation, reflect the aspirations of a rising India, the constraints were too many for India to risk its hands at this juncture.
Implications for Pakistan
While Pakistan may project this episode as a diplomatic success, the internal consequences are less positive. Its Field Marshal, Asim Munir, may use this narrative to further tighten control. This is not good news for those who want democracy to take root in Pakistan. For the Pakistani diaspora working from abroad to restore democracy, this is also not encouraging. With Imran Khan already imprisoned and democratic institutions under strain, this development could further strengthen the military’s narrative of strategic indispensability. Figures like Asim Munir may use this to consolidate power and further suppress dissent.
Moreover, the perception of Pakistan’s rising importance is largely media-driven hype. Domestic media has tried Pakistani mediation as a diplomatic victory over India. However, visibility should not be conflated with influence. Pakistan remains a constrained state, economically dependent on institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and on countries including the United States, China, and Gulf states. While it may gain short-term visibility, this does not translate into substantive strategic influence. It continues to face structural constraints across economic, geopolitical, and strategic domains and remains reliant on IMF bailouts. As a result, it is likely to remain more concerned with securing the next tranche of debt and managing its next payment obligations than with exercising independent strategic decision-making comparable to more autonomous states.
Moreover, Pakistan’s visible bias towards Iran has strained its relations with several Gulf countries and may generate further diplomatic complications ahead. Pakistan remains heavily dependent on the Gulf for financial assistance, energy supplies, and employment opportunities for a large expatriate workforce. Although these relationships have historically been underpinned by sustained Gulf support, they have also carried expectations of reciprocal political alignment during periods of regional tension. However, during recent escalations involving Iranian missile and drone activity against Gulf states, Pakistan’s posture was widely viewed as more sympathetic towards Iran, raising concerns among key partners that have long been central to its economic and strategic stability.
This is reflected in recent developments, including the UAE’ tightening of financial engagement with Pakistan, including demands for repayment or reduced rollover flexibility on existing deposits and support amounting to approximately USD 3–3.5 billion, alongside stricter guidelines affecting Pakistani workers. Moreover, there has been limited appreciation from Gulf countries for Pakistan’s mediation efforts. Going forward, this could make it more difficult for Pakistan to sustain its position. Pakistan’s tilt towards Iran during the conflict, even when Gulf states were under attack, has not gone unnoticed, and the lack of strong support from Gulf countries reflects this discomfort.
Foreign policy must never be assessed through a short-term lens. While Pakistan may celebrate its momentary visibility, its long-term strategic position appears more constrained. In contrast, India’s calibrated and pragmatic approach is likely to yield positive dividends over time.
Dr Imran Khurshid is Associate Research Fellow at Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed are his own.
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