The Curious Case of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami 2.0: Attempts at Rebranding Do not Alter the Core

Following the fall of Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) has aggressively worked towards a political resurgence. While attempting to rebrand as a moderate, inclusive party through minority outreach and "anti-fascist" rhetoric, BJI simultaneously engages in historical revisionism regarding the 1971 Liberation War and by aligning with other Islamist factions, the party increasingly advocates for Sharia-based governance and the eradication of "man-made" laws. This dual strategy signals a significant tilt toward Islamic radicalism in Bangladesh's mainstream politics in future, while the core ideology of BJI remains intact.

Bangladesh Chief Election Commissioner recently announced that 13^th national election would be held on 12 February next year— the first general election since the fall of Sheikh Hasina. The political scenario today is vastly different from what Bangladesh has witnessed in the past. The country’s largest political party, Awami League, is banned, restricting its electoral participation. The electoral game is now left to three main contenders—Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) and the National Citizen’s Party (NCP). While BNP is yet to announce any formal coalition, NCP has already joined a new political alliance—the Democratic Reform Alliance—posing as an alternative to ‘old-style’ politics. With the BNP leader Tarique Rahman back in Dhaka, the BNP is likely to decide fast on whether it needs to strike any alliance with any other party or go it alone. The way Rahman was greeted by people upon his return, indicates that popular mood is swinging in favour of BNP, which will further boost the confidence of its leaders. Given the fall-out between BNP and Jamaat, once partners in a long-standing political bloc against Awami league, the split appears to hold at the moment and Jamaat-e-Islami has arrived at an electoral understanding with seven ‘like-minded’ Islamic parties to contest election through a seat-sharing arrangement. In this comment, an attempt is being made to understand the emerging political trajectory of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) in the changing circumstances.

Resurgence and rebranding

The 2024 student-led July Uprising was a turning point for Bangladesh’s oldest Islamist party. With the outpouring of popular anger towards Sheikh Hasina and Awami League party, Jamaat-e-Islami found the time ideal for its political resurgence following Hasina’s deposition on 5 August. The lifting of ban on Jamaat-e-Islami, and its student wing Islamic Chhatra Shibir soon afterwards, opened the path for its enthusiastic political mobilisation. The resurgence, however, was not without the party’s quiet effort to rebrand itself as a progressive, tolerant, and moderate Islamic party. Its 41-reform proposal focused more on restructuring the judiciary, election, police and employment, foreign relations, limiting religious elements to education reform and moral training (police).

To shed its hardline image, Jamaat-e-Islami, post Uprising, ventured into ‘inclusive strategy’, by appealing to minority groups. Jamaat leaders, including the party chief, visited temples, spoke about protection of minorities (lives, faith, property) and constantly rejected ‘majority-minority divide’, expressing that new Bangladesh would be on the basis of unity. The party established its Hindu wing in areas with significant Hindu population (Khulna and Rangpur), and had a brief presence in Gopalganj, until mass-resignation by leaders. For the first time, Jamaat also nominated a Hindu candidate for Khulna-1 constituency.

Another way Jamaat rebranded itself was by positioning itself as an ‘anti-fascist’ and ‘pro-Uprising’ force. Jamaat not only equated the sacrifices of 1971 with those of 2024 but also claimed the latter as Bangladesh’s “second and true” independence. In a recent interview in Lahore, Jamaat secretary (nayeb-e-amer) Mujibur Rahman mentioned that it was Islami Chhatra Shibir that played an important role in the “revolution against Sheikh Hasina”, although not openly but ‘secretly’. Further in the interview, he mentioned that the ‘razakar’ label so long slapped against Jamaat under Awami League rule has been ‘removed’ after July Uprising during which students raised slogan “Tumi ke, Ami ke, Razakar! Razakar!” (Who are you? Who am I? Razakar! Razakar!). Perhaps this co-opting of the July spirit in 2024 is to avoid its role in 1971. Surely, Jamaat’s rebranding coupled with the interim government’s warming up to Pakistan earned Jamaat some success. Notably its student-wing Islami Chhatra Shibir’s socred unprecedented electoral victory in the university elections (Dhaka, Jahangirnagar, Chittagong and Rajshahi) this year.

‘Apology’

Notwithstanding the efforts at rebranding, the ghost of the past continues to creep in every time Jamaat members are confronted with questions about the party’s controversial role in the 1971 Liberation War. At first, Jamaat chief (ameer) Dr. Shafiqur Rahman stated his willingness to apologise for 1971, “only if 1971 mistakes are proven beyond doubt.” He maintained usual restraint and justified party’s role in 1971 as a ‘political stance’ which did not constitute a criminal act. Following the acquittal of senior party leader ATM Azharul Islam from death penalty related to 1971 crimes against humanity, Jamaat ameer offered “an unconditional apology for any mistakes made by the party or its members”. Later, he publicly sought “unconditional forgiveness” for all past wrongs since 1947, including Liberation War, this time in direct reference to 1971. A similar apology was also offered in New York in October for all past mistakes “from 1947 to October 2025.” However, every apology tendered by Jamaat leaders was ambiguous— for “past mistake”, without explicitly detailing the nature of mistakes the party had committed, especially during the Liberation War. Instead, Jamaat leaders, including the party chief, have used deflection tactics like he was “not the right person” or by saying, “I was not present in 1971”. Jamaat is yet to offer a formal apology explicitly for Jamaat’s role in atrocities committed in the Liberation War.

Historical Revisionism

Undoubtedly, the vague apologies have been an election gimmick, part of Jamaat’s efforts to rebrand itself. Interstingly, together with indirect admission of its ‘past mistakes’, Jamaat has also persisted with its stance of calling International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) trials against Jamaat leaders (during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure) to be, ‘politically motivated’. Dr. Shafiqur Rahman even called former party chief Ghulam Azam, the man behind Jamaat’s role as collaborator of Pakistan Army during 1971 War via paramilitary forces (Razakar and al-Badr), as a ‘victim of oppression’ who suffered the ‘tyranny of fascist Awami League’. ATM Azharul’s sentencing, too, was called ‘false and fabricated’, and the ICT trials was meant to attempt a ‘deliberate purge’ of party leadership. The recent ICT verdict on Sheikh Hasina who was sentenced to a death penalty was hailed by Jamaat chief to have met international standards, while previous trials of Jamaat leaders by the earlier ICT during Hasina’s tenure did not.

As Bangladesh was observing the Martyred Intellectuals’ Day on 14 December, Jamat secretary general Mia Golam Powar claimed ‘India’s conspiracy’ behind the killing of country’s intellectuals during Liberation War, and called the murders “part of a well-planned plot by the Indian army and Indian intelligence agencies.” He further remarked that Pakistani soldiers and its paramilitary forces—Razakar and al-Badr members—were “busy saving their own lives rather than searching for people to kill” while Indian forces had already taken control of Dhaka! He said the responsibility for murder of the intellectuals has been laid on Jamaat-e-Islami by the Delhi loyalists in Bangladesh through a new political narrative, thus giving a new twist to the Liberation War. Jamaat’s Chattogram chief Mohammad Nazrul Islam even called the Liberation War a “crackdown by Pakistan on Mujib Bahini, which carried out a ‘genocide’ prior to 25 March. Pakistan’s Operation Searchlight (25 March 1971) was, in fact, a response to such genocide. Jamaat ameer, however, called Liberation War a ‘revolt’ against the injustice and discrimination by the then ruling elite of Pakistan against people of East Pakistan, while maintaining silence on the genocide committed by Pakistan Army and Jamaat-backed Razakar/ al-Badr. Jamaat student wing Islami Chhatra Shibir’s Central Secretary General Nurul Islam Saddam, too, called that a large part of Liberation War history has been written with “false narratives.”

It is unclear what Jamaat’s previous ‘apology’ was for, as recent statements by Jamaat leaders reflect its desperate attempts at ‘historical revisionism’ attempting to downplay the party’s collaborating role, and to scapegoat India for atrocities it committed in the Liberation War, greatly in line with Pakistan’s narrative.

Mission Sharia

It was also not unexpected for Jamaat in its present edition to combine its attempt at curating a moderate, progressive, pluralist image, with express support for Islamic laws, which shall be the only laws to be followed in the parliament in future, and that there should be “no place for man-made ideas or systems” in Bangladesh. Jamaat, along with other Islamic parties, rejected the report of the Women’s Affairs Reform Commission, calling its recommendations on equal rights of men and women (among others) to be “against values and laws of Allah and thoughts and beliefs of the nation.”

The party also opposed government’s plan to recruit music, dance and sports teachers in primary schools, calling it a “suicidal move” that prioritises “immoral subjects” and demanded for recruitment of religious (Islam) instructors in their place. Eventually, the interim government reversed the move amid pressure, even at the cost of inviting backlash from civil society and rights groups for the same. The same rhetoric on Islamic governance continues following the electoral understanding with seven Islamist parties. Jamaat’s deputy secretary (nayeb-e-amer) Mujibur Rahman, in an address in Mymensingh rally, remarked that all institutions in Bangladesh, including the secretariat, will only be governed by Allah’s law and that no non-Islamic laws will be able to operate in the country. He also called the 1971 War a failure, implying the possibility of an ideological struggle in future (indicating the upcoming election) that will eradicate any man-made ideologies or nationalism and implement the laws of Quran and Sunnah. The party chief, too, reiterated the same, asserting that aspirations of Bangladeshi people can be realised only through “Quranic law”. Nayeb-e-Ameer ATM Azharul Islam stated explicitly that the state would run on the basis of Islam if Jamaat wins electoral majority, as the current constitution and laws are made-made.

Conclusion

With Jamaat’s resurgence, Bangladesh has witnessed an unmistakable tilt towards Islamic rhetoric in mainstream politics. The country has been facing increasing mob violence due to the rise of Islamist radicalism and Jamaat’s electoral alliance with seven parties, which include parties with controversial histories and ideological stand, is likely to further Islamicise the texture of Bangladesh politics and give political currency to such violence. Despite its efforts at rebranding the party, Jamaat’s efforts at historical revisionism alongside its hesitant apology and clear advocacy for a Sharia-based state leave little room to believe that Jamaat 2.0 has indeed moved past its hardline disposition.

Dr Ankita Sanyal is a Research Fellow at ICPS, New Delhi. The views expressed here are her own.