The commentary examines India's engagement with Central Asia through the 2026 SCO Summit in Bishkek, held as the organisation marked its 25th year. It traces India's evolving approach, from the 2012 'Connect Central Asia' policy and the India–Central Asia Dialogue to the first India–Central Asia Summit in 2022. The Bishkek Declaration addressed counter-terrorism, regional security and economic issues, with India signing a document condemning strikes on Iran without naming the states involved — a mark of its strategic autonomy. The authors argue that India and the CARs are significant to each other's foreign policy, and that India's strategic autonomy, combined with Central Asia's multi-vector policy, could ensure long-term mutual benefit, provided India addresses persistent connectivity challenges.
Introduction
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Bishkek this year (2026) marked the organisation’s 25th year of existence. Established in 2001, the grouping has moved beyond traditional security to encompass political, economic and regional concerns as well. Over the last decade, the organisation has expanded to include India and Pakistan in 2017, Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024, furthering its geopolitical significance in contemporary times. For India, the organisation fits into its strategic calculus and plays an important role for India’s Extended Neighbourhood Policy which includes Eurasia as one of its mainstays. This is evident by the Prime Minister’s visits to the region including the historic visit of 2015 which included all five Central Asian countries.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visits to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have not only underscored India’s intentions to strengthen its relations with the Central Asian Republics (CARs) but also highlighted the growing strategic significance of Central Asia in India’s wider foreign policy calculus. The 2026 SCO Summit thus provided an opportunity for New Delhi to step into a new era of strategic partnerships with the Republics.
The 2026 SCO Summit
The 2026 Summit came at a time when the global arena is in a state of flux. It has been four years since the beginning of the War in Ukraine where one of the founding members of the SCO, Russia is involved. Another permanent member of the SCO, Iran and the United States of America (US) have been at loggerheads over the Strait of Hormuz. The economic crises which have erupted due to the said conflicts have had a long-lasting impact in the global arena. This flux has not only led to a period of complexity but also a period of recalculation and recalibration of the alliances. The presence of such regional powers in major conflicts makes the summit gain even more significance.
During the Summit, the leaders of the member nations signed the “Bishkek Declaration” where they addressed issues on counter terrorism, regional security, economic and global issues.[1] Significantly, with the rise of Western debates about the SCO being an anti-West platform, the Summit stressed that the SCO was not a military-political bloc, and not directed at other nations.[2] The statement, therefore, stresses the focus of the SCO as not anti- West organisation and focused on the development of its member states.
Regarding Iran, while the Bishkek Declaration echoed the 2025 Tianjin Summit[3] in condemning the military strikes on Iranian territory, there was a notable difference in the framing of the two SCO declarations. While the Tianjin Declaration explicitly identified the states involved in the strikes, the Bishkek Declaration adopted more general language, condemning the attacks without naming the states responsible. Furthermore, the documents were also signed by India which signify India’s strategic autonomy despite India’s relationship with Israel and the US.
On terrorism, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, stressed that the SCO needed to play a more active role in dismantling the ecosystem of terrorism and send a strong message to countries using terrorism as a “state policy”. India’s PM also highlighted the need for a peaceful Afghanistan which would ensure stability of the Eurasian region.[4]
One of India's initiatives was taken up and supported in the SCO, with the SCO Young Scientists Forum focusing on “strengthening scientific, technical and innovative cooperation through active involvement of young people.”[5]
Overall, when focusing on India, the Summit brings dividends as the focus on terrorism were significantly highlighted alongside India’s concerns on Afghanistan. India's push for more focus on education was also discussed and signed by the SCO. Consequently, the no mention of Israel and the US could favour India given its deep ties with both nations.
Lastly, while the other eight members of the SCO reaffirmed their support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), PM Modi stressed on regional connectivity that respects the sovereigntyand territorial integrity of countries involved.[6] India has always been apprehensive about BRI, especially with the inclusion of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as part of the project. This further underscores the Indian stance of not supporting any declaration in the SCO regarding the BRI, as some territory that CPEC covers are in “India’s sovereign territory under forcible and illegal occupation by Pakistan.”[7]
Further, as the SCO remains the key highlight of the PM’s recent visit to Central Asia, it was not the only development in terms of the Indian leadership’s efforts to continue its engagement with the Central Asian nations. Prior to the Summit, the PM visited Uzbekistan, which led to further enhancement in cooperation between the two nations. One of the major developments was the elevation of ties to strategic partnership and setting a new target for bilateral trade i.e. $5billion by the year 2030.[8] The two nations also condemned terrorism, especially cross border terrorism, as both continue to be targets of such terror. New Delhi and Tashkent also stressed the need for intelligence sharing and combating violent extremism.[9]
The two nations also agreed on a deal which would see Uzbekistan supply uranium to India on a long term basis, and involve India in the mining of rare earth minerals in Uzbekistan.[10] Since Uzbekistan is one of the largest suppliers of uranium, ranking 5th in the world, and has large reserves of uranium, it can help India when it comes to investing in uranium for its nuclear capacity. Moreover, rare earth minerals which are now found in Uzbekistan can help India in its efforts aimed at supply chain diversification and reduce reliance on Chinese imports.
Additionally, discussions were held on the corporation in the education, public infrastructure, UPI, environment, and restoration of important Buddhist sites of Fayaz Tepa and Kara Tepa in Uzbekistan.[11]
India – Central Asia Ties: Towards Strategic Engagement
India has had a longstanding historical and cultural engagement with the landlocked Central Asian region. While many view the region as volatile, it functions as an important corridor between South Asia and Eurasia. Geographically situated at the intersection of South Asia, Russia, China and West Asia, the strategic importance of the region is growing by the day and so is its global influence. In the past, regional powers tried to gain control over the vast resource rich region, as evidenced from the 19th century “Great Game” between the Imperialist British Empire and the Tsarist Russia. During its time under the Soviet Union, the CARs, much like other former communist countries, underwent massive political, social and economic transformations. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation retained a significant influence over the region due to deep institutional, political and security linkages that continued despite independence of the CARs. However, with the continuation of the Ukraine war since 24 February 2022, the five Republics are increasingly diversifying their security and foreign policy which is being called a ‘multi-vector policy’, that has resulted in strategic partnerships with China, the US and India. Therefore, Central Asia remains what it has always been: a critical crossroads where the interests of the world’s major powers intersect leading them to compete for influence.
Viewed from an Indian lens, Central Asia holds great significance in terms of its security concerns. Moreover, the region’s geographical proximity to Afghanistan and Pakistan, coupled with the existence of extremist organisations across the neighbourhood, creates a shared concern for both India and the CARs. The instability emanating from Kabul not only has implications on the security of bordering states, but also it can potentially lead to spread of terrorism, radicalisation and drug trafficking, among other transnational security threats. Thus beyond bilateral relations, the Afghanistan factor impacts the larger security of the South Asian and Central Asia region. These concerns escalated with the return of the Taliban in 2021. However, while neither India nor the CARs have formally recognised the Taliban-led government in Kabul, toeing a pragmatic line, they maintain diplomatic engagement with the latter.
With security remaining an important aspect of India-Central Asia relations, New Delhi has increasingly sought to expand its economic presence via cooperation in commerce, trade, energy and infrastructure. The biggest barrier in this remains the geographical disconnect between India and the CARs, particularly when viewed together with the strained India-Pakistan relations. As a result, India has been supportive of pursuing alternative connectivity routes. The Chabahar Port in Iran provides India with an alternative gateway to Afghanistan and the wider Central Asian region while bypassing Pakistan. Similarly, the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which is a multimodal connectivity network links India with Iran, the Caspian region, Russia and further to Europe. These initiatives do not merely reflect India’s efforts to overcome geographical constraints and its active desire to establish commercially economic and strategic linkages with the larger Eurasian region. Additionally, considering the potential of Central Asia’s vast energy and mineral resource, a greater connectivity to the region will allow India to not only expand its economic and trade cooperation but also allow access to new markets and resources.
Furthermore, Russia’s traditional influence over the region is as perceptible as China’s growing economic presence in the region. And as India seeks to strengthen its engagement, it is necessary to balance it with the presence of other major powers. Therefore, the aim should not just be to develop stronger bilateral partnerships with the CARs, but to exploit all available opportunities in niche sectors to develop a meaningful strategic presence within an ever more competitive regional environment.
In 2012, coincidentally in Bishkek, through the framework of India’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ Policy, India-Central Asia ties gained a fresh momentum. The policy underscored India’s approach to enhance “political, economic and people-to-people engagement with Central Asian countries, both individually and collectively.”[12] Marking a shift towards a more proactive and comprehensive engagement with the CARs, the policy envisaged a multidimensional partnership encompassing political and high-level exchanges, strategic and security cooperation, counterterrorism coordination, economic and energy cooperation, connectivity, education, healthcare and cultural and people-to-people exchanges.[13]
Against this backdrop, two platforms have emerged: the ‘India-Central Asia Dialogue’ and ‘India- Central Asia Summit.’ The India-Central Asia Dialogue has so far hosted four high-level ministerial meetings (till June 2025). The 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue, held in New Delhi in June 2025, highlighted the growing breadth of the partnership, with cooperation extending across trade and investment, financial connectivity, transport corridors, digital public infrastructure, science and technology, healthcare, critical minerals and capacity building. During the 2025 Dialogue, the growing interest of the CARs in using Chabahar, alongside initiatives to develop transit and transport potential, demonstrated that connectivity is increasingly being approached as a shared regional objective rather than solely as an Indian strategic concern.[14] On the security front, the Dialogue emphasised on regular consultations among the National Security Councils of the countries to strengthen efforts to counter terrorism and other emerging challenges in the region.[15]
On the other hand, the first India-Central Asia Summit held virtually in 2022, marked an important step towards institutionalising India’s engagement with the region. Coinciding with the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Summit emphasised on the “long term, comprehensive, and enduring”[16] partnership between India and the Central Asian republics. It also established the Summit as a regular mechanism to complement the existing India–Central Asia Dialogue.
Additionally, the SCO serves as a platform for India and the CARs to collaborate in other avenues that could benefit all. Therefore, the Bishkek Summit provided an opportunity to examine how India's engagement with Central Asia is being recalibrated and what this reveals about New Delhi's wider strategic priorities.
Conclusion
In the light of the Bishkek Summit and the evidence of the relationship between India and the CARs, it is visible that they are both significant to each other’s foreign policy calculus. The Russia-Ukraine war has further strengthened Central Asian multi-vector policy, helping India gain further significance in Central Asian region to act as an alternative power as the five Republics diversify their partnerships. Indian ambitions in the region coincide with its extended neighbourhood policy and therefore, India strategic autonomy coupled with Central Asian multi-vector policy could be a combination which could ensure that both would thrive together in the long term.
For India, the issue of connectivity still persists; therefore, in the long-term, India would need to focus on forming new avenues for connectivity, in addition to the International North South Transport Corridor. Moreover, alongside the increased trade and security cooperation, India would need to focus on other avenues of cooperation, predominantly cultural and political.
The 2026 Bishkek Summit decisively demonstrated how India strategically views the SCO as a vital platform for cementing its ties with the Central Asian Republics (CARs). By participating in the Summit, India advanced its engagement through high-level dialogue, stressed shared security priorities including counter-terrorism and regional stability, and reaffirmed its strategic autonomy within the grouping. The Summit itself helped India realise this aim by providing a multilateral context to bilaterally strengthen relations, aligning with the CARs' multi-vector foreign policies, and facilitating cooperation on connectivity initiatives like the Chabahar Port. While geographical obstacles persist, the Bishkek Declaration and associated diplomatic engagements underscored that India-CARs relations are increasingly reciprocal, with connectivity becoming a shared regional objective rather than solely an Indian strategic concern.
*Anusua Ganguly is a PhD Scholar at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.
**Dr Jason Wahlang is an Assistant Professor in Political Science Department, at Janki Devi Memorial College, Delhi University.
[1] “Бишкекская Декларация Двадцатипятилетия Шанхайской Организации Сотрудничества,” Президент России, 2026, http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/6544?ysclid=mtic2m84qp663476616.
[2] Ibid.
[3] “Tianjin Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.” President of Russia, 2025, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/6376.
[4] “PM’s Statement at the 26Th SCO Summit.” PM India, 2026, https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pms-statement-at-the-26th-sco-summit/?comment=disable.
[5] Raveena Baneta. “Knowledge Nugget | SCO Summit 2026: What Does the Bishkek Declaration Say?” The Indian Express, 2 Sept. 2026, https://indianexpress.com/article/upsc-current-affairs/upsc-essentials/knowledge-nugget-sco-summit-2026-what-does-the-bishkek-declaration-say-10859987/.
[6] “At SCO Summit in Bishkek, India Draws a Red Line on China’s BRI.” Outlook India, 2 Sept. 2026, https://www.outlookindia.com/international/at-sco-summit-in-bishkek-india-draws-a-red-line-on-chinas-bri.
[7] “MEA Rejects References to J&K in China.” News On AIR, 1 June 2024, https://newsonair.gov.in/mea-rejects-references-to-jk-in-china-pak-joint-statement/.
[8] “Joint Statement during the State Visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Uzbekistan,” PM India, 2026, https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/joint-statement-during-the-state-visit-of-prime-minister-narendra-modi-to-uzbekistan/
[9] Ibid.
[10] “India, Uzbekistan Elevate Ties To Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Sign MoUs Across Various Sectors,” News on AIR, 30 August 2026, https://newsonair.gov.in/india-uzbekistan-elevate-ties-to-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-sign-mous-across-various-sectors/
[11] Ibid.
[12] “Keynote Address by MOS Shri E. Ahamed at First India-Central Asia Dialogue.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 12 June 2012, https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/19791/Keynote+address+by+MOS+Shri+E+Ahamed+at+First+IndiaCentral+Asia+Dialogue.
[13] Ibid.
[14] “Joint Statement of 4Th India-Central Asia Dialogue.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 6 June 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/39643.
[15] Ibid.
[16] “Delhi Declaration of the 1St India-Central Asia Summit.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 27 Jan. 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/34773/Delhi_Declaration_of_the_1st_IndiaCentral_Asia_Summit.
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