India’s engagement with BRICS reflects its pursuit of strategic autonomy, diplomatic leadership and reform of global governance while strengthening the voice of emerging economies. At the same time, New Delhi seeks a genuinely multipolar order in which the rise of BRICS does not simply lead to a greater concentration of power in China.
The 18th BRICS Summit, hosted by India this year, proved to be quite a successful one. All the major BRICS leaders attended the summit, including Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The theme of the summit was “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability,” with the joint declaration covering areas ranging from health, climate, agriculture and food security to digital healthcare, science and technology, artificial intelligence, education and disaster-risk reduction. These priorities are closely connected to the lives and livelihoods of people. Importantly, from the very beginning, India had approached its BRICS chairship with a “Humanity First” vision. As External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar emphasised, India sought to make BRICS “more people-centric,” an approach also reflected in Prime Minister Modi’s emphasis on a “people-centric and ‘humanity first’ approach.” In this sense, the summit focused less on geopolitics and more on constructive, forward-looking cooperation and development.
India’s BRICS Moment
From both a symbolic and substantive perspective, this year’s BRICS summit was important for India. India also used the summit to showcase its rise as one of the fastest-growing major economies and an emerging power amid turbulence in the global economy. At a time when global growth remains relatively subdued, India’s economy has continued to grow at a significantly higher rate, with the World Bank reporting 7.6 percent growth in FY2025–26 and describing India as the fastest-growing major economy. The way India organised the summit—from the arrival and reception of world leaders at Bharat Mandapam to the joint tree-plantation ceremony, the gala dinner, cultural performances, and other ceremonial events—projected India’s growing global stature and its ability to host major international gatherings. Even the Chinese media, which has often criticised India, was full of praise this time for the way India successfully hosted the summit.
Importantly, before the summit, expectations were low that there would be consensus on the joint declaration. This was due to several factors, including the fact that BRICS members from the Middle East, particularly Iran, and the UAE, were directly involved on opposing sides of the regional conflict, geopolitical tensions between China and India, and broader geopolitical differences within the group. Moreover, during the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New Delhi on May 14–15, 2026, the members failed to agree on a joint statement because of deep divisions over the war in West Asia. Therefore, there were considerable doubts about whether the leaders would be able to adopt a joint declaration at the summit. However, India demonstrated diplomatic leadership and considerable diplomatic skill in building consensus among these countries, especially between rivals, bridging differences on contentious issues, and negotiating language that all members could accept. The negotiations reportedly continued into the early hours until 4 AM on Saturday, September 12, 2026, involving intensive efforts by Indian diplomats to bridge differences. The fact that India was able to bring the members to a common position and secure the unanimous adoption of the 140-paragraph New Delhi Declaration was therefore an important diplomatic achievement for India.
Breaking the Ice
India also provided an important platform for Iran and the UAE to engage directly in New Delhi on the sidelines of the BRICS summit. The meeting between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan was the first high-level meeting between the two sides since the outbreak of the war in the Middle East. The meeting was particularly important given the tensions between Iran and the UAE, and Pezeshkian later said that the two sides had “agreed to put the past behind us and look to the future.” India’s efforts to keep difficult regional conversations going and provide a platform where countries on opposing sides of the conflict could engage diplomatically reflected its wider diplomatic outreach and its emphasis on dialogue and diplomacy as a means of addressing the conflict.
Importantly, the joint declaration also emphasised that regional solutions should be prioritised and that regional organisations must play a role in resolving regional issues. It called for “the active role of regional organizations in conflict prevention and resolution” and supported efforts to achieve peaceful settlements through “dialogue, consultation and diplomacy.” This emphasis on regional mechanisms may also have indirect implications for Pakistan. Given Pakistan’s recently created Makkah Pact with Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, its increasing involvement in the Middle East could potentially create further instability in the region if it pursues a particular agenda. In this context, India would have an interest in ensuring that emerging security arrangements do not further complicate an already fragile regional security environment.
Furthermore, the way Prime Minister Modi treated Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian—through his warm greetings, handshake, and the way he held his hand—sent a powerful message that India-Iran ties have not deteriorated. There had been considerable discussion in India and abroad that India-Iran relations had declined after the war in the Middle East and that India had moved closer to Israel. However, Modi’s warm interaction with Pezeshkian, along with their bilateral discussions, demonstrated that India continues to attach importance to its relationship with Iran. Modi’s gestures were therefore themselves a powerful statement that India is balancing its ties in the Middle East while pursuing its own strategic interests.
Moreover, in the days before the summit, there was considerable speculation about whether Chinese President Xi Jinping would visit India. When it was announced that he would attend, it attracted considerable attention. Xi’s visit to India itself, after seven years, was a powerful symbolic message and suggested that India-China relations may be moving in a more positive direction. The meeting between Modi and Xi further reinforced this impression. Xi described China and India as “partners rather than rivals” and said that China views its relationship with India from a “strategic and long-term perspective.” Modi, meanwhile, stressed that both sides should show “sensitivity to each other’s core concerns” and be guided by “mutual respect, mutual interest and mutual sensitivity.” The two sides also emphasised the importance of maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border and continuing dialogue and cooperation. Although significant differences between the two countries remain, these developments indicated that both sides are seeking to stabilise their relationship and move it in a more constructive direction.
Securing Global Consensus Against Cross-Border Terrorism
The BRICS summit declaration will also be noted for its strong language on terrorism, including cross-border terrorism. India was able to secure strong language on the issue and obtain consensus from the other members. Importantly, India got the Pahalgam terror attack specifically mentioned in the declaration, with the members “strongly condemning the terrorist attack in Pahalgam on 22 April 2025” and reaffirming their “zero tolerance” approach to terrorism. Securing this direct endorsement from the expanded 11-member bloc was a significant diplomatic achievement, especially given China’s close relationship with Pakistan and its decision to join the consensus on the reference to Pahalgam.
Moreover, the declaration adopted a comprehensive approach to combating terrorism, reaffirming the commitment to combating terrorism in “all its forms and manifestations, including the cross-border movement of terrorists, terrorism financing and safe havens”. It also stressed the need to counter extremism and radicalisation, particularly among young people, and to hold those involved in terrorist activities and their supporters accountable under national and international law. This broader approach strengthens India’s position that terrorism must be addressed not only by targeting terrorists themselves but also by confronting the networks, financing, and support structures that enable terrorism to continue.
Furthermore, the BRICS countries did not discuss de-dollarisation in the New Delhi. Instead, they focused on practical initiatives such as improving cross-border payment mechanisms and promoting trade settlements and investments in local currencies. The declaration specifically emphasised “pragmatic solutions” for cross-border payments and recognised that there is “no one-size-fits-all approach” while respecting the national priorities of member countries.
India has also made clear through its Ministry of External Affairs that it does not support the creation of a separate BRICS currency, preferring practical, bilateral arrangements for settling trade. De-dollarisation has therefore not been in India’s larger strategic interests if it means replacing the dollar with another dominant vehicle currency, particularly the Chinese yuan. India does not want a financial system in which China’s currency could acquire a dominant position, as such an arrangement would not serve India’s larger strategic and economic interests. Rather than joining aggressive anti-Western rhetoric, India successfully kept the summit’s economic focus anchored on lowering transactional friction and expanding the international footprints of existing national platforms, such as its Unified Payments Interface (UPI).
Reform, Not Rivalry
There is an important caveat to India’s approach to BRICS. When India speaks about a multipolar world, this aspiration is not directed only towards the West. It also has implications for China.
India does not want the international system to become dominated by any single power, including China. Importantly, there is a widespread misunderstanding about this position, particularly in the West, where analysts frequently misinterpret India’s engagement with BRICS as a structural alignment with an anti-Western, China-led bloc. In reality, there is a fundamental difference between how India and China view the global order. India wants a more multipolar and representative international system rather than a system dominated by any one country. Unlike actors who seek a revisionist upheaval, India wants the reform of existing global institutions because it has largely benefited from the existing liberal international system. When India criticises these institutions, its objective is actually reform: it seeks to improve existing global governance structures, give greater representation to emerging economies, and make the international system more representative. India’s approach is therefore not to dismantle the existing international system, but to reform it and make it more balanced and inclusive.
China, by contrast, has increasingly sought to reshape existing global governance institutions and promote alternative frameworks—such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and an expanded network under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—that could give it greater unilateral influence in the international system. Therefore, India’s interests and engagement within BRICS, as well as its broader foreign policy, remain largely reform-oriented rather than aimed at creating an anti-Western coalition.
Moreover, the section on “Inclusive Global Governance and Strengthening Multilateralism” in the joint declaration states:
“On the landmark occasion of the 20th anniversary of BRICS, we reiterate our commitment to reforming an inclusive, representative, legitimate, democratic and accountable international and multilateral system in the spirit of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits.”
This language also reflects India’s preference for a democratic, representative, legitimate and accountable international system rather than an international order dominated by any single power. The declaration further calls for a “more representative, fairer international order” and a “reinvigorated and reformed multilateral system.” This is consistent with India’s broader emphasis on reforming existing global governance structures and giving greater representation to the Global South rather than replacing the existing system altogether.
However, certain countries have tried to present BRICS as a challenge to the Western-led order. They may have their own agendas in doing so, but the substance of the declaration must be examined carefully. The language of the declaration is focused more on reforming multilateralism, making global governance more representative and strengthening the participation of developing countries than on creating an explicitly anti-Western system.
When India joined BRICS, it had, from the beginning, rejected the idea that the grouping should become an anti-Western coalition. It is not in India’s larger interests to promote bloc politics or for BRICS to adopt a hostile position towards the West. India’s current economic transformation has developed through engagement and collaboration with the West since the 1990s. India has significantly benefited from the existing liberal world order.
Genuine Multipolarity
India is also increasingly conscious of China’s growing ambitions to reshape the international system and its efforts to expand its influence through different economic, technological and multilateral platforms. India also recognises the possible implications of a China-led order. Such an order could create greater dependency, with economic relationships and supply chains already serving as sources of leverage. Given China’s authoritarian political system, extensive state control and growing use of surveillance technologies, India has concerns about the possibility that greater Chinese influence could produce more hierarchical, less transparent and more state-centric relationships externally. A China-centred international system could therefore reflect some of these characteristics, particularly if existing economic and technological dependencies translate into greater political leverage.
This is particularly relevant to how India views China’s advocacy of multipolarity. Terms such as “the world has become multipolar” and “power has shifted towards the East” must also be taken with a pinch of salt. China does advocate a multipolar world, but its advocacy of multipolarity is closely connected to its broader efforts to challenge the existing U.S.-led international order while expanding its own economic, technological and strategic influence, particularly across Asia and its wider strategic periphery. The language of multipolarity can provide a framework through which China presents its rise as part of a broader redistribution of global power, while simultaneously advancing its efforts to deepen strategic partnerships, economic dependencies and political influence across its neighbourhood. It also allows China to build greater political legitimacy and support among countries of the Global South by presenting itself as a champion of a more representative and balanced international order. In this sense, the language of multipolarity can serve as a shield for China’s broader strategic ambitions, enabling Beijing to portray its efforts to expand its influence and strengthen its strategic position as part of a broader transformation of the international system rather than simply as an effort to advance its own power and interests.
For India, multipolarity means creating space for multiple centres of power, including India, rather than allowing the international system to become increasingly concentrated around any single major power. Similarly, the claim that “power has shifted towards the East” should be examined carefully. If this shift primarily reflects the growing economic, military, technological and strategic power of China, it does not necessarily mean that the international system has become genuinely multipolar. China’s rise may contribute to a redistribution of global power, but if the resulting system produces greater concentration of power in China, it could represent another form of imbalance rather than genuine multipolarity.
India’s approach to BRICS must therefore be understood within this broader strategic context. New Delhi seeks to strengthen its position in a changing international system without becoming part of a bloc directed against the West or becoming dependent on China. Its participation in BRICS is ultimately about expanding its strategic space, strengthening the voice of emerging economies and supporting reforms in global governance while preserving its strategic autonomy. The 18th BRICS Summit demonstrated India’s ability to build consensus among diverse members while keeping the focus on practical cooperation, development, diplomacy and multilateral reform.
For India, therefore, genuine multipolarity means more than the redistribution of power from the West to the East. It means creating space for multiple independent centres of power, including India. The challenge for New Delhi will be to remain actively engaged in BRICS while ensuring that the grouping serves cooperation and reform rather than the geopolitical ambitions of any single power.
*Dr. Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi, India. The views expressed are his own.
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