The political structure of the so-called Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) faces a constitutional crisis stemming from federal control via Islamabad. The AJK Legislative Assembly operates under 1974 interim Constitution with 53 seats, including 12 general seats reserved for Kashmiri refugees settled across mainland Pakistan. These external seats are heavily criticised by the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) for enabling electoral engineering by Pakistan's ruling parties, acting as kingmakers, and creating demographic imbalances. The state recently banned the JAAC under the Anti-Terrorism Act to halt a planned June 2026 march ahead of the July elections. This follows years of resource-driven protests regarding electricity tariffs and local rights. While courts protect the refugee seats, the state's heavy-handed securitisation deepens the region's systemic legitimacy crisis.
For decades, the political structure of the so-called “Azad Jammu and Kashmir” (AJK), under illegal occupation of Pakistan (hence known as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir or PoK), has operated under a profound constitutional paradox: the promise of self-governance shadowed by the reality of federal control.
The territory elects its own legislative assembly and appoints its own prime minister. While officially designated as “Azad” (free), the territory has historically been governed through a hybrid system wherein elected institutions find their authority circumscribed by a powerful bureaucratic executive deployed from Islamabad and influenced by twelve members of the assembly representing the Kashmiri refugees settled in different parts of Pakistan.
The AJK Legislative Assembly is a unicameral house consisting of 53 seats total, operating under the AJK Interim Constitution of 1974. It has 45 general seats, elected directly via the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system. Apart from this there are 8 reserved seats which are filled via proportional representation by the elected members. These include five seats for women one seat for a technocrat, one seat for a religious scholar (Ulema) and one seat for Jammu & Kashmir nationals residing abroad (overseas diaspora). Out of the 45 general seats, a significant chunk—12 seats—are explicitly set aside for Kashmiri refugees who had reportedly fled Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir during the conflicts of 1947 and 1965. These 12 seats are divided evenly between the two divisions of Jammu and Kashmir. There are 6 seats for refugees from the Jammu division and 6 for refugees from the Kashmir Valley. Crucially, these seats represent refugees who are settled across mainland Pakistan (in cities like Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi), rather than residents living geographically within AJK (PoK). Historically, these seats were formalised in the 1974 Constitution to preserve the political and symbolic bond between displaced Kashmiris and the state, reinforcing the stance that the entire region’s fate remains intertwined until the broader Kashmir dispute is resolved.
The refugee seats have become a massive flashpoint, driven largely by intense mobilisation from the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC)—a regional protest alliance demanding governance and economic reforms. The Committee holds that refugee seats lead to the following:
(i) Electoral Engineering & Political Interference: Local activists argue that mainstream Pakistani political parties use these 12 external seats to manipulate AJK’s internal politics. Because these voters live scattered throughout Pakistan, it is widely believed that whichever political party holds power in Islamabad can easily influence or sweep these 12 seats. Consequently, these external seats often act as a kingmaker block, determining who forms the government in Muzaffarabad regardless of how local residents voted;
(ii) Demographic Imbalance: There is a massive disparity in voter-to-seat ratios. For instance, the 6 seats allocated to the Kashmir Valley refugees represent a tiny fraction of voters (roughly 30,000 people), giving them disproportionate legislative weight compared to local AJK constituencies, where a single seat might represent over a hundred thousand residents. Local residents argue this dilutes their democratic voice and misallocates resources;
(iii) Constitutional and Geopolitical Standoff: The JAAC has aggressively demanded the total abolition of these 12 seats, insisting representation should strictly belong to those living within AJK borders.
As narrated above, these twelve seats do not merely supplement the assembly, they anchor it to federal priorities. The result is a political system marked by frequent instability. Dozens of prime ministers have cycled through “AJK” in just twelve years, with the territory’s populace having minimum role in electing most of them. Elections are structured such that only candidates affiliated with Pakistan’s mainstream political parties, those with access to party funds and organisational machinery can effectively compete.
The latest proscription of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), placing it in the First Schedule of the Act alongside militant groups, marks a critical juncture in this dynamic. The timing was not accidental. JAAC had called for a wheel-jam strike and a long march to Muzaffarabad on June 9, coinciding with the opening of nomination filings for “AJK’s” July 27 assembly elections. For eight months preceding this ban, the government had engaged the committee in dialogue, offered assurances, and deployed delay tactics. Those eight months produced no structural resolution, but rather a legal hammer and strategic delay. This move signals a shift from political management to overt securitisation, raising questions about Islamabad policy toward the region particularly with regard to political representation, constitutional rights, and ownership over the material resources in the peripheries.
From Economic Grievances to Constitutional Demands
To understand the state’s severe response to JAAC protest call, which resulted in deaths and injury, one must move beyond the “agent of chaos” narrative presented by authorities. JAAC, a coalition representing traders, lawyers, transporters, and students, did not begin as a constitutional movement in 2026.
Its origins lie in the popular protests of 2023, which erupted in response to a federal government decision to raise electricity tariffs. Protests spread. Over time, the coalition expanded its demands to include cheaper wheat flour, an end to free utilities for politicians and officials, and greater local control over the territory’s natural resources. By October 2025, the protests had turned violent especially because of violent response from the state. Following deaths and injuries, a negotiated agreement was reached in which the government claimed to have accepted 37 of the 38 demands. The sole remaining demand of the abolition of the twelve reserved seats proved non-negotiable. Unlike the 33 general seats representing local constituencies, the refugee seats are voted on by non-resident ‘Kashmiris’ living in mainland Pakistan. Allegations persist that these seats are used to ensure that governments in Muzaffarabad remain subservient to Islamabad’s policy priorities rather than local will.
The AJK Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion stating that any constitutional amendment affecting these seats could not be “a concession to be wrested from a government under duress.” Moreover, it said that these seats enjoy deep constitutional protection under Article 22 and cannot be abolished by an executive order or street pressure; it requires a formal constitutional amendment passed by the assembly.
The court further held that the refugee seats are constitutionally protected and cannot be altered through administrative measures, political agreements, or public pressure. That judicial ruling closed the constitutional pathway, pushing the locals towards the streets as the only available avenue. Meanwhile, defenders of the seats warn that dismantling refugee representation plays into a dangerous geopolitical narrative. They argue that removing these seats could signal that Pakistan is “regularising” the Line of Control (LoC) as a permanent border, weakening its historical and legal stance on the unresolved status of the entire former princely state.
JAAC, with no history of electoral presence or a party registration, nonetheless demonstrated the ability to shut down markets, mobilise transporters, and bring lawyers and students into coordinated action. The group demands bread, electricity, dignity, a political voice accountable to locals, and how resources are allocated. Yet because these demands touch the architecture of federal control, the twelve seats, the dependency on mainstream parties, the bureaucratic veto, the state has chosen to treat them as a law-and-order problem rather than a governance failure.
Anti-Terrorism as administrative convenience
The use of the Anti-Terrorism Act against a civil rights alliance is not unprecedented in Pakistan’s peripheries, but it remains a dramatic escalation. The notification issued by the “AJK” Home Department accuses JAAC of being “engaged in terrorism” and acting “in a manner prejudicial to the peace and security of the state”. Following the ban, authorities arrested dozens of individuals, recovered weapons and communication equipment according to official statements, deployed additional security personnel, and imposed intermittent internet restrictions. The Prime Minister of “AJK” Faisal Mumtaz Rathore defended the action by warning against “creating anarchy” and suggested ideological links between JAAC and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). No evidence for such links has been presented in public documentation.
A federal minister, Rana Sanaullah, further claimed that the protests were being financed by the Kashmiri diaspora in the United Kingdom. This classification allows enforcement of ban and deployment of sweeping powers, including the utilisation of Rangers and Frontier Constabulary. While the state frames this as a defense of the upcoming electoral process (Scheduled for July 2026), the timing suggests an attempt to silence a rival source of political legitimacy. These claims, however, serve to securities what remains, at its core, a dispute over resources and political representation.
What Comes After the Ban
The ban on JAAC may temporarily clear the streets for the July 2026 elections, but it deepens the legitimacy crisis of the “AJK” state. By designating a civil rights alliance as a “proscribed organisation,” the government has criminalised the very political society it claims to represent. If the grievances regarding the twelve seats and resource control are not addressed, the current crackdown will merely serve as a prelude to a more violent iteration of the movement.
The July elections are scheduled to proceed as planned. Nominations will be filed, and a government is expected to take shape, likely through the familiar mechanism of the twelve reserved seats, which have historically ensured outcomes aligned with federal preference. Meanwhile, JAAC faces the prospect of continued proscribed, with its leaders potentially facing more repression, with protests being declared illegal. Yet, a ban does not eliminate a systematic grievance rooted in inhabitant’s everyday livelihood issues, it merely postpones its expression. The people of “AJK” have watched dozens of prime ministers come and go in within years. They have seen a high-handed bureaucratic officer override elected representatives on matter of policy and the region’s polity. The popular disaffection pouring out onto the streets today signal a deeper malaise, i.e., the proclivity of the Pakistani state apparatus dominated by the military to use brute force to suppress local sentiments in favour of greater autonomy and effective representative governance. The protests are likely to continue if Islamabad does not change its approach, which looks improbable given the reflex of the military dominated hybrid regime to deal with any dissent with force rather than dialogue.
Dr Usman Bhatti is a freelance commentator on security issues relating to South Asia. The views are his own.
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