Abrogation of Article 370: Why Pakistan’s Gilgit-Baltistan Parallel is Misplaced

Date
22-11-2026

Pakistan’s proposal to confer provisional provincial status on Gilgit-Baltistan has prompted comparisons with India’s abrogation of Article 370. This article argues that the analogy is misplaced. Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India through an Instrument of Accession in October 1947; Article 370 subsequently regulated the application of the Indian Constitution while representative institutions developed in the state. Its abrogation in 2019 therefore altered an existing constitutional arrangement, not the basis of accession. Gilgit-Baltistan, by contrast, forms part of the erstwhile princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, whose accession India maintains was legally completed. Pakistan has administered the territory while preserving ambiguity over its constitutional status and continuing to invoke self-determination for the former princely state. This commentary examines this contradiction through Pakistan’s administrative conduct, the UN plebiscite framework, the Karachi Agreement, and the 1963 boundary agreement with China. It concludes that constitutional incorporation cannot itself create lawful territorial title.

In an article titled “GB reforms panel to widen consultations,” published in Dawn on 25 September 2026, Jamil Nagri reported that a committee constituted by the Government of Pakistan was considering a constitutional amendment to confer provisional provincial status upon Gilgit-Baltistan, formerly known as the Northern Areas, and provide it with representation in Pakistan's Parliament. The proposal has revived the debate over Gilgit-Baltistan's constitutional integration into Pakistan, with some commentators drawing parallels with India's abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019. The analogy, however, is fundamentally misplaced, as the two situations are entirely different in their historical, legal, political, and constitutional foundations.

India: J&K’s accession and subsequent constitutional relationship

Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India took place under the statutory framework governing the accession of princely States following the Indian Independence Act, 1947. Under Section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted, accession was effected through an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler and accepted by the Governor-General. Accordingly, when Mountbatten accepted the accession on 27 October 1947 by placing his signatures on the Instrument of Accession, the constitutional process of accession was complete. Although Pakistan disputed its validity, its case before the UN was not that the Maharaja had never acceded to India but that since accession had been obtained through fraud and violence, therefore being void ab initio, it could not be recognized by it. In its 1977 White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan acknowledged that, India’s acceptance of the Maharaja’s accession on 27 October was accompanied by the acknowledgement that the issue of accession had been the subject of dispute. Thus, whatever arguments and counterarguments may have arisen concerning the steps needed to be taken by both sides to resolve the dispute following the accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India, the fact that the Maharaja had executed an Instrument of Accession in favour of India and India had accepted it on 27 October remained distinct from the question of whether that accession was legally valid.

Neither the statutory framework nor the Instrument of Accession made the accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India conditional to a plebiscite, referendum, or some other form of popular ratification. It was in a separate communication that was not a part of the Instrument of Accession that Mountbatten stated, “As soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.” This was a moral obligation and political commitment given by India in furtherance of its stated policy concerning disputed accessions and did not affect the legality, validity, or completeness of the Instrument of Accession already executed by the Maharaja.

Article 370

In a democracy, popular will may be expressed through elections, representative institutions, constituent assemblies, or direct referendums, depending upon the constitutional and political circumstances. When the Indian Constitution was being framed, no Constituent Assembly had yet been established in Jammu and Kashmir, nor had any representative constitutional process taken root through which the wishes of the people could be ascertained.

In fact, India’s first general elections were themselves held only in 1951-1952 after its Constitution had come into force. A transitional mechanism was therefore necessary to accommodate the Govt. of India’s commitment while permitting the State’s constitutional relationship with the Union to develop pending the establishment of its representative institutions. This mechanism was provided by Article 370, which was envisaged as a temporary provision. The exceptional circumstances surrounding its introduction were acknowledged by N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar when he introduced it (then Article 306A) before the Indian Constituent Assembly on 17 October 1949. Ayyangar referred to the conflict, the ceasefire, the involvement of the United Nations, India's commitment concerning a plebiscite, and the fact that the state’s own Constituent Assembly had yet to be constituted.

The Constituent Assembly and the expression of popular will

On 25 November 1949, Yuvraj Karan Singh, acting as Regent of Jammu and Kashmir, issued a proclamation declaring that the Constitution of India, insofar as applicable to the State, would govern its constitutional relationship with the Union and would supersede all existing provisions inconsistent with it. This proclamation affirmed the authority of the Indian Constitution while leaving the manner and extent of its application to Jammu and Kashmir to be governed by the constitutional provisions themselves.

The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was constituted following elections held in the State in 1951. It was convened on 31 October 1951 and proceeded to deliberate upon the State's constitutional future and its relationship with India. On February 1954, it ratified the State’s accession to India, and on 17 November 1956, adopted the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, Section 3 of which unequivocally declared, “The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.” The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir came fully into force on 26 January 1957, and elections to the first Legislative Assembly under that Constitution followed in 1957.

These developments marked the establishment of a representative constitutional framework within which the State's political institutions operated and its electorate participated, thereby providing a means for the expression of popular will. Whatever questions may arise concerning the adequacy or representative character of the framework so established, they do not detract from the fact that a constitutional process was undertaken, the constitutional vacuum that had necessitated Article 370 had been substantially filled, and the constitutional bridge it was intended to provide had been substantially crossed.

The Progressive Transformation of Article 370

Article 370 was introduced almost two years after the accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India. It neither effected that accession nor conferred legal validity upon it but only regulated the application of the Indian Constitution to the State. Therefore, the perception that it was an obstacle to Jammu and Kashmir's complete integration with India and that its abrogation removed that obstacle is misconceived. The mechanism for extending the application of the Indian Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir, subject to the consultation or concurrence of the State Government as the case required, was contained within the Article itself.

Beginning with the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1950, and more comprehensively through the Presidential Order of 1954 and its subsequent amendments, successive provisions of the Indian Constitution were made applicable to the State, thereby enlarging Parliament's legislative competence in Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, what had initially been conceived as an exceptional arrangement was progressively modified, and by 2019, much of the substantive constitutional distinction associated with Article 370 had already been eroded, reducing it increasingly to a constitutional shell. Its eventual abrogation therefore did not fundamentally alter Jammu & Kashmir’s constitutional position as an integral part of the Indian Union, a status that had already been established long before.

Northern Areas— A territory of Jammu & Kashmir not Pakistan

India has consistently asserted its sovereignty over the entire State of Jammu & Kashmir (which includes Gilgit-Baltistan) on the basis of the State’s accession to it. Therefore the integration of Pakistan administered Kashmir with India would follow from its existing sovereign title and be a natural corollary of that accession. India’s constitutional arrangements have long recognized the territories under Pakistan's control as part of Jammu and Kashmir, with seats in its Legislative Assembly kept vacant for their representation pending their return to Indian administration.

Pakistan’s stand, on the other hand marked by contradictions and calculated ambiguity, rests principally on its challenge to the validity of that accession rather than any independent legal instrument conferring territorial title on it.[1] The reasons are not difficult to guess. If Pakistan had simply annexed all the areas which it was administering in J&K after 1949 then its case before the UN for a plebiscite in the entire State would have lost legitimacy. With international support for its claim weighing heavily, and eyeing that part of Kashmir which was being administered by India, Pakistan was obliged to maintain a degree of political separateness with the State and therefore designated it as ‘disputed territory’. However, even while doing so, instead of treating the entire region within its control as one unit, it divided it into two distinct administrative entities: Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) and Northern Areas.

While AJK had its own capital, full-fledged government and later a constitution (1974), the Northern Areas were directly controlled by the Govt. of Pakistan through the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Frontier Regions. The term Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) was coined for Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) in 1970 when it was brought under the Northern Areas Council administered by the Federal Government of Pakistan. Though initially Pakistan depicted Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas distinct from West Pakistan in all its maps, it gradually started the process of separating the Northern Areas from J&K with the obvious objective of shrinking the size of the disputed region on its side by confining it to just AJK. The intent to slowly appropriate parts of Northern Areas was first visible in maps and postage stamps printed in Pakistan as early as 1955 in which Gilgit Agency was separated from the ‘disputed’ region of Northern Areas.[2]

The cartographic dissection of J&K was followed by political and administrative steps which indicated that Pakistan considered Northern Areas as a separate jurisdictional entity and for all practical purposes, a part of Pakistan. These included abolition of the princely rule in Hunza and its merger with the Northern Areas (1974), imposition of martial law for the first time in the Northern Areas, Gilgit and Baltistan even though it was not formally extended to AJK (1977) and observer status for representatives from the Northern Areas in the Majlis-i-Shura constituted under the martial law (1982). Although these steps were being taken, the fiction of autonomy for the region was maintained and Pakistan never asserted an established sovereign title over any part of Jammu and Kashmir, a position reflected in its 1963 Border Agreement with China. Nor did it make the Northern Areas a part of its territory in the 1973 Constitution.

Significantly, Article 257 of Pakistan’s Constitution of 1973 expressly contemplated the future accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan, providing that when the people of the State decided to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and the State would be determined in accordance with their wishes. It did not proceed on the premise that Jammu and Kashmir, or any part thereof, had already acceded to Pakistan.

Against this background of constitutional ambiguity, the legal status of the Northern Areas eventually came before the AJK High Court in 1990. In a judgment delivered on 8 March 1993, the Court held that the Gilgit-Baltistan Areas are not a part of Pakistan, and permitting their detachment from the rest of AJK and integration with any province of Pakistan would tantamount to negation of Pakistan’s stance at home and in the Security Council. It further observed that the AJK government represented the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and directed it to assume administrative control over the Northern Areas. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, however, in its 14 September 1994 ruling on the government's appeal, held that the Northern Areas were, ‘a part of Jammu and Kashmir State but not a part of Azad Kashmir as defined in the Azad Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974; therefore, the Govt. of AJK need not take administrative control of these areas.’[3]

In 1999 the Supreme Court added that Pakistan exercised de facto and de jure administrative control over the northern areas, and the people of the region were its citizens for all intents and purposes.[4] Thereafter, in its 2019 Judgment[5], it agreed with the Sartaj Aziz Committee that GB be accorded a provisional and special status as a province of Pakistan pending the final settlement of the J & K dispute without affecting Pakistan’s principled stand on Kashmir.

Pakistan's Professed Principled Position on Jammu and Kashmir

Interestingly, Pakistan's professed principled position on Jammu and Kashmir appears to rest on foundations that are difficult to reconcile with its own historical conduct. While professing to uphold the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to determine their political future, Pakistan has been simultaneously giving itself the authority to divide, administer, and negotiate over portions of that state. The principle of self-determination is conveniently invoked as a restraint upon India's sovereignty, but not as a restraint upon itself, and appears to apply with considerable force to those parts of Jammu and Kashmir outside Pakistan's control, but remarkably little to those within it.

(a) Misconceptions about the UN Resolutions and the promised plebiscite:

Pakistan maintains that the future of the entire State must be determined through the exercise of the right of self-determination by its people and continues to invoke the United Nations resolutions as though they embodied an unconditional and unfulfilled promise of a plebiscite. What Pakistan conveniently overlooks, however, is that the plebiscite envisaged under those resolutions was expressly conditional upon the prior implementation of the prescribed ceasefire and truce arrangements. Before proposing a plebiscite in the State vide Resolution 47 dated 21 April 1948, the Security Council called upon Pakistan to use its best endeavors to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State. Consequent upon the establishment of such withdrawal to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council’s Resolution 39 (United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, UNCIP) and confirmation that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting had become effective, India was to put into operation, in consultation with the Commission, a plan for withdrawing its own forces from Jammu & Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required to reduce its forces in the State to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order. Notably, the Government of India was permitted to maintain its presence in the State and was given the responsibility of conducting a plebiscite but only after Pakistan had completely withdrawn from the State.

Similarly, Part II (A) of the 13th August 1948 UNCIP Resolution recorded that ‘the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constituted a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, and the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.’ The Government of Pakistan was also enjoined to use its best endeavor to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident and who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops was to be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the commission. Only upon the Commission notifying India about (a) the withdrawal of the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by it to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of its troops, and (b) the withdrawal of the Pakistani forces from the State, was the Govt. of India required to begin withdrawal of the bulk of its forces from the State in stages to be agreed with the Commission. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government was permitted to maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the ceasefire the minimum strength of its forces, which, in agreement with the Commission, were considered necessary to assist the local authorities in the observance of law and order.

The subsequent UNCIP Resolution of 5 January 1949 expressly stipulated that a plebiscite would be held only after the ceasefire and truce arrangements had been implemented. Clearly, the steps required to be followed for a plebiscite under the Security Council as well as UNCIP resolutions were sequential and consequential. Instead of complying with the explicitly laid out directives and withdrawing all its forces, Pakistan insisted on their simultaneous and synchronized withdrawal along with the bulk of the Indian forces. This being contrary to the resolutions was unacceptable to India. Since Pakistan never fulfilled its withdrawal obligations and continues to remain present in the State even today, the conditions precedent to the proposed plebiscite were never realized. Thereafter, several rounds of United Nations mediation and negotiations took place, but they failed to overcome the impasse arising from Pakistan’s initial and continued non-compliance.

(b) Pakistan’s own democratic record

Pakistan’s professed commitment to self-determination also stood in sharp contrast to its own democratic record and the right of self-determination of its own citizens. It took more than twenty-three years after independence to hold its own first nationwide general elections, which were conducted only in December 1970 nearly fifteen years after its constitution came into force. Although provincial elections had been held earlier, the people of Pakistan had not, until then, been afforded the opportunity to elect their national representatives through a direct nationwide vote based on adult franchise.

(c) Misrepresentation before the UN and concealment of facts from the people

While Pakistan was advocating before the United Nations the right of the people of the entire State to determine their political future, it was simultaneously consolidating its own administrative authority over the territories whose political future it maintained had yet to be determined. In April 1949, even as the United Nations was engaged in mediation to resolve the dispute, Pakistan entered into the Karachi Agreement with representatives of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government and the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference without ascertaining the wishes of the people whether by way of a plebiscite or otherwise. Under this agreement, Pakistan assumed control over defence, foreign affairs, negotiations with UNCIP, arrangements concerning the plebiscite, and the affairs of Gilgit and Ladakh under the Political Agent at Gilgit. The existence of this agreement was not disclosed either before the UN or the people and came to light only decades later, when it was reproduced in proceedings before the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court in early 1990. The question naturally arises whether Pakistan's representations before the United Nations would have been viewed in the same light had the full extent of these arrangements been disclosed and scrutinized at that time.

(d) Parting with the territory of the State without any right to do so

In 1963, Pakistan entered into a boundary agreement with China and parted with territory forming part of J&K, again without ascertaining the wishes of the people. Although the agreement was described as provisional and contemplated renegotiation following a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan nevertheless purported to determine the disposition of territory over which it never enjoyed and even claimed any sovereignty.

Pakistan’s status in J&K: A belligerent occupier

The invasion of the State of Jammu & Kashmir started from the Pakistani side around 22 October when armed tribesmen and other Pakistani nationals entered the State with a view to march towards its capital and overthrow the government in place. Urging Pakistan to prevent this ingress, Nehru wrote to Liaquat Ali Khan on 31 October 1947: ‘I have no doubt that you realize that the raiders from the Frontier province or along the Murree road come from Pakistan territory and it is the easiest thing in the world to stop them at the two bridges which connect Pakistan territory to Kashmir. They were not so prevented and their equipment and arms including artillery and automatic weapons bear witness of every help being given to them. We are credibly informed that regular officers of the Pakistan army are advising the raiders. Even now it should be easy for your Government to stop the passage of these raiders or their supplies to Kashmir territory completely’. Subsequently, Zafrullah Khan admitted to the presence of Pakistan’s regular forces in the State from May 1948.

The reasons given for the entry of Pakistan troops in the State were: the protection of the territory of Pakistan from aggression by Indian forces, the prevention of fait accompli in Kashmir by India, and the prevention of the influx of refugees into Pakistan. While none of these reasons justified entering and occupying the territory of another State, Khan’s admission confirmed before the world the extent of Pakistan’s involvement in Jammu and Kashmir and provided compelling evidence that Pakistan committed an act of aggression by entering and occupying the State, when viewed in light of the definition of aggression adopted under UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974. Article 3(a) of that resolution expressly recognized that the invasion or attack by the armed forces of one State upon the territory of another State, any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force, constitutes an act of aggression. Article 3(g) further recognizes that the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries to carry out acts of armed force against another State, of sufficient gravity to constitute aggression, or the State's substantial involvement therein, likewise constitutes an act of aggression. Article 5(3) categorically declares that “No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful.”

Since Pakistan not only occupied parts of J&K but also established de facto administrative control over them, its position in the territories of Jammu and Kashmir under its control is that of a belligerent occupier. The passage of time cannot transform such occupation into lawful ownership or give it a measure of sovereignty that the original occupation never conferred. Nor can the original defect of title be cured by unilateral annexation, constitutional incorporation, legislative enactment, or any subsequent exercise of sovereign authority. To hold otherwise would permit an unlawful occupation to become the very source of the legal title that it lacked at its inception.

While the interim measures contemplated by Pakistan to address the political aspirations of the inhabitants of Gilgit-Baltistan and secure their fundamental rights may be welcome, Pakistan cannot draw any parallel between India’s abrogation of Article 370 and its proposed incorporation of GB into its federation, provisionally or otherwise. While the former altered an existing constitutional relationship, the latter concerns the proposed constitutional incorporation of territory over which Pakistan possesses no lawful sovereign title, the State of Jammu & Kashmir having legally acceded to India. To equate the two is to confuse constitutional reorganization with territorial annexation and to overlook the fundamentally different legal premises upon which they rest.

The debate over Gilgit-Baltistan must, therefore, be taken beyond the narrow question of whether it should receive provincial status. The immediate and legitimate concern is the political representation, fundamental rights, and socio-economic welfare of its inhabitants, who should not be made to bear the costs of Pakistan’s unresolved constitutional position on Jammu and Kashmir. Yet administrative convenience or the conferral of provisional provincial status cannot, by itself, settle the question of sovereignty or erase the territory’s place in the larger dispute. India should consistently distinguish between supporting the rights and aspirations of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan and recognising Pakistan’s claim to the territory. The wider lesson is that constitutional measures must be assessed not merely by the institutions they create but also by the legal authority on which they rest. The proposed reform may change governance; it cannot, on its own, resolve title.

Dr. Amit Krishankant Paul is a lawyer, author, and columnist. He is a life member of Centre for Peace Studies (CPS), New Delhi. The views expressed are his own.

[1] Robert Wirsing, ‘The Siachen Glacier Dispute-I: The territorial dimension,’ Strategic Studies, Autumn, 1986, Vol. 10, No 1, pp 49-68 at p 53

[2] See map printed in Pakistan Affairs, August 14, 1964, Vol. XVII, No. 14 published by the Information Division, Embassy of Pakistan, Washington DC which shows a line of separation between Gilgit Agency and the Northern Areas. See Postage stamp: 14 October, Pakistan, 1955

[3] Malik Muhammad Miskeen v/s Govt. of Pakistan

[4] Al Jehad Trust Case

[5] Civil Aviation Authority v/s Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit Baltistan

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