It would be inaccurate to assert that the relations between India and Bangladesh are experiencing a 'historic low.' In fact, the dynamics of their bilateral relations are currently undergoing a transformative phase, as Bangladesh initiates a process of state reconstruction. Through numerous high-level meetings, both New Delhi and Dhaka have achieved a consensus to expand their bilateral engagements, reaffirming their mutual commitment to enhancing their ties.
Exactly six months into Hasina’s deposition, Bangladesh’s political complexities seem to be deepening further. The student-led mass movement in July last year that led to the end of 15-year-old rule of the Awami League-led government of Sheikh Hasina left an indelible mark in the country’s history, perhaps the most historic development since 1971. The world watched with bated breath the resilience of Bangladesh’s predominantly youth population, and their collective hope to see a just, democratic and pluralistic Bangladesh. However, contrary to what was termed as ‘second liberation’ on 5 August 2024, the day Hasina fled Dhaka, the absolute chaotic ‘state of nature’ grappling the country reveals that much-promised state reconstruction process is yet to take off. The challenges facing the interim government tasked with such ambitious mission at home have also begun to show their effects on Bangladesh’s neighbourhood relations, especially with India.
A re-look at the events that followed 5 August last year can be summarised in one word—‘lawlessness’. Even as the nation was celebrating the ‘downfall of authoritarianism’, deplorable images and videos of an uncontrolled mob vandalising and desecrating murals and statues of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, recognised as the Father of the Nation, sent in shock-waves globally. This was not a lone event, as incidents like this have recurred across the country ever since— Sheikh Mujib’s private residence, also known as 32 Dhanmondi residence in Dhaka, was recently set ablaze and bulldozed; systemic attacks have been carried out on offices, political leaders and known sympathisers of Awami League party and its allied parties; temples/shrines of ethnic and religious minorities have been torched and vandalised. The interim government established after the fall of Hasina did little to effectively tackle the law-and-order crisis in the country that is unfortunately legitimising a mob culture threatening to redefine the political culture of Bangladesh.
On the other hand, opposition parties and factions, so long sidelined and repressed under Awami League rule, have been gaining their space and coming to the political front. While the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is pressing for an early national election, Islamist parties are expected to form an alliance in the upcoming election, aiming to strengthen their vision of establishing Islamic rule in Bangladesh. The interim government, for long prioritising its focus on reforms before deciding on election, has recently indicated the possibility of national election this December, although it is still struggling to evolve a decent roadmap in that direction. The initial cooperation of political parties with Muhammad Yunus-led interim government, too, have waned, showing growing rifts, with the latter’s credibility now in question.
The fall of Sheikh Hasina paved way for Bangladesh’s present political vacuum. The Awami League is now ostracised, and parties opposed to it are hell-bent on making sure it does not stage a comeback soon. The recent launch of ‘Operation Devil Hunt’, a nationwide security operation by the interim government, majorly a crackdown on Awami League leaders and workers, is hinting at a general political consensus on working towards the death of the League. Of the many accusations League have been facing, one is its ‘tacit support’ from India. It is indeed true that under Sheikh Hasina’s second tenure, India-Bangladesh enjoyed a robust bilateral relationship. However, India’s relationship with Bangladesh is not regime-specific. It is regarded as Bangladesh’s closest neighbour because of shared traditional and historical connections, not because of one political party. Nonetheless, cooperation between the two has been, and continues to be, falsely labelled as India’s ‘interference’ in Bangladesh’s domestic affairs. The growing unpopularity of the Hasina government in the country as a result of her perpetuation in power via authoritarian means have been wrongly attributed to India’s support, intensifying anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh as noted in ‘India-Out’ campaign last year. Opponents of the Awami League party have, for years, claimed India’s ‘hand’ behind the victory of Sheikh Hasina in the last three national elections, including the one in January 2024, thus deeming the elections as ‘unfair’ and ‘rigged’.
As skepticism regarding the integrity of the January 2024 elections grew among Western nations, New Delhi upheld its diplomatic stance of non-interference in the internal matters of Bangladesh, a position that was met with discontent from the parties opposed to the ruling Awami League. During the height of political turmoil in July of the previous year, and even following Hasina's departure to India, New Delhi continued to adhere to this diplomatic approach, prioritizing the safety of Indian nationals in Bangladesh and collaborating with Dhaka's security forces to secure the vulnerable border between India and Bangladesh against unauthorized crossings. Indian PM Modi congratulated Muhammad Yunus when he took charge as the Chief Advisor of the newly established interim government on 8 August 2024, expressing New Delhi’s hope for ‘an early return to normalcy’ and reiterating its commitment to “working with Bangladesh to fulfil the shared aspirations of both our peoples for peace, security and development.”
However, the interim government’s policy of denial of the growing communal violence across the country soon after Hasina’s fall, that especially targeted the minority Hindu, claiming them as ‘exaggerated’ and ‘political’ instead of communal, raised Indian concerns and drew condemnation from New Delhi. This stance raised alarms in India and elicited criticism from New Delhi. Concurrently, Dhaka's attempts to foster closer ties with Islamabad heightened New Delhi's security apprehensions, considering the complex nature of India-Pakistan bilateral relations. Nevertheless, it is imperative for the leadership in Dhaka to understand that, despite these challenges, India has adopted a measured and prudent 'wait and watch' strategy regarding Bangladesh while reaffirming its commitment to advancing bilateral relations.
It would be wrong to say that India-Bangladesh relations is passing through a ‘historic low’. Surely, the dynamics of bilateral relations is going through a phase of transformation, since Bangladesh has embarked on a state reconstruction process. Both New Delhi and Dhaka, via several high-level meetings, have reached a consensus to broaden bilateral engagements where both have reiterated their shared willingness to strengthen bilateral ties. However, there is a perception in India that the interim government, like many in Dhaka opposed to Awami League and Hasina, is viewing India negatively, unjustly blaming India for Hasina’s remarks in exile. India has repeatedly maintained that Hasina’s comments are made in ‘her individual capacity’, with India having no role to play in them.
India is optimistic about a peaceful, democratic transition in Bangladesh which will uphold the rights of all citizens, including those of the minorities. It also hopes that bilateral relations will improve and both countries will embark on a shared journey of development. Perpetuation of instability in Bangladesh impacts not only Dhaka’s internal politics but also its neighbourhood relations, as reflected in the border tensions between India and Bangladesh last month.
Notwithstanding a few hitches that can be addressed through bilateral deliberations, both India and the new leadership in Bangladesh have shown an interest in engaging each other, as was evident in the Indian foreign minister S. Jaishankar’s meeting with Bangladesh foreign relations advisor Tohid Hussain on the sidelines of 8th Indian Ocean Conference in Muscat where the two shared their mutual concerns and reached a consensus for a border meeting, a first since Hasina’s ouster. It now remains to be seen whether developments on the bilateral front reflect the willingness of cooperation as noted in the latest meeting or Dhaka continues to resort to blame game and holds India responsible for its internal political churns.
*Dr Ankita Sanyal is working as Associate Research Fellow at ICPS, New Delhi. She has obtained her Ph. D. from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
