This comment explores how a possible regime change in Iran might affect Gilgit‑Baltistan (G‑B). Iran’s current Islamic regime has long supported Shia communities in Pakistan, particularly in G‑B, through funding of mosques, seminaries, welfare organisations, and cultural centres. This influence has helped Pakistan and China manage local dissent against CPEC projects and resource exploitation. However, if Iran transitions to a pro‑Western, secular government, funding for Shia institutions could end, reducing sectarian extremism but also weakening Iran’s leverage in G‑B. Such a shift would challenge China’s reliance on Iranian ties to soften opposition to its presence and complicate Pakistan’s balancing act between Western powers and China. Locals may welcome reduced external interference, seeing it as an opportunity to strengthen cultural identity and resist exploitation. Overall, waning Iranian influence could destabilise Pakistan’s strategic calculus in Gilgit‑Baltistan, with ripple effects across Ladakh, Kashmir, and China’s regional ambitions.
The Iranian people are seeking regime change since the existing Islamic government has failed to handle crippling inflation, extreme poverty, commodities overpricing, corruption, and unemployment. Currently, there is a significant national water shortage that affects both urban and rural consumers.
On 1 January 2026, the Iranian president acknowledged the failures in the following statement: “If the people are unhappy, the fault lies with us, not the United States or any external power. Addressing the peoples’ problems is our responsibility. Our shortcomings stem from mismanagement”.
Iran earns billions of dollars from the export of fossil fuels. However, poor governance and misguided priorities inhibits the Islamic regime from adequately addressing citizens' well-being. Local activists argue that the Islamic regime has prioritised sending the majority of its revenues to foreign proxies in Palestine, Yemen, Eritrea, Egypt, Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and other countries in order to counter Western influence.
One such place is Pakistan-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B), where more than 60% of native population professes Shia religion and declares devotion to the Iranian Islamic regime. Over the last four decades, local religious and humanitarian organizations have received major support from Iran to sustain hundreds of mosques, Shia religious and cultural centers, schools, colleges, and health-care facilities.
Shias make up approximately 10% of Pakistan's 252 million population and many of them benefit from Iranian philanthropy. However, the Pakistani government remains wary of Iranian intentions and frequently accuses the regime of funding Pakistani Shia organisations operating in Shia-Sunni sectarian hotspots.
In recent years, Pakistani authorities have imprisoned hundreds of Shias from Balochistan, Parachinar, and Karachi, accusing them of inciting instability and terror. According to Pakistani officials, many Pakistani Shias travel to Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon as covert students and pilgrims to receive militant training, with Iranian aid.
According to Pakistan's ISI, Iran supports non-Shia terrorist organisations and provides them with hideouts and launch pads to strike Pakistani law enforcement and civilian officials. It also suspects that Iran cultivates Baloch separatists who demand Balochistan's independence. Over the years, terrorist incidents have cost Pakistan billions of dollars in assets and weakened its grip over the restive province. Iran denies the allegations and urges Pakistan to avoid baseless terror charges.
Despite all the resentments, character assassination and blame game, it has been noticed that the Pakistani government, rather than being threatened by Iranian influence in Gilgit-Baltistan, fosters and uses it for larger strategic gains.
Gilgit-Baltistan is part of Jammu Kashmir that India claims as its own. Geographically G-B functions as a land bridge between Pakistan and its largest military partner, China. The latter has spent billions of dollars on the China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor (CPEC), which entails building major dams, industrial and economic zones, and highways in Gilgit-Baltistan. Without this corridor, China’s journey to the ports in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf would take over 28 days— a lot more time than the current two-day travel time. Pakistan also allows China to exploit precious gems, marble, minerals, lumber, and precious herbs in Gilgit Baltistan. Both Pakistan and China receive billions of dollars in revenue from these activities, with little or no benefit to the local population.
Locals refer to this exploitation as economic terrorism and demand that Pakistan and its friend, China cease abusing their resources. While citing the United Nations Security Council resolution, locals remind both countries that Gilgit Baltistan is part of Jammu Kashmir and they have no legal jurisdiction to pitch camp and exploit its resources. Locals also ask China and Pakistan to remove military personnel from their lands.
China is Iran's closest trading and military partner which invests billions of dollars to help float Iran’s economy. China offers Iran strategic stability and diplomatic protection, which lets the Iranian Islamic regime prolong control over the entire country. In exchange, China expects Iran to utilise religious and emotional bond with the people of Gilgit-Baltistan to soften public antagonism against unwarranted military presence and resource exploitation.
With support of local people, China thinks it will be in a better position to handle the legal anomalies and India’s opposition. This strategy is both effective and less expensive than paying billions of dollars in annual land royalties and resource usage compensation to the government of Gilgit-Baltistan. The CPEC is Pakistan's strategic and economic lifeline and it also believes that with Iran’s cooperation, Islamabad could deal with the enraged people of Gilgit-Baltistan better rather than allowing the local apathy to be tapped by India.
However, the Iranian regime is currently in severe jeopardy. Given Iran's never-ending economic failings and political repression, 2026 could bring regime change in Tehran and an end to the Islamic governance structure.
If that happens, majority of Iranians are anticipated to elect a pro-Western government, which would completely revamp the foreign policy, end strategic ties with Russia and China, and brand the Islamic militant proxies as terrorists and stop their patronage. The people could also expect the government to draft a secular constitution and end funding to all religious seminaries within their country.
This could bring about significant changes in Gilgit-Baltistan and Ladakh. For instance, thousands of students and teachers studying and working at the Iranian seminaries may lose financial assistance and be forced to leave the country. The new government could also terminate financial assistance to tens of thousands of seminaries and welfare organisations established in Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan.
Against this background, the progressive Pakistani Shias contend that Iran should not exploit Gilgit-Baltistan's population to further its foreign policy because doing so damages ethnic cohesion and local cultural identity. They draw attention to the fact that Iranian-funded organisations frequently support Persian and Arabic language initiatives in Gilgit-Baltistan, which has a detrimental effect on regional languages and scripts. They believe that cutting off funding to religious organisations will lessen extremism and fanaticism among local Shias. In Ladakh, this could help to foster multiculturalism and bring Buddhists and Shias closer together. In Kashmir valley, this could help put an end to separatism among Shias.
It remains to be seen how Shias in Gilgit-Baltistan will react to Iran's pro-western leadership harbouring strong scorn for Islamic identity and credentials. However, if both sides opt to advance good ties, China's involvement in Gilgit Baltistan will face significant problems.
China does not want Western influence in Gilgit-Baltistan, which might provide a platform for rights movements and separatism in Tibet and Xinjiang. All of these factors point to the conclusion that in the next years, if Iranian influence wanes, and pro-Western outlook grows in G-B, Pakistan would have substantial hurdles in balancing relations with the West and China.
*Senge Sering is founder of Institute for Gilgit Baltistan Studies based in USA. He is an independent analyst. The views expressed are his own.
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