The NA 130 tribunal verdict highlights Pakistan’s entrenched hybrid system, where political outcomes are orchestrated by the security establishment. Nawaz Sharif’s rehabilitation and Imran Khan’s confinement reveal a recurring cycle of managed leadership, judicial reversals, and electoral engineering. Courts, constitutional amendments, and procedural flexibility function as instruments of elite control rather than justice. This case illustrates how Pakistan’s democracy remains subordinated to military oversight, ensuring leaders survive or fall depending on their alignment with the deep state’s strategic interests.
An election tribunal in Pakistan, on 30 December 2025, dismissed a petition that challenged Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) leader and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s victory in the 2024 general elections from the NA-130 constituency in Lahore. The petition, filed by Yasmin Rashid of the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) on the issues of electoral discrepancies, was dismissed on “technical grounds”.
The tribunal’s dismissal of the NA-130 petition is not an isolated legal event, but rather one instance of a recurring cycle in Pakistan’s managed democracy. Just as the state machinery was once deployed to clear the path for Imran Khan in 2018, it has now been utilised to rehabilitate Nawaz Sharif (and his party) illustrating that in Pakistan, electoral legitimacy is a gift granted or rescinded by the security establishment. This is yet another instance of the hybrid system of governance adopted by Pakistan spreading its roots, especially since the return of democracy in 2008.
The Management of Political Leadership
Nawaz Sharif’s attempts to assert civilian supremacy over foreign policy and national security, a move that fundamentally challenged the military’s traditional dominance, led to repeated conflicts with the country’s security establishment. The military considered it an affront to its per-eminence in the power architecture of Pakistan. Sharif’s pursuit of revamping economic relations with India and his support for a negotiated peace in Afghanistan further harboured resentment within the military hierarchy. The situation got worse with the Dawn Leaks scandal of 2016 that revealed the tensions between civilian leaders and the military over counter-terrorism, particularly regarding militant groups targeting India. The report detailed civilian warnings of international isolation if the military didn't curb these groups. This got compounded when Sharif admitted the cross-border role of Pakistani-based militants in terror attacks in Mumbai in 2008. Finally, Nawaz Sharif was removed as Pakistan's Prime Minister in July 2017 by a unanimous decision from Pakistan’s Supreme Court in the Panama Papers case, for not disclosing assets from a Dubai-based company in his nomination papers, making him ineligible to hold public office. It was now the army’s turn to find an obliging leader in Pakistani politics (read Imran Khan) and push him to political centre stage. A mercurial Imran went to the extent of calling the army chief “Father of the Nation” to retain his hold on power until he crossed the red line and fell out of favour.
Khan’s trajectory follows a familiar pattern in Pakistan’s civil–military landscape. Khan benefited from the military’s not-too-tacit support during his rise to power in 2018. Khan’s attempts to intrude into areas of decision-making related to senior appointments and foreign policy as also his growing populist image led the army to change the puppet in the game of musical chairs in Pakistani politics. In 2019, when Khan allegedly removed Asim Munir- now the Army Chief- from his post as Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) against the wishes of the army chief, this move was widely seen as crossing an institutional red line. What began as a political disagreement soon escalated into a full-blown confrontation when Khan adopted a foreign policy that distanced Pakistan from the US, which was not acceptable to the deep state. The die was cast. The search for a new obliging dispensation began. Shehbaz Sharif, Nawaz’s brother with his known for his obliging disposition vis-à-vis the army was favoured as the successor to Imran. Shehbaz had his pound of flesh too, in the new hybrid arrangement that was worked out. All decisions against Nawaz that had led to his exile in London were reversed. He was now to be tolerated as a politician, even as the leader of consequence in his party Pakistan Muslim League, named after him— but not as prime minister. His reputation of being a leader with known penchant to disregard the military in his decision making came on the way of his being picked up as the prime minister. The new hybrid system with Shehbaz Sharif as prime minister has survived through the transitional period after Imran’s fall and a highly controversial election, that continues to be challenged even after a year. The recent judicial verdict in favour of Nawaz only shows that the power arithmetic at work in Islamabad will keep Khan out of the political race.
Khan’s past and future
Khan has done everything to rile the army leadership ever since he was faced with the challenge to face the confidence motion in the house. Khan held the top army leadership of the day responsible for not delivering a majority for him to win the no-confidence vote and ever since, he has not done anything to bridge the differences with it. His craving for power made him forget the all-too-important hand of the army behind his success which is also responsible for his popularity that he is seeking to use to upset the current army leadership.
After his removal from office through a no-confidence motion, Khan went public with his accusations, openly naming senior generals. Khan labelled the former Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa a traitor and accused General Munir of deliberately working to break up his party, turning behind-the-scenes power struggle into a full-blown, existential confrontation with the military establishment.
The hybrid system in place shepherded by the army has not forgiven Imran Khan for his insolence. Khan faces over 150 legal cases across various jurisdictions, a situation that has resulted in his continuous detention despite securing acquittals or bail in several individual matters. Most recently, on 20 December 2025, a special court sentenced Khan and his wife, Bushra Bibi, to 17 years in prison in the Toshakhana-2 case regarding the alleged mishandling of state gifts. While the prosecution maintains the cases are based on evidence of financial and procedural irregularities, Khan’s legal team argues the volume and timing of these charges are intended to prevent his participation in the political process.
When one examines the political careers of Sharif and Khan in tandem, it becomes clear that the legal system is not being used for justice; it is being used to manage the players. This further substantiates the fact that civilian politics in Pakistan still functions under military oversight, where a leader’s survival depends less on popular mandate and more on staying within the military’s red lines. The military establishment does not ever fully get rid of a leader, nor does it fully trust anyone. Instead, they keep them in a state of constant uncertainty wherein leaders are alternately disciplined or rehabilitated depending on their alignment with the security establishment’s core interests.
Procedural Flexibility: From Judicial Reversal to Electoral Engineering
Nawaz Sharif’s political rehabilitation occurred amidst a series of synchronised judicial reversals that, when viewed collectively, suggest facilitation by the country’s institutions. Within months, courts overturned his prior corruption convictions, acquitted him in long-pending graft cases, and ultimately removed the lifetime disqualification that had barred him from electoral participation.
This strategic rehabilitation was not confined to courtroom reversals alone but was reinforced through post-election legal and procedural redesign. The post-election passage of the Elections (Amendment) Bill, 2024, which was introduced months after petitions were filed, did not merely adjust the procedure but signalled that the rules governing electoral adjudication themselves remain contingent and flexible. By enabling the appointment of retired judges, altering tribunal composition following objections by the Election Commission of Pakistan, and conducting proceedings in closed chambers, the institutional architecture was reshaped to manage outcomes rather than resolve disputes on their merits. Not to mention, these procedural manoeuvres were accompanied by unresolved allegations of vote inflation, denial, and manipulation of Form 45, as well as turnout anomalies documented by civil society observers, further eroding confidence in the electoral process.
In Pakistan, the rules of the game can be rewritten at the will of the ruling elite. If a court case gets in the way, it can be delayed and then a pliant judge or a bench can be brought in to deliver a favourable verdict. The law and the constitution take a back seat to accommodate the whims of the powerful ones. Lately, this structural subordination is exemplified through the 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments, which effectively ‘constitutionalise’ military’s dominance in the system.
The NA-130 tribunal verdict is yet another instance of managed hybrid system at work. In Pakistan. This case is not about one constituency or one leader; it is rather a window into a system where political outcomes are managed to the advantage of the system in place Viewed in the larger context, Imran Khan is going to be under prolonged confinement, while the hybrid order remains firmly entrenched. Elections, judicial rulings, and constitutional amendments are deployed as toolkits for elite management by the deep state to keep this system going.
Mohammed Shoaib Raza is a PhD scholar at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The views expressed here are his own.
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