The Shaksgam Valley, historically part of Jammu and Kashmir, was transferred by Pakistan to China in 1963 under a provisional border agreement. India considers the move unlawful, asserting Shaksgam as its territory. China, however, has expanded infrastructure and military presence in the region, citing strategic needs and its alliance with Pakistan. The agreement itself acknowledges Shaksgam’s disputed status, promising renegotiation after Kashmir’s resolution. India continues to oppose Chinese activity, warning against construction projects that threaten its security. Meanwhile, local communities in Gilgit-Baltistan contest the transfer, arguing neither China nor Pakistan holds sovereignty over their land.
The Shaksgam Valley, which lies between the Karakorum and Kunlun Mountain Ranges, is part of China-occupied Jammu Kashmir (COJK). In addition to Shaksgam, China controls the valleys of Taghdumbash, Dafdar, Raskam, Aghil, Mintaka, and Aksai-chin in Jammu Kashmir. As of now, China controls over sixty thousand square kilometers of strategically important mineral-rich territory that once belonged to the principalities of Jammu Kashmir. For instance, the Dafdar pass, which was part of Hunza in Jammu Kashmir until the Chinese communist revolution, gave India a direct access to Tajikistan.
Between 1947 and 1948, Pakistan invaded and seized one-third of Jammu Kashmir in response to the state’s official accession to India through a British-led constitutional provision. Pakistan's subsequent control over the Shigar, Hunza, Ishkoman, and Gupis valleys resulted in India losing its land bridge to Afghanistan and Tajikistan. India took the matter to the United Nations Security Council, which determined that Pakistan must completely withdraw its nationals, including armed forces, from Jammu Kashmir in order to find a long-term solution. Pakistan consented to and signed the peace plan, but it has refused to physically withdraw from Jammu Kashmir. Since then, India has used Iranian ports to transit to Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Russia.
On 2 March 1963, China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto signed an illegal interim border agreement, flagrantly defying the approval of authorities in Jammu Kashmir. The deal involved Pakistan transferring the valleys of Shaksgam, Raskam, Aghil, Taghdumbash, Mintaka, and Dafdar to China. The chiefs in the Hunza and Shigar valleys of Jammu Kashmir disagreed with the decision, but were forced to keep quiet for fear of incarceration and losing appanages and perquisites. This agreement provided prospects for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and communist China to forge a strategic alliance against regional competitors.
The Agreement states that the boundary delimitation is temporary and that China will delineate a formal boundary with the relevant sovereign power to replace the 1963 treaty following the final ruling on the Kashmir dispute.
“……the two parties agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the government of the peoples’ republic of China on the boundary, as described in Article II of the present agreement of Kashmir, so as to sign a boundary treaty to replace the present agreement.”
Shaksgam had historically been part of the Shigar princedom. Whereas, Shigar was part of Jammu Kashmir's Ladakh district before India was bifurcated to create Pakistan. Hydrographically, both Shigar and Shaksgam valleys receive water from the Braldu glacier. The streams flowing southward from the Braldu glacier eventually join the Mighty Indus, and those running northward merge into the Yarkand River.
All geographic and topographic phenomena in Shaksgam, including glaciers, mountains, high passes, water bodies, valleys, and camping grounds, are named in Balti and Ladakhi Tibetan dialects, indicating a long-standing socioeconomic and political relationship to Ladakh. Shaksgam appears on Chinese official maps from 1917, 1919, and 1933 as part of Jammu Kashmir. Historically, Chinese rulers have claimed the Kunlun Mountain range, nicknamed the backbone of China, as the southern boundary of their traditional realm. The Chinese Emperor Chien Lung's government released a map in 1762 that identified Shaksgam as Indian land.
According to local history, Shigar's Chowo (chiefs) made periodic visits to Shaksgam after the autumn harvest. The Chowo established the Muztaghi Shagaran, a polo ground in Shaksgam in the fifth century AD. The Chowo also built Moni Brangsa, a camp for the musicians that joined him on his voyage, near the Sarpo Lago River. During the annual autumn festival, the rulers of Hotan and Yarkand joined Shigar's chiefs in playing polo in Shaksgam. The Polo Diplomacy benefited neighboring states in maintaining healthy political and cultural relations.
The India Factor
India considers the Trans-Karakorum Tract, including Shaksgam, to be an integral part of its territory and strongly opposes Chinese economic and military activity in the occupied areas. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, claimed that the Shaksgam Valley belonged to the princely state of Jammu Kashmir and consistently opposed the 1963 China-Pakistan ad-hoc border arrangement. According to archives, shortly after China and Pakistan signed the boundary agreement, Prime Minister Nehru called it unlawful and reminded the United Nations that neither Pakistan nor China had locus standi in Jammu Kashmir.
In response, Chinese officials assured India that they accepted the disputed status of Gilgit-Baltistan, including Shaksgam, and that if Pakistan relinquishes its claim to Jammu Kashmir, China will renegotiate the boundary with India. The 1963 agreement is a proof that China does not recognise Pakistan's sovereignty over any part of Jammu Kashmir, including Gilgit Baltistan and more importantly, views its own presence in the Trans-Karakoram Tract including Shaksgam to be provisional.
On 14 January 2026, an Indian diplomat once again warned China to suspend infrastructure construction in Shaksgam and the surrounding valleys of the Trans-Karakoram Tract. India is concerned that China has built feeder roads through Shimshal and Shaksgam to connect Gilgit with Hotan, Golmud and Tibet. China is currently planning to build a tunnel beneath the Aghil Pass to make the Gilgit-Hotan route all-weather.
Chinese Calculus
Hotan City is an important military headquarter situated at the crossroads of the Tibet-Xinjiang Highway (G219) and the Hotan-Qiemo-Golmud Highway (G315). The G315 connects eastern Xinjiang to Qinghai province and central China, cutting the distance between Gilgit and Golmud in half circumventing the much longer Kashgar-Urumqi route. Golmud, western China's military headquarter, also acts as a major cargo transit and petrochemical hub.
At the same time, the feeder road through Shimshal and Shaksgam connects Gilgit to Aksai-chin, and reduces the distance between Pakistan and Tibet by over 800 kilometers. China completed the construction of a bridge over the western margins of Pangong Lake in 2023. This significantly shortens the distance between Aksai-chin and Shaksgam, endangering India's military installations along the Actual Line of Control. These road networks enhance China's ability to encircle the Siachen Glacier and swiftly project power in disputed regions.
Every new transportation development initiative brings China closer to Pakistani shores in the Indian Ocean. When Nawaz Sharif was Prime Minister of Pakistan, China expressed interest in spending $18 billion in building a 200-kilometer tunnel across Gilgit-Baltistan to further shorten travel time between Xinjiang and the Gwadar port in occupied Balochistan.
Pakistan, like North Korea, is viewed by China as a long-term military and strategic partner. China and Pakistan are currently peering down at Iran's terrifying political developments. If the protesters succeed, then Iran's new government is likely to be hostile to China, which would make Beijing exceedingly dependent on Gilgit for access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Oceanic Region. Despite India's concerns, these variables compel Pakistan and China to pursue long-term cooperation and fortify permanent land linkages.
In an alternate universe, if Pakistan would have acted as per the India Independence Act and not occupied Gilgit-Baltistan, New Delhi would have enjoyed unrestricted access to Afghanistan, Iran, central Asia, and Russia through Gilgit. Interestingly, the same circumstances would have made China rely on India to reach Persian Gulf ports.
The prospect of India reclaiming occupied territory has persuaded Pakistan to allow China to manage not only Shaksgam, Aghil, and Raskam, but all of Gilgit-Baltistan. However, the acceleration of infrastructure development in Gilgit Baltistan, Tibet, and Xinjiang damages indigenous culture and ethnic demographics. Furthermore, China's disproportionate involvement in the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan complicates and prolongs the Kashmir conflict, posing financial risks and increasing vulnerability in an ecologically fragile area.
Local Perceptions
Back in Gilgit Baltistan, the locals allege that the Chinese-Pakistani alliance is growing at the expense of their right to life. They are disputing the illegal temporary boundary agreement, as well as the illegal transfer of parts of Jammu Kashmir to China, because neither country has sovereignty over Gilgit-Baltistan.
The locals remind the United Nations Human Rights Council that Pakistan breaches the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by refusing to seek permission from the people in Gilgit Baltistan for resource extraction and infrastructure development. These illicit actions have far-reaching ramifications throughout Asia.
The Shaksgam Valley dispute underscores how unresolved territorial conflicts create ripples across geopolitics, infrastructure, and local livelihoods. China’s deepening presence, enabled by Pakistan’s concessions, complicates India’s security calculus and complicates the Kashmir issue. Until a fair resolution is reached, Shaksgam will remain a symbol of contested sovereignty and strategic rivalry in Asia.
Senge Sering is founder of Institute for Gilgit Baltistan Studies based in USA. The views expressed are his own.
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