As India adopts a cautious 'wait and watch' approach, the recent engagements between Bangladesh and Pakistan indicate that Dhaka, under the current interim government, is prepared to initiate a new chapter in its relations with Islamabad, seemingly without regard for past grievances. The implications of this development for India, particularly whether it could lead to the resurgence of a terror axis that threatens India's security interests, remain uncertain.
Five months have elapsed since the establishment of the new interim government in post-Hasina Bangladesh, which has been actively pursuing a range of reforms aimed at revitalizing the nation. The progress thus far has been fraught with difficulties. Although there were initial hopes associated with the Yunus-led administration, it now confronts significant obstacles as the route to state reconstruction remains ambiguous.
Following the formation of the interim government on 8 August 2024, the country has been engulfed in lawlessness and disorder. Additionally, the issue of constitutional reform is reigniting the longstanding divide between the secular and religious aspects of the state. A re-evaluation of historical narratives is also emerging, particularly concerning the legacies of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the events of the 1971 Liberation War. Furthermore, Bangladesh's foreign relations have taken a new direction, as evidenced by Dhaka's intention to enhance bilateral relations with Pakistan, its former western cousin in Pakistan. Given the unique historical context between Bangladesh and Pakistan, it is essential to examine the recent developments in their interactions.
The nature of bilateral relations after 1971
It would be inaccurate to characterize the bilateral relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan as hostile, despite the fact that Bangladesh was formed through the secession of East Pakistan from its western counterpart. The nine-month-long Liberation War in 1971, which led to the tragic loss of three to five million lives and the displacement of approximately ten million ethnic Bengalis due to the actions of the Pakistan Army and its allied forces (razakar), remains an undeniable aspect of Bangladesh's journey towards becoming an independent and self-governing nation. Pakistan officially recognised Bangladesh on 22 February 1974, following months-long pressures from Muslims nations as a condition for Dhakaâs attending the Islamic Summit in Lahore. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then Pakistan PM, expressed his dislike and unhappiness about this decision, but finally accepted the reality of Bangladeshâs existence as an independent nation. As a reconciliation, Islamabad offered to engage in trade relations with Dhaka after the assassination of Mujibur Rahman and change of regime in 1975. Diplomatic relations, especially trade and travel, turned full-fledged the following year, indicating a normalcy in bilateral relations. Following the restoration of civilian democratic government in the 1990s, after almost 15 years of military dictatorship, there was a significant enhancement in diplomatic relations, characterized by the fortification of economic connections and cultural diplomacy, particularly during the tenure of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) from 1991 to 1996 and again from 2001 to 2006. This period was marked by notable high-level diplomatic visits from Pakistan, including a significant trip by then-President Pervez Musharraf to Dhaka in 2002, during which he articulated Islamabadâs intention to âmove beyond the past and collaborate for a shared futureâ. This visit remains the last by a head of state between the two nations.
A period of disengagement
Bilateral relations, however, have periodically witnessed turbulence due to disagreements over the events of 1971 War and unresolved historical grievances. Diplomatic relations turned substantially hostile during Sheikh Hasinaâs second tenure (2009-2024) when International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 was enacted following amendments in 2009. In 2013, leaders of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) were sentenced to death after being found guilty for their role in war crimes in 1971 War, drawing protests from Pakistan. In 2015, a ban on educational exchanges was imposed, restricting the entry of Pakistani students in Dhaka University, because of Pakistanâs refusal to acknowledge its 1971 war atrocities. In May 2016, the Supreme Court dismissed review plea of BJI chief Motiur Rahman Nizami, who was awarded death sentence for his war crimes, to which Pakistan Foreign Office expressed deep concern. This action by Islamabad led to Dhaka submitting its protest letter to the Pakistan envoy.
Again, Pakistan expressed its strong condemnation through an unanimous parliamentary resolution, when prominent leaders of BJI and the BNP were executed for war crimes in 2016. These actions from Islamabad were perceived by Dhaka as âinterference in internal mattersâ, triggering travel restrictions on the former. Bangladesh also joined India, Bhutan and Afghanistan in refusing to attend the 19th SAARC summit slated to be hosted by Islamabad in 2016, citing Pakistanâs âincitement of terrorâ as a reason. The Awami League government also sought an official public apology from Pakistan for the 1971 atrocities committed by Pak forces, making it conditional for the improvement of bilateral ties. Pakistan has yet to formally apologised for its 1971 war atrocities on ethnic Bengalis in East Pakistan. Instead, Islamabad says that the 1974 Tripartite agreement between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, had âsettledâ the issue for ever, when the then government of Pakistan âcondemned and deeply regretted any crimes that may have been committedâ. Back in Dhaka, the use of the term, âmay-have-been-committedâ rings hollow and it is taken as a proof that Pakistan has never admitted to, leave alone apologise for, the atrocities committed by its soldiers in 1971.
Post-Hasina bilateral engagements
Against this backdrop, after Sheikh Hasinaâs ouster, the news of Pakistan trying to woo Bangladesh and intensify strategic engagement with it, beyond the public glare, has startled many observers in Dhaka and India.
It is widely believed that the Awami Leagueâs diplomatic closeness with New Delhi, and its general historical grievances against Pakistan, are reasons behind souring bilateral relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan under Sheikh Hasina government. With Hasina ousted after a student-led mass movement in August 2024, Dhaka has been seen to be making an effort to improve its ties with Islamabad.
In fact, the change of government was noted by Khawaja Muhammad Asif, the defence minister of Pakistan, as a âwelcome opportunityâ for renewing bilateral ties. On a telephonic conversation between Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif and the chief advisor of Bangladeshâs interim government Dr. Muhammad Yunus, both agreed to work closely for greater regional progress. Yunus also met Sharif on the sidelines of the UNGA meeting in New York in September 2024, where they agreed to expand bilateral ties.
Subsequently, Bangladeshâs National Board of Revenue, in October 2024, announced the elimination of the mandatory requirement of 100 per cent physical inspection of all imported goods from Pakistan, in a move to ease bilateral trade. In November 2024, a cargo ship from Karachi docked at Chittagong port, marking a first direct maritime contact between the two in 53 years. The restrictions on Pakistani studentsâ entry to Dhaka University were also lifted, re-opening the doors of bilateral educational exchanges. At the D-8 Cairo Summit in December last year, both held further bilateral talks to strengthen relations in areas like trade, sports and cultural exchanges.
Talks on the need of reviving SAARC (last meeting held in 2014) as a foreign policy priority was also expressed by Yunus to which Shehbaz Sharif extended his governmentâs support. Moreover, Yunus urged his Shehbaz to settle 1971 issues âonce and for allâ for Bangladesh-Pakistan relations to move forward. Reiterating the previous Pakistani stand, Sharif, quite expectedly, mentioned the 1974 Tripartite agreement which, as has been said before, may not be acceptable to Bangladesh.
This month, January 2025, witnessed proactive engagements on both sides and a consensus to expand the areas of bilateral cooperation. Dhaka eased visa process for Pakistanis to travel Bangladesh in an effort to prioritise increase in trade and investment. In Pakistan, senior military leaders reportedly held a high-level meeting where they pledged to boost defence ties as âtwo brotherly nationsâ, via joint efforts in addressing regional security strategic interests and  to resist âexternal disruptionsâ, a plausible hint at India.
There are already reports on Pakistan Armyâs plan to establish good ties with the military of Bangladesh, a first since 1971, by offering to provide military training to Bangladesh army, scheduled to begin from February. In a first, Pakistan ISI chief made a historic visit to Dhaka, reported to be aimed at building intelligence sharing network between Dhaka and Islamabadâs intelligence agencies, which many in New Delhi believe will be aimed at cross-border subversion activities targeting India, especially the North East. Harping on the need for direct engagements, plans are afoot to resume direct flights between the two countries, after a long hiatus since 2018, which was recently announced by Bangladesh High Commission to Pakistan.
There is view in Bangladesh, which comes out of conversations with interlocutors from the country, who would speak on condition of anonymity, that anti-India forces (read those subscribing to Jamaat ideology) are exercising lot of influence in the interim governmentâs functioning, which explains the new-found enthusiasm to strengthen relationship with Pakistan disregarding history, willing to proceed without Pakistan offering an apology for its excesses in 1971. In fact, in a first, some such elements associated with Nawab Salimullah Academy celebrated Jinnahâs birthday on 25 December 2024, December 25, 2024, at the VIP Hall of the National Press Club in Dhaka! Some observers from Dhaka would urge this author to ignore such events and take it just as a âflash in the panâ, while some others would say caustically: âTighten your belts, you will see many such firsts in the coming days; the âmajorityâ will allow it to go unprotested, while disapproving of it in silenceâ. Still others would argue forcefully: âBangladesh is no Pakistan and Pakistanis are not trusted hereâ.
Indiaâs concern
In the post-Hasina era, Bangladesh-Pakistan bilateral relations is moving beyond mere traditional tiesâ economic and culturalâ and assuming a strategic shape with ongoing talks for strengthening bilateral defence cooperation. The new wave of engagements indicate that the expansion of bilateral relations is primarily leaning towards buttressing defence ties. These developments have raised concerns in India, which shares borders with both Pakistan and Bangladesh. In the past, the notorious intelligence agency of Pakistan, the ISI, had used Bangladeshi soil to train and nurture insurgents in the North East. During Sheikh Hasinaâs prime ministership, this trend was reversed which had been received well in India.
New Delhi enjoyed a robust bilateral relationship with Dhaka under Hasina-ruled government. However, as Hasina grew unpopular within Bangladesh, her perpetuation in power by unfair means was wrongly attributed to Indian support leading to a spurt in anti-India sentiment in the country. After the fall of Hasina, these sentiments intensified further, even leading to anti-Hindu sentiments, which have plagued Bangladesh for the last few months. In fact, reports of increasing attacks on minority Hindus after 5 August 2024 became a major point of tension in Indo-Bangladesh bilateral relations. New Delhi is also faced with the problem of illegal migration via the porous border it shares with Bangladesh.
Given these circumstances, Dhakaâs defence and intelligence-sharing cooperation with a country that shares antagonistic relation with India, is undoubtedly a point of security concern for New Delhi. As India is carefully on a âwait and watchâ mode, the new Bangladesh-Pakistan engagements is revealing that Dhaka under the present interim dispensation is willing to start its relationship with Islamabad âafreshâ, without âlooking backâ. What shape it will take vis-Ă -vis India, and whether it would mean revival of a terror axis detrimental to the security interests of India remains to be seen.
One can only hope that Dhaka would value its engagements with India, a country which shares deep historical and cultural roots, and is committed to take the developmental engagements with the country forward.
*Dr Ankita Sanyal is Associate Research Fellow at International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed here are her own.
