Field Marshal’s Pakistan: Institutionalized Authoritarianism Under the 27th Amendment

Pakistan’s 27th Constitutional Amendment formalizes military dominance by creating a powerful Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) with unified control over all armed services and lifetime immunity from prosecution. The amendment abolishes the CJCSC role, curtails judicial oversight, and empowers military-led governance. Field Marshal Asim Munir, now CDF, promotes an ideologically extreme stance against India, framing hostility as existential. Western silence reflects strategic interests, including Pakistan’s potential normalization with Israel. The amendment marks a shift from hybrid democracy to institutionalized authoritarianism, deepening public despair amid economic collapse and emigration. India faces a militarized, ideologically driven Pakistan with grave regional security implications.

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Pakistan’s 27^th Constitutional Amendment marks the constitutional legalisation of de facto military rule, enabling the military to assume de jure control over the Pakistani statecraft, which has grave implications for regional stability and India’s security.

The Context

A series of recent events in South Asia have once again brought Pakistan’s internal and external instability to the forefront.  Not a single day passes in Pakistan without news of terrorist attacks in mostly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and also in Balochistan. The attack on Wana Cadet College took place on Monday, 10 November 2025 in South Waziristan, KP. A suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into the college’s main gate, followed by armed militants entering the premises. The Pakistan security forces could neutralise the attackers soon; otherwise it would have as devastating as the attack in December 2014 on the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar, which had left about 140 people dead. A day later, on 11 November 2025, Islamabad also witnessed a deadly suicide explosion near its district court complex in Sector G-11, claiming twelve lives and leaving dozens injured. Within hours of the Islamabad attack, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) issued an explicit claim of responsibility, declaring that the operation targeted “judges, lawyers and officials enforcing Pakistan’s un-Islamic laws,” and warning that further attacks would follow unless Sharia was implemented nationwide. Despite the clarity of this admission, Pakistani authorities quickly sidestepped the TTP’s statement and began advancing an alternative narrative, laying the groundwork for a politically motivated externalisation of blame. In the following days too there were several reports of tussle between security forces and insurgents in different parts of KP.

Following a predictable pattern, in most of these cases Pakistan has been quick to pin responsibility for most of these attacks including the Islamabad blast on India. Such orchestrated narrative is clearly intended to deflect attention from its own internal crises, shape international perception against India and portray Pakistan as a victim of terrorism, likely aiming to both soil India’s image and to ward off any possible Indian retaliatory action, in case of terrorists acts in India, with links to Pakistan. Under Field Marshal Asim Munir, this new pattern of Pakistani behaviour has come to light whereby Pakistan has sought an external diversion amid surging insurgency and growing domestic political discontent over constitutional changes that have been brought about to further consolidate preponderance of the military in the domestic power structure.

New Delhi has firmly and consistently rejected these baseless allegations, describing them as a deliberate attempt by Islamabad to divert attention from its deepening domestic crisis. Responding to remarks made by Pakistani leaders, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stated on 11 November 2025 that the accusations were “baseless and unfounded,” calling them “a desperate attempt by Pakistan’s delirious leadership to deflect attention from the ongoing military-inspired constitutional subversion within the country.” He emphasised that the international community is well aware of Pakistan’s internal turmoil and will not be misled by such diversionary tactics.

Internal Turmoil: Institutionalization of Military Rule

The 27^th Constitutional Amendment, fundamentally alters the balance of power within the Pakistani state. The amendment creates a new position of the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) that consolidates control over all three services—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—under a single, centralized military authority, with a tenure of five years, renewable once, appointed by the President on the Prime Minister’s advice. This position is expected to be held by General Asim Munir, the current Army Chief, who was elevated to the five-star rank of Field Marshal following Pakistan’s recent military confrontation with India in the aftermath of the Pahalgam killings.

The Amendment

The post of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) is going to be abolished after the current office-holder retires, and all three service chiefs now fall directly under the unified command of the CDF. A new post of Commander of National Strategic Command (CNSC): has been created, focused on strategic assets, likely including nuclear command and high-level defence planning, functionally subordinate to the CDF. The CDF is also granted lifetime immunity from prosecution—both during their tenure and after retirement. This immunity is also given to the President and covers anybody holding the position of Field Marshal, Marshal of the Air Force and Admiral of the Fleet. Such immunity covers civil, criminal, and constitutional cases, effectively shielding these individuals from judicial scrutiny during and after their service, effectively institutionalising military supremacy under a constitutional framework.

It authorizes the creation of Federal Constitutional Courts (FCCs), whose jurisdiction will include interpretation of the Constitution, and disputes between institutions, while the Supreme Court will henceforth be limited mainly to civil and criminal matters—effectively curbing its powers of constitutional oversight.

The CDF, through the Defence Coordination Council, will exercise significant control over appointments, transfers, and postings in sensitive security and bureaucratic institutions, reducing the judiciary’s traditional influence in such matters.

Administrative reforms embedded in the amendment empower district magistrates with enhanced law-and-order authority, reviving elements reminiscent of colonial-era governance to maintain tighter centralized control. In parallel, the amendment also significantly dilutes provincial autonomy by centralising greater administrative and structural authority at the federal—and effectively military—level, thereby weakening the constitutional balance that once afforded provinces a semblance of self-governance.

This transformation marks the institutionalization of military rule under a constitutional façade. What was once a de facto military regime is now being granted de jure legitimacy through legislative sanction. Even former military rulers such as Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, or Pervez Musharraf—who seized power through coups—never succeeded in securing such comprehensive, legally enshrined control over all arms of the state.

In essence, the 27^th Amendment represents a systematic militarization of Pakistan’s political and judicial architecture, effectively dismantling the delicate civil–military balance that existed on paper. The result is a Pakistan where the military’s dominance is no longer an informal reality—it is now a constitutional fact.

Pakistan’s experiment with democracy is now on life-support. The amendment introduces an undeclared martial law, eliminating whatever remaining modicum of nominal civilian supremacy was there.

A well-known Pakistani analyst, Dr Farrukh Saleem, has tried to address the criticisms surrounding Pakistan’s amended Article 243 and the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) model in an op-ed piece in The News International. He would argue that the prominence that army acquires is mainly because of the ‘threat geography’ Pakistan finds itself in, and it is not dominance; that unified command enhances operational speed without undermining civilian oversight. The CDF model, he would say, aligns with global standards, ensuring battlefield coherence rather than uniformed supremacy. The amendment does not alter promotion systems in other services, nor is it tailored to any individual. Ending the CJCSC role removes redundancy, not jointness and such constitutional embedment ensures stability, not rigidity. He also says that Article 243 is about modernizing command for fast-paced warfare, not shifting power away from democratic control. While such argument is a valiant attempt to normalise an otherwise abnormal act of constitutional impropriety, the fact remains that creating such an apex military office and granting such sweeping powers to it, run against the grain of constitutional democracy.

Pakistan has historically justified such expansions of military authority under the pretext of national security and grave threat to its survival. Since independence, the army has strategically characterised India as a permanent existential threat to rationalize its intervention in governance, consolidate institutional control, and accumulate wealth and privileges. Civilian attempts at strengthening democracy have often been curtailed through narratives of Indian aggression, convincing the public that strong military rule is essential for national survival. The same logic has been employed to rationalize the 27^th Amendment. By portraying India as an ever-present existential threat, the military positions itself as the indispensable guardian of the state, thereby institutionalizing its supremacy and ensuring that constitutional reforms serve the army’s interests rather than those of the Pakistani people. Over the decades, this approach has allowed the military to become a state within a state, dominating political, economic, and institutional life while ordinary citizens remain politically and economically marginalized.

Western Silence

Surprisingly, this constitutional coup has drawn minimal criticism from Western powers and media outlets that are otherwise vocal about democratic backsliding elsewhere. This silence is not coincidental.

Asif Munir remains strategically useful to the West—especially to the United States—for advancing key regional objectives, including in Afghanistan, Iran, and the broader West Asian dynamics, particularly in the context of Pakistan’s potential normalization of ties with Israel. Reports also suggest that Islamabad has already held discussions about possible troops deployment for international stabilization missions in Gaza and is tacitly moving toward recognizing Israel—something Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif subtly hinted at in a tweet referring to a “two-state solution.”

Officially, Pakistan still does not recognize Israel; its passports explicitly state that they are valid for travel to all countries except Israel. However, the shifting geopolitical landscape suggests otherwise. US President Donald Trump, during his first term, had already pushed several Middle Eastern nations toward recognizing Israel under the Abraham Accords. Trump, who understands Pakistan’s dual significance as both a Muslim-majority state and a nuclear power, views the Pakistani military as a critical player in this context and recognises the potential challenges that Pakistan could pose in future for Israel’s security.

As much as Pakistani military courts the US, Trump appears to have made his own calculation to bring Pakistan’s military leadership on board. Recognition of Israel by Pakistan would have a powerful symbolic effect across the Muslim world, potentially encouraging other states to follow suit. Pakistan’s military, in turn, has indicated that such a strategic shift would require stronger institutional authority—something the 27^th Amendment conveniently facilitates. This enhanced authority would also help manage domestic opposition to the military’s decisions. This mutual understanding explains the conspicuous silence of Western nations in this broader diplomatic realignment.

Trump’s repeated praise of Asif Munir as a “great Field Marshal” fits neatly into this pattern of transactional politics. Known for his zero-sum approach, Trump rarely offers support without expecting tangible returns. His dealings with allies—whether in Asia or the Middle East—consistently demand favourable outcomes for American interests. Western nations thus appear to be quietly endorsing Munir’s consolidation of power in exchange for strategic favours, revealing a troubling convergence between geopolitical expediency and democratic compromise. Moreover, it becomes easier for the United States to deal with a single, centralized military authority in Pakistan—as suggested by a recent CIA operative—since Washington often finds it more convenient to engage with a unified command rather than a fragmented civilian government.

A Dangerous Ideological Turn

Beyond the structural changes, the most alarming aspect of Asif Munir’s rise is his ideological radicalism. Unlike his predecessors, Munir’s statements reveal a deeply extremist and sectarian worldview. He has repeatedly invoked the Two-Nation Theory, stating in April 2025:

Our forefathers believed that we were different from Hindus in every possible aspect of life. Our religion is different. Our customs are different. Our traditions are different. Our thoughts are different. Our ambitions are different… That was the foundation of the Two-Nation Theory. It was laid on the belief that we are two nations, not one.

These remarks confirm that Munir frames Pakistan and India as fundamentally distinct entities divided along religious, cultural, and civilizational lines, implying that enmity is existential rather than merely political. The aftermath of such statements often coincides with real-world hostilities; for example, the Pahalgam terror attack occurred shortly after his rhetoric intensified, underscoring how his ideological framing can subsequently translate into violence.

Munir has also employed vivid metaphors to describe India‑Pakistan dynamics. At a private gathering in Florida, he compared the two countries to a “Mercedes” and a “dump truck,” observing: “India is a shining Mercedes … we are a dump truck full of gravel. If the truck hits the car, who is going to be the loser?” This analogy underscores both his recognition of India’s comparative advantage and his deliberate attempt to frame confrontation in dramatic, destructive terms.

In addition, Munir issued nuclear threats against India from the American soil (he was visiting the US) on 10 August 2025, emphasizing Pakistan’s willingness to escalate if it perceives existential danger. He declared: “We are a nuclear nation. If we think we are going down, we’ll take half the world down with us.” These statements, coupled with his consolidation of command over all three services under the National Strategic Command (NSC) through this constitutional amendment, indicate that he now possesses both the institutional authority and ideological motivation to pursue aggressive, faith‑driven, and potentially catastrophic policies against India.

Moreover, his rhetoric also extends to economic intimidation. On 12 August 2025, Munir explicitly threatened India’s economic infrastructure—singling out the Jamnagar refinery, a symbol of India’s industrial strength—and warned that in a future conflict it would be a target. By naming a major economic asset of India, he signals a strategic shift: confrontation will no longer be limited to military fronts but to the economic backbone as well.

This rhetoric, steeped in religious, cultural, and civilizational terms, reflects a mindset in which hostility toward India is inevitable. Munir’s worldview indicates that Pakistan’s animosity toward India is existential and enduring, independent of any territorial disputes. Scholars and analysts from India have not yet sufficiently exposed or highlighted this ideological dimension on the global stage, leaving the international community less aware of the deep-rooted nature of the threat.

Pakistan’s Deepening Crisis and the People’s Despair

For ordinary Pakistanis, the 27^th Amendment represents the final betrayal of the people by their power elite. Labouring under elite-capture, the Pakistani economy is in shambles; inflation is rising, unemployment is soaring, and the state is increasingly unable to provide even basic economic stability. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s military elite continues to enrich itself—owning vast properties and running multi-billion-dollar business empires. The Fauji Foundation alone is valued at around $6 billion, while wider military-owned conglomerates such as the Army Welfare Trust, Bahria Foundation, Shaheen Foundation, the National Logistics Cell (NLC), and Frontier Works Organization (FWO) dominate key civilian sectors including fertilizer, cement, banking, insurance, real estate, transport, construction, and food industries. Collectively, these military enterprises generate tens of billions of dollars annually, giving the armed forces immense economic power while the common citizen struggles for survival.

The desperation has reached such levels that Pakistan now ranks among the highest emigrant-producing countries in the world. According to the ICMPD Migration Outlook 2025, “862,625 Pakistani nationals left the country in 2023” in search of economic opportunities abroad. At the same time, official data from Pakistan’s Protectorate of Emigrants confirms that 2,894,645 Pakistanis emigrated between 2022 and September 2025. Alarmed by this unprecedented exodus — with over 335,000 Pakistanis leaving in just the first half of 2025 — the government has introduced restrictions on emigration. Yet such measures cannot stop people from leaving, when the country does not offer them security of life, nor opportunity for growth. Such unprecedented outward movement reflects a harsh truth; young Pakistanis no longer dream of rebuilding their country; they dream only of escaping it. With the new amendment granting the military constitutional permanence, the people are effectively trapped in an entrenched cycle of poverty, repression, and hopelessness.

Implications for India and the Region

India must view these developments with utmost seriousness. A militarized Pakistan led practically by an ideologically extremist Field Marshal is a direct and existential security threat. Munir’s worldview ensures perpetual hostility towards India, independent of any political or territorial considerations. His rhetoric and actions reflect a mindset that equates Pakistan’s survival with India’s destruction.

For the region, this means heightened instability. A constitutionally entrenched military dictatorship in Pakistan, backed by selective Western support, could embolden aggressive policies against India and destabilize Afghanistan and Iran as well.

Pakistan’s 27th Constitutional Amendment marks the end of democracy, in a real sense, in the country. By giving constitutional legitimacy to military dominance, the extant hybrid governance system in Pakistan has turned for the worse. Pakistan has, indeed, entered an era of institutionalized authoritarianism. The international community’s silence, driven by strategic convenience, only emboldens this dangerous experiment.

For India, Asif Munir represents a new kind of challenge—an ideologically driven, constitutionally empowered, and internationally shielded military dictator. His policies are not merely anti-India in a geopolitical sense; they are fuelled by a deeper ideological hostility that could shape Pakistan’s actions in the years to come.

India and the world must recognize this shift for what it truly is: not just a political change in Pakistan, but a structural militarization of the state—one that could have grave consequences for regional peace and stability.

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* Dr Imran Khurshid is Associate Research Fellow at ICPS. The views expressed in this comment are his own and does not in any way represent the views of the Institution.