* This Essay was published in Strategic Analysis, September-October 204, (Vol. 48, Issue 5, pp. 520–529), at https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2024.2367839. This is being reproduced here with due permission.
If Helen’s is the face that launched a thousand ships and started the Trojan War, NJ 9842 or 980420 to be precise, is the map grid reference point which launched a thousand soldiers and started the coldest war – a military standoff which continues at the highest battlefield on Earth even today. Operation Meghdoot, which commenced on 13April 1984 is perhaps the costliest and longest ongoing operation of the Indian Army. It started with a brilliantly conceived, meticulously planned and precisely executed pre-emptive strike by India at altitudes where even survival is difficult, and resulted in its occupation of the Saltoro Heights and effective control over the Siachen Glacier.
But what is NJ 9842? How did it come into existence? Where is it mentioned? Where is it located? What is the exact meaning of the term and what are the misconceptions surrounding it?
Since the Siachen impasse is essentially about the alignment of the line beyond NJ 9842, answers to these questions are more important than ever before so that the facts surrounding it can be appreciated in their correct perspective.
What is NJ 9842 and how did it come into existence?
India and Pakistan fought their first war over Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 and on 27 July 1949 the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) mediated a ceasefire agreement (CFA) between them in Karachi .1 Even though this agreement clearly delimited the entire ceasefire line (CFL), it was yet to be completely demarcated. Therefore, it was agreed that the descriptive narrative in the CFA will serve only as a general guide when the CFL positions are under consideration, while the basic document, which will determine the exact location of the line, would be the original map drawn during the demarcation exercise, signed by the opposing army representatives and United Nations (UN) Observers and approved by UNCIP’s Military Advisor (MA). On 8 August 1949 the MA shared the Organization Chart for the demarcation of the CFL in eight Sectors, the eighth sector being Marpola NN 6744 incl. Glacier. In this Sector Maj. Gen. Crum, Captain Frederickson and Major Ward were the UN Observers from the Pakistani side (Location: Marol) while Major Ives, Col. Ebbesen and Major Kaufmann were the UN Observers from the Indian side (Location: Kargil). The process which commenced in the first week of August was expected to be completed within a month, however it went on till much later, as a result of which, the one month period provided in the CFA for readjustment of the troop positions had to be extended to 31 October 1949. By September 1949, the first snow had already fallen in a few of the high mountain passes and the daunting task of undertaking physical demarcation of the line in this region was yet to be completed.
The hostile terrain, harsh climate, lack of resources, practical difficulties in surveying and demarcation, general inaccessibility of the uninhabitable glaciated region which lay ahead and the fact that it had never witnessed any skirmishes, would certainly have been some of the important factors weighing in the minds of the demarcating teams when they decided to halt the process, instead of completing it as per the mandate of the CFA. Additionally, since the entire Jammu and Kashmir dispute was expected to be resolved within a few months and there was no controversy inter-se regarding the precise delimitation of the region yet to be demarcated, one can reasonably assume that both sides left the demarcation for a future date, there being a distinct possibility that it might not even be necessary.
This point at which the demarcation exercise was agreed to be halted and up to which the CFL was mutually delineated, is identified by its map grid reference and referred to as NJ 9842. It is the last physically demarcated point on the ground which the teams managed to reach while moving north en route to the glaciers.
By around 1 November 1949, the agreed CFL for the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir had more or less been agreed to and demarcated, barring the region beyond NJ 9842 which had been left out. Whatever the sides agreed to, is recorded in the third Interim Report of UNCIP S/1430 dated 9 December 1949, which reads at Para 165 that, the line contemplated in the ceasefire agreement of 27th July 1949 has been completely demarcated on the ground. There is no dispute on the proposition that the region beyond NJ 9842 was pending mutual demarcation and delineation, as this status quo was duly acknowledged and maintained by both the sides2.
After the 1965 war, the Tashkent Agreement was signed and both the countries reverted back to their CFL positions by returning the territories captured from each other. However, after the 1971 war, post the Simla and Suchetgarh Agreements, both sides agreed to retain their gains, as a result of which, the CFL had to be realigned. Since the line which came into existence included all the new areas occupied and controlled by the respective sides, it came to be referred to as the Line of Control. Even when the demarcation and delineation of this line was being done, the entire focus was on areas where actual fighting had taken place or where there were existing disputes. Since there was no confusion regarding the status of the region beyond NJ 9842 and it had never seen any military presence or action at any point of time including 1965 and 1971, perhaps neither side contemplated that it would ever become a bone of contention in the future. It appears that both sides were happy with the status quo both in terms of the ground position (area being unoccupied and demilitarized) as well as the paper position enunciated in the CFA (area pending demarcation and delineation), neither of them raised any claim or counter-claim regarding this region while the demarcation/delineation of the LoC was being done. Consequently no effort was made to get it mutually demarcated as per the mandate of the CFA. Therefore, the northernmost terminus of the LoC too remained fixed at this point, i.e., the northernmost and last mutually demarcated point of the CFA. The contention that there was any shift or movement of the northern extremity of the CFL from KHOR in 1949 to NJ 9842 after the Shimla Agreement, is incorrect.3
How do we conclude that the demarcation of the CFA was halted with mutual agreement?
According to the procedure being followed as per the CFA, if there was any dispute, the UN Observers would try to solve it on the spot. If the parties did not agree with the decision of the Observers then the matter would be referred to the Military Advisor (MA) Gen. Maurice Delvoie, whose decision would be final. According to Press reports Gen. Delvoie was called to give such decisions in the regions of Kambah, Hajira-Kotli, Uri, Tumari-Gali, Gurais, Marpo, Kargil and KHOR.4 In fact, even after the completion of the demarcation, till as late as 1951, there were areas where confusion persisted amongst the sides regarding specifics on the ground, for which they sought clarifications and rulings from the MA in case they were unable to mutually resolve the issues. Therefore, it can be inferred that, if at all either side had or continued to have even an iota of doubt regarding the alignment of the line or their respective allocations beyond NJ 9842 at any time after 27 July 1949, then they would have certainly used the forum and procedure provided to clarify it as they had done on numerous occasions earlier. The logical conclusion which follows is that the demarcation was stopped with mutual consent and both sides had complete clarity on every issue, be it the language of the CFA or the alignment of the line beyond NJ 9842.
In fact, between 1949 and 1983, there is no contemporaneous evidence to show that either side had any misconception or doubt regarding the phraseology or terminology used in any clause of the CFA or any confusion regarding the direction in which the line was to proceed beyond NJ 9842, as no such concerns were ever raised by them in any engagement with each other.
Where is NJ 9842 mentioned?
The CFA executed on 27 July 1949 is a six-page document which constitutes Annexure 26 of UNCIP’s Third Interim Report. It minutely delimits the entire ceasefire line and describes it as running from KHOR, thence north to the glaciers in this region without mentioning NJ 9842 anywhere. This point became an integral part of the CFA later, when the actual physical demarcation was being undertaken as per its mandate, by moving North towards the glaciers.
The description document titled Description of the cease fire line as drawn on the Official Map No 1: Para X from Point NN 675740 to NJ 9842 (Map Sheets ¼ inch No: 43N, 52B, 52F)5 describes the CFL as it runs from Marpo La till NJ 9842 and towards its end, reads as follows:
- Thence Northwards keeping approximately five hundred yards East along the Eastern Bank of the TEBE LUNGPA to a high feature 500 yards East of the Junction of the TEBE LUNGPA and the SHYOK river at NJ 962140
- Thence across the SHYOK river to cairn at NJ 959145,
- Thence up the ridge to a point on the boundary line at NJ 975193
- Thence Northwards along the boundary line going through point 18402 up to NJ 9842.
Similarly, the document titled Description of the Line of Control as drawn on map sheets No. 52B, 52F and 52E6executed by Major General M.R. Rajwade (India) and Brigadier S.M. Abbasi (Pakistan) on 11 December 1972, describes the Line of Control from Point No. 260955 on Map Sheet 52 B/6 to NJ 980420 on Map Sheet 52E and towards the end, reads as follows:
….thence northwards to NJ 844380, thence SE to a point on boundary at NJ 973330, thence along the boundary line to NJ 980420.
Where is NJ 9842 located?
NJ 9842 lies well within the area controlled by the Indian Army. It is a point one will encounter on the Saltoro Ridge while moving north from Chalunka along the heights towards the glaciers. Currently it is accessible only by foot and the Indian Army regularly unfurls the national flag on it on the occasion of the Independence Day. Contrary to the previous perceptions, it does not lie at the foot of any mountain.7
The CFL terminates at NJ 9842 but was NJ 9842 meant to be its terminal point after the demarcation exercise as per the CFA, or was it meant to extend beyond it?
To answer this question we must refer to Clause B2 (d) and Clause C of the CFA.
B2(d) From Dalunang eastwards the ceasefire line will follow the general line Point 15495, Ishman,Manus,Gangam,Gunderman, Point 13620,Junkar (Point 17628),Marmak, Natsara, Shangruth (Point 17531), Chorbat La (Point 15700), Chalunka (on the Shyok River), Khor, thence north to the glaciers. This portion of the cease fire line shall be demarcated in detail on the basis of the factual position as of 27 July 1949 by the local Commanders, assisted by the United Nations Military Observers.
C. The cease fire line described above shall be drawn on a one inch map (where available) and then be verified mutually on the ground by local Commanders on each side with the assistance of the United Nations Military Observers, so as to eliminate any no-man’s land. In the event that the local Commanders are unable to reach agreement, the matter shall be referred to the Commission’s Military Advisor, whose decision shall be final. After this verification, the Military Advisor will issue to each High Command a map on which will be marked the definitive cease fire line.
A careful reading shows that that the CFA explicitly defines the alignment and orientation of the CFL, describes exactly how it should run and delimits it completely in a language which is plain and simple, leaving no room for any confusion whatsoever. Clause B2(d) can be viewed in two distinct parts. While one part gives a directional command, the other part gives a demarcation command. This demarcation command, whenever executed, has to be executed in consonance with the directional command, and not in derogation thereof. Even if not fully executed, it does not imply that the sanctity of the intent agreed to and expressed in the directional command is diminished in any manner. The clause clearly and categorically mentions that the line is to proceed north to the glaciers and this portion, like the rest of the line is to be subsequently demarcated in detail by the local Commanders under the supervision of the UN Observers. The use of the phrase ‘shall be’ both in Clause B2 (d) and C makes it clear that as on the date of signing of the CFA, only the delimitation had been agreed to and the demarcation and delineation were to follow thereafter. Unfortunately, the subsequent demarcation on the ground and hence delineation on the maps could not be completed in this region. Therefore, the line abruptly ends at a point short of the vast glacial tract in the north instead of going all the way as envisaged.
Clause B2(d) does not mention the name of any particular glacier in the north but uses the phrase thence north to the glaciers. Any misgivings regarding the extent to which the demarcating teams were required to proceed north while chalking out the ceasefire line on the ground, are cleared in clause C of the agreement. Reading clause B2(d) with clause C makes it clear that wherever demarcation is done, it has to be done in such a manner so as not to leave any no man’s land. Thus, the line could not have stopped before the glaciers of the north or at the snout of just about any glacier because if that were to happen, then the entire mass of land lying between NJ 9842 and the vast glacial tract in the north (within the boundary of the State of Jammu and Kashmir) would become a no man’s land which position will fall foul of the mandate of clause C. Therefore, while NJ 9842 is the northernmost and the last mutually demarcated point on the ground en-route to the glaciers while moving in the general direction north along the heights, it was certainly not meant to be the terminal point as per the CFA, as the line could not have been left hanging in the air contrary to the Agreement. The demarcating teams were obliged to proceed with the demarcation in such a manner that the entire boundary was completely demarcated without any patch being left out. Therefore, thence north to the glaciers in the CFA could only mean due north to wherever the boundaries of the State of Jammu and Kashmir lay at that time, which position was well known to both the sides8.Thus, it would be incorrect to say that the northern extremity of the CFL is incompletely defined or is unclear in any manner.
It is apparent that the CFA was not meant to terminate at KHOR because in that case the words thence north to the glaciers written after it, become redundant. Further if the line was to terminate at NJ 9842 then the CFA should have read ‘thence north to NJ 9842’ and not ‘thence north to the glaciers’. The word ‘glaciers’ in the Agreement refers to the many glaciers and cannot be substituted with a single grid reference point which is distinct from the entire glacial tract of the north. Additionally, the grid point NJ 9842 is not even mentioned anywhere in the body of the CFA and only emerges in the demarcation description documents which were prepared when the physical demarcation on the ground was undertaken, subsequent to the Agreement. Therefore it was not even in contemplation when the CFA was executed and the question of it being envisaged as its end point does not arise.
Clearly, if either KHOR or NJ 9842 were meant to be the final terminus of the CFL and if it were not to extend beyond NJ 9842, then the CFA would have said so, instead it says that the line is to proceed further north to the glaciers. The fact that the CFA has not been rescinded and the entire region beyond NJ 9842 is pending demarcation and delineation, is not even disputed by Pakistan, which extends the line beyond NJ 9842 eastwards towards the Karakoram Pass, instead of north as per the CFA.
Was the region beyond NJ 9842 left out as a no man’s land in the CFA?
If an area has not been dealt with at all in an agreement then one may conclude that it was the intention of the parties to exclude it, however if it is squarely covered then it cannot be construed as a no man’s land. In this case, the failure of the demarcating teams to carry out their mandate as per the directions contained in the CFA due to some mutual understanding or extraneous consideration, does not make the intent expressed in the agreement vague or sanction the creation of a no man’s land contrary to it. Incomplete demarcation in a region pursuant to an agreement cannot be construed to imply the complete absence of an agreement for that region. The mere fact that before, during or after the agreement, the region continued to remain unoccupied and neither side claimed it or raised any dispute regarding it, does not make it a no man’s land especially when it has been explicitly dealt with in the CFA. On the contrary, such a position shows that both sides clearly understood the agreement and were ad idem with each other in maintaining status quo in the region pending mutual demarcation in conformity with the same.
Is NJ 9842 the same as KHOR?
While KHOR, referred to as an area (and not a point), finds mention only in the descriptive narrative of the delimitation agreement, i.e., the CFA signed on 27 July 1949, NJ 9842 is a specific point explicitly mentioned in the description documents prepared subsequently at the time of the physical demarcation on the ground.
Even though KHOR and NJ 9842 are distinct from each other and were understood as such by both the sides while executing the CFA and later demarcating the CFL, many commentators have used them interchangeably as if the two refer to the same point.9
It is pertinent to note that the CFA came into existence after months of negotiations and discussions between local commanders and senior officials from both sides. These meetings took place under the aegis of the Truce Sub-Committee of the UNCIP and started soon after the ceasefire came into effect on 1 January 1949. The final meetings commenced in Karachi from 18 July 1949 and the delimitation document was signed on 27 July 1949 by senior military officials from both sides. The Indian delegation included Lt. Gen. S.M. Shrinagesh, Maj. Gen. K.S. Thimayya, Brig. S.H.F.J. Manekshaw, Major S.K. Sinha, Mr. H.M. Patel, Defence Secretary and Vishnu Sahay, Secretary, Kashmir Affairs, while the Pakistani delegation comprised Maj. Gen. Cawthorn, Deputy Chief of General Staff, Maj. Gen. Nazir Ahmed, Commander 9 Frontier Division, Brig. M. Sher Khan, Director Military Operations, Mr. Ayub from the Defence Ministry and Mr. A.A. Khan from the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs.11 This Agreement was subsequently ratified by both the Governments of India and Pakistan. The detailing in the Agreement about which part is inclusive to which side and the description of various landmarks as the line traverses through an obviously difficult terrain, bears testimony to the commitment, application of mind and efforts made by both sides in producing the document. There can be no doubt about the fact that whatever was agreed, was clearly expressed in words, signed, ratified and thereafter implemented on the ground without demur. Therefore, the assertion that it is the demarcation of the CFL which subsequently revealed 10 that there is no place or village called KHOR from which the CFL could be fixed, is difficult to believe because if the sides’ were unaware of whatever KHOR referred to and where it was, then they would not have used the term in the Agreement.
An analysis of the Gazetteers of those times confirms that KHOR is not the name of a specific village or place or point. Research thus far reveals that in all probability it was the name given to a general feature/region of heights along the Saltoro Ridge, north of Chalunka. It is common knowledge that several features are referred to by peculiar names by military men which may or may not necessarily be the same as the geographic, colloquial or locally used names; for example, Gore Heights, Pimple Complex, Gulab, etc. and KHOR could be one such given name. However not much turns on this as neither KHOR nor NJ 9842 were envisaged as the terminal points of the CFL as per the CFA. In any event, so long as the signatories understood the agreement in the same sense while executing it there is no reason to doubt their wisdom in hindsight.
What exactly does NJ 9842 or NJ 980420 mean?
All military maps have a special grid system. The map grid system used by India and Pakistan till 1972 used yards. Just as civilian maps have grid zones marked by numerals and then alphabets like 53/K6 or 50/E2, army maps also have grid zones. Each grid zone identifies a special area on the map that is not repeated anywhere else in the world.12 Thus, the coordinate NJ 9842 or 980420, represents one specific point on the map as per the grid system.
Conclusion
From the foregoing discussion it emerges that NJ 9842 or NJ 980420 came into being as a consequence of an incomplete demarcation exercise after the execution of the CFA. It became the northernmost or the last mutually demarcated point of the CFL when both sides decided to abruptly terminate the exercise, leaving a vast tract of land un-demarcated, contrary to the CFA, which envisaged demarcating the entire line right up to the glaciers without leaving any no man’s land. Even though the CFL terminates at NJ 9842, it is clear that it was to extend further north and neither KHOR nor this point was envisaged as its terminus as per the CFA. While KHOR refers to a general region of heights of the Saltoro Ridge, NJ 9842 is a specific point on the heights. There has been no shift in the northern extremity of the CFL from KHOR to NJ 9842 post the Shimla Agreement, and NJ 9842 of the CFA continues to remain the northernmost mutually demarcated point of the LoC, the crucial point being that the LoC finally terminates at it. Since the CFA alone describes the alignment of a line if it were to exist beyond NJ 9842, the words ‘thence north to the glaciers’ which are exclusive to it, assume great significance because they show that the region beyond NJ 9842 is not a no man’s land, as the line is to proceed north therefrom. NJ 9842, which lies on heights, north of Chalunka, on the Saltoro Ridge, finds its first mention in the detailed description document of the CFA, while NJ 980420 is recorded in the description document of the LoC, both being the same point.
** Amit Krishankant Paul is an independent researcher and the author of the book, Meghdoot: The Beginning of the Coldest War (Notion Press, 2022).
Email: amitkrishankantpaul@gmail.com.
Notes
- “Agreement between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan regarding the establishment of a Cease-Fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir”, Annexure 26, Third Interim UNCIP Report, S/1430/Add. 1 dated 9 December 1949.
- The first demi-official article on this subject which appeared in Pakistan was written by a Military Observer titled ‘Siachen Glacier: Facts and fiction’ and appeared in Dawn, Defence of Pakistan Day Supplement, 6 September 1986. It clearly mentions that ‘….the portion of the CFL beyond KHOR was not demarcated due to the inaccessible glaciated nature of the terrain. It was then mutually decided by both the countries that this portion of the CFL would be demarcated later, on the basis of the 1949 Agreement by the local commanders assisted by the UN Military Observers……. The area being disputed, no Pakistani troops were placed in Siachen Glacier area in consonance with the provisions of the Karachi and Simla Agreements’. On the same lines Khalid Mahmud Arif (Retd) in his article, ‘India’s Siachen adventure’, Dawn, Karachi, 21-22 May 1989 while discussing the status of the region beyond NJ 9842 writes ‘this portion of the CFL was to be demarcated in detail on the basis of the factual positions as of July 27 1949 by the local commanders assisted by the UN Military Observer. The demarcation has not taken place till today. It was not done at the time of signing of Karachi Agreement primarily for two reasons- inaccessibility of the area due to its glacial nature and absence of any fighting there because neither India nor Pakistan had troops deployed in the region. The military representatives had confined their agreement to the area of actual hostilities’. Later in his book Working with Zia, (Oxford University Press, 1995, p 223), he confirms that ‘The demarcation of the cease fire line was completed up to the terminus point NJ 9842 (edge of the Siachen Glacier area) on the basis of the factual position as of July 27 1949.The demarcation beyond the terminus point was left to be done subsequently and has not yet taken place. The Siachen Glacier area thus remained free from the troops of either country. This status quo was not disturbed during the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971’.
- The contradictory position in the Pakistani discourse on this aspect is apparent. While in the article ‘Siachen Glacier: Facts and fiction’ (supra) it is mentioned that ‘…The status of CFL in the area remained unchanged even after 1965 war. The CFL was disturbed during the 1971 war and at the end of the hostilities the new terminus was fixed in general area Shyok Valley instead of KHOR. However the CFL which now came to be called the Line of Control (LoC) was still not demarcated beyond Chulung La area ( Map reference NJ 9842)’, Khalid Mahmud Arif in his subsequent article India’s Siachen adventure’(supra)‘….The CFL terminus of the CFL (NJ 9842) remained unchanged despite the 1965 war….As a result of Simla Agreement signed on July 2, 1972 India extracted the price of Pakistan’s defeat…..The term CFL was renamed as Line of Control (LoC). However the northern terminus of the LOC once again remained fixed at NJ 9842. It indicates that upto the time of signing the Simla Agreement both the countries had no military troops deployed in the Siachen glacier area- a position which had remained unchanged since the signing of the Karachi Agreement of 1949. In other word the area north of point NJ 9842 remained un-demarcated and demilitarized.’
- “Cease-fire Line Demarcation”, Hindustan Times, 2 September 1949.
- Document inspected by the Author.
- Robert Wirsing, ‘The Siachen Glacier Dispute-I, The Territorial Dimension’, Strategic Studies, 10 (1), Autumn 1986writes at p 51 ‘…The CFL extended from the international border between India and Pakistan in Punjab in a rough arc running 800 kilometres north and then northeastwards to a point (map grid point NJ 9842) 20 kilometres north of the Shyok river at the foot of the Saltoro range’.
- See B.G. Verghese, Siachen Follies, CPR Occasional Paper No. 20, May 2012, pp 6, 7, 8 especially for his excellent interpretation of Clause C of the CFA. In fact B.G. Verghese is perhaps the first commentator to have rightly pointed out the importance of Clause C of the CFA. For a brief discussion on the interpretation of Clause B2 (d) and C of the Karachi Ceasefire Agreement see Author’s articles, “Myths and Facts about Siachen”, The Statesman, 13 April, 2022; “Siachen dispute needs India and Pakistan to revisit Karachi Ceasefire Agreement”, The Print, 27 July 2022, which draw support from Verghese (supra).
- For example, Brig. (Retd.) M. Shafi Khan, “Siachen and the Indian designs”, The Nation, Islamabad, 25 December 1987 writes: ‘…We have also been talking about the Ceasefire Line and the Line of Control not having been marked beyond Khor or Grid Point NJ 9842’. Similarly Gen (Retd.) Shiv K. Sharma, “Siachen: A fresh perspective”, Defence Today, 1 (1), 1993 writes ‘…After the 1947-1948 war in J&K, a cease fire line (CFL) was drawn under the Karachi Agreement. Demarcation of this line terminated at a place called Khor.’; Shahzad Masood Roomi, Siachen: The Geopolitics and Strategy in Frozen Battlefield, BrassTacks, at p 5 refers to KHOR as NJ 9842; Pavan Nair in “The Siachen War: Twenty-Five Years on”, Economic and Political Weekly, 44 (11), 14-20 March 2009, , pp 35-40, at p 36 while referring to the Simla Agreement, writes: “due to a change in the line at the terminating point , the last demarcated point on the map corresponding to Khor was referred to as NJ 9842”; Siachen: End to Impasse, Report prepared by PSA, New Delhi, January 2013, p. 6 observes that due to the change in the line at the terminating point, the last demarcated point on the map corresponding to KHOR was referred to as NJ 9842’; Shrabana Barua, “Militarization of Siachen: An Anomaly in India’s national Security Context”, Mainstream 57 (27), New Delhi, 22 June 2019 writes: the line was drawn clearly starting from Chhamb passing through many points up to KHOR that is map grid reference NJ 980420; Martin A. Sugarman writes: ‘In the Karachi Agreement it was vaguely specified that the line would move north to the glaciers from Khor, the last identified location…’ while simultaneously referring to NJ 9842 at length. See Martin A. Sugarman, War Above the Clouds, Sugarman Productions, California, 1996.
- Asad Hakeem, Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal, Demilitarization of the Siachen Conflict Zone: Concepts for Implementation and Monitoring, Sandia Report SAND2007-45670, September 2007, p.14.
- For a discussion on the demarcation talks refer to Major General S.K. Sinha’s account in Operation Rescue, Vision Books, 1977 at p. 141.
- For a detailed discussion on the technical meaning of NJ 980420 refer to Romesh Bhattacharji, Ladakh Changing, Yet Unchanged, Rupa 2012, p. 209.
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