Following the dramatic toppling of Sheikh Hasina's government of over 15 years on 5 August, the world watched with concern as violence escalated, particularly targeting Bangladesh's Hindu minority.[1] Though the possibility of the country's descent to military rule was averted with the military chief facilitating the transition to an interim political arrangement under Nobel laureate Professor Mohammad Yunus, the upsurge in Islamist politics has become a near reality. In a country with complex political and religious dynamics, the emboldened Islamist actors led by Jamat-e-Islami in this new political reality threaten secular democracy maintained tenuously by leaders of the Awami League, who had struggled to uphold it at least symbolically.
Despite their adversarial role during the liberation war when Islamists collaborated with the Pakistani forces and participated in the carnage that resulted in the death of millions of Bangladeshis, these actors reemerged on the political landscape of Bangladesh within a decade especially after the tragic assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975. In fact, they returned to claim street power, even when Mujib was alive, as was demonstrated by the way they asserted and forced Mujib government to arrest and torture Daud Haider and then force him out of Bangladesh as a reluctant exile, after he allegedly committed blasphemy through poems he wrote as a young man in his late teens.[2] They have retained their political space even as their fortunes have varied over time depending on the country's political circumstances, not to mention their role in Bangladeshi society taking a rightward turn that not only bred Islamist sentiments but also fueled terrorism in Bangladesh. Far from the simple struggle between secular nationalism and Islamism, the reality of Bangladesh's political landscape is far more complex.
Perhaps we need to go back to the era of colonialism in the Indian subcontinent, which reveals how Bengal became a crucible of competing identity movements which became a driving force for the politics in the region. For instance, on the one hand, the Faraizi and Wahhabi movements used religion to organize poor Muslim peasants in East Bengal against their mostly Hindu landlords; on the other, Hindu revivalist movements also ran parallel to these, thereby making religious identity a critical political tool in the region.[3] As such, religion assumed a significant role in politics in Bengal.
Interestingly, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman himself wrestled with this duality in political affairs. Although he was a champion of the idea of a secular Bangladesh, his memoirs suggest that he also initially believed that Bengali Muslims would find it difficult to lead secure lives in a Hindu-majority country like India. As a result, the idea of an independent Pakistan, where Bengali Muslims could assume leadership of their land within a larger Muslim community and based on Islamic solidarity, perhaps seemed more plausible.
However, for the North Indian Muslim aristocracy, which predominantly led the Pakistan Movement, who considered Pakistan's establishment as their birthright and themselves as the custodians of the Muslim' renaissance', it did not take them long to dismiss the Bengali and other regional identities.[4] This tension, coupled with Pakistan's push for Urdu and further Islamisation of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), eventually backfired, culminating in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Although Bengali was recognized as an official language of East Pakistan in 1956, Pakistani military and state officials continued to push Urdu and further Islamization of East Pakistan. The notion that Islam alone could unify Pakistan was ultimately disproven.
In the years following Bangladesh's independence, the country appeared to embrace secularism, as evidenced by the 1972 constitution, which made a strong commitment to secular credentials of the nascent political institutions of the newly formed country. For instance, secular policies, such as replacing exclusive Quranic verses on Radio Bangladesh, its state broadcaster, with a multi-religious programme, "Speaking the Truth", to start the daily transmissions, reflected this commitment.[5]Â This was a significant departure from Mujibur Rehman-led Awami League's election manifesto of 1969 in undivided Pakistan, wherein it promised no laws that would contradict Islamic teachings would be enacted if elected to power, perhaps in deference to the prevalent deep-rooted religious sentiments within the electorate.
Nevertheless, as Bangladesh emerged as an independent state following a bloody war with the Pakistan Army, it did not take much time for the Islamist actors such as Jamat-e-Islami, who had sided with Pakistan during the liberation war, to reemerge on the streets of the country slowly. Moreover, his avowed commitment to secularism aside, Mujib quickly realized that there was enormous resentment against his envisioned brand of secularism. Despite his repeated reassurances that secularism did not mean opposition to religion, his concessions to religious conservatives reflected the growing influence of Islamist factions. In 1973, Mujib declared a general amnesty, which included Islamist leaders.
The state began promoting religion, with the state radio and television playing more and more religious programmes, restrictions imposed on alcohol and gambling for Muslims, raise in grant of funds from the government to madrasas. Internationally, Mujib aligned Bangladesh with Islamic nations, joining the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)[6] in 1974 and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB)[7] shortly afterwards, as a founding member in Kuala Lumpur. These moves indicated that Bangladeshi people were perhaps not ready for this top-down approach of Mujib's secularism brand yet.
The fact that Daud Haider, the famed Bangla poet, was hounded by Islamists for one of his poems for alleged blasphemy and forced into lifelong exile under the Mujib's rule before his assassination in 1975 demonstrated how the conservatives slowly started gaining their lost ground after a brief hiatus when they were targeted for their complicity in Pakistan's war on Bangla people. Subsequently, after Mujib's tragic assassination on 15 August 1975, the military regime that succeeded his government not only reconciled with the Islamists but also allowed them to ascend to positions of power and authority with ease.
When General Ziaur Rahman came to power in 1977, secularism was formally removed from the constitution. Much like the infamous military dictator General Ziaul Haq of Pakistan (1977-1988), Ziaur Rehman built an alliance between the military and religious parties to legitimize his rule, a trend which continued later under General H.M. Ershad (1982-1990), who declared Islam as the state religion of Bangladesh.[8] These shifts reflected broader societal support for Islamist policies, as evidenced by General Ziaur Rehman's overwhelming electoral victory in 1978. It is quite another thing that his political overtures to conservative forces could not make him popular enough and he was assassinated in May 1981. The fact remained that both Ziaur Rahman and Ershad took several significant steps to align with Islamist groups and incorporate Islamic principles into the governance of Bangladesh.
After Ershad’s fall and onset of democratic politics since 1991, two major political parties in Bangladesh dominated the politics of Bangladesh led by the “Two Begums”― Begum Khaleda Zia, wife of Ziaur Rahman leading the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and Begum Sheikh Hasina, daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman leading the Awami League (AL). They won the elections alternately till 2008, since when the dynamic changed. The BNP, in line with the policy followed by its founder, Ziaur Rahman, aligned with Islamist parties, most notably the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). This alliance was part of a broader coalition that helped the BNP secure electoral victories, such as in the 2001 national elections. Awami League has, on the contrary, tried to position itself as a moderate Muslim party, balancing secularism with Islamic values, taking absolute care to pander to Islamism at least symbolically. In Bangladesh's choppy political environment, both parties have tried always to negotiate the intricate relationship between Islamism and secularism, frequently shifting their stances in response to shifting public opinion and political demands.
Much like her father, Sheikh Hasina campaigned on promises to uphold secularism during the 2008 elections, which started her longest reign over power that lasted over 15 years and four elections till her ouster on 5 August 2024.[9] This was significant given that Bangladesh suffered heightened Islamist violence through the early 2000s, with the then Khaleda Zia-led BNP government failing to contain the rising wave of terrorism in the country. As such, while vowing to curb Islamist violence and extremism in all hues, Sheikh Hasina initiated the war crimes trials targeting those responsible for the atrocities committed during the 1971 war of liberation in alliance with Pakistan military like prominent members of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami. She also banned Jamaat first in 2012, disallowing it to contest the subsequent polls. At the same time, she also sought to appease conservative Islamic factions by endorsing elements like the Charter of Medina and granting madrasa students academic recognition equivalent to traditional degree holders. These concessions did little to address violence against minorities, such as Hindus, and demonstrate the enduring influence of Islamist forces in Bangladesh society.
Furthermore, as a counterweight to the Jamaat, she encouraged Hefazat-i-Islami, formed in 2010, to grow into a formidable Islamist force with a pan-Bangladesh presence. However, this group, over the years, became a Frankenstein’s monster for Sheikh Hasina as it led the campaign against the government's secularism.[10] This proved that neither she nor her father, nor for that matter any other leader, despite their resolve to uphold the principles of secularism in running the affairs of the state, have found it convenient to engage with and provide concessions to Islamist actors of choice, something that has sustained the influence of these forces. Therefore, as much as Hasina tried to suppress Jamaat and other Islamists, they have found a way to return to the streets of Bangladesh with a vengeance.
In the recent anti-discrimination movement (Boisomyo-birodhi Chhatro Andolan), it was seen how the BNP and the Jamaat came together by default to leverage the grievances of the students and turn it into a largescale popular movement that swept away the autocratic government of Sheikh Hasina, who looked so formidable and invincible after holding sway for so long with absolute control over the entire system including the military, the police, the judiciary, and the legislature. That the army switched side once it saw the movement turning into an irresistible force spanning the entire country is now well-known. It played a critical role in sparing Sheikh Hasina the wrath of the demonstrators who entered her official residence hours before she was smuggled out and sent away to India in a military helicopter. The violence that singed Bangladesh in the subsequent days targeted AL workers and Hindus (as AL sympathisers). Those amongst the protestors who attacked minority villages and places of worship (especially Hindus) were allegedly Jamaat sympathisers. While the interim government backed by the government has tried to salvage the situation, there is a view in Bangladesh that at the moment, the top leadership of the army sympathises with the Jamaat ideology and therefore, the turn of events has reinforced the trend towards Islamist alignments in the coming days, despite the success of the so-called movement for a new Bangladesh (Natun Bangladesh).
Nevertheless, while it is tempting to frame Bangladesh's current political evolution as a simple struggle between secularists and Islamists, this perspective fails to capture the deeper, more intricate contest that has defined the country since its birth in 1971. The balance between these competing ideologies will continue to shape Bangladesh's identity and future.
* Mohammad Taha Ali is pursuing postgraduation from the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. The views expressed in this article are entirely his own.
Endnotes
[1] Krutika Pathi et al., “The violence in Bangladesh after Hasina’s ouster stirs fear within the country’s Hindu minority”, The Associated Process, 13 August 2024, (accessed 25 August 2024)
[2] Praveen Swami, “Exile of atheist poet Daud Haider shows Bangladesh wasn’t secular paradise even 50 years ago”, The Print(accessed 25 August 2024)
[3] Nahid Hossein Choudhury, “Faraizi Movement and Zamindars of Nineteenth Century Bengal: The Story of a Peasant Movement”, Journal of International Studies, 2020 9, 113–128, (accessed 25 August 2024)
[4] Ahona Panda, “Philology and the Politics of Language: The Case of Bengali, 1893-1955”, Doctoral Thesis, The University of Chicago, 2019 (accessed 25 August 2024)
[5] Nasreen Chowdhory, “The Policies of Belonging in Bangladesh: The Chakma Refugees in the Chittagong Hill Tracts”, In: Refugees, Citizenship and Belonging in South Asia, 2018, pp. 107–143, Springer: Singapore.
[6] Syed Shah Amran, “OIC and Bangladesh”, Prothom Alo, 6 May 2018, (accessed 25 August 2024)
[7] Md Asaduz Zaman, “The Journey of Islamic Banking in Bangladesh”, The Daily Star, 11 June 2023, (accessed 25 August 2024)
[8] Shafquat Rabbee, “General Ershad: The deposed dictator who became kingmaker”, Al Jazeera English, 18 July 2019, (accessed 30 August 2024)
[9] Ashikur Rahman, “Decoding Bangladesh election: Sheikh Hasina’s manifesto, economic challenges, and the crucial West factor”, The Indian Express, (accessed 1 September 2024)
[10] Taslima Nasreen, “Sheikh Hasina was no progressive. She knelt down to Islamic fundamentalists, created a demon”, The Print, 6 August 2024, (accessed 25 August 2024)
