Date
09-06-2026
Pakistan’s renewed engagement in the Middle East reflects a paradox: tactical diplomatic engagement paraded as successful mediation amid growing strategic fragility. Driven by precarious economic situation at home and IMF dependence, Islamabad leverages geography, military assets, and nuclear capability to secure goodwill from the Gulf and continued political relevance. The 2025 defence pact with Saudi Arabia, deployments during the US–Iran war, and mediation efforts highlight Pakistan’s attempt to position itself as a “critical state” in Gulf security. Yet contradictions abound—balancing Riyadh’s defence needs with Tehran’s trust, facing Emirati frustration over Kashmir rhetoric, and lacking structural leverage to enforce mediation outcomes. Pakistan’s transactional diplomacy has yielded immediate dividends—financial lifelines and diplomatic visibility—but remains undermined by domestic instability, political dysfunction, and economic fragility. The concept of “perpetual periphery” captures this paradox: geographically central, yet strategically constrained, Pakistan survives by projecting relevance without converting tactical gains into lasting influence.
For a state grappling with chronic balance of payments crises, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme is dictating its fiscal policy. Its foreign exchange reserves, though showing improvement, remain precariously dependent on friendly countries and IMF deposits. In this context Pakistan’s aggressive engagement with the Middle East presents a striking paradox. Far from a simple pursuit of petrodollars, Islamabad’s recent diplomatic and military outreach in the region represents an effort to convert geographic proximity, including its 1,046-kilometre Arabian Sea coastline overlooking the Strait of Hormuz into diplomatic relevance. Pakistan has facilitated US-Iran dialogue, formalised a mutual defence pact with Saudi Arabia, and hosted four-power consultations involving Turkiye, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. It is simultaneously leveraging its nuclear capability for strategic influence among Gulf monarchies.
This Issue Brief argues that Pakistan is positioning itself as a “critical state” in the Gulf security architecture. By injecting itself into the region, Islamabad seeks to generate vital economic rent, offset the strategic consequences of India’s deepening Guld ties, and weaponize diplomatic capital to advance its Kashmir agenda. Critically examining the transactional nature of these entanglements, the article contends that while Pakistan may have achieved a tactical success, remaining engaged with all the major and regional powers, its domestic economic fragility, political dysfunction, and regional security complications fundamentally undermine the long-term sustainability of this strategy. Pakistan, this article concludes, remains trapped in a ‘perpetual periphery’–geographically central yet strategically circumscribed by chronic domestic structural deficits that undermine its agency.
Introduction: The Economic Imperative and its strategic limits
To understand Pakistan’s resurgence in the Middle East, one must begin not with maps of geopolitics but with the ledgers of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). As of early 2026, the country’s economic fragility remains its defining strategic vulnerability. The State Bank has purchased approximately 27 billion from the domestic market over the past three and half years to strengthen foreign exchange reserves. While this demonstrates some capacity for reserve management, the composition of those reserves tells a more telling story: approximately 12 billion consists of deposits from friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia and China. Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves currently stand around 16billion, with the IMF approving 1.2 billion disbursements in may 2026. Inflation continues to erode purchasing power, and the threat of sovereign default, though temporarily abated, has not been permanently eliminated.
It is in this context of managed precarity that Pakistan’s middleman diplomacy must be assessed. In April 2026, as Islamabad hosted diplomatic engagements related to the US-Iran conflict, Saudi Arabia simultaneously announced a critical financial deposit amounting to 3 billion. This timing was not coincidental, it was a calculated financial intervention designed to help Islamabad repays 3.5 billion loans to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), an evolving regional rival of Riyadh. However, reducing Pakistan’s engagement to mere economic mendicancy would miss the strategic calculus at work. The Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have moved beyond the traditional “cash for loyalty” model. Having accumulated vast sovereign wealth funds and embarked on transformative domestic agendas such as Vision 2030, they now seek strategic depth, military–assets, and diplomatic intermediation.
A nuclear armed Pakistan, with its 1,046-kilometre coastline overlooking the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz through which approximately 20 percent of global oil passes, offers these assets at what Gulf capitals perceive as a bargain price. Yet this perception obscures a deeper reality: the very assets that make Pakistan attractive, its nuclear capability, its military assets, its geographic location are embedded within a state structure whose internal fragilities increasingly limit its capacity for strategic partnership.
From Cold War Frontline to the Anti-Soviet Pivot
Pakistan’s contemporary Middle East entanglements rest on foundations laid decades before the current Iran-Israel-US war. Contrary to the perception that the current Iran-US-Israel war has created Pakistan’s role ex nihilo, Islamabad’s engagement with the region predates its own consolidation as a state. Pakistan strategic insertion into the Middle East began almost immediately after its creation in 1947.
In 1955, Pakistan joined Bagdad Pact (later renamed the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO), a US-led military alliance that included Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The pact explicit purpose was the containment of Soviet Union expansionism, and Pakistan’s inclusion was predicated on its geographic location as a bulwark against “communist influence” spreading toward the Persian Gulf.
This early alignment established a pattern that would prove enduring: Pakistan offering its territory and military capacity in exchange for great-power patronage and economic support. During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-89), Pakistan, under General Zia-ul-Haq, became the primary conduit for US and Saudi Arabia’s support to the ‘Afghan Mujahideen.’ This period further entrenched a pattern that would re-emerge after September 11, 2001: Pakistan as an indispensable but exasperating partner, valued for access rather than trusted for intentions.
The relationship with Saudi Arabia deepened during this period as well. In the 1980s, Islamabad stationed a division-scale presence in the Kingdom, including the Pakistani personnel deployment during the 1990-91 Gulf War.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s nuclear capability, first demonstrated in 1998, fundamentally altered its standing in the Muslim world. It became, and remains, the only nuclear-weapons state in the Islamic world, a distinction that carries enormous symbolic and strategic weight. Within Gulf capitals, this capability has long been referenced carefully, privately, but persistently as an ultimate backup against external threats.
A critical inflection point occurred after 2011 during the Arab Spring. Prior to the Arab Spring, Pakistan’s middle East Policy was heavily tilted toward Saudi Arabia. However, the post-Arab Spring environment, particularly the Saudi-Iranian rivalry that played out in Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain forced a recalibration. Pakistan’s parliament famously debated and ultimately rejected sending troops to support the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015, instead opting for neutrality. This decision, while angering Riyadh at the time, subsequently enhanced Pakistan’s credibility as a potential mediator. By refusing to choose definitively between Riyadh and Tehran, Islamabad preserved the relationships necessary to later function as diplomatic conduit.
The Evolving Security Architecture
The signing of the Pakistan-KSA Defense Pact in September 2025 marked a qualitative shift in the relationship. Under the terms widely reported in the state-owned Hilal magazine, an attack on either nation will be treated as an act of war against the other, with Pakistan pledging military assets to defend the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah.
The pact’s text is deliberately terse, while it talks about collective defense and what it leaves deliberately unclear: whether the deterrent shadow extends to a nuclear dimension. This ambiguity is not a flaw but a feature. The operationalisation of this pact was visible in April 2026. Following alleged Iranian missile and drone strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure amid the broader US-Iran war, Pakistan rapidly deployed fighter jets and support aircraft to King Abdulaziz Air Base.
This deployment served a dual purpose: it may physically deter any external aggression during the course of ongoing war, while broadly signaling to Washington that Riyadh has substantial alternatives to Western Air defenses. The presence of former Army Chief Raheel Sharif as commander of the Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), a 43-nation alliance, exemplifies Pakistan’s institutional embedding in regional security architecture. Yet, this “contractor-of-choice” role carries inherent risks. Pakistan is attempting to balance its security guarantee to Saudi Arabia while simultaneously mediating peace talks for Iran, a state that views Riyadh as a rival and has a deep sectarian tie to Pakistan’s own Shia population, a community estimated at 15-20 percent of the national population.
This tightrope act has proven particularly costly as far as its relationship with the UAE is concerned. During the conflict, Iran directed much of its military retaliation at Emirati infrastructure, drawn by the UAE’s hosting of US military assets and its perceived alignment with Israel. For Abu Dhabi, there was no middle ground in this conflict. Pakistan’s decision to position itself as a neutral mediator, jumping to broker a ceasefire that halted the war before the UAE could secure a harder response against Iran. Emirati policymakers regard mediation as a form of unacceptable neutrality at a time when Iran has directly targeted Gulf territory. The UAE’s frustration extends beyond the war itself to what Gulf officials perceive as Pakistan’s prioritization of religious and territorial symbolism particularly the Kashmir narrative over the pragmatic economic and security calculus that defines UAE foreign policy.
The UAE, which views India as a critical economic partner with bilateral trade exceeding 60 billion annually has signalled its displeasure over Pakistan promotion of symbolic narratives including the Kashmir issue. Yet, significantly, Abu Dhabi has stopped short of breaking ties entirely, a calculated restraint that reflects the UAE’s continued need for Pakistan security cooperation and its recognition of the millions of Pakistani expatriates whose remittances remain integral to both economies.
The Current Entanglement and the Limits of Mediation
The outbreak of full-scale conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran in February 2026 created an immediate opening for proactive diplomacy. On March 29, 2026, Islamabad hosted foreign ministers from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt for consultations aimed at creating conditions for US-Iran direct talks. The meeting, originally planned for Ankara, was relocated to Islamabad because of Pakistan’s deepening role in relaying messages between Washington and Tehran.
Pakistan strategically employed both the civilian and military means to reach out to different parties to the war. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has engaged Iranian President Masoud Pazeshkian directly, holding long phone call days before the four-power meeting, while Army chief shuttled to Tehran to carry US messages and “narrow gaps” between the positions. This dual-channel approach allows Pakistan to offer multiple points of contact, each with different degrees of formality and deniability.
The qualified optimism of the White House indicates that Washington, despite its frustrations with Pakistan’s double games, views Islamabad as a useful channel to a regime with which direct communication is otherwise impossible. A nuanced assessment suggests that Pakistan’s mediation has limits, some inherent to its position and some self-imposed. These constraints become visible when examining three specific dimensions: the collapse of diplomatic momentum, the contradiction of dual loyalty, and the fraught bilateral landscape Islamabad must navigate.
The cancellation of a second round of Islamabad talks serves as a reminder that geography creates opportunity but cannot guarantee outcomes. Furthermore, Pakistan’s simultaneous role as a mediator and as a party to a mutual defence pact with Saudi Arabia, a state that is a direct antagonist to Iran’s regional position, raises questions about impartiality. If Riyadh were to invoke the defence pact, would Pakistan be compelled to respond, thereby incurring Tehran’s wrath and nullifying its mediation credibility?
Moreover, any escalation that triggers the defence pact would immediately nullify Islamabad’s mediation credibility with Tehran. Additionally, Pakistan’s relationship with Iran is itself fraught. While Iranian drone and missile attacks on neighboring countries have notably not targeted Pakistan, the two states have experienced border skirmishes as recently as 2024. Pakistan is attempting to mediate between the United States and Iran while maintaining no diplomatic relations with Israel and only patchy relations with Iran itself.
It has been argued that Pakistan’s effectiveness as a mediator in the Iran-US conflict stems from the fact that it hosts no US military bases, thereby earning a modicum of trust from Tehran while maintaining lines of communication with Washington. This “multivector” approach, simultaneously close to China, the US, Saudi Arabia, and Iran positioned by Islamabad is suitable to all parties involved particularly in the absence of any credible alternative. Pakistan’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Ishaq Dar, has been keen to project this influence. Addressing diplomats, Dar claimed that Pakistan engaged with over 120 foreign ministers to build consensus for de-escalation between the US and Iran.
Furthermore, Pakistan has tried to coordinate with regional heavyweights, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Egypt to form a quartet aimed at establishing a post-war security framework for the Gulf. However, a critical lens demands to view this “success” with skepticism. While Pakistan maybe an excellent venue for talks and hard-working courier of messages, it lacks the structural power to enforce outcomes. Internally, Pakistan is consumed by growing security threats including in the province of Balochistan bordering Iran, and political rivalries between civilian and military institutions.
The current army chief has successfully entrenched the military’s role across all levels, a dynamic, critics argue, has reduced civilian governance to an adjunct of the military. Externally, Pakistan dependence on IMF programmes and friendly country deposits means that its diplomatic posture can be influenced by its creditors. This structural dependency fundamentally limits Islamabad’s ability to act as an independent broker. Mediation requires not just access but also leverage over the parties being mediated. Pakistan has access, it has no leverage. Its role has been that of a messenger rather than a capable mediator who could influence the process of reconciliation.
The OIC and the UN Platform: Cashing on Diplomatic Capital
Perhaps the most significant, and least analysed dimension of Pakistan’s Middle East engagement is its attempt to convert goodwill in the Gulf into diplomatic pressure on the ‘Kashmir issue.’ For decades, Gulf monarchies prioritised economic relations with India over the religious sentiments that Pakistan historically sought to mobilise on Kashmir. Pakistan is attempting to reverse this calculus. This reversal, however, has proven more rhetorical than substantive. By positioning itself as the defender of the Haramayn (the two holy mosques) and a guarantor of Gulf energy security, Islamabad demands political reciprocity. The Saudi-Pak defence pact itself explicitly references the protection of “the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah”. This is not merely symbolic language; it is a strategic framing that elevates Pakistan’s role from security contractor to custodian of Islam’s holiest sites.
At the same time, Pak deputy prime minister Ishaq Dar has explicitly linked regional peace in South Asia to “a just resolution of Jammu and Kashmir,” leveraging Pakistan’s seat on the UN Security Council (2025-26 term) to amplify this message. During an OIC Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Jeddah in January 2026, Dar “urged the OIC Secretary General to step up his efforts for the realisation of the right to self-determination of Kashmir people,” explicitly linking Pakistan’s regional role to its core national interest. The logic is transactional: We secure your oilfields; you pressure India on the Line of Control. While there is little evidence of a major shift in Gulf policy toward New Delhi, Pakistan has succeeded in making Kashmir a persistent talking point in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
Yet, this strategy has significant limits. The reluctance of the Gulf states to endorse Pakistan’s Kashmir agenda despite consistent appeals from Pakistani leadership, indicates that economic pragmatism consistently trumps Pakistan push for emotive and religious territorial narrative when the two come into conflict. This economic asymmetry is stark, India’s bilateral trade with the UAE now aiming for $100 billion, nearly triple Pakistan’s total remittances from the entire Gulf region, a gap that fundamentally shapes Emirati calculations. The UAE, which views India as a critical economic and strategic partner, has demonstrated its displeasure through administrative measures rather than policy changes. Reports from Pakistani expatriate communities in the UAE suggest tightened visa regimes, strict security profiling of Pakistan-origin nationals. However, UAE’s own future political positioning in Gulf emerging security architecture is contested, and Pakistan believes that lesser UAE influence in the evolving security alignments would better serve Islamabad’s diplomatic aims. The entry of Turkiye as a central player in Gulf security architecture further enhances Isambard’s diplomatic and political pursuits, including Kashmir narrative, given Ankara’s historically more sympathetic stance. However, Pakistan’s ability to influence Gulf policy on Kashmir remains limited by the fundamental asymmetry of the relationship: Gulf states need Pakistan’s security services, but they need India’s economic partnership and investment capital.
The ‘Perpetual Periphery’ in Practice: Tactical Wins, Strategic Losses
Despite its multiple and prolonged vulnerabilities, Pakistan has accomplished something significantly notable. As one analyst puts it, “Despite the positive optics of punching above its weight, Pakistan has become weaker over time”. This paradox, tactical diplomatic success coexisting with strategic decline lies at the heart of understanding Pakistan’s Middle East entanglement. It is precisely this condition that the concept of the “perpetual periphery” seeks to capture: a state that is geographically central yet strategically circumscribed by the regional security realities, and chronic domestic structural deficits that undermine its agency.
Meanwhile, Islamabad remains engaged in the ongoing geopolitical game with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Riyadh, Ankara and Tehran simultaneously. During the course of current conflict, Pakistan became the default venue for US-Iran dialogue. The defence pact with Saudi Arabia has been operationalised through deployments, projecting power beyond its borders despite domestic political instability and severe economic constraints. The White House’s qualified optimism and China’s endorsement of Pakistan’s mediation role indicate that both superpowers see utility in Islamabad’ continued engagement. Pakistan’s geography, its nuclear capability, and its historical relationships have created a unique position, indispensable enough to be tolerated, peripheral enough to be trusted as a mediator. Yet, this position is not simply a function of geography or nuclear heft, it is equally a product of Pakistan’s internal fragility. Its precarious economic condition, dysfunctional politics, and security volatility undermine Pakistan’s long-term strategic agency.
Moreover, these achievements sit uneasily alongside deep structural weaknesses. Some analysts have characterised Pakistan’s current mediating efforts and subsequent military commitments in the Middle East as “anti-Bismarckian: it is adept in the art of realpolitik, but unable to translate this into lasting gains for the country. While Otto von Bismarck’s machinations resulted in the unification of Germany, the Pakistani military actions contributed to the break-up of the country in 1971 and its ongoing destabilization.” The comparison is instructive as Bismarck’s realpolitik, produced German unification and positioned Germany as a European great power.
The hybrid regime’s realpolitik, its ability to play great powers against each other, to extract resources from multiple patrons simultaneously, to position itself as indispensable to competing interests has not produced national consolidation. Instead, Pakistan has experienced fragmentation: the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, ongoing insurgencies in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and a political system where the country holds the unenviable status of not having a single prime minister complete a full term in office.
A state that is in perpetual war on its western border with Afghanistan, where relations under Taliban rule have become increasingly fraught can hardly claim to guarantee the security of others indefinitely. This is not merely an external perception problem, rather it is reflected in the actions of regional partners. While Saudi Arabia continues to engage Pakistan, it has simultaneously diversified its security partnerships, including with Turkiye and China. The UAE’s frustration with Pakistan’s wartime geopolitical positioning has led to quiet but meaningful distancing. In an emerging fragile scenario, these shifts further limit Islamabad’s room for diplomatic maneuver.
Conclusion: The fragility of a transactional power and the perpetual periphery
Pakistan’s current trajectory in the Middle East is best understood as a paradox: a fragile state leveraging its geography into diplomatic relevance, succeeding tactically while struggling strategically. The economic dividends, Saudi deposits, deferred oil payments, potential Gulf investments are real and meaningful for a country on the edge of default. The diplomatic achievements like hosting US-Iran talks, coordinating with Turkiye and Egypt, maintaining channels with both Washington and Tehran are significant for a state operating at the peripheries. Yet the sustainability of this posture is uncertain. It relies on the continued goodwill of a Saudi leadership that is simultaneously pursuing Vision 2030 and diversifying its partnerships. It requires strategic coherence from a Pakistani state whose civilian-military relationship remains contested and whose domestic political turmoil regularly spills into foreign policy. More significantly, the old Middle East order is collapsing, and a new West Asian security architecture is being negotiated in real time. In that transition, whether Pakistan’s attempted entrenchment would translate into lasting influence depend less on the cleverness of its diplomacy and more on whether Islamabad can address its internal chronic issues, economic stability, political continuity, and a genuine reconciliation with its own ethnic and sectarian diversity.
Pakistan’s current trajectory in the Middle East is a high-risk, low-reward gambit driven by desperation and opportunity. Economically, the strategy has yielded immediate dividends: Saudi dollars keep the economy from collapse. Militarily, the defence pact with Riyadh restores a sense of purpose to an army that has lost political capital at home. This pattern is what the idea of the “perpetual periphery” seeks to bring in. A perpetual periphery is not a failed state, nor is it a powerless one. It is a state whose geographic centrality routinely generates tactical opportunities that its internal; structural deficits prevent it from converting into lasting strategic influence. As long as Pakistan keeps pushing its Kashmir agenda and its economy remains dependent on IMF programmes and friendly country deposits, Islamabad will continue to try to inject itself into Middle Eastern geopolitics. It is a strategy of survival by projecting its continuous relevance by all means. Unless Pakistan moves beyond transactional diplomacy and addresses its internal governance deficits and its wicked and malevolent regional diplomacy, it will remain trapped in the paradox of the periphery: central enough to matter, fragile enough to fail.
Dr Usman Bhatti is an independent analyst from Jammu and Kashmir, now based in New Delhi. The views expressed are his own. Generative AI has been used to polish the language while the arguments made in the Issue Brief are those of the author.
