Date
28-10-2026
Summary
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960, is at a critical juncture following India’s decision to place it in abeyance after the April 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack. This paper examines the treaty’s historical evolution, water-allocation framework, dispute-resolution mechanisms and the competing legal positions of India and Pakistan. It analyses India’s security concerns and demand for revision against Pakistan’s insistence on integrity of the treaty, alongside the implications of international arbitration, climate change and growing water insecurity. The paper argues that the dispute extends beyond legal interpretation to encompass strategic mistrust, regional security and the challenges of transboundary water governance. It concludes by examining possible futures for the treaty and advocating a pragmatic Indian approach that safeguards national interests while preserving scope for negotiated modernisation.
Introduction
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is often cited as a rare example of cooperation between India and Pakistan. It was signed in 1960 and was brokered by the World Bank after years of difficult negotiations. The treaty survived several wars, multiple military crises and prolonged periods of diplomatic hostility between the two countries over nearly seven decades.[i] However, that reality changed on 23 April 2025 when India placed the treaty in “abeyance”, following the Pahalgam terrorist attack a day earlier (22 April), in which 26 people, including 25 tourists and a local pony wallah, were killed. With the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba’s local proxy, The Resistance Front (TRF), claiming the attack, New Delhi linked its decision to Pakistan’s sustained support for cross-border terrorism. This decision thereby brought a long-standing water-sharing arrangement into direct conflict with the country’s national security policy.
Several issues arise beyond the scope of the IWT text. Is it possible for a state to comply with cooperative obligations while maintaining that the other side has destroyed the grounds for cooperation?[ii] To what extent can security be used to justify unilateral actions if there is no clause on suspension of the treaty? This article explores the history of the treaty, its provisions on allocation and dispute resolution, the opposing legal positions of India and Pakistan, and the consequences of the conflict for regional security and water diplomacy.
Historical Genesis: The hydrological legacy of partition
The Indus River system comprises six major rivers: the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. Under British rule, canals and headworks were developed as an integrated irrigation network serving the undivided Punjab operating under the assumption of administrative continuity that the 1947 partition dramatically undermined.[iii] The Radcliffe Line, hastily drawn to divide the province, cut directly through this carefully engineered system, severing the canal headworks and creating an immediate hydrological crisis.[iv]
The hastily drawn Radcliffe Line, which divided the province between the two countries, cut directly through this carefully engineered system, severing the canal headworks and creating an immediate hydrological crisis. The hydrological inheritance of the 1947 partition was particularly challenging for Pakistan as it left some canal headworks in Indian territory while Pakistan’s agricultural economy depended heavily on water controlled upstream by India.[v] The new border therefore created an immediate problem: political sovereignty had been divided, but the irrigation network still functioned as a connected system. Pakistan’s leaders feared that the upstream position could be exploited by India to strangle it during times of crisis, particularly amidst ongoing territorial disputes.
Pakistan’s concerns deepened in April 1948 when East Punjab shut down canals that flowed into Pakistan from headworks now under its control after the expiry of the short-term Standstill Agreement.[vi] The disruption affected more than 1 million acres (1.66 million acres) of agricultural land, resulting in a direct loss of an estimated USD 20 million to Pakistan’s economy:[vii] reinforcing its fears that India’s upstream position could be used as an instrument of coercion.[viii] The episode shaped Pakistan’s negotiating position and left a lasting impression that water security was inseparable from the wider territorial conflict. Historian David Gilmartin has argued that partition reflected a conception of national territory that “was strikingly oblivious to the connection between national territory and water”.[ix] The treaty would later settle the immediate allocation dispute without resolving this underlying tension. As Uttam Sinha, one of India’s foremost scholars on transboundary water and author of Indus Basin Uninterrupted (2021) and Trial by Water (2025), argues, the treaty “resembled a divorce settlement, characterised by conflicting claims from the Partition and a pervasive atmosphere of mistrust”.
The Inter-Dominion Accord and the limits of early bilateral arrangements
The Inter-Dominion Accord of 4 May 1948 was intended as a temporary arrangement. India would release water to Pakistan in return for annual payments, but the agreement did little to resolve the imbalance between the upstream and downstream states. Pakistan had limited means of compelling continued supplies, while India retained control over headworks on its territory. Then chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal, Sir Patrick Spens, recalled that the Attorneys General of the two countries had invited the tribunal to reach its decision “on the basis that there would be no interference whatsoever with the then existing flow of water”.[x] The April 1948 interruption had already shown how quickly water management could become a source of political and economic pressure.
Pakistan sought international intervention, specifically from the International Court of Justice, while India initially favoured bilateral negotiations. But as talks had stalled by 1950, the dispute required a framework that could address the technical needs of the irrigation system while offering both governments a way out of an increasingly bitter political confrontation.
The World Bank’s role
An opportunity arose in 1951 when David E. Lilienthal, the former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, visited the Indian subcontinent and warned that the water dispute could lead to a larger conflict, or “another Korea” in South Asia if left unresolved.[xi] He suggested that India and Pakistan cooperate in the development of the Indus Basin, with the World Bank serving as a mediator.[xii] Crucially, Lilienthal recognised that Pakistan’s desperation to control the rivers flowing through Kashmir was a hidden driver of the territorial conflict, and he argued that resolving water anxieties could help defuse broader tensions. His approach framed the water management issue as a technical one that could be solved through engineering and investment, despite disputes between the two governments over territory and security. This novel use of engineering to produce the basin as a “depoliticised space” helped to frame the terms of the subsequent debate.
World Bank President Eugene Black supported the proposal but made clear that the Bank would act as a “conduit for agreement” rather than adjudicate the dispute.[xiii] A working party of Indian, Pakistani and Bank engineers was proposed, with Black arguing that “engineers speak the same language and approach problems with common standards of judgement.”[xiv] The assumption that technical expertise could be separated from politics proved optimistic, but the Bank’s role helped sustain negotiations and mobilise the funds needed to implement a settlement.
The Indus Basin Development Fund was established, with contributions totalling about US$894 million. This included US$541 million in grants from donor countries, US$150 million in loans from the Bank and the United States, and a payment of US$174 million from India.[xv] The funding supported the replacement works Pakistan needed after the river allocation was divided. India was therefore not only the upstream state but also a significant contributor to the infrastructure required to make the settlement workable. Both countries needed external financing to develop their water resources, which gave the Bank considerable influence over the final agreement.
Allocation, institutions and the treaty’s design
In 1954, after years of deadlocked negotiations, the World Bank went beyond its mediating role by offering a concrete proposal. Under this, it proposed allocating three eastern rivers, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, for the exclusive use of India, while Pakistan would receive the three western rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. India agreed to the proposal in March; Pakistan refused to accept it, arguing that it did not satisfy the ‘test of fairness’ and that the western rivers would not compensate for its water supply. However, it eventually agreed to the proposal in July after further negotiations.[xvi] The treaty was signed in Karachi on 19 September 1960 by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistani President Ayub Khan and World Bank Vice-President W. A. B. Iliff.
By 1954, the World Bank, having tried to mediate the dispute for several years, went beyond its mediating role by offering a concrete proposal. Three eastern rivers – Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej would go to India’s disposal, while the western rivers, Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, would belong to Pakistan. India agreed to the proposal in March; Pakistan refused to accept it, arguing that it did not satisfy the ‘test of fairness’ and that the western rivers would not compensate for its water supply; however, it eventually agreed to the proposal in July. The treaty was signed in Karachi on 19 September 1960 between Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistani President Ayub Khan and the vice president of the World Bank, W. A. B. Iliff.
Pakistan received 80 per cent of the water from the basin under the agreement, while India agreed to certain limitations in terms of storage and development of hydropower projects on the western rivers. The arrangement was designed to provide each state with a defined share rather than preserve the basin as a single, jointly managed system. In that sense, it resolved an urgent dispute by adapting the river system to the borders created by partition. It also left a lasting tension between the treaty’s fixed allocation and the environmental relationships that connect the basin.
The treaty created the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), with one commissioner appointed by each country. It was tasked with holding regular meetings, exchanging data, conducting inspections, and handling questions arising under the agreement. A three-stage process was established for dispute resolution, viz., discussion through the PIC, referral of technical questions to a Neutral Expert, and recourse to a Court of Arbitration for specified legal disputes. The Commission continued to operate through periods of serious political hostility, which became one of the treaty’s strongest arguments for preserving a technical channel between the two states.
Article XII (4) states that the treaty remains “in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two Governments”.[xvii] It does not expressly provide for unilateral suspension or withdrawal. Pakistan relies on this provision to argue that India cannot place the treaty in abeyance unilaterally. India, by contrast, argues that the circumstances surrounding the agreement have changed and that continued cooperation cannot be separated from the security threat it attributes to Pakistan.[xviii]
The Question of Kashmir
The treaty’s most politically significant feature is its studied silence on Kashmir. Its provisions were designed to preserve the parties’ respective territorial positions and interpretations while allowing them to proceed with the water agreement. Although this compromise made a settlement possible, it also separated river management from the political conflict surrounding the basin.[xix] As such, while the rivers cross a contested region, the treaty’s institutions were designed primarily to manage allocation and technical questions.
It is this separation that helped the agreement endure despite limiting its capacity to address the wider causes of mistrust. Cross-border violence, disputes over hydropower projects and competing interpretations of the treaty have repeatedly placed pressure on its technical mechanisms. The IWT was never a comprehensive peace agreement. Its survival depended on both governments continuing to see value in keeping water cooperation apart from their broader political disputes. India’s decision in 2025 directly challenges that premise.
India’s position: security, reciprocity and trust
India’s decision to place the IWT in abeyance followed the April 2025 Pahalgam attack in Jammu and Kashmir. It rests on several interconnected legal and political arguments. The primary contention is that Pakistan has fundamentally breached the conditions necessary for the treaty to function.[xx] The IWT, New Delhi argues, was concluded in an atmosphere where both parties were expected to maintain peaceful relations. Persistent cross-border terrorism originating from Pakistani territory has fundamentally altered those circumstances. From this perspective, India cannot be expected to continue “business as usual” under a treaty while facing repeated terrorist attacks.[xxi]
The principle of reciprocity reinforces this argument. Treaties, India contends, are based on good faith and a state that repeatedly permits or supports hostile acts cannot simultaneously insist on the uninterrupted benefits of a cooperative arrangement. Pakistan’s attempt to separate water from terrorism is rejected as artificial; for India, the two are inextricably connected because the treaty represents the product of bilateral trust that Pakistan has systematically eroded. India’s current position is that, by placing the treaty in “abeyance,” it has neither withdrawn from the IWT nor entirely altered the course of the Indus rivers.[xxii] Instead, New Delhi has stopped exchanging hydrological data concerning the IWT’s operation, withheld technical cooperation and notification, and refrained from participating in the dispute resolution mechanisms.[xxiii] The Ministry of External Affairs has maintained that the treaty will remain in abeyance until Pakistan “credibly and irrevocably” stops cross-border terrorism.[xxiv]
For New Delhi, the current crisis also reflects a longer-standing demand to revise the treaty. Indian officials argue that India has been more generous than the treaty strictly required, continuing to honour the treaty through wars in 1965, 1971, and 1999. India further contends that Pakistan has repeatedly delayed or objected to Indian water projects that the treaty explicitly permits. Pakistan has challenged run-of-the-river hydropower projects such as Kishanganga and Rattle, even when India maintains they conform to treaty provisions.[xxv]
India’s legal justification for abeyance draws on broader principles of treaty law. Even though there is no provision in the IWT providing for withdrawal from the agreement, India could refer to material breach by the other party (Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) and/or to fundamental changes in circumstances (rebus sic stantibus, Article 62). However, as neither India nor Pakistan is a party to the Vienna Convention, principles of international law, such as “necessity and countermeasures,” could allow temporary abeyance.[xxvi] In relation to material breach, India argues that the sponsorship of terrorism against India by Pakistan represents a breach of obligations necessary for the purpose of the agreement. Moreover, experts contend that the security and strategic environment have changed so fundamentally through decades of cross-border terrorism that the basis of consent has been radically altered.[xxvii] The Pahalgam attack sharpened the security argument, but dissatisfaction with Pakistani behaviour while operationalising the treaty predates it.
India has also emphasised that its river water management strategy should be guided by its long-term development goals, energy transition, food security, and regional resilience. India’s dissatisfaction with the treaty began much before the Pahalgam attack. New Delhi has increasingly argued that the agreement was drafted under very different circumstances and does not adequately account for present-day realities such as climate change, changing water consumption patterns, clean energy needs, and population growth. In January 2023, India formally notified Pakistan of its intention to modify the agreement,[xxviii] followed by another notice in 2024, signalling growing frustration with the treaty’s existing framework. Indian concerns include the treaty’s treatment of hydropower, changing patterns of water use, climate change, population growth and energy needs. The Pahalgam attack sharpened the security argument, but dissatisfaction with the treaty’s operation predates it.
India’s upstream position gives it strategic leverage, though that leverage should not be confused with an immediate ability to control the volume of water reaching Pakistan. Infrastructure limits the extent to which India can alter flows at short notice. Even so, the decision to place the treaty in abeyance signals that New Delhi is prepared to use its position to press for a change in the bilateral relationship.
Pakistan’s position: treaty integrity and water security
Pakistan argues that India’s decision has no basis in the treaty. Article XII(4) provides for termination through a duly ratified agreement between the two governments, not unilateral action. Pakistan also rejects India’s reliance on material breach or a fundamental change in circumstances, maintaining that the IWT is a technical water-sharing agreement and contains no counter-terrorism obligations.[xxix] Its resilience in previous wars, Pakistan argues, shows that political hostility has not been treated as grounds for suspension.
Pakistan has also accused India of manipulating river flows and withholding information required under the treaty. Pakistani officials have pointed to reported variations in the Chenab’s flow during 2025 and argued that a lack of advance notification and data sharing threatens flood forecasting, food production and economic security.[xxx] These claims are part of Pakistan’s broader effort to portray India’s actions as a breach of treaty obligations and an attempt to use water as political pressure.
For Pakistan, the treaty is not merely a legal instrument but an existential predicament. Nearly 80 per cent of Pakistan's cultivated land and an equal percentage of its irrigated agriculture depend on the Indus basin system. Agriculture contributes nearly 23 per cent of Pakistan's GDP and employs 38 per cent of the labour force.[xxxi] The Indus Basin Irrigation System irrigates around 18 million hectares, providing food and fibre for over 240 million people.[xxxii] Groundwater, which supplies 60 per cent of irrigation water, 90 per cent of domestic water, and 100 per cent of industrial water, is also critically dependent on surface water recharge from the Indus system.[xxxiii] Any prolonged reduction in irrigation water would have catastrophic effects on food security, rural livelihoods, and economic stability.[xxxiv]
Pakistani officials highlighted that India’s growing ability to influence the timing and predictability of river flows, particularly in the Chenab River, poses a series of challenges to Pakistan’s long-term water, food, energy and economic security, adding that if India stopped sharing hydrological data, Pakistan would not be able to conduct timely flood forecasting or emergency preparedness.[xxxv] Pakistan’s concerns have been reflected in increasingly belligerent rhetoric from senior officials. Planning Minister Ahsan Iqbal warned that any attempt by India to stop Pakistan’s water would amount to an “act of aggression” and said Islamabad would “cut off those hands” that sought to do so.[xxxvi] Defence Minister Khawaja Asif warned that Islamabad could resort to war if it believed its water security was under threat.[xxxvii] Pakistani leaders have declared water as Pakistan’s “lifeline and red line”.[xxxviii]
Pakistan has also developed ‘countermeasures’ including the construction of the Diamer-Basha Dam and other reservoirs to enhance water storage capacity and reduce its vulnerability.[xxxix] Pakistan is also exploring diplomatic outreach from the OIC, China, and the United States.[xl] However, as analysts have noted, Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus system remains its fundamental vulnerability, which India could exploit, and there is not much Pakistan can do to alter India’s actions.[xli]
The Court of Arbitration and competing legal claims
Pakistan has pursued proceedings before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), while India has boycotted the Court and rejected its authority. In 2023, the Court affirmed its competence to hear specified disputes.[xlii] In a supplementary award issued in June 2025, it held that India’s declaration of abeyance did not remove its competence and concluded that the treaty did not permit unilateral suspension. The Court’s position is that the treaty remains in force until terminated by mutual agreement.
The Court has also addressed the interpretation of the treaty’s provisions on the western rivers. Pakistan regards the rulings as support for its position that India must comply with the agreed allocation and dispute-resolution framework. India, by contrast, describes the Court as illegally constituted and considers its decisions null and void. The two governments therefore disagree not only over the treaty’s status but also over which dispute-resolution process has authority to interpret it.
The rulings provide Pakistan with legal support, but their practical effect is limited by India’s refusal to participate and the absence of a central enforcement authority capable of compelling compliance. International law still matters: it shapes diplomatic arguments, affects the legitimacy of each side’s position and sets expectations for other states. It cannot, by itself, resolve a dispute when the parties disagree about the authority of the forum and the terms under which cooperation should continue.
As highlighted above, India’s legal case draws on principles concerning material breach and a fundamental change in circumstances as reflected in Articles 60 and 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. India argues that the security environment has changed fundamentally and that Pakistan’s continued support for terrorism undermines the basis for continued cooperation. Pakistan counters that the treaty contains no link between water allocation and counter-terrorism, and that a change in political relations does not create a right to suspend it.
Pakistan’s diplomatic campaign
Pakistan has sought to internationalise the dispute. In June 2026, Islamabad hosted its first-ever international seminar on the IWT, titled “Indus Water Treaty: An Instrument of Peace and Regional Stability”. The event brought together water and legal experts from around the world. Senior Pakistani leaders, including the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, and Information Minister Attaullah Tarar, addressed it. The seminar has been described as marking “an extraordinary milestone in Pakistan’s legal, diplomatic, and media strategy,” catapulting the IWT back into the global spotlight, with international media covering the event's proceedings.[xliii] The Indian Ministry of External Affairs issued an official denial within 72 hours of the seminar, which some observers described as a proof of the impact the seminar had on India.
At the United Nations, Pakistan’s ambassador Asim Ifthikar Ahmad has condemned India’s actions as a “textbook example of resource weaponisation,” warning that it could disrupt the delicate ecosystem and harm millions who rely on the Indus River for drinking water, irrigation, and livelihood.[xliv] He emphasised that the treaty remains a binding legal instrument with no provision for unilateral withdrawal and urged the UN to integrate climate and ecological concerns into peacekeeping and political missions. India has largely ignored Pakistani attempts to internationalise the issue and there is no visible desire in New Delhi to reverse its position on abeyance.
Climate change and the case for modernisation
Climate change adds urgency to the dispute. The Indus basin depends on Himalayan snow and glacier melt as well as monsoon rainfall. Changes in precipitation, faster glacial retreat and more variable river flows are making water planning less predictable. Research cited in the debate points to declining snow and ice cover in parts of the upper basin and growing risks of both floods and droughts. These changes affect irrigation, hydropower, disaster preparedness and the reliability of water supplies.
The IWT was negotiated in a different hydrological and technological context. Its allocation rules and institutions were not designed to address all the pressures now facing the basin, including changes in water demand, groundwater use, climate risk and new energy requirements. The treaty’s data-sharing and commission mechanisms could help both states respond to these challenges, but their effectiveness depends on cooperation. Reduced information exchange makes it harder to forecast floods, manage droughts and prepare for emergencies.
Modernisation need not mean abandoning the treaty’s basic allocation. It could involve better data exchange, joint monitoring, clearer procedures for technical disputes, climate risk assessments, and arrangements for managing extreme events. Such measures would not resolve the territorial conflict or erase the security concerns that divide the two countries. They could, though, reduce the risk that environmental stress compounds political tension. Progress will remain difficult without a minimum level of political engagement.
The treaty’s strengths, weaknesses and legal grey areas
India’s position derives its strength from decades of procedural compliance and Pakistan’s persistent obstructionism, which has allowed it to frame its abeyance as a measured response to an accumulation of bad faith. India’s proposition that cooperative treaties depend upon mutual good faith resonates with a broader principle of international law. The principle of reciprocity underpins India’s case, and a state that systematically undermines the spirit of cooperation cannot indefinitely claim the benefits of a treaty framework. However, the textual vulnerability of India’s position is equally evident, as Article XII (4) of the IWT explicitly provides for termination only by “a duly ratified treaty concluded for the purpose between the two governments, with no provision for unilateral suspension.[xlv] This tension between context and the text lies at the heart of the dispute.
Pakistan’s legal framing rests on this textual inviolability, emphasising that the treaty, having endured multiple wars and political crises, cannot be suspended on grounds of external security grievances.[xlvi] While Pakistan’s argument may be doctrinally sound, it also confronts a geopolitical reality: the treaty’s text is a product of its historical moment, and today's threats- terrorism, climate stress, demographic shifts, and variance in water consumption were neither anticipated nor accommodated. The Court of Arbitration rulings, which India already rejected, may be a tactical victory for Pakistan. Still, they remain legally contested by India, which has rejected the tribunal as “illegally constituted”.[xlvii] This procedural deadlock underscores a deeper reality: in an anarchic regional system where international law lacks a central enforcement mechanism, legal pronouncements do not compel states to comply; they merely shape the normative framework within which states operate.[xlviii] The asymmetry of power, India’s upstream position and Pakistan’s downstream dependence ultimately determine the political terrain on which legal arguments were tested.
India’s decision to place the treaty in abeyance thus occupies a legal grey zone, neither clearly a breach nor a straightforward application of treaty provisions. The term “abeyance” carries less severe implications than “suspension” or “termination,” affording India a degree of legal ambiguity while leaving open the possibility of a future restoration of the treaty without formally committing to a timeline or conditions. This grey zone, however, does not resolve the dispute. It merely shifts the locus of contestation from whether the treaty permits suspension to whether contemporary circumstances, with growing security threats and climate-induced stress, justify it. India thus continues to maintain abeyance status and has signalled its willingness to proceed with infrastructure projects on the western rivers.[xlix] At the same time, Pakistan has responded with diplomatic pressure and a warning of escalation. However, such a position may lead to escalation, with Pakistan responding with diplomatic pressure, legal actions, and possible military posturing. The risk of direct conflict increases significantly with each unilateral step, yet both parties remain engaged in the possibility of modification under Article XII (3).
Conclusion
The Indus Water Treaty, once celebrated as a model of peaceful water cooperation, now stands at a critical juncture. India’s decision to place the treaty in abeyance reflects a fundamental shift in the relationship between water management and security, with water cooperation now contingent upon Pakistan addressing India’s security concerns. Pakistan’s insistence on treaty integrity, while legally compelling, cannot insulate it from the geopolitical reality of India’s upstream position and India’s underlined security concerns. International law, while it may favour Pakistan’s textual arguments, offers no straightforward mechanism for compulsion, nor does it address India’s vital security concerns.
The dispute is particularly political rather than purely legal. It reflects the mutual distrust, divergent security perceptions, and competing national narratives that have characterised India-Pakistan relations since partition. The Indus system sustains over 240 million people in Pakistan and 1.4 billion in India, and the failure of the treaty would have consequences beyond bilateral relations, potentially destabilising the entire region. The question is whether both parties can find a path back to pursuing a mutual agreement, as the failure of the treaty would not only disrupt water-sharing cooperation but also intensify climate-induced stress, water scarcity and shifting geopolitical alignments.
The future of the Indus Waters Treaty will depend on whether India and Pakistan can move beyond their competing legal and political positions towards a framework that addresses contemporary security, developmental and environmental realities. India should adopt a pragmatic, calibrated and interest-based approach: maintaining its firm position on cross-border terrorism while maximising the lawful use of its water resources, accelerating necessary infrastructure development, strengthening hydrological data and flood-management capabilities, and investing in scientific assessment of the basin. New Delhi should remain open to negotiations on modernising the treaty, including its dispute-resolution mechanisms and provisions for climate resilience, without conceding its core security interests. Such engagement need not imply a return to business as usual or an unconditional restoration of the existing arrangement. Rather, it would preserve India’s strategic leverage while reducing the risks of legal isolation, regional escalation and environmental insecurity. Ultimately, the objective should be neither to preserve the treaty unchanged nor to abandon cooperation altogether, but to secure a framework that better serves India’s long-term water, energy and national security interests.
Dr Mohammad Usman Bhatti is a research fellow at Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed are his own.
[i] Khan, M. (2026), “IWT: Pakistan’s Non-Negotiable Red Line”, Pakistan Observer, January. Available at: https://pakobserver.net/iwt-pakistans-non-negotiable-red-line/ (Accessed 5 January 2026).
[ii] Associated Press of Pakistan (2026), “India’s IWT Suspension Sparks Strategic Concerns at National, Int’l Levels over Pakistan’s Water Security”, 6 July. Available at: https://www.app.com.pk/national/indias-iwt-suspension-sparks-strategic-concerns-at-national-intl-levels-over-pakistans-water-security/ (Accessed 21 July 2026).
[iii] Yousafzai, F. (2026), “Senate Panel Warns Water Crisis Deepening”, The Nation, 20 February. Available at: https://www.nation.com.pk/20-Feb-2026/senate-panel-warns-water-crisis-deepeningsvg (Accessed 29 June 2026).
[iv] Gilmartin, D. (2025), “Nation and Region in the Post-Partition Remaking of the Indus River Basin”, Critical Pakistan Studies, 2(1–2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/cps.2025.10005.
[v] Ibid.
[vi] Abubakar, S. M. (2016), “The Water War!”, The News International, 9 October. Available at: https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/561901-water-war (Accessed 28 October 2026).
[vii] Janjua, R. W. (2025), “IWT Is a Perfectly Valid Instrument”, Dawn, 18 August. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1931616/#comments (Accessed 1 July 2026).
[viii] Shah, S. M. A. (2026), “The Indus Waters Treaty: Correcting the Record, Preserving the Law”, Dawn, 16 June. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/2008013/the-indus-waters-treaty-correcting-the-record-preserving-the-law (Accessed 19 June 2026).
[ix] Gilmartin, D. (2025). “Nation and Region in the Post-Partition Remaking of the Indus River Basin.”
[x] Ranjan, A. (2025), “Indus Waters Treaty Negotiations: Geopolitics, Disputes and Cooperation”, South Asia Research, 45(1), pp. 110–131. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/02627280241303540.
[xi] Mehsud, M. I. (2020), “Lilienthal’s ‘Another “Korea” in the Making?’: From the Cold War to the Indus Waters Treaty”, World Water Policy, 6(2), pp. 202–211. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/wwp2.12035.
[xii] World Bank Group (1960), “India and Pakistan Sign Indus Waters Treaty”, World Bank Group Timeline, September. Available at: https://timeline.worldbank.org/en/timeline/eventdetail/1716 (Accessed 1 June 2026).
[xiii] World Bank Group (2016), “The World Bank’s Role as Mediator in the 1950s”, September. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/archive/history/exhibits/The-World-Banks-Role-as-Mediator-in-the-1950s (Accessed 3 July 2026).
[xiv] Mahajan, S. (2024), “Strategies for Successful Negotiation of International Disputes: Positional Bargaining vs. Principled Negotiation in the Indus Water Treaty Negotiations”, Journal of Dispute Resolution, 2024(1), Article 7. Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2024/iss1/7
[xv] Ibid.
[xvi] The New York Times (1954), “Waters of the Indus”, 18 July. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1954/07/18/archives/waters-of-the-indus.html (Accessed 9 March 2026).
[xvii] Ranjan, A. and Siddiqui, N. (2025), “The impact of suspending a water treaty”, The Hindu, 1 May, Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-impact-of-suspending-a-water-treaty/article69510612.ece (Accessed 7 March 2026).
[xviii] Rizvi, M. (2025), “Can the Indus Waters Treaty Be Held in Abeyance? What the Law Allows”, South Asian Voices, 9 May. Available at: https://southasianvoices.org/geo-m-r-indus-waters-treaty-abeyance-05-09-2025/ (Accessed 9 March 2026).
[xix] Jangra, A. (2026), “Indus Water Treaty (IWT): Competing Interpretations of India and Pakistan”, Water, 18(13), Article 1556. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3390/w18131556
[xx] Raj, H. (2025), “Holding Back the Flow: ‘Abeyance’ of Indus Waters Treaty and India’s Legal Posture Post-Pahalgam”, Washington International Law Journal Blog, 7 October. Available at: https://wilj.org/2025/10/07/holding-back-the-flow-abeyance-of-indus-waters-treaty-and-indias-legal-posture-post-pahalgam/ (Accessed 27 May 2026).
[xxi] Jalali, U. (2026), “India Rejects Hague Court Ruling on Indus Water Treaty, Says Pact Remains in Abeyance”, The Tribune, 16 May. Available at: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/india-rejects-hague-court-ruling-on-indus-water-treaty-says-pact-remains-in-abeyance/ (Accessed 3 June 2026).
[xxii] The Times of India (2026), “Pakistan Must Stop Backing Terror: India Says Indus Waters Treaty ‘in Abeyance’; Conveys Views on Teesta to Bangladesh”, 3 July. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pakistan-must-stop-backing-terror-india-says-indus-waters-treaty-in-abeyance-conveys-views-on-teesta-to-bangladesh/amp_articleshow/132160506.cms (Accessed 20 July 2026).
[xxiii] India Today (2026), “India on Indus Waters Treaty Order: Never Recognised So-Called Court of Arbitration, Any Decision Is Illegal”, 2 February. Available at: https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/never-recognised-so-called-court-of-arbitration-any-decision-is-illegal-india-on-indus-waters-treaty-order-2861973-2026-02-02 (Accessed 12 July 2026).
[xxiv] Jalali, “India Rejects Hague Court Ruling on Indus Water Treaty.”
[xxv] Saxena, P. K. (2026), “How Pak Weaponised Indus Water Treaty, & India’s Long Overdue Reckoning”, ThePrint, 6 May. Available at: https://theprint.in/india/how-pak-weaponised-indus-water-treaty-indias-long-overdue-reckoning/2923430/ (Accessed 18 July 2026).
[xxvi] Barua, A., Vij, S., Bisht, M., Siddiqui, M. S. and Manhas, N. S. (2025), “The Messaging from Putting the IWT in Abeyance”, The Hindu, 6 May. Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-messaging-from-putting-the-iwt-in-abeyance/article69541448.ece (Accessed 28 October 2026).
[xxvii] Raj, “Holding Back the Flow.”
[xxviii] Explained Desk (2024), “India Issues Notice to Pakistan Seeking Review of Indus Waters Treaty: What to Know”, The Indian Express, 19 September. Available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-notice-pakistan-indus-water-treaty-9574375/ (Accessed 1 October 2026).
[xxix] Permanent Court of Arbitration (2023), The Indus Waters Western Rivers Arbitration (Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Republic of India), PCA Case No. 2023-01, Award on the Competence of the Court, 6 July. Permanent Court of Arbitration: The Hague. Available at: https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/284/ (Accessed 20 July 2026).
[xxx] Dwivedi, E. (2025), “On Indus Waters Treaty, Why India Is Right to Boycott the Ruling of Court of Arbitration”, The Indian Express, 11 July. Available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/indus-waters-treaty-india-boycott-court-of-arbitration-ruling-10120536/ (Accessed 15 July 2026).
[xxxi] Khalid, N. (2025), “Flood Threats to Pakistan’s Food Security”, Pakistan Observer, 19 November. Available at: https://pakobserver.net/flood-threats-to-pakistans-food-security/ (Accessed 14 July 2026).
[xxxii] Fakhar-e-Alam (2026), “Pakistan’s Right on Western Rivers Globally Accepted; IWT’s Abeyance by India against International Law”, Associated Press of Pakistan, 30 June. Available at: https://www.app.com.pk/features/pakistans-right-on-western-rivers-globally-accepted-iwts-abeyance-by-india-against-intl-law/ (Accessed 19 July 2026)
[xxxiii] Associated Press of Pakistan, “India’s IWT Suspension Sparks Strategic Concerns at National.”
[xxxiv] Khan, “IWT: Pakistan's non-negotiable red line.”
[xxxv] Associated Press of Pakistan, “India’s IWT Suspension Sparks Strategic Concerns at National.”
[xxxvi] Daily Times (2025), “India Weaponising Water, Says Ahsan Iqbal after Floods”, 27 August. Available at: https://dailytimes.com.pk/1360252/india-weaponising-water-says-ahsan-iqbal-after-floods/ (Accessed 16 July 2026).
[xxxvii] The New Indian Express (2026), “We Will Go to War: Pakistan Defence Minister’s Warning to India over Indus Waters”, 22 June. Available at: https://www.newindianexpress.com/india/2026/Jun/22/we-will-go-to-war-pakistan-defence-ministers-warning-to-india-over-indus-waters (Accessed 16 July 2026).
[xxxviii] Tanoli, N. (2025), “Pakistan Rejects Indian Threats to Indus Waters Treaty”, Minute Mirror, 7 August, Available at: https://minutemirror.com.pk/pakistan-rejects-indian-threats-to-indus-waters-treaty-422237/ (Accessed 16 July 2026).
[xxxix] The Nation (2026), “Senate Panel Warns Water Crisis Deepening”, 20 February, Available at: https://www.nation.com.pk/20-Feb-2026/senate-panel-warns-water-crisis-deepening (Accessed 17 July 2026).
[xl] Tanoli, “Pakistan Rejects Indian Threats to Indus Waters Treaty.”
[xli] Anwer, Z. (2026), “India’s $60bn River Storage Plans Raise Alarm in Islamabad over Water Security”, HUM News English, 2 March, Available at: https://humenglish.com/latest/indias-60bn-river-storage-plans-raise-alarm-in-islamabad-over-water-security/ (Accessed 18 July 2026).
[xlii] Dwivedi, “On Indus Waters Treaty.”
[xliii] Radio Pakistan (2026), “Islamabad to Host Seminar on Indus Waters Treaty on Tuesday”, 29 June, Available at: https://radio.gov.pk/29-06-2026/islamabad-to-host-seminar-on-iwt-tomorrow (Accessed 20 July 2026).
[xliv] Daily Times (2025), “Pakistan Slams India at UN over Indus Treaty ‘Weaponisation’”, 7 November. Available at: https://dailytimes.com.pk/1396637/pakistan-slams-india-at-un-over-indus-treaty-weaponisation/ (Accessed 22 July 2026).
[xlv] Kebebew, T., Pellaton, C. and Tignino, M. (2025), “A Treaty on the Brink? India’s Suspension of the IWT and the Case for Cooperative Transboundary Water Governance”, International Water Law Project Blog, 16 June. Available at: https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/blog/2025/06/16/a-treaty-on-the-brink-indias-suspension-of-the-iwt-and-the-case-for-cooperative-transboundary-water-governance/ (Accessed 22 July 2026).
[xlvi] Naweed, M. (2025), “IWT Suspension: India’s Untenable Legal Arguments”, The Express Tribune, 30 April, Available at: https://tribune.com.pk/story/2543051/iwt-suspension-indias-untenable-legal-arguments (Accessed 20 July 2026).
[xlvii] Dal S. (2025), “IWT: Indo-Pak Flashpoint”, Pune Mirror, 3 July, Available at: https://punemirror.com/opinion/columnists/iwt-indo-pak-flashpoint/ (Accessed 20 July 2026).
[xlviii] The Indian Express (2025), “Indus Waters Treaty and Simla Agreement in Abeyance: What This Means”, 24 April. Available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-law/indus-waters-treaty-simla-agreement-in-abeyance-what-this-means-9966366/ (Accessed 20 July 2026).
[xlix] Ibid.
