Emergence of Terrorism in Central Asia: Roots, Drivers, and Implications

Central Asia, which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, has always been regarded as a stable and safe region, but the recent incidents of terrorism, linked to this region and perpetuated by ISIS-Khorasan (IS-KP), have caused significant concern both regionally and globally.1 Four Tajik nationals associated with IS-KP were allegedly involved in the recent Moscow bombing terror attack 22 March 2024, at the Crocus City Hall concert venue, in which 140 people were killed and many wounded.2 However, the magnitude of terrorism emanating from this region compared to that of the Middle East or Af-Pak region is very low. Terrorism in Central Asia is caused by distinct geopolitical, socioeconomic, and historical factors. In this article, the author examines the roots, systemic drivers, and enabling socio-political factors of terrorism in Central Asia.

The roots of the terrorism in Central Asia today can be traced to the earlier years of the Soviet period. During this period, religious practices were systemically suppressed under communistic policies, and Islamic education was severely curtailed.3 This resulted in clandestine gatherings of Islamist theologians and their followers who sought to preserve and reform Muslim traditions. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was an ideological void that galvanized the attraction towards Islam as a new form of identity. This post-1991 phase was referred to by many as an era of renaissance; however, it came with the drawback of worsening socio-economic situations and what was popularly perceived as repressive forms of governance. Poverty, unemployment, corruption, and ethnic frictions provided suitable breeding grounds for growth of radical ideologies.4

Many radical organizations took advantage of the spiritual revival in the region offering a narrative of resistance against the perceived oppression by these authoritarian regimes. Straddling the borders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz republic, and Tajikistan is the Fergana valley which became the hotspot for extremist ideologies. High population densities, economic marginalization and poor governance in this region have made the environment conducive for radicalization. This has led to emergence of radical militant groups like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Jund al-Khilafah (Kazakhstan) and Ansarullah (Tajikistan) who intend to create Islamic states in their respective areas of operation.5 Pan-Islamist organisations like Hizbut Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat are also operating in this region. The assertion of IS-KP in the extended central Asian and Eurasian region in recent years is an issue of concern in this context.

Drivers of Radicalization

Radicalization in Central Asia is driven by a combination of personal crises, systemic grievances, and geopolitical dynamics. At the personal level, people experiencing crises such as unemployment, domestic abuse, or migration trauma are easy targets for self-radicalization, as extremist ideologies offer an alternative way of life with a sense of purpose, meaning to their lives, and inclusion for them.6 The Islamic State (IS), for example, was able to garner recruits because it promised them psychological support and outlet for their suppressed feelings and the ability to direct their rage at systemic injustices.7

Additionally, regimes in Central Asia, have encouraged radicalization through their authoritarian style of governance. Policies aimed at limiting religious freedoms, such as banning hijab, imposing restrictions on beard, and crackdowns on religious education have alienated large segments of the populace. For example, hijab bans in schools and government workplaces have sidelined faithful Muslim women, while a lack of sanctioned religious education has left a void that has been filled by unauthorized and frequently extreme interpretations of Islam.8

These grievances are compounded by ethnic and regional discrimination within the Central Asian Republics (CARs). Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan, for example, allege that they have been suffering discrimination and ethnic violence especially since the 2010 clashes. During the 1992-1997 suppression of the Tajik civil war, Rasht Valley has also had similar experience leaving the residents of the area disillusioned and willing to be radicalized.

The Role of Socio-Economic and Political Conditions

Socio-economic variables such as lack of employment, poverty, and endemic corruption are also significant reasons for the spread of radicalisation and terrorism in Central Asia. This region has huge resources but the fruit of these resources has not been enjoyed by everyone.9 In areas like Zhezkazgan, Kazakhstan’s declining industries and shrinking welfare systems rendered communities weak and vulnerable to radical ideologies. Corruption contributes to degradation of administrative order, loss of faith by the public in government authorities and affects in counter-terrorism efforts. Consequently, the inability of these regimes to provide solutions to socio-economic issues in society has provoked popular angst against them, while the rudimentary services rendered by many radical groups and the ‘the last hope’ they offer to free such societies from corruption and nepotism has endeared them to the people.10

Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that socio-economic factors alone cannot account for the rise of terrorism. Some of those who join these terror organizations come from wealthy families; so, besides these factors, mobilization strategies, political, ethnic and various other factors are also very important. As has been suggested above, radical groups exploit socio-economic grievances to attract followers, but their appeal often lies in their ability to provide a sense of identity, purpose, and hope to those who feel alienated and marginalized within the system.11

The Geopolitical Dimension

Central Asia’s geographical proximity to Afghanistan has had a huge impact on the growth of terrorism in the region. The ISKP has increased its efforts to recruit Central Asians, exploiting historical and trade links between the two regions. Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, the ISKP has extended its propaganda networks by establishing Tajik and Uzbek media divisions exclusively for Central Asian countries.12

The ISKP has been systematically attacked Central Asian governments, depicting them as corrupt and oppressive. These themes appeal to disillusioned Central Asians, particularly those who have faced persecution or tyranny.13 It has also attempted to disrupt the Taliban’s connections with Central Asian governments.14 For example, in 2021, certain Pakistani members of the ISKP were detained for attempting to bomb the Turkmen embassy in Kabul. Such attacks underscore the group’s objective of destabilizing the region by targeting regional administrations as well as foreign diplomatic missions. The ISKP also condemns the Taliban as a Pashtun-centric movement that is antagonistic to the Uzbeks and the Tajiks, accusing it of supporting foreign powers opposed to Islam.15

State Responses and Their Consequences

To combat the problem of terrorism in this region, the regimes in Central Asian States have adopted the twin strategies of co-optation and repression. They invest in mosques and Islamic cultural centres to promote state-approved views of Islam, while also enforcing restrictive and repressive laws, such as prohibiting unregistered religious groups and regulating theological discourse.16

While these regulations have, to some extent, limited the propagation of extreme ideology, they have also resulted in a violent backlash. As already stated, measures like as banning beards and hijabs have alienated practicing Muslims, driving some to radicalism. For example, in Kazakhstan, restrictions on religious freedoms and extensive corruption have spurred anger, as seen in the 2022 protests against government buildings.17

Regional and International Cooperation

Combating terrorism in Central Asia requires cooperation beyond national boundaries. The region’s huge geostrategic importance and the threats that terrorism poses have resulted in cooperation among various countries.18 Russia and China, particularly through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (SCO-RATS), have played a prominent role in helping these countries in their counter-terrorism efforts.19 However, mutual mistrust and rivalry between these central Asian countries can hamper their regional collaboration. For example, tensions between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over water resources and border conflicts have made it difficult to develop coordinated counter-terrorism strategies.

The international community has an important role in tackling the root causes of terrorism in Central Asia. Economic investment, education programmes, and the promotion of good governance can all help to address the socioeconomic and political concerns that fuel radicalism.

Challenges and Opportunities

The future of terrorism in central Asian countries depends on the ability and capacity of these countries to identify the real causes of radicalization and address them; taking only a security-centric approach to this issue will not help; it requires a multifaceted strategy to combat this menace. Economic reforms aimed at reducing poverty and unemployment can address socioeconomic discontent, which fosters extremism. Similarly, promoting religious freedom and tolerance can help governments bridge the gap with their Muslim communities. Education also has an important function here. Offering religious teaching in line with scientific temper and existing needs of the people can reduce the appeal of radical ideologies. Encouraging critical thinking and interfaith discussion can help prevent extremism. Finally, regional, and global coordination is critical in combating the cross-border aspect of terrorism. Central Asian countries must work together to exchange intelligence, coordinate counter-terrorism policies, and address interrelated challenges such as drug trafficking and proliferation of arms.

Conclusion

The rise of terrorism in central Asia is a complex phenomenon and a byproduct of social, economic, political, historical, and ethnic factors. While this region has made tremendous strides in addressing the menace of terrorism, challenges and difficulties remain. Addressing these difficulties requires a multifaceted approach that goes beyond a security-centric approach incorporating economic development, political reform, and regional cooperation. By addressing the underlying causes of terrorism, Central Asian states can ensure, for the people living in the terrain, a more stable and safe future.

*Imran Khurshid, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Kashmir, specializes in Indo-Pacific studies and South Asian security issues. The views expressed here are his own.

Notes

1. RATS, SCO, “Situation, Facts and Events” 26 Janaury 2024. Available at:
2. Laura Gozzi, “Moscow attack: Central Asian migrants hit by backlash in Russia”, BBC News, 27 March 2024.
3. Fiona Hill, “Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability” 23 July 2003
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Intel Brief. “Terrorism Trends in Central Asia”, 26 November 2018.
7. E Lemon, Tucker N. A ‘Hotbed’ or a Slow, Painful Burn? Explaining Central Asia’s Role in Global Terrorism - Combating Terrorism Center at West Point [Internet]. 2024 [cited 2024 Nov 21]. 
8. See note 5.
9. Ayjaz Wani, “Resurgent Taliban and its implications on Central Asia”, 09 September 202,. Available at:
10. See note 5
11. Svante Cornell, “Central Asia Is Not a Breeding Ground for Radicalization”, The Diplomat, 15 November 2017.
12. See note 9
13. Ibid.
14. Lucas Webber, “ISKP Expands its Focus Toward Central Asia - Jamestown”, 14 April 2023.
15. Ibid.
16. See note 7
17. Ibid.
18. Edward Lemon, “Cable No. 38: Talking Up Terrorism in Central Asia”, 29th July 2018. 
19. AyjazWani, “ISKP’s recruiting strategies and vulnerabilities in Central Asia”, 26 March 2024.

(All the websites mentioned in the comment were accessed on 22 November 2024)