India-Bangladesh relations are entering a new phase following the political transition in Dhaka in August 2024. The relationship faces greater political uncertainty as Bangladesh seeks broader strategic options and stronger engagement with China, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United States. Trade imbalances, power agreements, visa restrictions and competing media narratives have emerged as sources of friction over the last few years, while cooperation in healthcare, education, connectivity and security continues to bind the two. The post-Hasina period represents a renegotiation of the bilateral relationship rather than a complete rupture. For New Delhi, adapting to Bangladesh’s expanding strategic choices while sustaining economic and people-to-people links will be central to maintaining a stable and productive partnership.
India and Bangladesh share one of the world’s most intricate bilateral relationships, defined by a 4,096-kilometre border, 54 common transboundary rivers, and the foundational legacy of the 1971 Liberation War. For over a decade under Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government, this relationship was characterised as a “golden era” of cooperation, marked by the resolution of boundary disputes and deepening economic integration. Yet the political transition that began in August 2024 has fundamentally recalibrated this dynamic, exposing the tensions between structural interdependence and assertions of strategic autonomy. This analysis examines how geographical proximity and functional dependencies shape India-Bangladesh relations while simultaneously enabling both states to pursue divergent strategic objectives. Drawing on official data, diplomatic records, and diverse media narratives from both countries, it argues that the post-Hasina era represents not a rupture but a renegotiation, one that reflects Bangladesh’s growing attempts at strategic agency, India’s recalibrated neighbourhood policy, and the competitive pressures of a multipolar South Asia.
India-Bangladesh Economic Ties
Bangladesh is India’s largest trading partner in South Asia, with bilateral trade standing at approximately USD 11.39 billion in FY 2024-25. Official data presented in the Bangladesh Parliament show that Bangladeshi imports from India totalled $9.62 billion, while exports stood at $1.76 billion, resulting in a trade deficit of $7.86 billion. Commerce Minister Khandaker Abdul Muktadir informed parliament that this is Bangladesh’s largest trade deficit among SAARC member countries. India grants duty-free, quota-free access to nearly all Bangladeshi goods under SAFTA. However, the structural trade imbalance and the change in Bangladesh’s political regime have become sources of political friction. Bangladesh is now seeking a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with India to narrow the gap, with the commerce minister noting that imports of food products and industrial raw materials have kept the difference large. India’s Lines of Credit to Bangladesh since 2014 total $6.5 billion–among India’s largest concessional financing commitments to any country, supplemented by grants for development projects. State minister Kirti Vardhan Singh affirmed in the Lok Sabha that India’s approach remains “neighborhood driven and people centric.”
Bangladesh imported approximately 1,160 to 2,600 MW of electricity from India in recent years, accounting for 15 to 18 per cent of the national supply during peak periods. The Adani Power Godda plant (1,600 MW capacity) has been a major supplier, contributing approximately 5.17 per cent of Bangladesh’s total installed power generation capacity. However, this dependence has become a source of political vulnerability. Following the regime transition, the new BNP-led government announced plans to renegotiate the Adani power deal to seek lower prices. According to a Bangladesh government report released in January, the overall cost of electricity from the Adani plant is “roughly 50% higher than what it should be”.
In November 2024, Adani Power reduced electricity supply by 32.8 percent citing payment disputes, underscoring the vulnerability of dependence on a single supplier. The reduction followed Adani’s earlier warning that it would suspend supply from 31 October if overdue payments of US$846 million were not cleared. The company also noted that Bangladesh had not provided the requisite letter of credit for $170.03 million, which constituted a “material default” under the power purchase agreement. The government’s intention to renegotiate the agreement “out of court” represents a significant shift from the Hasina-era approach. New Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has made renegotiating the Adani deal one of his government’s first initiatives since taking office.
However, Adani Power maintains that it has not received any formal communication regarding renegotiations and is meeting all supply obligations under the contract. In June 2026, however, Adani Power indicated that Bangladesh had been steadily clearing outstanding dues and expressed confidence that the remaining issues would be resolved. Despite the tension, Adani Power continues to supply electricity, and Bangladesh has been making partial payments to ensure an uninterrupted supply.
Healthcare and Education
Bangladesh has consistently been the largest source of medical tourists to India. According to Indian Tourism Ministry data presented in parliament, 499,951 Bangladeshis visited India on medical visas in 2023, declining to 482,336 in 2024. Overall, 1,750,165 Bangladeshi tourists visited India in 2024. However, post-August 2024 visa restrictions have created uncertainty. By August 2024, India had issued 800,000 visas across 15 categories to Bangladeshis, including 200, 000 medical visas. The Indian High Commissioner has stated that medical visas remain “widely” available, while acknowledging that the visa process would “normalise if the situation “improves”. Meanwhile, five visa centres have been operating at reduced capacity.
Education remains another important channel of engagement. India provides scholarships to Bangladeshi students through the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) scholarship programme. For the 2026-27 academic year, 541 Bangladeshi students received ICCR scholarships, including 500 under the Subarno Jayanti Scholarship for undergraduate, postgraduate and doctoral programmes in STEM and non-STEM disciplines. Additionally, 38 students received the Lata Mangeshkar Dance and Music Scholarship and three received the ICCR-QUAD scholarship for undergraduate STEM programmes. The fully funded scholarships cover tuition, university fees and a monthly stipend at Indian institutions.
The Issue of Water
Water sharing remains one of the most sensitive dimensions of India‑Bangladesh relations, particularly the unresolved Teesta issue and the Ganges Treaty of 1996. While the Ganges agreement was hailed as a landmark in cooperative river management, three decades of demographic pressures, climate variability, and competing developmental needs have questioned its adequacy. The Teesta dispute, meanwhile, has become emblematic of the limits of bilateral water diplomacy, with Bangladesh pressing for equitable allocation to sustain agriculture in its northern districts. Bangladeshi policymakers increasingly argue that both frameworks require renewal or renegotiation to reflect contemporary realities, including ecological sustainability and fair distribution. For India, revisiting these agreements offers an opportunity to demonstrate responsiveness while reinforcing its image as a reliable partner in transboundary water governance. A forward‑looking framework could integrate basin‑wide cooperation, joint monitoring, and climate‑resilient infrastructure, thereby transforming potential sources of friction into pillars of trust. Addressing water security alongside trade and energy would strengthen the foundations of a reciprocal partnership in the post‑Hasina era.
Media and Disinformation: A new challenge
Despite all this India has a bad name in Bangladesh thanks to media disinformation on either side. While negative views about Indian media are peddled by some vested interest groups, there is no acknowledgement of disinformation campaigns about India in Bangladesh. According to Bangladeshi analysts, cross-border (read Indian) media narratives have added another layer of friction. Rumour Scanner Bangladesh identified 155 instances of disinformation about Bangladesh circulating through Indian media outlets and social media platforms in 2025, an increase of nearly 5 per cent over the previous year. Of these, 91 concerned communal incidents. Seventy Indian news outlets published 140 reports across 38 incidents containing false or misleading information about Bangladesh. Outlets identified in the reporting included NDTV, The Times of India, Zee News, India Today, Hindustan Times and News18. The pattern has been described as a “wedge campaign” that can deepen public distrust.
The information environment in Bangladesh is thus shaped by anti-India narratives. Indian officials have identified a sustained online campaign linked to Pakistani intelligence elements and radical groups in Bangladesh which actively spreads anti-India narratives and brands any cooperation with India as “betrayal”. A “rule book” circulating on social media platforms instructs Bangladeshis to blame India for every crisis in the country, and social media handles with names like “kick India out of Bangladesh” continuously promote provocative anti-India content. These competing disinformation ecosystems, one emanating from Indian media portraying Bangladesh as unstable, and another from Pakistani-linked networks framing India as a hostile hegemon, have created a toxic cross-border information environment that complicates elite diplomacy and poisons public sentiment on both sides.
India’s Approach under Hasina and BNP’s Return
India’s approach during the Hasina era rested on a strategic bargain involving security cooperation, connectivity and political alignment. The arrangement produced tangible gains, particularly in addressing northeastern insurgent networks and developing connectivity projects linked to India’s Act East Policy. It also came with some political costs. A section of Bangladeshi public opinion viewed India less as a supportive neighbour and more as a patron of an increasingly authoritarian political order.
Many Bangladeshis, particularly the younger generations, refer to the disputed general elections of 2014, 2018, and 2024, and to Delhi’s perceived “endorsement” of them. According to a 2026 Pew Research survey, 51 per cent of Bangladeshis now hold an unfavourable view of India, reflecting a 15 per cent decline in positive sentiment since 2024. The upheavals of 2024, culminating in Hasina’s flight into exile, exposed the limits of India’s bet on a single political equation.
The Bangladesh nationalist party’s electoral victory under Tarique Rahman has partially altered the bilateral geometry. The new government has signalled strategic autonomy, including renewed engagement with Pakistan and China. During Prime Minister Rahman’s Beijing visit, 13 Memoranda of Understanding were signed between Bangladesh and China, covering investment cooperation, green development, media collaboration, and the inclusion of Mandarin in school curricula, alongside cooperation in technical and vocational education. This recalibration extends to the power sector, with the new government moving to renegotiate the Adani deals as one of its first initiatives. The government claims it favours a more balanced foreign policy that works for Bangladesh, acknowledging that renegotiating the contract may complicate relations with India. Yet the government has signalled that pursuing lower electricity prices and fiscal prudence takes precedence over avoiding diplomatic friction, a calculated trade-off that reflects Dhaka’s new assertiveness.
The Geopolitical Chessboard: External Actors and Strategic Hedging
First, China’s engagement with Bangladesh has intensified post-2024. The signing of 13 MoUs during Prime Minister Rahman’s visit to Beijing marks a significant deepening of ties, broadening cooperation beyond traditional infrastructure into investment, trade, education, and media collaboration, including partnerships with China’s Xinhua News Agency and China Media Group. The agreements cover investment, green development, media cooperation, human resource development, Teesta management, and the Global Development Initiative. Separate MoUs were signed on Mandarin-language education and technical and vocational education. Bangladesh is also seeking Chinese support for BRICS membership. The strategic calculus is quite evident. Dhaka is practising classic hedging, extracting benefits from multiple partners while avoiding exclusive dependence on any single one.
Second, Pakistan’s renewed engagement with Bangladesh carries symbolic importance and growing strategic substance. For Islamabad, a Bangladesh with stronger defence capabilities could challenge India’s influence in the Bay of Bengal. The rapprochement has extended to security and intelligence cooperation. A six-member delegation from Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), led by Colonel Magfuz-ul-Bari, visited Pakistan on 15 August 2026. The visit followed DGFI Director General Major General Qaiser Rashid Chowdhury’s trip to Islamabad in April 2026, indicating efforts by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to expand its footprint in India’s eastern neighbourhood. Since the fall of the Hasina government, Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment has increased its engagement with Bangladesh’s security institutions. However, Pakistan’s leverage remains constrained by structural factors, including limited economic integration, enduring historical grievances related to 1971, and Dhaka’s multi-alignment strategy, which prevents exclusive dependence on any single partner.
Third, the United States remains Bangladesh’s largest export market, accounting for approximately 18 per cent of total exports, with earnings of US$48.28 billion in FY 2024-25. Washington’s engagement with Dhaka has expanded amid wider strategic competition. The two countries conducted the joint military exercise “Tiger Lightning 2026” from 19 July to 31 at the Sylhet military complex. The 13-day exercise involved the US Army Pacific Command and Bangladesh’s parachute commando brigade. US Ambassador Brent T. Christensen described defence cooperation as “one of the pillars of their developing strategic partnership”, reflecting shared interests in an open and secure Indo-Pacific. Washington’s interest in Bangladesh is driven in part by the country’s strategic location, concerns over Chinese influence and the wider Indo-Pacific strategy.
And lastly, Turkey has emerged as another significant defence partner, with bilateral defence cooperation expanding since 2018. Bangladesh has acquired 15 types of Turkish weaponry, including Bayraktar TB2 combat drones, Cobra armoured personnel carriers and TRG-300 Kaplan guided multiple rocket launch systems. In June 2026, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit marked what both sides described as a “new era” in bilateral ties. The two countries agreed to establish annual “2+2” consultations involving their foreign and defence ministers. The relationship is also moving towards joint domestic production of military equipment, including drones, with potential technology transfer and manufacturing facilities in Bangladesh. This diversification supports Bangladesh’s “Forces Goal 2030” modernisation programme and adds another dimension to its multi-alignment strategy.
These developments show a broader South Asian trend in which smaller and medium-sized states leverage their geographic position and the interests of larger powers to increase their bargaining space. Bangladesh’s post-2024 multi-alignment, Nepal’s balancing, Sri Lanka’s engagement with China and the Maldives’ diplomatic manoeuvring point to a regional reality in which proximity does not automatically translate into political influence. States can convert geography and great-power competition into bargaining levers.
Conclusion: From Dependency and Partnership
India-Bangladesh relations rest on deep structural interdependence in energy, trade, healthcare, and connectivity underpinned by geography and shared history. Bangladesh cannot easily eliminate reliance on Indian vital supplies and markets, while India cannot ignore Bangladesh’s role in Northeast connectivity and Bay of Bengal security. Yet political agency, multi-alignment options, and domestic narratives enable calibrated distancing. The post-Hasina transition has shown that functional interdependence does not automatically produce political alignment. The BNP government’s efforts to renegotiate the Adani agreement and expand engagement with China and other partners reflect a strategy of diversification rather than a complete break with India. The path forward requires moving beyond hierarchical assumptions toward reciprocal partnership. This means addressing trade barriers through mechanisms like the proposed Comprehensive Economic Partnership, ensuring reliable energy and visa access, and managing media narratives to prevent disinformation from poisoning public sentiment. In a multipolar and interdependent South Asia, mutual recognition of agency offers the most realistic path for stability and shared prosperity. The developments in the coming years will continue to test the balance between necessity and choice, geography and sovereignty, interdependence and autonomy.
The post‑Hasina era is not a rupture but a renegotiation. Geography and interdependence bind India and Bangladesh, yet sovereignty and multi‑alignment shape Dhaka’s choices. A reciprocal partnership—rather than hierarchical relationshp— offers the most realistic path to stability and shared prosperity in a multipolar South Asia.
Dr Mohd. Usman Bhatti is a Research Fellow at Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed here are his own.
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