Following the US-Israeli military strikes on Iran in February 2026, the conflict has evolved into a major regional crisis threatening global stability. Both American-Israeli and Iranian leadership made critical miscalculations; whilst expecting swift victory, they underestimated each other's resolve. The war has fractured Gulf unity, with regional states adopting divergent stances—the UAE supporting the US-Israeli position whilst Oman aligns with Iran. Saudi Arabia maintains strategic ambiguity. Five months in, the conflict has destabilised Yemen and Iraq, disrupted the Strait of Hormuz, and impacted global energy security. The commentary argues that only sustained diplomatic engagement and multilateral commitment can prevent further escalation and regional catastrophe.
On 28 February 2026, when the US and Israel launched the Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, respectively, attacking Iran’s military, political, and strategic targets, they had probably not had a prolonged conflict in sight. The Trump-Netanyahu duo had expected that their overwhelming joint military superiority would effortlessly break Iran's political will and military power. They grossly underestimated and overlooked Iran's fierce resolve and readiness to withstand the assault. Furthermore, the US-Israel leadership dismissed the warnings of their Arabian Gulf partners, who had urged President Trump to forsake military action in favour of continued political, economic, and diplomatic pressure against Iran. A key concern for the Gulf states and the international community was that an all-out war would disrupt the strategic Strait of Hormuz chokepoint with cascading economic impact. The US readiness to make a deal with Iran has been supported by most regional stakeholders except Israel, which remains adamant on resolving regional problems and threats by use of force instead of diplomacy.
Iranian leadership too has made serious miscalculations before the conflict. Although they were arguably preparing for a showdown with the US and Israel, especially since the 12-day war in June 2025, Tehran was probably inclined to believe that, given the serious international and regional apprehensions, the Trump-Netanyahu duo would refrain from widening the circle of conflict. This belief hampered their ability to respond positively to the diplomatic overtures for a deal that could have avoided the conflict. Moreover, Iranian calculations that withstanding the war is akin to a victory indicate a skewed thinking wherein the leaders are ready to risk the future of the country and its people for a showdown that will likely take decades to recover from, especially in economic aspects. Iran's response thus far has continued to show no signs of any indication of resolving the issues involved; rather, for the regime, it has become a matter of survival and prestige. Hence, the focus is on rhetoric rather than substance.
The international responses to the war have mostly been on predictable lines. Russia and China condemned the attacks, terming it violation of Iranian sovereignty and international norms. Both Beijing and Moscow have extended some degree of political and strategic support to Tehran but have refrained from getting directly involved. The EU countries and the UK expressed their scepticism about the need for going to war and refused Trump’s call to join it. Other US NATO and non-NATO allies have avoided getting directly involved without necessarily condemning the US actions. Many East and Southeast Asian countries too have been impacted, especially as their dependence on Gulf oil imports and trade and business ties with the region remain significant. India, too, has been seriously impacted, with cascading effects on its energy security, safety and security of its expatriates and inward remittances, access to sea routes in the region, and on trade, business and investment engagements with the Gulf states.
The regional actors, especially the Arabian Gulf states, find themselves in a precarious situation with limited choices. Their strategic, military and security dependence on the US leaves little room for them to manoeuvre. Though Qatar and Oman have tried to engage both sides, Saudi Arabia has preferred ambiguity and restraint to deal with the situation. Nonetheless, none have escaped the political, economic and security cost of the conflict. Other regional countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Türkiye have also been affected and have expressed solidarity with Arab Gulf states, without necessarily directly joining the conflict.
After five months, the Iran war has shown signs of continuing and evolving into a major regional crisis, especially as Yemen and Iraq are getting seriously affected. In July 2026, the four-year ceasefire in Yemen showed signs of breaking down as the Iran-backed Houthis and Saudi-backed Yemen government resumed fighting in mid-July after a civilian airline from Iran was not allowed to land in Sana’a by Saudi and Yemeni forces. The Saudis and their Yemeni allies argued that the plane carried IRGC commanders and weapons, while the Iranians and Houthis said that the flight was bringing mourners back from Iran after attending Khamenei’s funeral. Towards the end of July, a joint US-Saudi military operation targeted Iran-aligned Hashd al-Shabbi or Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) bases and command centres in Iraq, saying that they are being used to target US bases across the Middle East and Saudi energy infrastructure. This evoked a serious reaction from the PMF that pledged retaliation and revenge.
In the light of the ongoing situation in the Gulf and West Asia, six broad points emerge. Firstly, the global geopolitical tension and competition are becoming highly contentious and violent. Russia-Ukraine war, the Gaza crisis, and the Iran war underline the proclivity of global, regional, and non-state actors to choose violence. To some extent, it also indicates the growing disappointments in the international order, norms, and organizations to resolve serious global issues. Secondly, the US, under the Trump administration, is becoming more blatant and disparaging of international laws and norms and is ready to use force (abduction of Maduro) or go to war (attack on Iran), a shift from the general US tendency to avoid war after its entanglements in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Thirdly, the West Asia region is yet to recover from the cascading effects of the 7 October 2023, attacks on Israel. The attacks mounted by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad not only evoked a disproportionate response from Israel and pushed the Gaza Strip to a humanitarian crisis, but it has also created a tendency in Israel to use force instead of diplomacy to resolve issues and threats it faces. These developments have stalled the progress made by the Abraham Accords framework. Fourthly, despite Iran's ability to withstand the US-Israel onslaught, it remains ultimately on the losing side, especially as it will take decades for it to recover economically, even if the regime manages to survive. Moreover, the outstanding nuclear issue and support for armed non-state actors (ANSAs) in the region will continue to create problems between Iran and its neighbours, forcing the US to get involved.
Fifth, the GCC states find themselves in a precarious situation. Although the war was not their making, they have been increasingly involved in it and affected significantly. The economic development and diversification plan that is premised on regional peace and stability is becoming increasingly challenging, especially if the war drags on. Moreover, the war has widened the divide within the GCC, with the UAE moving closer to the US-Israeli position while Oman moving closer to the Iranian position. Bahrain and Kuwait are aiding the US war without necessarily joining it, while Qatar is in contact with both sides without denying access to US military to its territory. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has adopted a risk-averse and ambiguous approach wrapped in the principle of strategic restraint. Although its patience vis-à-vis Iran is running thin, it does not want to be seen as part of a war effort by Israel.
Sixth, the situation in the West Asia region is gradually becoming precarious, especially as the conflicts and war have now engulfed the Gulf region as well. The Gulf had remained free from war for the past decade and a half, when the entire region had witnessed serious churn in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings. The Iran war, therefore, underlines that the crisis in the West Asia region is expanding and widening, with several regional countries showing signs of getting involved or impacted. The region needs a comprehensive effort that can bring the regional stakeholders, including Iran and Israel, to commit to resolving problems and conflicts through diplomacy instead of war. So long as such a commitment from regional stakeholders remains absent, the region faces a precarious situation and remains prone to violent outbursts.
* Dr Md. Muddassir Quamar is an Associate Professor at Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The views expressed are his own.
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