Behind Pakistan’s narrative of “Azad Kashmir” lies a region marked by political control, constitutional restrictions, and recurring unrest. The contrast between Pakistan’s rhetoric and its record in AJK(PoK) deserves closer scrutiny.
Pakistan has long projected “Azad Jammu and Kashmir” (AJK/PoK) as a free and autonomous region while criticizing India’s policies in Jammu and Kashmir. However, the reality on the ground presents a starkly different picture. Since 1947, AJK has remained politically constrained, economically marginalized, and administratively dependent on Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Constitutional provisions introduced in 1974 and strengthened in 2018 require political actors to support the ideology of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan, effectively excluding pro-independence voices from electoral politics. Recent protests against economic hardship and political repression have been met with crackdowns, internet shutdowns, and anti-terror measures. Despite possessing significant natural resources, including the Mangla Dam, local populations have seen limited benefits from development. Pakistan continues to invoke the principle of a plebiscite and Kashmiri self-determination internationally, yet its own governance framework in AJK restricts political choice and limits democratic participation, raising questions about the credibility of its narrative.
Pakistan engages in extensive propaganda against India on the global stage, particularly regarding India and Kashmir. Since illegally occupying part of the region in 1947, it has strategically used the term “Azad Kashmir” (“Free Kashmir”) to refer to the territory it has illegally occupied (Pakistan occupied Kashmir or PoK) and project it as a region enjoying complete freedom and autonomy. It has been selling this narrative to the international community and media for decades, presenting the situation as if everything is settled and fine there, with people happy and fully satisfied, while portraying that problems exist in Jammu and Kashmir in India and using propaganda to advance this narrative. However, the reality is quite the opposite.
Colonial Reality of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir
Similarly, Pakistan carried out extensive propaganda when India abrogated Article 370 in Kashmir in 2019. However, Pakistan itself has brought about substantial changes in its relationship with the so-called “Azad Kashmir.” First, it has kept AJK (PoK) an disempowered region since it illegally occupied it in 1947. That is why, today, protests and demonstrations are taking place there against Pakistani oppression, and unrest continues, with more than 70 innocent civilians reportedly killed and over 200 injured. These mass protests have now entered their second week, with authorities reportedly responding by invoking anti-terror laws against demonstrators. Recently, around 150 protesters have been declared “terrorists” amid the agitation. This reflects an increasingly coercive approach toward dissent, where even large-scale civilian protests over economic grievances and political rights are being framed through a security lens, further deepening repression in the region and highlighting the brutality faced by those who protest.
The military controlled state apparatus in Pakistan has completely blocked internet and communication services in the region, thereby limiting external access to information about the situation, while supply routes for basic and essential items, including food and other necessities, have also reportedly been blocked by the Army. Deliberately depriving civilians of essential supplies needed for bare survival is profoundly inhumane and amounts to collective punishment of an entire population for nothing. Such actions violate fundamental humanitarian principles and raise serious concerns that they may reflect a genocidal intent, as well as potentially amount to a crime against humanity under international law.
Moreover, since 1947, the people in AJK (PoK) have not experienced participatory democracy or any functioning system in which they can decide matters for themselves or shape outcomes. People have been denied autonomy, as well as meaningful political representation and participation in decision-making. The region has been run like a colony since 1947, with Pakistan acting like a colonial power, taking resources and giving little in return.
It has followed a model of settler colonialism there from the beginning, keeping the region deliberately impoverished and denying basic economic, civil, and political rights. The region actually has abundant resources, but these do not benefit the local population; instead, the benefits of these resources are transferred to other provinces, especially Punjab. For example, electricity generated there goes to other provinces, while locals face high load shedding and are charged high tariffs, whereas other provinces receive cheaper electricity.
They have one of the largest dams, Mangla Dam, located on the Jhelum River near the Mirpur region, which was constructed between 1961 and 1967 as part of the Indus Basin Project, where people made huge sacrifices, including the displacement of around 100,000 to 150,000 people and the loss of livelihoods, with a large number still not properly resettled. The dam has an installed hydroelectric capacity of around 1,000 MW, later upgraded to over 1,100 MW, and its power is integrated into Pakistan’s national grid. The electricity produced from this dam goes to other provinces, while locals face high charges. The region has been directly controlled from Rawalpindi and Islamabad, which is why protests are happening today.
Engineering Accession
From the beginning, Pakistan carried out repressive changes in its engagement with AJK (PoK). Instead of a unified administrative framework, Pakistan developed separate governance arrangements for AJK (PoK) and Gilgit-Baltistan over time after 1947. Then, in 1974, it passed a constitutional act under which the political framework is explicitly based on the ideology of accession to Pakistan, and it states that “no person or political party in AJK (PoK) shall be permitted to propagate against, or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to, the ideology of the State’s accession to Pakistan,” and that the office-holders must swear loyalty to the “cause of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan.” Public office requires oath-based alignment, as a person cannot hold office unless they take an oath consistent with the ideology of accession to Pakistan. Political activity is restricted so that no party can act against the principle of accession to Pakistan.
The constitutional framework is explicitly built around the idea of final status being linked to accession to Pakistan. Under this framework, political participation is structured around alignment with this position, and political space for pro-independence voices has been significantly constrained and effectively excluded from mainstream participation. Even for common people, access to public office and institutional opportunities requires oath-based alignment under this principle.
Similarly, in 2018, under the AJK Interim Constitution (13th Amendment) Act, Pakistan reinforced and strengthened this requirement that political activity must operate within the framework of accession to Pakistan, and it explicitly restricted political activity against the ideology of accession to Pakistan. Political participation was carefully managed within a pro-accession framework, and candidates are required to sign declarations and affidavits affirming alignment with Pakistan’s ideology and the accession framework, including support for Pakistan’s ideology, the ideology of accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, and commitment to Pakistan’s integrity and sovereignty. Political parties and candidates are expected to operate within this framework, and as a result, groups or individuals associated with pro-independence positions are not allowed to contest elections. These measures also strengthened restrictions on pro-independence Kashmiri groups such as JKLF and others.
Moreover, in 2016, the AJK(PoK) government banned 16 books supporting independence narratives, including works associated with Maqbool Bhat, who was hanged in Jammu and Kashmir after he was awarded a death sentence for multiple murders
Pakistan’s stance that those in AJK (PoK) engaged in political activities will have to pledge their allegiance to the Pakistani state and commit themselves to accession to Pakistan in the event of any future plebiscite flies in the face of its claim that AJK is enjoying “azaadi” or freedom. This is in clear contrast to Pakistan’s propaganda narrative against India, where it repeatedly claims that the Kashmir issue must be resolved in accordance with UN resolutions and through a plebiscite, and that Kashmiris must be given the freedom to decide their own future. In practice, Pakistan has restricted and banned voices supporting independence and has structured the political and institutional framework in a way that effectively aligns with and supports the merger of AJK(PoK) with Pakistan.
Moreover, when Pakistan recently faced criticism from British Members of Parliament and other international voices regarding the ongoing atrocities it is committing in AJK(PoK). In response, Pakistan has issued statements rejecting such remarks as “ill-informed” and urged British MPs to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan, while its official position has been that AJK remains independent and its fate is still not decided. This contradiction raises questions about how it can simultaneously claim it as an internal issue.
In reality, for all practical purposes, Pakistan has completely integrated AJK(PoK) into its system and is engaging in propaganda, while having made its condition worse than other provinces, where some autonomy exists. In contrast, AJK (PoK) is directly controlled and run from Islamabad and Rawalpindi.
Plebiscite Rhetoric and the Reality of Political Control
Pakistan has not given people of AJK (PoK) the power to choose their representatives freely. The system in so-called “Azad Kashmir” is such that the party that forms the government in Islamabad often comes to power there as well, making the region effectively powerless. Regional parties have been repressed and over the years they have lost their popular base. Mainstream parties from Pakistan have progressively expanded their activities and ensured that regional voices are marginalised and silenced. That is why people of this terrain are frustrated, as they have been treated poorly since being brought under Pakistan’s control. The region has largely been used as a tool against India in Pakistan’s rivalry with India.
Moreover, Pakistan often talks about a plebiscite and repeatedly asserts that, as per UN resolutions, the Kashmir issue must be decided. However, when a plebiscite option was available, Pakistan did not allow it, fearing that people in its own part might not support merger with it. For instance, in November 1947, when Governor-General Lord Mountbatten proposed a plebiscite under international supervision after the restoration of peace and order, Pakistan did not accept the proposal in that form. Again, in 1950, it rejected key elements of the proposal put forward by UN representative Sir Owen Dixon, including a regional plebiscite in the areas where the dispute was most acute. Similarly, in 1953, during India-Pakistan discussions, it opposed proposals involving a regional plebiscite. Pakistan feared that people in the areas under its occupation might not necessarily support merger with Pakistan. Yet today, Pakistan repeatedly invokes the plebiscite principle and claims that the Kashmir issue must be resolved as per UN resolutions. However according to these UN resolutions, which Pakistan often invokes, one of the preconditions for a plebiscite is that Pakistan must withdraw its forces from entire AJK(PoK), which is unlikely given how it has altered the constitutional reality of AJK(PoK) over time. Given the constitutional, political, and administrative changes Pakistan has introduced in AJK(PoK) over the decades, including structuring its political system around accession to Pakistan, its continued reliance on the plebiscite narrative appears increasingly inconsistent with the realities it has itself created on the ground.
Similarly, in AJK(PoK), as it has been narrated above, it has not allowed local parties to grow. Unlike in Jammu & Kashmir, where local parties such as National Conference (NC), Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and others participate in elections and governance, in AJK(PoK) it is mainstream Pakistani parties such as PPP, PML-N, and PTI that dominate the political landscape. Pakistani authorities have not allowed strong local parties to develop and take root, as they fear they would lose their control of local parties channel local aspirations which is opposed to Pakistan’s control.
It is not like Jammu and Kashmir, where, under the Jammu and Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act, 1989, a formal framework for grassroots local self-government exists through Panchayati Raj institutions, with elects village-level bodies, block-level councils, and district planning structures, along with regular Panchayati Raj elections and democratic decentralization through these institutions. Within this system, there is grassroots democracy and local self-government, with people actively participating in decision-making at the grassroots level in both rural and urban areas, and where participatory democracy empowers citizens to shape decisions and outcomes themselves.
In AJK (PoK), there is no grassroot democracy like this. The assembly is effectively controlled from Rawalpindi, making meaningful autonomy unimaginable. Yet Pakistan continues its propaganda.
The story of AJK (PoK) exposes a fundamental contradiction at the heart of Pakistan’s Kashmir narrative. While advocating self-determination abroad, Islamabad has constructed a political system in AJK (PoK) that permits only one acceptable outcome—alignment with Pakistan. The gap between the rhetoric of “Azadi” and the reality of constitutional control, political exclusion, and economic exploitation is increasingly difficult to ignore. If freedom is measured by the ability of people to choose their future, express dissent, and govern themselves, then the experience of AJK (PoK) raises uncomfortable questions about who truly speaks for the people of Kashmir—and whose interests are ultimately being served.
*Idrees Aftab is a freelance commentator on regional politics. The
views expressed are his own.
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