From Assertion to Deference: How the Iran War and Shifting Power Dynamics Redefined Trump’s China Visit

Date
18-05-2026

Donald Trump’s May 2026 state visit to China highlighted a dramatic shift in power dynamics, with a defensive Washington increasingly ceding ground to a confident Beijing. Weakened by the strategic fallout of the Iran war, Trump adopted a uncharacteristically cautious, deferential posture, avoiding firm commitments on Taiwan and failing to secure crucial economic deals or mediation on Iran. Conversely, President Xi Jinping leveraged grand symbolism to manage Trump psychologically while firmly asserting China's global rise and geopolitical "red lines". Ultimately, the high-optics, low-substance summit underscored China’s growing capacity to dictate the terms of engagement.

Trump was recently on a state visit to China (14–15 May 2026) at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping, marking his first trip to the country in nearly a decade. Accorded a ceremonial welcome, he was received at the airport by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng. Previously, he had visited China in 2017. At that time, Trump was very confident and assertive, and the international landscape was also different. But this time round, he appeared more defensive compared to his earlier visit. It also appeared that Beijing had much more leverage compared to Washington, in the way the meeting went.

This visit had been scheduled earlier, but due to the Iran war it was delayed. Much of Trump’s deferential attitude this time also seemed linked to this war. The Iran war has actually exposed the US limitations and shattered his confidence, and that is why, despite the bluff and bluster of the Trump supporters at home, he appeared very weak and completely different in his attitude.

Optics, Caution, and the Absence of Substantive Breakthroughs

During the visit, Trump, quite unlike himself, avoided statements that could complicate relations with China. He was very cautious and chose his language carefully. When reporters asked him about Taiwan and whether he would support it, he did not answer, reflecting a defensive approach aimed at not upsetting China. He was also non-committal on the arms deal with Taiwan and stated that a decision on future arms sales would be taken later, while avoiding any firm commitment. Furthermore, he downplayed Xi Jinping’s statement by saying that when Xi referred to the US as a declining nation, he was actually referring to the period when Joe Biden was president.

Trump went there hoping that Beijing would help him on the Iran war, given the leverage that Beijing has over Iran, and expected Beijing to assist his efforts in reaching a deal with Tehran. But that did not happen. Both sides issued different statements regarding this issue, reflecting divergent positions. While Trump claimed progress on Iran and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, the Chinese side remained more cautious and avoided publicly endorsing Washington’s position on the war. They agreed only on generalised points, such as the need for freedom of navigation.

Moreover, an assertive Xi Jinping directly told Trump that Taiwan is a red line, warning that “if it is not handled well, the two countries will collide or even conflict, pushing the entire China-US relationship into a very dangerous situation.” He also described Taiwan as the “most important issue” in China-US relations. Trump, who is often very vocal and assertive in his language when dealing with other global leaders, could not say anything in response. This underscored that Trump was operating from a very weak position during the visit.

Trump also wanted to secure some economic deal with China, underscored by the fact that during this visit, he had taken a large business delegation with him that included the CEOs of many important American companies. The delegation included Apple CEO Tim Cook, Tesla CEO Elon Musk, Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink, Goldman Sachs CEO David Solomon, Citigroup CEO Jane Fraser, Boeing CEO Kelly Ortberg, Qualcomm CEO Cristiano Amon, Visa CEO Ryan McInerney, and Micron CEO Sanjay Mehrotra, among others. The inclusion of prominent CEOs of these high-tech and financial firms during this visit clearly signalled the agenda and underlying purpose of the visit. Given that the US midterm elections are approaching, Trump wanted to secure some deal with China that he could then present to his domestic support base as ‘yet another success’ of his foreign policy. However, nothing substantial happened, as no major deal was signed, and the visit proved to be high on optics and low on substance.

Xi ensured that Trump received a red-carpet welcome. He was given everything that would appeal to Trump’s psychology, including children waving Chinese and American flags while receiving him at the airport and during the official ceremony in Beijing, a 21-gun salute, military band performances, and choreographed cultural displays. Xi also took him to the historic Temple of Heaven, including the Hall of Prayer for Good Harvests, and brought him to rare and symbolic locations inside the Chinese leadership compound where, according to Xi, only Vladimir Putin had visited before him. This all appeared designed to appeal to Trump psychologically through display of symbolism, exclusivity, and grand spectacle. But when it came to substance, the visit was far less substantive and far more focused on show, symbolism, and optics. This can also be understood from the fact that no ‘joint statement’ or ‘fact sheet’ was issued, unlike in 2017 when both countries issued one together.

Xi Jinping’s Strategic Messaging and China’s Global Positioning

Beijing, on the other hand, used this visit to showcase its arrival as a great power. It relied heavily on optics, symbolism, and spectacle and this can also be indicated by the statements that Xi issued. He said, “The world has come to a new crossroads. Can China and the United States overcome the so-called ‘Thucydides’ Trap’ and create a new paradigm of major-country relations?” This actually indicates that China now sees itself as a country which is likely to replace the US as a great power. By issuing such a statement, Beijing appears to believe that the time has come when it could replace the US. Otherwise, China never uses such language and would always put the narrative that its rise would be peaceful, repeatedly projecting itself as a distinct, non-Western power. It would always say that it does not believe in these Western constructs and rejects such Western vocabulary and terminology, which it believes do not exactly represent the true nature of relations between countries, especially great powers.

But this time, Xi’s use of this phrase itself reflects that he acknowledges there could be war during this power transition between the US as the existing power and China as the challenging power, and that both sides may fall into the Thucydides’ Trap. China therefore wants to avoid that and manage this transition with the US peacefully, perhaps in the same way the US replaced Britain without fighting a war and peacefully emerged as the dominant power.

Besides this, Xi also used language such as “constructive strategic stability.” Given the way Trump has behaved internationally, Beijing wants stability in ties. By using such language, China seeks to present itself to the world as a stable partner at a time when Trump has injected considerable instability into global politics. As a statement released by the Chinese Foreign Ministry said: “The two presidents agreed on a new vision of building a constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability to provide strategic guidance for China-US relations over the next three years and beyond.” Xi also described this “constructive strategic stability” as “a positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay, a sound stability with moderate competition, a constant stability with manageable differences, and an enduring stability with promises of peace.” Through this framing, Beijing sought to position itself as a stabilising force in global politics during a period of heightened uncertainty.

Before Trump’s visit, Beijing had already established the red lines that Trump should not cross. China outlined four key red lines — Taiwan, democracy and human rights, China’s political system and development path, and China’s “development right” — demonstrating its confidence as a rising power. Beijing had publicly stated that these “must not be challenged.” Setting these red lines in advance showed that China had already conveyed its message and highlighted the leverage Beijing has developed. This was different from Trump’s earlier visit, when China was not as assertive in its language regarding such red lines.

China’s Strategic Gains

On the other hand, the Iran war has strategically benefited China, which has reportedly provided support to Iran and continues to do so. Iran emerged somewhat stronger from the war, as it has now effectively used the Hormuz card, something the US had not anticipated. This has actually provided greater leverage to Beijing. Importantly, the US has shifted more of its attention toward West Asia rather than the Indo-Pacific, which again represents a strategic advantage for China. Trump also did not clarify whether he would continue the weapons deal with Taiwan, which again was viewed as a win for China.

Recently, following his Beijing summit, Trump made a shocking statement in a Fox News interview with Bret Baier, saying, “When you look at the odds, China is a very, very powerful, big country. That’s a very small island. Think of it; it’s 59 miles away. We’re 9,500 miles away. That’s a little bit of a difficult problem. I do say this: Taiwan would be very smart to cool it a little bit. China would be very smart to cool it a little bit. They ought to both cool it,” a remark that has triggered shock and disbelief in diplomatic and strategic circles, raising serious concern over the US stance and signalling what many see as an alarming shift in tone.

Importantly, there has also been no Quad leaders’ meeting since 2024, which has been a strategic gain for China in the Indo-Pacific, as the Quad is one of the main instruments of strategic balancing in the Indo-Pacific. After Trump returned to office, he appeared to have deprioritized the Quad. The planned Quad meeting in India did not take place, which again represented a win for China.

Overall, this visit was beneficial for China, as Beijing used it to project its growing power. Through the language it employed, the red lines it set, and the way it managed Trump psychologically, China demonstrated its confidence. Trump, who is usually considered very articulate and assertive, refrained from openly challenging China during the visit. Beijing’s growing power and leverage appeared to keep him in check this time. The visit underscores an evolving dynamic in which China was confident enough to shape the terms of engagement, while the United States appears weak and defensive, increasingly ceding ground to China across key strategic and diplomatic fronts.

Dr Imran Khurshid is an Associate Fellow with Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed are his own.

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