Considering Trump's unwavering support for the 'America First' policy and his withdrawal of the United States from foreign entanglements, alongside Israel's concerns regarding Iran's nuclear advancements, limiting Iran's capabilities would likely be a primary focus of his agenda. Nevertheless, given Iran’s internal it is yet to be determined whether his initiatives will lead to increased instability or offer a glimmer of hope for the region.
With Donald Trump returning to office as the President of the United States for a second term after a gap of four years, the world is gearing up for his characteristically disruptive and unpredictable style of decision-making. Passing as many as 80 executive orders on the Day 1 of his term, i.e. 20 January 2025, that included US’s withdrawal from the 2015 Paris climate agreement and the World Health Organisation, the signs clearly point towards Trump 2.0 being a bolder, more unrestrained period with significant ripple effects for the international order. For Iran, this is a particularly worrying development given Trump’s aggressive ‘maximum pressure’ policy against the country in his first term as well as its much weakened regional and domestic position since then.
American engagement with Iran, for the past few years, has revolved around tactics to curtail its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes along with its regional sphere of influence. In this context, the 2015 Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) involving the P5 and Germany, which mandated Iran to dismantle much of its progress on its nuclear programme and open its facilities to international inspection, in exchange for massive sanctions relief, constituted a watershed development. However, alleging ineffectiveness of the deal in limiting Iranian nuclear ambitions, Donald Trump, as President, unilaterally withdrew from it in 2018, reimposing and severely intensifying economic sanctions against the Iranian regime, particularly targeting its oil sector, although at the time, evidence pointed towards Iran trying to comply with the agreement. It is also true that Iranian compliance has been in doubt ever since. Currently, the IAEA reports that the Iranian stockpile of uranium has reached 30 times the level accepted under the JCPOA, while its enrichment has been raised up to 60 per cent which exceeds the permitted level of 3.67% under the deal and is dangerously close to weaponization.
On the other hand, it is true that in the four years of Biden presidency, when Trump was not there as President, Iran’s regional position, or in other words, its self-described ‘Axis of Resistance’, has been severely eroded, especially in the aftermath of the 7 October 2023 Hamas assault on Israel. As Israel launched a disproportionate retaliation on Hamas in Gaza and later, Hezbollah in Lebanon, conclusively diminishing their capabilities and killing their longtime leaders, Iran was left without two of its most crucial strategic allies. Moreover, the tit-for-tat strikes between Iran and Israel in October 2024 rendered the former even more vulnerable as the Israeli military claimed to have hit a component of Iran’s nuclear programme, along with its missile manufacturing facilities and air defences. Finally, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in early December 2024 dealt a decisive blow to Iran which lost its main state ally in the region.
On the domestic front, Iran has been reeling under the devastating effects of sanctions and systemic mismanagement. Economic issues are propelling massive discontent within Iranian society which has seen frequent rounds of unrest, causing a crisis of legitimacy for the regime. The value of the Iranian rial hit a record low of 8,21,500 rials to the dollar at the end of 2024, which is 40 per cent lower than the corresponding figure at the start of the year. The GDP per capita has plunged 45 per cent since 2012, as per the World Bank. An acute energy crisis, which is triggering electricity outages, has significantly impaired production and even leading to shutting down of businesses. In December 2024, the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture stated that in the month of November, industrial units were producing at just 41 per cent of their capacity due to energy shortage.
Staggering inflation, rising food and fuel prices, housing crisis, increasing poverty and declining living standards are compelling Iranians across social classes, ages, and fields of profession to demonstrate against government policies. Other than the economic frustrations, Iranians, particularly belonging to the newer generations, are increasingly harbouring dissatisfaction against the ideological foundation of the regime, most powerfully demonstrated during the 2022-23 ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ protests. Frequently, the demonstrators are seen expressing opposition to the regime’s involvement in regional conflicts.
Therefore, taking advantage of Iran’s vulnerable position, President Donald Trump might attempt to decisively constrain its capacities for nuclear or ballistic missile buildup as well as revitalization of Hamas and Hezbollah. A return to his ‘maximum pressure’ policy seems quite likely to strap Iran’s economy even further. During his re-election campaign, Trump talked about airstrikes to target Iranian nuclear facilities and according to some reports, his advisers have been seriously weighing the option of either directly striking Iran’s nuclear programme or backing Israel (which perceives a nuclear Iran as an existential threat) to do so. If followed through, this would mark a departure from the established US policy of dealing with Iran with sanctions and diplomacy.
Previously, in early January 2020, Trump had ordered the killing of the IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, while Israel has, for a long time, engaged in covert cyber and physical attacks against the Iranian nuclear programme, including target assassinations of nuclear scientists. It must be remembered that during his campaign, Trump had also accused Iran of plotting his assassination and declared that if he were President, he would be threatening to ‘blow the country to smithereens’.
However, since a direct military strike may engender more complicated and out-of-hand outcomes, a more plausible scenario would be the threat of military action, combined with intensive sanctions, aimed at coercing Tehran to agree to US’s terms in the event of a nuclear deal. On 23 January 2025, his 4th day in office, President Trump stated his hope for the Iranian nuclear crisis to be solved peacefully without Israeli airstrikes, and indicated that a new nuclear deal with Iran can be pursued. This came a day after Iran’s Vice-President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif called on Trump to restart nuclear negotiations with Iran. Reiterating Iran’s long-standing stance, he highlighted that the country has never been interested in developing the nuclear weapon. With the formal expiration of the JCPOA in October 2025, barely seven months away, it could be hoped that both US and Iran proactively and pragmatically approach the diplomatic route.
At the internal level, considering Iran’s domestic woes, it would be desperate for lifting of the sanctions. The current reformist Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has already offered to enter new nuclear negotiations with the US and other partners. Even regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar have vocally opposed the possibility of an escalation between Israel and Iran over this issue and welcome a peaceful resolution of the same. Given Trump’s consistent advocacy of ‘America First’ and retraction of US’ embroilment in foreign conflicts, coupled with Israel’s threat perception of Iran’s nuclear development, containing Iran’s capacities would be a top objective on his agenda. It remains to be seen, however, whether his actions precipitate more instability or a ray of hope for the region.
*Ms. Ruchi Sharma is pursuing her Ph. D. in Centre for West Asian Studies in Jawaharlal Nehru University and associated with International Centre for Peace Studies as a life member. The views expressed here are her own.
