On 10 May 2025, a US-mediated ceasefire halted the escalating India-Pakistan conflict sparked by India’s Operation Sindoor (6-7 May) and Pakistan’s Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos (10 May), following the 22 April Pahalgam attack that killed 26 civilians. The operations, which claimed over 60 lives, have exposed Pakistan’s internal dilemmas. This analysis examines Pakistan’s political and security dynamics during and after the operations, reactions to the ceasefire, allegations of violations, and implications for the military, political leadership, and the country.
The ceasefire, effective at 5:00 PM IST on 10 May, was brokered by US, with Saudi Arabia and China facilitating. Trump announced it on ‘Truth Social’ saying it could materialise after “a long night of talks mediated by the United States”. Pakistani media and leadership praised Trump’s “pivotal” role and background role played by Saudi Arabia, China, UK and others. Indian side downplayed US involvement, expressing concerns over continuing fire from Pakistani side despite the understanding and re-emphasising India’s “firm and uncompromising stance against terrorism”. Follow-up DGMO discussions are set for 12 May against the backdrop of continuing shelling along the LoC threatening to unravel the ‘understanding’.
Pakistan’s political landscape remains strained, with depleted reserves and public unrest over Imran Khan’s detention since August 2023. Prior to the Pahalgam attacks, the military, led by General Asim Munir, had tightened control, targeting Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) supporters, drawing criticism of its actions, focussing more on Khan and ignoring deteriorating internal security aggravated by attacks from Baloch separatists demanding independence and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighting for an Islamic Pakistan modelled after Taliban’s Afghanistan. Pakistan faced 784 terror incidents in 2024, killing 579 civilians and 383 security personnel.
The Pahalgam attack, blamed on Lashkar-e-Taiba proxies, was, thus, seen as Munir’s attempt to rally nationalism as a diversion, amid economic woes and worsening security at home. Munir’s exhortations to Pakistanis addressing the ‘Overseas Pakistanis Convention’ on 16 April, to pass on Pakistan’s story to the next generation “so that they don’t forget it when our forefathers thought we were different from Hindus in every possible aspect of life” is being seen as a rallying cry against India that culminated in the massacre of Hindus in Pahalgam barely a week later.
Operation Sindoor might have induced a façade of unity in Pakistan offering Munir a sigh of relief from domestic pressures, however, there was heavy pressure on him on the one hand to respond to Indian attacks targeting nine terrorist camps, while fuelling opposition to his diversionary focus on Kashmir on the other. Munir’s detractors allege his policy is emboldening the jihadists and jeopardising security. Imran Khan capitalised on the situation by warning India of Pakistan’s “capabilities to give a befitting response,” and accusing Munir of stage-managing the crisis, which has galvanized PTI.
Munir’s response in the shape of Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos (Wall of molten lead or Unity) is being splattered in the hyper-nationalist media as the main reason for American rethink and Indian climb down. Post-ceasefire, Munir declared 11 May a “Youm-e-Tashakkur,” (Day of Thanksgiving) praising military bravery, but PTI’s calls for his resignation continues signalling persisting deep political divisions within Pakistan.
Reactions from Pakistan mixed relief with defiance. Shehbaz Sharif claimed a “historical victory” noting “Indian airbases turning into rubble.” Frontline/social media rallied behind the military, with #PakistanStandsUnited trending. Muzaffarabad residents welcomed peace, hoping for stability. The mood in the media was hysterical and triumphant. India’s Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) suspension, threatening agriculture, has fuelled anti-India sentiment, providing a handle to terror elements to engineer public protests, which might complicate future reconciliation efforts.
Explosions in Srinagar and Jammu hours after the truce has led to hardening of sentiments in India against ceasefire, while Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry has denied violations, accusing India of breaches in Uri and Gurez instead. Cross-border shelling and drone activity persist, highlighting the truce’s fragility.
The ceasefire’s durability is uncertain, with past truces (2021) faltering. US, Chinese, and Saudi pressure offers hope, but Pakistan’s non-committal denial-based approach to containing terrorism and its unrepentant use of terror as an instrument of its India policy remain a dampener. Whipping up of emotions inside Pakistan over IWT suspension and terror elements expressing their resolve to fight it out might derail talks. Hyper-nationalist fervour and Khan’s undimmed influence may force the army to revert to India and Kashmir to divert attention.
All in all, Munir’s leadership faces scrutiny. Robust political opposition and reported internal dissent within the Army threaten his credibility. A prolonged standoff could go either way, depending on the ability of Munir and Imran to sway public opinion. Possible unabashed regurgitation of the rhetoric of triumph snowballing in Pakistan risks generating counter-impulse in India provoking India to junk the understanding. Moreover, Indian resolve not to let Pakistan’s backing of terror go unpunished by dragging Pakistan into a long-running festering war might unpopularize the army and help Khan’s rebound. Sharif’s government, weakened by economic woes, relies on Munir and its stocks will fall if army is unable to hold ground. The ceasefire might have unified parties for the time being, but PTI’s agitational politics might reappear and destabilize the regime if relapse to war saps Pakistan’s resources and augments economic woes.
