The commentary examines Bangladesh’s shifting politics after the ICT sentenced Sheikh Hasina to death for the 2024 crackdown. It highlights uncertainty surrounding the upcoming elections, Jamaat-e-Islami’s push for a referendum, BNP’s resurgence, and rising violence. Anti-India sentiment dominates campaigns, leaving New Delhi facing coordinated hostility and strained ties regardless of who forms Bangladesh’s next government in Dhaka.
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The Verdict and the Vortex
On 17 November, the Dhaka-based International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) delivered its long-awaited verdict, convicting former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal and sentencing both to death. The verdict, following a long trial, comes amidst increased cases of violence perpetrated by Awami League (AL) supporters to protest the trial.
The charges against Hasina and two others can be traced back to the government’s violent crackdown on the “July Uprising” of 2024, a student-led protest movement that eventually brought down Hasina’s fifteen-year-old rule in August last year. The ICT was established by the Sheikh Hasina-led government in 2009 to prosecute the collaborators who committed war crimes and genocide during the 1971 Liberation War. After the government was toppled, the interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus restructured the ICT to investigate and prosecute the atrocities committed during the July 2024 Uprising.
The very judicial mechanism created by one regime to consolidate its legitimacy by prosecuting its rivals is now being deployed by the successor regime to delegitimise and eliminate the predecessor. The ICT’s verdict against Hasina was not unprecedented, given the severity and breadth of the charges filed against her. The ruling was built on an unusually extensive foundation, a chargesheet reportedly running into 8,747 pages, which included 2,018 pages of legal references, 4,005 pages of detailed evidence, and 2,724 pages, documenting the victims. The prosecution’s case became even stronger when one of the co-accused, former Inspector General of Police Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun, turned approver and confessed to the crimes. IGP Chowdhury was given only a five-year prison term for doing this.
Bangladesh’s Shifting Political Currents
Meanwhile, the uncertainty around holding of parliamentary elections on time on or before 16 February 2026, continues to grow ahead of this crucial vote, with major political players accusing one another of trying to delay the process. The decision by Yunus government to schedule the general election and the July Charter Referendum for the same day in February 2026, while logistically sound for reasons of efficiency and cost, has amplified the opposition's belief that the administration is subtly favouring the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
JI Buoyant
Jamat-i-Islami (JI) Bangladesh and its allied parties have stated, time and again, that there will be no election unless a referendum is held first and the charter is made binding on all. JI argues that the July Charter, with its radical political reforms (such as the bicameral parliament and term limits) is a revolutionary document and must be given constitutional and legal validity first through a referendum. However, JI’s concerns plausibly lie in its efforts to legally lock in the reforms and constrain the next parliament's power, ensuring that the next government is elected to serve under the new constitutional framework. Moreover, JI operates primarily on a strong, organised grassroots support base. If logistical confusion stops supporters from casting both votes correctly, or if voters focus more on the candidate than the reform itself, the “Yes” campaign risks losing momentum. Such missteps could dilute its overall impact and make the movement’s political mobilisation appear fragmented and less convincing.
Another possible reason behind JI’s push to separate the ‘referendum’ from the ‘election’ is its need for securing more time to strengthen its grassroots network and improve its electoral preparedness. The party’s confidence has grown noticeably after its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) secured unprecedented victories in major university students union elections. It views these victories as a key sign of its revived organisational strength and growing popularity, especially among politically engaged youth. Given this success, JI would naturally want to extend the pre-election period to translate this campus momentum into a widespread mobilisation drive so that it can expand its national voter base ahead of the parliamentary elections.
Advantage BNP!
BNP now appears fully focused on gearing up for the elections. Internal rifts appear to have been resolved, especially following the announcement that Chairperson Khaleda Zia will contest from Dinajpur. This renewed sense of unity is expected to grow even stronger with the planned return of Tarique Rahman to Bangladesh by end November or early December. There are some issues Rahman has to overcome immediately. He is not listed in the national voter database, as he left Bangladesh in 2008 before completing mandatory biometric enrollment (fingerprints, iris scan, digital signature) under the digital system introduced during the caretaker government. Expatriate registration via UK hubs (e.g., 5,749 completed so far) requires in-person biometrics, which he has not submitted. He must return and enroll before EC schedule announcement (expected first week of December 2025). To contest (e.g., from Bogura-6, as BNP-nominated), he must first qualify as a voter. Post-schedule announcement, new registrations need a court order and unanimous Election Commission (EC) approval, which may not be easy to achieve.
Even in the face of such challenges, BNP has started its political activity in right earnest. BNP’s efforts align with a September survey showing the BNP as the clear frontrunner with 39.1% of the respondents saying it was the “most suitable party” to form the next government, well ahead of Jamaat-e-Islami (28.1%), the Awami League (17.7%), and the National Citizen Party (4.9%).
Heightened security and the risk of renewed violence now seem unavoidable, as the AL attempts to assert its political relevance from the sidelines and disrupt the electoral process. Sajeeb Ahmed Wazed Joy, Sheikh Hasina’s son and adviser, has warned that the party’s supporters are ready to block the upcoming February polls unless the ban on the AL is lifted, a statement that clearly signals the potential for unrest if their demands are not met. Bangladeshi authorities have recently acknowledged that AL supporters have been actively coordinating efforts against the interim government, including running disinformation campaigns, engaging in hybrid warfare, and carrying out cognitive operations.
New Delhi's Diplomatic Tightrope
The ‘guilty’ verdict against Sheikh Hasina has put India in a delicate position. It must decide how to handle the presence of the former prime minister on its soil, which is a sensitive issue that has significant diplomatic implications for its relationship with post-Hasina Bangladesh under any non-Awami League government. As the elections draw closer, India’s room to navigate these sensitivities is shrinking, and maintaining steady bilateral ties is likely to become more challenging, regardless of who forms the next government in Dhaka.
Anti-India sentiment has already emerged as a prominent theme in the campaign. The new entrant National Citizens Party (NCP), is pushing for a parliament that is explicitly “anti-Indian-hegemony, anti-fascist, and pro-Bangladesh.” The main opposition BNP has also placed “ending India’s hegemony” at the centre of its message, alongside calls for fair water-sharing and action on border killings. And JI’s historically hostile posture toward India remains unchanged.
Together, these political currents suggest that New Delhi is confronting not just one unfriendly voice, but a coordinated surge of anti‑India sentiment involving multiple actors. This broad alignment of political currents is poised to redefine and shape the trajectory of India‑Bangladesh relations, regardless of which party assumes power in Dhaka.
*Mohammed Shoaib Raza is a Ph.D. scholar at the School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. The views expressed here are his own.
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