Date
18-12-2024
The Rohingya crisis, stemming from the persecution of the minority Rohingya Muslim population in Myanmar in recent years, has garnered significant attention in India. The illegal migration of Rohingyas seeking refuge from Myanmar is increasingly viewed as a considerable security threat within India. This paper intends to explore the intricate dynamics of illegal migration patterns, the implications for India's internal security, and the challenge of reconciling humanitarian commitments with national security concerns. Additionally, it will examine various policy alternatives and the strategies India might employ to address this pressing issue.
Introduction
The Rohingyas represent an ethnic minority in Myanmar, primarily residing in the Rakhine state. Following the enactment of the Citizenship Act of 1982, they were stripped of their citizenship rights. This legislation stipulates that only those classified as 'national races,' who have resided in Myanmar since 1823, are eligible for citizenship. The Rohingyas were not recognized as a national race following the country's independence in 1948, and they were unable to provide the necessary 'conclusive evidence' to secure citizenship.[1]
After General Ne Win of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) assumed power in 1962 and consolidated his hold on power, he launched Operation Nagamin, also referred to as Operation Dragon King on 6 February 1978. This initiative involved the establishment of a National Register aimed at identifying and excluding foreigners. The Burmese authorities at that time classified the Rohingyas as illegal citizens, leading to a significant exodus of approximately 20,000 Rohingyas to Bangladesh in May 1978. However, the most substantial wave of Rohingya migration occurred in 1991 and 1992, when around 250,000 Rohingyas fled from Arakan, now known as Rakhine, to Bangladesh due to incidents of rape and religious persecution perpetrated by the Burmese Army.
In September 1992, the Bangladesh government began discussions with Myanmar authorities regarding the repatriation of Rohingyas, as Bangladesh was not a signatory to the 1951 Refugees Convention of the UN or its 1967 Protocol. During the repatriation process, which took place between 1993 and 1997, approximately 230,000 Rohingyas returned to Arakan. However, in 1997, the Myanmar authorities notified both the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Bangladesh government that they would no longer accept Rohingya refugees after 15 August 1997. Consequently, Bangladesh expelled over 300 Rohingya refugees migrating illegally across the Naf River back to Myanmar, resulting in violence within the refugee camps in Bangladesh. By 1998, all repatriation efforts were halted. Reports from 1999 and 2000 indicated that the Bangladesh government and UNHCR estimated that more than 100,000 Rohingya refugees remained in Bangladesh.[2]
The most significant surge in the exodus of Rohingya refugees occurred in August 2017, following severe violence in Myanmar's Rakhine state. This was triggered by an assault on police and military installations by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a militant group representing the Rohingya community. As a result, approximately 742,000 individuals fled to Bangladesh. From 2021, when the military seized control in Myanmar, until 2023, over 2.6 million Rohingyas were displaced internally, while 1.3 million sought refuge in various countries, including around one million in the Cox’s Bazar region of Bangladesh.[3]
Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia are all impacted by the presence of Rohingya refugees. In India, approximately 40,000 Rohingya refugees reside, with around 16,500 of them officially registered with the UNHCR. Notably, their distribution is not confined to the border states of Jammu and Kashmir, West Bengal, and the northeastern regions; they can also be found in Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, and even New Delhi.[4] Since India is not a signatory to the 1951 UNHCR Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, the recognition of certain groups as refugees is solely determined by India's internal policies. The Indian government has been actively pursuing the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, having initiated the repatriation process in 2018, during which six Rohingya Muslims were deported back to Myanmar. In March 2024, an ethnic Rohingya woman was also forcibly returned to Myanmar. These actions have drawn criticism from human rights organizations, which argue that such deportations put the refugees at grave risk of persecution and violence in Myanmar.[5]
Pattern of Migration
Rohingyas have established their presence in various regions of India, including Jammu, Hyderabad, West Bengal, Assam, certain areas of Haryana, New Delhi, and several districts in Uttar Pradesh. The migration of Rohingyas into India primarily follows two significant routes: one moving westward from Bangladesh to West Bengal, and the other heading northeast towards Mizoram and Meghalaya. The journey undertaken by Rohingyas to reach India can often be fraught with difficulties, as they live in fear of being apprehended by Indian border security forces.
In order to evade these challenges and facilitate their illegal entry into India, Rohingyas frequently rely on the services of smugglers. Typically, they travel in groups of around ten or clusters of twenty-five individuals, collectively hiring a smuggler to manage the logistics and navigate the perils of their journey. The smugglers involved are usually from Bangladesh, India, or occasionally, they may be Rohingyas themselves. Indian smugglers primarily operate along the India-Bangladesh border, while their Bangladeshi counterparts promote India as a destination offering resettlement opportunities to the Rohingya community. The fees charged by smugglers range from 98 to 168 USD per person; however, due to increased border security measures, these costs have surged, reaching as high as 400 USD per individual.[6]
Numerous human traffickers and agents are engaged in the illicit business of facilitating the settlement of Rohingyas across various states in India. After gaining unauthorized entry into India with the assistance of smugglers, they get in touch with these human traffickers. A total of 74 Rohingyas in the custody of Indian security forces have corroborated the involvement of these human agents within the country. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has apprehended 44 human smugglers operating in cities such as Jaipur, Bengaluru, Chennai, and Guwahati, and has confiscated 200 Aadhar and PAN cards from them. These human smugglers not only aid Rohingyas in obtaining Indian national identity documents but also assist them in purchasing property in Muslim-majority areas of various cities. For instance, the Nuh and Mewat regions of Haryana have seen the settlement of thousands of Rohingyas. Presently, Rohingyas are unlawfully residing in cities including Aligarh, Mathura, Ghaziabad, Meerut, and Saharanpur in Uttar Pradesh; Mangalore, Gulbarga, and Kalaburagi in Karnataka; Malda, Murshidabad, and Nadia in West Bengal; as well as Jaipur, Alwar, and Jodhpur in Rajasthan, along with Jammu, Delhi, and southern cities such as Hyderabad, Chennai, and Puducherry.[7]
In West Bengal, a comprehensive refugee camp for Rohingyas has been established, located merely 40 kilometers from the capital city of Kolkata. Additionally, 29 Rohingyas have settled in a private property in Harda village, situated within the South 24 Pargana district. According to reports from India Today, an NGO named “Desh Bachao Samajik Committee”, led by Hossain Ghazi, has erected shelters for these Rohingya immigrants. Notably, a banner displayed outside the shelters states, “Protesting the massacre of Rohingyas and to provide assistance to helpless, homeless refugees, please donate generously.”.[8]
Numerous Rohingya refugees have been illicitly transported into India through three locations in Tripura: Sonamura in the western Tripura district, Belonia in the South Tripura district, and Bishnupur, a village within the Rupaichari administrative block of South Tripura district. Following their arrival, the refugees travel by train from Agartala to Kolkata and New Delhi, subsequently dispersing to various cities across India. Smugglers have facilitated their settlement in predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods. According to the Assam Police, individuals who assist in the illegal entry of Rohingyas operate on both sides of the border, with Tripura-based touts maintaining connections with their counterparts in Delhi and other regions of India.[9]
According to data from the Indian government, approximately 40,000 Rohingya refugees have been residing in India since 2017, with around 20,000 of them having registered with the UNHCR. These refugees are primarily located in camps in New Delhi, specifically in areas such as Shaheen Bagh, Madanpur Khadar, Okhla, and Vikaspuri. A significant number of Rohingya refugees from Madanpur Khadar and Shaheen Bagh are employed as daily wage labourers in construction sites and factories, while others engage in rag picking as a means of livelihood.[10]
Hyderabad is home to the largest population of Rohingya refugees in India, with approximately 7,200 individuals residing in 32 urban areas that resemble slums, commonly referred to as refugee camps. In Tamil Nadu, a smaller group of Rohingyas has settled in Kelambakkam, Chennai. These refugees arrived in Chennai in 2012, consisting of only 19 families, totaling 88 individuals, who are currently living in cyclone shelters.[11]
The Indian government is taking the issue of illegal refugee migration seriously and is actively working on the detection and deportation of unauthorized immigrants. On 8 August 2017, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued an order to all chief secretaries of state governments and Union Territory administrations, instructing them to take immediate action to identify and deport Rohingyas without delay.[12]
The NIA conducts nationwide raids to identify illegal Rohingya immigrants and the smugglers who assist them in migrating and settling in India. As of 2023, the NIA has conducted raids at over four dozen locations across ten states, resulting in the arrest of 44 middlemen involved in a pan-India human trafficking network. This network not only facilitates the illegal entry of Rohingyas but also aids their settlement in Indian territory via the India-Bangladesh border. The NIA has initiated four cases to investigate this extensive network of illegal immigration.[13]. In February 2024, the NIA filed a charge-sheet against 24 operatives linked to international syndicates.[14] Furthermore, in June 2024, the agency charge-sheeted eight individuals who are also part of a transnational syndicate involved in trafficking of Rohingyas and Bangladeshis into India using fraudulent and counterfeit documents.[15]
Security Concern
In 2017, the Government of India, during proceedings in the Supreme Court, characterized Rohingya refugees as a potential threat to national security while addressing a challenge to the government's decision to deport them. A senior lawyer representing the Indian Government stated in the Supreme Court that "Intelligence agencies have raised concerns that Rohingya Muslim leaders in India may be in contact with militant groups based in Pakistan." [16]
The influx of Rohingyas into India has emerged as a significant issue, involving three key stakeholders: Bangladesh, Myanmar, and the United Nations. India is already grappling with the presence of thousands of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, and according to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), approximately 40,000 Rohingyas are residing illegally in the country, with the actual figures likely to be higher. Bangladesh currently hosts around 7 million Rohingyas in refugee camps, many of whom are attempting to migrate to India, while others are arriving directly from Myanmar. The rapid increase in the Rohingya population poses a considerable challenge for India and the political and security ramifications of this are particularly evident in regions such as Jammu and Kashmir, West Bengal, and Kerala, with similar trends observed in other states, including New Delhi. Another pressing concern is the potential for their presence fuelling terrorism in the region. Organizations such as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, and the Arakan Army, along with the Aqa-Mul-Mujahideen linked to Pakistan's Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami-Arakan (HUJI-A) and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), are reportedly mobilizing Rohingya Muslims against Buddhists in Myanmar. AMM is a Rohingya Islamist militant group that originated from the Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami-Arakan (HUJI-A). The group is primarily active in the Rakhine region of Myanmar. AMM leaders were trained in Pakistan and later recruited Rohingya youth in Rakhine. It is also linked to attacks on Myanmar border outposts and has connections with other militant organizations, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Apart from Pakistani connections, China is also believed to be supplying advanced weaponry to these militant groups. Intelligence reports indicate the emergence of new jihadist and militant factions along the India-Bangladesh border. India is actively working to secure the Arakan corridor, as it has direct implications for its maritime security in the Bay of Bengal and the northeastern region.
An Intel report in 2023 indicated that the Rohingya community were involved in anti-India activities and had established connections with terrorist organizations such as ISIS and the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI. Allegations have been made regarding their participation in anti-Hindu violence during the West Bengal elections and the riots in Delhi.[17]
On 9 September 2017, protests erupted in Kashmir against the persecution of Rohingyas, with some demonstrations escalating into violence in various parts of the valley. Zakir Musa, the leader of Ansar Gazawat-ul-Hind, an offshoot of Al-Qaeda, released a ten-minute audio message warning the Government of India to reconsider its deportation policy concerning Rohingyas. Additionally, groups such as Aqa Mul Mujahedeen (AMM), along with Laskar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), are reportedly active in Jammu and Kashmir, with reports suggesting that Rohingya militants have been sent to the valley alongside Pakistani mercenaries.[18] According to the National Investigation Agency, there are indications that Rohingyas may have been involved in the 2014 Burdwan Blast in West Bengal. A man named Khalid, identified as a Rohingya, was arrested and found to have received training from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as well as connections to Jamaat-ul-Mujahedeen, a Bangladeshi terrorist organization. In August 2023, Rohingya refugees were implicated in communal violence in the Nuh and Mewat regions of Haryana, where they were accused of of throwing stones and being part of a violent mob. The Haryana Police discovered that Rohingyas had unlawfully occupied land belonging to “Haryana Shahri Vikas Pradhikaran”.[19]
The issue of illegal migration involving not only Rohingya refugees but also other individuals from Myanmar has raised significant security concerns and demographic changes in India's northeastern states, including Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, and Arunachal Pradesh. Notably, this mass influx into India comprises not only civilians but also numerous junta soldiers armed with weapons. During the ethnic conflict in Manipur, both the Chief Minister of Manipur and the Home Minister of India acknowledged the presence of illegal infiltrators aggravating the ethnic situation in the state.[20]
The Rohingya refugee situation has posed a critical challenge to the Indian Government, creating a policy dilemma for the nation. Discussions regarding the deportation of Rohingyas have emerged among political parties, civil society organizations, and the general populace. Currently, the Indian Government is under pressure from various fronts, including the judiciary, international entities, opposition parties, and to some extent, civil society. [21] Furthermore, the West Bengal Government has taken measures to assist Rohingya refugees, which contradicts the stance of the Central Government. [22] The Indian Government has also faced backlash following the enactment of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in 2019, which grants citizenship to persecuted minorities from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. However, this legislation does not extend to Muslim minorities from these countries or to the Rohingyas from Myanmar. In response to this situation, over 200 petitions have been submitted to the Supreme Court, questioning the Indian Government's rationale for excluding Rohingyas, Ahmadiyas, and Tamils from this citizenship law, despite its focus on persecuted minorities. [23]
The Indian Government has faced criticism for its failure to denounce Myanmar's handling of the Rohingya crisis.[24] In the past, in 2018, the then Indian Minister of External Affairs, Shushma Swaraj had visited Rakhine State and extended a humanitarian aid offer of US$ 1 million. India's reluctance to condemn Myanmar could be because any such position might drive the latter closer to China, and jeopardise India's own energy and economic interests in Myanmar. India has significant investments in the Shwe Gas field located off the coast of Rakhine and is involved in a project (multi-modal Kaladan project) aimed at linking its northeastern region to the Bay of Bengal. This initiative includes the development of the Sittwe port, the establishment of an inland waterway along the Kaladan River, and the construction of a road to connect with the northeast. Additionally, there exists a security partnership between India and Myanmar to address cross-border ethnic insurgencies in their border regions.[25] It is widely recognized that Bangladesh and Myanmar are of considerable importance to India, as both nations actively participate in India's Act East policy and are involved in various initiatives and projects aimed at enhancing connectivity between South Asia and Southeast Asia.[26] India has modified its diplomatic strategy concerning Bangladesh by launching a programme known as “Operation Insaniyat”, which provides humanitarian aid and material support to Bangladesh for the benefit of Rohingya refugee camps.[27]
Following the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh, the interim government of Mohammad Yunus has pledged its support for Rohingya refugees. Yunus has advocated for the resettlement of Rohingyas currently living in South Asian countries in a third nation. During a meeting with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Yunus emphasized the need for a straightforward and efficient resettlement process. However, Bangladesh's de facto foreign minister, Tohid Hossain, has remarked that the country is unable to accommodate additional Rohingya refugees and urged other nations, including India, to address the ongoing violence.[28]
In the emerging political scenario, India must engage all relevant parties, both internal and external, to build confidence in addressing this issue, while also recognizing the contributions of all stakeholders involved. For effective resolution of the issue, it is essential for India to comprehend the concerns and actions of Myanmar and Bangladesh, as both nations continue to play a significant role in India's geostrategic and geo-economic interests, potentially influencing India's Indo-Pacific strategy and regional diplomatic efforts.[29]
Role of Non-State Actors
Non-State actors, including global organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society groups are playing a vital role in addressing the Rohingya crisis. The UNHCR has called upon the international community to intensify efforts to safeguard Rohingya refugees worldwide. In 2024, the UNHCR, in collaboration with the government of Bangladesh, launched the 2024 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis. This initiative involves approximately 117 stakeholders, with around half being Bangladeshi institutions. The primary objective of this joint plan is to deliver essential services such as food, healthcare, shelter, education, and livelihood opportunities to one million Rohingyas residing in the camps of Cox's Bazar and the island of Bhasan Char.[30]
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has significantly extended its assistance to Rohingya refugees. The organization has been instrumental in providing support during emergencies such as fires, cyclones, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Beyond humanitarian aid, IOM is also dedicated to preventing and addressing human trafficking, having successfully rescued 1,300 victims from such circumstances.[31]
In India, the UNHCR, in collaboration with smaller non-governmental organizations, is actively working to aid Rohingya refugees. For instance, in 2019, the Zakaat Foundation of India (ZFI) took the initiative to support Rohingya refugees by providing them with a 9,805 square foot plot, despite it having been previously set on fire.[32]
Additionally, the regional organization ASEAN has recognized the significance of this issue, which has transcended Myanmar's borders and is now impacting Bangladesh and other ASEAN countries. It is quite another thing that the situation has become increasingly complex due to the lack of a cohesive legal and political framework among ASEAN nations. Indonesia has already characterized it as a regional crisis and has advocated for a policy of constructive engagement. In 2017, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) convened an emergency ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur, where Malaysia highlighted the Rohingya migration as a regional concern and urged ASEAN to coordinate efforts in investigating the violence against the Rohingya people. This pressure led Aung San Suu Kyi to hold a special meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers in Yangon in December 2016, during which she affirmed Myanmar's commitment to collaborate with ASEAN. Furthermore, she established an advisory committee for Rakhine State, chaired by Kofi Annan, which included three international and six national members.[33]
Following the coup in Myanmar in 2021, the ASEAN summit convened in Melbourne in March 2024, where ASEAN countries introduced a five-point consensus proposal regarding the situation in Myanmar. This consensus called for an end to violence and the establishment of dialogue among all involved parties, while also underscoring the importance of safety and peace in the Rakhine State. Any subsequent measures addressing the Rohingya crisis are contingent upon the restoration of democracy in Myanmar.[34]
China Factor
China maintains amicable relations with both Myanmar and Bangladesh, having made substantial investments in both countries as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Myanmar's geographical position to the south of China provides it with significant strategic advantages. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) is of great importance to China, as it is part of the BRI aimed at linking Yunnan Province in China with central Myanmar, extending southeast to Yangon and southwest to Rakhine. In addition to the CMEC, China has already invested in Myanmar's infrastructure sector and the development of the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which centers around a deep-sea port in the Bay of Bengal.
Conversely, China has emerged as Bangladesh's largest trading partner, having signed approximately 27 memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with the country, valued at around US$24 million. Similar to its involvement in Myanmar, China has also invested in Bangladesh's infrastructure, including the development of Chittagong Port and railway lines.[35]
China has initiated a three-phase plan to address the Rohingya crisis, which has garnered the support of both Myanmar and Bangladesh. This plan encompasses (i) a ceasefire, followed by (ii) bilateral dialogue, and (iii) the pursuit of a long-term resolution.[36] In 2021, Bangladesh expressed its confidence in China's role in facilitating the repatriation of refugees, noting that both China and Russia defended Myanmar at the United Nations (UN) regarding the military actions taken against the Rohingyas by the Myanmar military. [37]
During the 12th Foreign Office Consultation between Bangladesh and China in May 2023, China reaffirmed its commitment to the Rohingya issue, particularly concerning the repatriation process. Bangladesh has also entered into a bilateral agreement with Myanmar to facilitate this repatriation. China has established a significant presence in Myanmar and maintains active military and economic relations with Bangladesh. The stability of Rakhine province is crucial for China, as it is vital to its strategic interests and military objectives in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, China has utilized its veto power to shield Myanmar from allegations brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).[38]
It is interesting, in this context, to see China providing support to the Arakan Army in the shape of supply of arms which had been noticed during the Sittwe naval vessel attack when militants of Arakan Army (fighting for the rights of ethnic Rakhine or Arakanese people) were seen to be carrying Chinese weapons (107mm surface-to-surface rockets).[39] China's direct or indirect assistance to the Arakan Army raises significant concerns. This support could have a direct impact on India's Kaladan project in Rakhine, which aims to connect the northeastern states of India with the Bay of Bengal. The project includes the development of port facilities at Sittwe and a roadway leading to Mizoram. If it is completed successfully, it would establish a direct link between the northeastern states of India and the Indian Ocean. However, the Arakan Army has seized control of Maungdaw in Chin State, a crucial area for the Kaladan project, resulting in delays in its completion. Ironically, China is also providing support to the military junta (which has declared Arakan Army as a terrorist outfit), which could be for three primary reasons: to limit the influence of Western nations in the border regions, to ensure stability along the China-Myanmar border, and, importantly, to safeguard its infrastructure projects and economic corridor that connects its southwestern provinces to the Indian Ocean.[40]
India must, therefore, undertake decisive action to balance China's influence in the Rakhine region. Additionally, India could assume the role of a mediator between Myanmar and Bangladesh concerning the Rohingya crisis, as this would undoubtedly enhance India's stature as a major power in South Asia and elevate its image as a leader of the Global South. Conversely, there is an argument suggesting that India should collaborate with China on this matter, as such cooperation could potentially improve diplomatic relations between the two countries.[41]
Conclusion
The unauthorized migration of Rohingyas into Indian territory has emerged as a significant challenge for India's security and diplomacy. This situation primarily stems from the internal conflicts and policies of Myanmar; however, its repercussions have extended throughout South Asia and Southeast Asia, particularly affecting Bangladesh and India. In addressing this matter, India finds itself navigating the delicate balance between its security responsibilities and its humanitarian principles. From a security standpoint, the presence of Rohingyas lacking proper documentation raises considerable concerns, particularly regarding the potential for radicalization and exploitation by extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, which poses a serious threat to Indian security. The influx of Rohingyas into the historically vulnerable northeastern states further heightens the risk of cross-border terrorism. Additionally, this issue presents a substantial threat to India's internal security, as their presence in demographically and politically sensitive regions like Assam, West Bengal, and Jammu and Kashmir could disrupt the socio-political landscape and adversely impact both internal and border security.
In conjunction with these security challenges, India faces increasing complexity in maintaining its diplomatic priorities. The nation has consistently positioned itself as one that upholds democratic values and humanitarian ideals. Consequently, India has refrained from publicly criticizing Myanmar on this issue, primarily due to its strategic interests in the country. Myanmar plays a crucial role in India's Act East Policy and is significant in addressing the insurgency challenges in India's northeastern states. Furthermore, India maintains a strong relationship with Bangladesh, which has been heavily impacted by the influx of Rohingya refugees, with approximately one million currently residing there. While India has extended humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh, it has simultaneously restricted the entry of Rohingyas into its own territory. Striking a balance between the interests of Bangladesh and Myanmar, while safeguarding its national interests, presents a formidable challenge for Indian diplomacy. Additionally, internal political dynamics also play a role in shaping India's response to the Rohingya situation.
The Rohingya issue is significantly influenced by internal politics, which includes the humanitarian aspect. It has been observed that numerous civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, and even certain state governments have voiced their support for Rohingya refugees, thereby complicating India's domestic response.
In addition to these, India is faced with the challenge of growing influence of China in Myanmar and Bangladesh. In order to balance Chinese influence in these two important neighbouring countries India is obliged to act in a manner that reinforces its image as a responsible power. In this geopolitical context, how India handles the Rohingya crisis would serve as a critical test for India's strategy in the South Asian region. India has, so far, adopted a realistic approach by prioritizing its security and strategic interests. However, the Rohingya crisis presents a significant dilemma for India, as it has to balance its role as a responsible regional leader of high moral fibre in the Global South with its duty to address its security concerns in a realistic manner.
Shailendra Upadhyay has done his M.A. in Global Studies from Ambedkar University Delhi. He has worked as an intern with Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP -IDSA) and Vivekanand International Foundation (VIF). His research interests include diasporic Studies, Refugee and Migration Studies and National Security.
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