The so-called Spring Revolution began in Myanmar as a response to the military coup on 1 February 2021, led by Min Aung Hlaing, the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces). The coup that ousted the democratically elected government, led to country-wide protests and civil disobedience. This popular movement against the Junta is also known as the People’s Defensive War and involves a diverse range of participants, including students, trade unions, and ethnic armed organizations. There is a growing demand for the resignation of the military leaders, release of political detainees like Aung San Suu Kyi, and the establishment of a federal democracy.
The National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar was formed on 16 April 2021, by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw1 (CRPH), and now consists of the elected lawmakers ousted in the 2021 military coup [including members of the National League for Democracy (NLD)], ethnic minority groups, and other political parties. The ruling junta considers it illegal while the main objective of the NUG has been to restore democracy, establish a federal democratic union, and ensure justice and human rights for all citizens, including the Rohingyas. The situation has escalated into a civil war, with the NUG and its armed wing, the People’s Defence Force (PDF) (declared a terrorist outfit by the Junta), leading the resistance against the military junta with some ethnic resistance groups intensifying their operations aiming at independence.
The conflict has resulted in significant casualties and thousands of people have been detained and many more have fled across the borders into India, Bangladesh and Thailand. By some estimates, about two million people have been displaced and there is an unprecedented humanitarian crisis looming large in the horizon with acute food shortages and limited access to medical care. The situation remains complex and fluid with no clear end in sight.displaced. According to the Myanmar Campaign Network2, at least 50,000 have been killed by the Junta forces and over 26,000 have been arrested as of March this year. This conflict has had devastating implications for the country’s domestic affairs and its impact also reverberates across the South Asian region. The persistence of the civil war has added a new layer of complexity to the bilateral relationship as India finds itself at a critical juncture in an attempt to navigate its formal ties with Myanmar while also safeguarding its security concerns.
Historical Context
During the initial years after gaining independence, India forged strong ties with Burma (present Myanmar), marked by the Treaty of Friendship (1951)3, pledging “everlasting peace and unalterable friendship.” Both nations were also part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), portraying their shared vision in global affairs. However, the 1962 military coup, which terminated constitutional democracy in Burma under General U Ne Win, strained relations with India. The junta’s inward focus, suppression of minorities and expulsion of foreigners, including ethnic Indians, also created tensions between the two countries. Despite these challenges, India chose a balanced approach, maintaining diplomatic relations with the regime while offering limited support to democratic factions. India also extended its support to Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Aung San, in her fight for democracy and provided political asylum to exiled former Prime Minister U Nu during Ne Win’s regime. Despite political tensions, various diplomatic exchanges continued. General Ne Win made several visits to India in the late 1960s and 1980s and since then, successive Indian prime ministers, including the current PM Narendra Modi, have visited Myanmar, reaffirming the enduring diplomatic ties between the two nations.
When Myanmar began its political reforms in 2011 under President Thein Sein, India welcomed these changes as a positive step towards democracy and regional stability. India re-engaged with Myanmar’s pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, expressed support for her National League for Democracy (NLD) by inviting her to India and endorsing Myanmar’s democratic progress. Economic and developmental support provided through India’s investments, such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, played a significant role in fostering economic ties during Myanmar’s political transition.
With the NLD’s victory in the 2015 elections, India further strengthened its bilateral ties through high-level engagements focused on security, trade and infrastructure. Security cooperation was the key, especially in counter-insurgency operations, such as operation “Hot Pursuit” (2015)4, along the shared border, which was crucial for India’s strategic interests in its northeast region. Operation Hot Pursuit marked a significant moment in showcasing India’s capability and willingness in undertaking cross-border counter-insurgency measures to ensure national security. This operation also underscored the significance of robust India-Myanmar cooperation and mutual interest in addressing cross-border security challenges. Beside security cooperation, bilateral cooperation was further enhanced in various sectors, including infrastructure, connectivity, and trade with the signing of a landmark agreement5 on land border crossing in 2018. This agreement underscored India’s commitment to strengthening ties with Myanmar, facilitating regional integration, and countering China’s growing influence in the region.
Changing nature of security issues for India
Since gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1948, Myanmar (officially known as Burma till 1989) has experienced persistent insurgencies characterised primarily by ethnic grievances. Various ethnic armed factions have engaged in protracted conflicts against the country’s military― the Tatmadaw― seeking self-determination. In August, September and October 2007, Myanmar witnessed the emergence of the Saffron Revolution, marked by a succession of economic and political protests and demonstrations. At this time, India continued to maintain strong ties6 with the nation supporting it through infrastructure development and holding diplomatic talks showing solidarity for the democratic movement in the country.
The Rohingya crisis, involving the persecution and mass displacement of the Rohingya Muslim minority from Myanmar’s Rakhine State in 2017, has been a matter of grave concern for India. India’s reaction to this issue has been multifaceted, reflecting its complex interests and relations with both Myanmar and Bangladesh. India initially adopted a cautious stance on the Rohingya issue, mindful of its close ties with Myanmar and the potential for the crisis to spill over into India’s north-eastern states. The Myanmar military’s poor governance has created a situation where borders are easily crossed and armed groups operate freely. Instead of preventing Indian rebels from using its territory, the junta has been providing them refuge in Myanmar7 in exchange for their help in fighting the pro-democracy People’s Defence Forces and ethnic revolutionary organisations (EROs) in the Sagaing region. The People’s Liberation Army of Manipur and Manipur Naga People’s Front, which seek separatism or greater autonomy from India, have reportedly used Myanmar as a base for attacks on Indian soil, including the November 2021 ambush8 on an Indian paramilitary force― the Assam Rifles convoy. The Indian government viewed the influx of Rohingya refugees as a security threat, citing9 the possibility of their involvement in terrorist activities or being recruited by extremist groups. In line with its security concerns, India has taken steps to deport Rohingya refugees living in the country illegally. In 2017, the government announced10 plans to deport around 40,000 Rohingya refugees. It has urged Myanmar to resolve the issue through dialogue and address the root causes of the conflict, while also encouraging Bangladesh to ensure the safe and sustainable return of the refugees. Post 2021 civil war, newer dimensions of security issues have emerged. The presence of insurgent groups has grown in the region and India has expressed concern with regard to their involvement in the conflict that emerged in Manipur in 2023. India’s Intelligence, Narcotics and Affairs of Border’s report (2023) stated that 2480 illegal immigrants11 from Myanmar were detected in the region.
China’s involvement and investment in Myanmar via its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have further raised concerns for India, particularly the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of the BRI. The CMEC projects like the Kyaukpyu Deep Sea Port, the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone and an extensive network of railways and highways linking China’s Yunnan province to the Indian Ocean, enhance China’s strategic access to the Indian Ocean, thereby potentially threatening India’s maritime security and economic interests in the region. Another significant concern is the presence of Chinese intelligence facilities on the Coco Islands12, located near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, where India has significant naval bases. Indian officials have raised alarms about these facilities, fearing that they could enhance China’s strategic reach and surveillance capabilities (to monitor Indian naval activities and missile tests) in the Indian Ocean region.
China’s growing ties with Myanmar’s military junta, especially after the 2021 coup, have further complicated the security dynamics. Beijing has promised13 to support the SAC (State Administration Council) “no matter how the situation changes” and is increasing its cooperation with its allies among the ethnic revolutionary organisations (EROs). This support includes supplying jets, building new infrastructure projects and agreements for China’s Yunnan province to supply the SAC with essential goods like rice and fertiliser. China’s support for the junta not only stabilises the military regime but also ensures China’s continued influence in Myanmar. It is also believed that China seeks to leverage its policies against Indian interests in the region, aimed at affecting India’s long-term strategic and security calculations. The deepening of China-Myanmar relations, through both the BRI and military cooperation, therefore, represent a challenge to India’s influence and strategic positioning in Southeast Asia.
India’s balancing act
Since the 2021 coup in Myanmar, India has attempted to strike a balance between its strategic interests, security concerns, and humanitarian considerations in its bilateral relations. On the one hand, India refrained from directly criticising Myanmar’s handling of the ongoing civil war (including Rohingya crisis) citing14 it as an internal matter for the country to resolve. This stance was reflected in India’s abstention15 from voting on a UN Security Council resolution in 2022 that criticised Myanmar’s military regime, and called for “quiet, patient and constructive diplomacy with the junta”. India’s abstention was seen as a move to avoid straining its relationship with Myanmar and maintain its influence in the country. Despite the security concerns, India has provided humanitarian assistance16 to Rohingya refugees who have taken shelter in Bangladesh.
However, India has also expressed concerns about the potential of the Rohingya crisis to fuel terrorism and illegal immigration into Indian territory. Therefore, India has urged17 Myanmar to resolve the issue through dialogue and address the root causes of the conflict, while also encouraging Bangladesh to ensure the safe and sustainable return of the refugees. India has continued to engage with Myanmar’s military leadership, in an effort to maintain its influence in the country. This engagement has included high-level visits, economic cooperation, and capacity-building initiatives. India’s relationship with Myanmar, post 2021, has been as pragmatic as it has been ever since the junta came to power in the 1960s. While India has always expressed18its deep concerns and called for the restoration of democracy, emphasising its support for democratic processes and the rule of law, and condemned the 2021 coup, it has continued to engage with the military junta. This is to safeguard its strategic interests and ensure the continuation of ongoing projects at the same time, extending humanitarian aid during the COVID-19 pandemic, including vaccines and medical supplies.
There have also been several instances of India hardening its approach on the issue of cross-border security challenges following 2021 coup. In 2023, India also asked19 citizens to restrict travel to Myanmar. To address the security challenges, India has taken steps to strengthen border control and maintained its historical ties with Myanmar through proactive and pragmatic diplomacy. . This is reflected in its changing stance on the Free Movement Regime (FMR), which was introduced in 1950 to allow individuals of the hill tribes to travel between the two countries without certain documents. The changing security dynamics and concerns over illegal immigration and Indian insurgent groups taking advantage of the cross-border free movement has led India to announce the Free Movement Regime (FMR) to be halted20 to solve the issues of influx of immigrants, smuggling and drug trafficking. This represents a shift towards a more defensive posture from India going against the principles of open engagement that it has sought in its Act East policy. In March, reports of India’s plan to build $3.7 billion21 fence around the 1,610 kilometres border with Myanmar came to the fore. This is believed to be an effort to further secure its national security while keeping an empathetic eye on the demographic structure of its northeastern region. India deported22 the first group of refugees who fled from Myanmar during the 2021 coup and sought shelter in India, in May 2024. The deportation of refugees was believed to have been earlier delayed due to the ongoing civil war in Myanmar.
Conclusion
Since the onset of conflict in Myanmar, India has maintained its support for democratic processes, participation and values. It has sought to strengthen its ties with the neighbour and as a part of its ‘Look East’ (later ‘Act East’) policy it has also attempted to increase bilateral trade relations. Despite pervasive security concerns, India and Myanmar were able to cooperate on issues surrounding border demarcation and also implemented the Free Movement Regime. However, Indian is quite cautious now and has put it on hold. Post 2021, India’s security concerns have intensified and going forward, India sees a bumpy road ahead in its relations with the Junta. Nevertheless, India has attempted to engage in constructive dialogue and diplomatic efforts to maintain its relationship with the ruling regime in Myanmar and sought stability in the region. At the same time, it has decided to take a firm stance against growing cross-border security challenges, reflected in its abstention in the UNSC or the latest plan to fence its border and deportation of first batch of refugees. Such balancing move has drawn criticism from both human rights organisations and the United States and ASEAN who have pushed India to adopt a tougher approach vis-à-vis the junta. Despite seeming contradictions in its policy, India continues with its attempt to pursue issues with the junta in a manner that aligns with its national interest and ensures stability in the region while endorsing the clamour for return of democracy to Myanmar.
*Ms Kirti Advani is an Intern at International Centre for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. The views expressed are her own. She wishes to thank Dr Ankita Sanyal for her inputs during the preparation of this commentary.
Endnotes
1. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw is the the bicameral legislature established in Myanmar under the 2008 National Constitution. It is composed of the 224-seat Amyotha Hluttaw, or House of Nationalities (regarded as the upper house) and 440-seat Pyithu Hluttaw, which is the House of Representatives (regarded as the lower house). Both houses have co-equal powers and most members are directly elected. The House of Nationalities has 12 elected members each from seven states and seven regions and 56 members appointed by the armed forces, while the House of Representatives has 330 members elected directly and 110 members appointed by the armed forces.
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12. Coco Islands, Intelligence Resource Program FAS (accessed on 21 June 2024).
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