

VOLUME 31, ISSUES 3 & 4, JULY - DECEMBER, 2024

ISSN 0972-5563

---

# Journal of Peace Studies

---

ISSN 0972-5563

Journal of Peace Studies

VOLUME 31, ISSUES 3 & 4, JULY - DECEMBER, 2024



---

PUBLISHED BY INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PEACE STUDIES

---

# Journal of Peace Studies

---

C	O	N	T	E	N	T	S
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

From the Editors' Desk		1
<b>ARTICLES</b>		
Vedanta and Tawhid: Convergences in the Conception of Godhead	<i>Adil Rasheed</i>	3
The Power of Words: Analysing the Role of Communication in Contemporary Diplomatic Practice and International Relations	<i>Ali Mohammed Al-Qarni</i>	29
Subaltern Realities as Critical Methodology: Re-Imagining Kurdish (Statehood) from the lens of Non-Western IR	<i>Premanand Mishra</i>	58
The Curious Politics of Islam in Pakistan: An Agent of Subversion?	<i>Ashok Behuria</i>	82
<b>ESSAY</b>		
Banal Nationalism in Everyday life: The Intersection of Cultural, Ethnic, Linguistic and National Identity in India	<i>Akankshya Ray</i>	95
<b>OPINION</b>		
Fall of Bashar Al-Assad: What it Means for the Region and India	<i>Mohmad Waseem Malla</i>	107
India's Evolving Indo-Pacific Strategy: Navigating Geopolitical Shifts and Strengthening Strategic Autonomy	<i>Imran Khurshid</i>	126
The Micromanagement of Politics in Pakistan	<i>Ashish Shukla</i>	134
<b>BOOK REVIEW</b>		
Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes? By <i>Banafsheh Keynoush</i>	<i>Mohmad Waseem Malla</i>	140
Anger Management: The Troubled Diplomatic Relationship between India and Pakistan by Ajay Bisaria	<i>Safoora Yousuf</i>	145

---

# Journal of Peace Studies

---



**FOUNDING EDITOR**  
LATE PROF. RIYAZ PUNJABI

**ADVISORY BOARD**  
T. K. OOMMEN  
RENÉ WADLOW  
G BALACHANDRAN

**EDITORIAL BOARD**

NOOR A. BABA  
AJAY DARSHAN BEHERA  
DIPTI RANJAN PATTNAIK

**GUEST EDITOR (HONY)**  
SALEEM KIDWAI

**CONSULTING EDITOR (HONY)**  
SMRUTI S. PATTANAİK

**ASST. EDITORS**  
PRATEEK JOSHI  
MOHMAD WASEEM MALLA

**DESIGN**  
BRINDA DATTA

**PRINTED & PUBLISHED BY**  
SHEIKH KHALID JEHANGIR

International Centre for Peace Studies

**Printed at:**  
A.M. Offsetters  
Kotla Mubarakpur, New Delhi  
PIN- 110 003, TEL: 2463 2395

Office Address:  
157/9, Block 4, Second Floor,  
Kishangarh, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi-  
1110070  
Regd. Address:  
C-11 Jangpura Extension  
New Delhi - 110 014  
Tel: (91-11) 49989230, +91-9810317972  
<http://www.icpsnet.org>  
Emails: cpsndjps@gmail.com;  
jps@icpsnet.org

## SUBSCRIPTION

### In India

This Copy	
(Two Issues):	Rs. 600.00
Annual	
(Individual)	Rs. 1200.00
(Institutional)	Rs. 1800.00

### Overseas (Air Mail)

This Copy:	US\$ 15.00
	UK£ 9.00
Annual:	US\$ 60.00

---

# Subaltern Realities as Critical Methodology: Re-Imagining Kurdish (Statehood) from the lens of Non-Western IR

---

Premanand Mishra\*

## Abstract

*The normative conception of the state formations has been hegemonically grounded in socio-historical experiences of the Westphalian order. However, post-colonial trajectories have diverged from this model. Subaltern realities challenge the normative crises presented by dominant IR theories on war and peace, conflicts and the process of state formation. This article examines subaltern realities to contextualise the question of Kurdish aspiration for a separate state. A significant challenge for hegemonic IR theories is their inability to account for existing pluralistic structures of international society. Scholars like Acharya and Buzan have contested the status of IR as an inclusive universal “discipline,” arguing against the zero-sum choice between mainstream IR and its critical and cultural challenges needs. While alternative realism de-essentialises structural fixity in this context, the Westphalian episteme and its singular language, which dominates IR, present another challenge. As such, re-imagining Kurdish aspiration for statehood needs a rethinking of ideals of Westphalian notions, advocating for informed interpretations of domestic, external and normative ideas. Subaltern realities aim to address this gap by exploring the Kurdish question through its socio-historical processes, relative powerlessness, weak institutional settings, and the domestic and external realities that undermine its aspirations and possibilities.*

*Keywords: Kurdish Question, International Relations, State, Subaltern Realities*

*\*Dr. Premanand Mishra is a faculty at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. He can be reached at: [mailpremmishra@gmail.com](mailto:mailpremmishra@gmail.com)*



**Introduction:  
Subaltern  
Realities and the  
Idea of the State**

The modern state, rooted in the Westphalian order and shaped by realist-liberal debates, is highly grounded in Western epistemic understanding. The idea of the state and its sovereignty, particularly the question of legitimacy, often demands universal recognition. For a state to attain such recognition, it must adhere to a well-established idea of the state.

Sub-altern International Relations (IR) presents a critique of the hegemonic Westphalian model, particularly the (neo)realist and (neo)liberal dominance that continues to shape the notion of the state. The realist-liberal explanations have failed to adequately explain the international structure, conflicts (both inter- and intra-state), and the shifting global order. Within this context, Kurdish aspirations for statehood necessitate a rethinking of the Westphalian order from non-Western epistemic perspectives, shaped by different socio-historical experiences and responses to hegemonic Western modernity.

The emergence of subaltern IR as a field of inquiry has posed significant to the realist dominance. As Robert Gray (2020) argues, "Realism's current lack of legitimacy" can be countered by

"Ayoob's Subaltern Realism, a post-colonial, positivist, neo-classical perspective/theory, possesses rehabilitation potential for realism as a mainstream IR paradigm."<sup>1</sup> Traditional realists view the world through the lens of conflict/war, power distribution, and security, with a deterministic focus on hegemonic culturalist and anarchist determinism. In contrast, subaltern IR emphasises the multi-faceted nature of power in the international system, acknowledging the internal-external dynamism of security threats. Mohammad Ayoob, a proponent of subaltern IR, argues that "internal threats are more structural than external threats and thus it requires a multi-faceted approach that subaltern-IR approaches are responding to the security dynamism in the world."<sup>2</sup>

Neo-realists, such as John Mearsheimer, often overlook the significance of internal security, focusing instead on power only in the context of hegemonic dominance at regional or global levels. This is critiqued by subaltern IR, which challenges the Western-centric fixation on power and sovereignty while calling for a rethinking of the role of the state in the international system. By challenging the positivist, absolutist epistemology, subaltern IR introduces adaptability and contexts as crucial elements of its understanding.

SUBALTERN REALITIES AS CRITICAL METHODOLOGY:  
RE-IMAGINING KURDISH (STATEHOOD) FROM  
THE LENS OF NON-WESTERN IR

---

Ayoob's Subaltern IR critiques the hegemonic IR theories and their 'mindless scientism,' arguing for a re-evaluation of conflict and order through an internal-external dichotomy rather than adhering to the realist view of an anarchic international system. Ayoob considers subaltern IR as more of a critical perspective (of one truth and its timelessness) than a theory, challenging the timeless truths that Spivak critiques as an epistemic overhaul in the Foucauldian sense.<sup>3</sup> He further engages with the idea of the modern state by drawing from Hobbes's notion of Domestic order, the European historical-sociological understanding of state formation, and insights from the third English school on order in international structure.<sup>4</sup>

Ayoob argues that theoretical timelessness perpetuates inequality in IR. He draws on Robert Cox's assertion that "all theories have a perspective" to critique the scientific exclusivity of Western IR and its timelessness. For him, realism and liberalism have become more ideological than objective, with Headley Bull describing them as an "exercise of judgement than scientific."<sup>5</sup> As such, Ayoob contends that the path for weak states is "not to transcend the Westphalian state system and adopt post-Westphalian characteristics" but to build political

structures that more closely approximate the Westphalian ideal. For states to achieve long-term stability, they must be both effective and legitimate. Only by moving closer to the Westphalian ideal can post-colonial states establish stable domestic orders and participate more equally in shaping international rules.<sup>6</sup>

The dichotomy between international and world society, shaped by the West in its own socio-historical experiences, has also shaped the realities of post-colonial states. Spivak's concept of precarious subjectivity and Foucault's notion of "subjugated knowledge" reflect the epistemic challenges faced by non-Western states.<sup>7</sup> Can then subaltern epistemologies address these challenges and facilitate the re-imagination of the state as a sovereign entity, as in the case of Kurdish statehood?

For Antonio Gramsci, hegemony is both cultural and political. While both elites and subjugated class share a history, the subjugated lack the social, cultural and political institutional apparatus to dismantle the hegemony. Gramsci argues that the only way to achieve freedom is to create their state, calling this a 'permanent victory'. He suggests that individuals must have an inventory to develop the consciousness necessary to challenge

SUBALTERN REALITIES AS CRITICAL METHODOLOGY:  
RE-IMAGINING KURDISH (STATEHOOD) FROM  
THE LENS OF NON-WESTERN IR

---

hegemony. As such, for subaltern groups, the state becomes a necessity. Gramsci also notes that “the subaltern classes, by definition, are not unified and cannot unite until they can become a ‘State,’” given their history “is intertwined with that of civil society, and thereby with the history of States and groups of States.”<sup>8</sup> For him, institutions are crucial in achieving autonomy as he outlines six steps toward this goal, beginning with changes in economic production and culminating in the affirmation of full autonomy.<sup>9</sup> Relatedly, Spivak’s concept of voice-consciousness for the subalterns plays a significant role in addressing the structure-actor and institutional legitimacy questions surrounding Kurdish statehood.

Hegelian notions of self-identity with the nation were significant for movements like Zionism, which led to the formation of a Jewish state (Israel). Kurdish aspirations, however, do not face such moral challenges as the Zionist project or the ideological project that led to the formation of Pakistan. For nation-states to succeed, there must be a relationship between structure and actors, as well as institutional legitimacy. While the Kurdish claims to statehood are rooted in self-identity and are better positioned to form a sovereign and legitimate state, without the actor-structure relationship and institutional

legitimacy, statehood aspirations, as those of Kurds, risk failure. The challenges of forging a cohesive Kurdish identity across Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria underscore the importance of a conscious nationalism that can translate into a viable nation-state.

Subaltern realism offers a normative understanding of the pluralist structure of the world that could help in re-imagining weak states and forging new paths. It also acknowledges the limitations of epistemic exclusivity of neo-realism and neoliberalism, both of which have shaped state violence and order in the international system. As such, this paper seeks to place the Kurdish question within the broader context of regional and global dynamics, examining how shifting power structures and evolving norms might allow for the re-imagining of Kurdish statehood. Through subaltern realism, which offers a pluralistic understanding of global structures, this paper argues that an alternative lens may provide new insights into the possibilities for Kurdish statehood amidst the limitations of dominant realist and neoliberal frameworks.

### **Re-Imagining (Statehood) Kurdish Question**

Re-imagining Kurdish aspirations for statehood necessitates a rethinking of Westphalian ideals,

SUBALTERN REALITIES AS CRITICAL METHODOLOGY:  
RE-IMAGINING KURDISH (STATEHOOD) FROM  
THE LENS OF NON-WESTERN IR

---

even as essentialist realism and neoliberal propositions of cooperation and ethnocentrism are acknowledged. This paper seeks to offer a more nuanced interpretation of domestic, external, and normative ideas through the lens of subaltern realities, exploring the complexities of the Kurdish question. Given the unique political landscape surrounding the Kurdish issue, subaltern realities can redefine ethnic identity and civic culture and fill the gaps in established literature. The Kurdish aspiration for statehood faces challenges stemming from the uneven distribution of power in the region, particularly among Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, as well as the role of the United States. Exploring subaltern realities allows for the discovery of new patterns, ideas, norms, theories and methods that may help re-imagine the idea of Kurdish statehood.

Historically, the Kurdish people have endured significant disadvantages. As Mc Dowall (2007) points out, their struggle has been twofold: against the government under which they live and their quest to transform from a people described as 'Kurdish' into a coherent national community "with the essential characteristics of nationhood."<sup>10</sup> The annulment of the Treaty of Sèvres and Lausanne by the Turkish Republic marked a pivotal moment in this struggle. Further challenges emerged in 1994 when the power-

sharing arrangements between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) collapsed, leading to a civil war which lasted till 1998. Then, following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the national referendum of 2005, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Parliament were recognised under the new Iraqi constitution. However, the 2017 referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan, while non-binding, created further uncertainty.

In such context, subaltern realities aim to bridge gaps in understanding the Kurdish question by analysing its socio-historical processes, the relative powerlessness of Kurdish people, the weakness in institutional settings, and the domestic and external realities that have undermined Kurdish aspirations and possibilities of a statehood. These perspectives provide critical insights into how to re-imagine Kurdish statehood in a way that challenges dominant ideas despite acknowledging essentialist realism and neoliberal propositions of cooperation and ethnocentrism while incorporating the necessary domestic and external factors.

Since the annulment of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Kurdish issue, with a national community divided across countries, has remained one of the most contentious in the region, along with the Arab-Israeli conflict over



Palestine. Geostrategic factors, instability due to the rise of the Islamic State, instability in Iraq, the Syrian civil war, political instability in Turkey, and the continued Saudi-Iranian rift have all contributed to regional instability. The 2017 referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan, though non-binding, further complicated the region's already volatile dynamics. The broader implications of the referendum are discussed in a regional and global context to nuance this debate around the question of Kurdish statehood.

### **Genealogy of the Kurdish Question**

Like the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine, the Kurdish question is another significant political problem in the West Asian region. Kurds, spread across Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria, have long struggled for statehood on their shared identity. Kurds are present in four countries in this region: Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. The recent Kurdish referendum in Iraq brought renewed attention to this long-standing issue, especially amid the chaos in Iraq, the Syrian civil war, Turkey's political instability and the emergence of the Islamic State.

David McDowall notes that the term "Kurdistan" first emerged in the twelfth century under the 'Saljuqs'.<sup>11</sup> Today, the Kurdish population is estimated to be between 25-35

million, making them one of West Asia's largest ethnic groups.<sup>12</sup> The Kurds live primarily along the geopolitical fault line of the region, at the intersection of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria, with a significant diaspora scattered globally.<sup>13</sup> Before World War I, Kurdistan was split between the Ottoman and Persian Empires.<sup>14</sup>

Following the war, it came to be divided among five states, with Turkey holding the largest Kurdish population at 43%, followed by Iran at 31%, Iraq at 18%, and Syria at 6%. The Kurds, predominantly Sunni Muslims, have a strong ethnic identity that often supersedes political and religious nationalism. Though the Kurds too redefined their ethnic identity like Arabs and Turks, but as McDowall (2007) asserts, they "were fatally disadvantaged because they lacked both a civic culture and an established literature."<sup>15</sup>

At the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Sevres momentarily bolstered Kurdish nationalist aspirations.<sup>16</sup> However, these hopes were dashed when the Treaty of Lausanne annulled Sevres, marking the rise of the Turkish Republic. The PUK-HDP civil war from 1994 to 1998 created further fragmentation within the Kurdish movement. It was not until the Washington Agreement between Masoud Barzani (KDP) and Jalal

**Table 1**  
**Distribution of Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq**

Country	Population	Kurds as % of National Population	Kurdish Population (in million)	Prominent Kurdish majority regions
Iran	82,021,564	10	8-10	Western provinces of Kermanshah, Ilam, West Azerbaijan and Kordestan
Iraq	39,192,111	15-20	4-5	Northern Iraq (KRG-governed areas)
Syria	18,028,549	10	3-3.5	Afrin in the northwest, Kobani in the north and Jazira in the northeast.
Turkey	80,845,215	18-19	20	Eastern and South Eastern Anatolia, Istanbul, Izmir, Diyarbakir Province

Sources: CNN (2017); Central Intelligence Agency- World Fact Book (2017); Kurdish Institute of Paris (2017); UNPO (2017); World Population Review (2017); BBC News (2017); Aljazeera (2017).<sup>19</sup>

Talabani (PUK) in 1998 that the conflict subsided, allowing for a degree of peace and cooperation.<sup>17</sup>

The 2003 US invasion of Iraq once again reshaped Kurdish fortune, as the Kurdish Peshmerga played a significant role in toppling Saddam Hussein's regime, and the subsequent 2005 constitution recognised the Kurdistan Regional Government, established after the Gulf War, and the Kurdistan Parliament. As McDowall (2007) explains, the modern history of the Kurds must address two key questions: their struggle against the governments to which they are subject and their quest to become a coherent national community.<sup>18</sup>

The Kurds, who are predominantly Sunni Muslims and scattered across parts of eastern Turkey, northern Syria, northern Iraq and northwestern Iran, have long faced hostility from both Baghdad and Ankara. This is particularly evident in the efforts of Turkey and Iraq to coordinate the suppression of Kurdish nationalist aspirations, fearing the potential for broader pan-Kurdish movements. The 2003 American invasion of Iraq shifted this delicate balance, with the Kurds emerging as key allies to the US, further complicating regional relations.

### **Kurdistan Region of Iraq**

The 2017 referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan raised significant concern regarding the future of Kurdish aspirations for independence. The protracted struggle for autonomy, deeply rooted in the region's history, may provoke political upheavals, especially considering the current complexities of West Asia, particularly Iraq. However, to grasp these evolving political dynamics, it is essential to explore the cause and effect of the referendum, as Iraq has long been central to Kurdish statehood aspirations.

Iraqi Kurdistan has endured a turbulent history since the establishment of modern Iraq. Following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq was placed under British protection under the mandate system agreed upon by France and Britain. Since then, the Kurds have consistently fought for independence. However, Iraqi Kurds have been able to organise more forcefully and hence garnered more international attention than other Kurds in neighbouring countries of Turkey, Syria and Iran. As Michael M. Gunter (2004) explains, "Iraqi Kurds constitute a greater proportion of the population than any other state they inhabit," Which is around 20 per

SUBALTERN REALITIES AS CRITICAL METHODOLOGY:  
RE-IMAGINING KURDISH (STATEHOOD) FROM  
THE LENS OF NON-WESTERN IR

---

cent of Iraq’s population (See Table 1). Furthermore, Iraq’s political legitimacy is more precarious compared to Turkey and Iran, largely due to its status as an “artificial state” created during the mandate period. Additionally, the sectarian divisions that exist in Iraq between Shia and Sunni populations are not as prevalent in Turkey or Iran, and even in Syria, before the civil war that started following the Arab uprising protests of 2011, these divisions were less pronounced.<sup>20</sup>

Two key events stand out in the Kurdish struggle: the formation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1946 and the recognition of Kurdish nationality in Iraq’s post-revolution constitution in 1958. Historically, Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed more national rights than their counterparts in neighbouring states due to various factors. However, despite this, they have never accepted the arbitrary national borders drawn during the Mandate period, and their efforts to achieve independence have been

**Table 2**  
**Parliamentary Election in Iraqi Kurdistan,**  
**1992, 2005**

Date	Total Vote Cast	Result
19 May 1992	971,953	1. KDP, 45.3% votes, 51 seats 2. PUK, 43.8% votes, 49 seats
30 January 2005	1,753,919	1. Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan, 89.55% votes 104 seats 2. Kurdistan Islamic Group, 4.85% votes, 6 seats
25 July 2009	1,866,264	1. Kurdistan List (KDP and PUK), 57.34% votes, 59 seats 2. Change List (Gorran), 23.75% votes, 25 seats 3. Reform and Service Coalition, 12.8% votes, 13 seats
21 September 2013	1,968,775	1. KDP, 38.15%votes, 38 seats 2. Change Movement, 24.42% votes, 24 seats 3. PUK, 17.97% votes, 18 seats 4. Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), 9.58% votes, 10 seats 5. Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), 6.08% votes, 6 seats

*Sources: Kurdistan National Assembly (Parliament 1992);  
Relief Web (2006)<sup>21</sup>*

met with violent suppression on multiple occasions.

### **Major Issues between Baghdad and the Ethnic Kurds**

The Kurdish support for the 2003 US invasion of Iraq had a significant impact on their demands for autonomy within Iraq to begin with. Three key factors reinforced Kurdish aspirations: the 2005 constitution, shifts in post-Saddam Iraq politics, and a strategic alliance with the United States. While the changing regional power dynamics, instability and internal chaos within Iraq seemed to favour Kurdish interests, the reactions from Baghdad, Ankara and Tehran were overwhelmingly negative, as reflected in their leaders' rhetoric following the 2005 Kurdish referendum. This fuelled concerns in these regional capitals about the implications of Kurdish assertiveness.

**Participation in National Politics and Government:** Kurdish political parties believed that participation in post-Saddam Iraq's political system would strengthen their position. In the 2005 national elections, the KDP and PUK allied (See Table 2 for results and outcome), although the prospect of full-term participation in national governance was weakened by the participation of Sunni Arabs in the elections.

### **Political Orientation of the Kurds:**

In post-Saddam Iraq, sectarian politics favoured the Shia majority, who had been marginalised under Saddam's Sunni-dominated regime. The rise of a Shia-led government under Nour al-Maliki altered the country's political dynamics. Kurds supported Shia Islamist parties between 2003-2008 for their benefit.<sup>22</sup> In this new political reality, between 2003 and 2008, Kurdish parties aligned with Shia Islamist parties to further their interests, helping al-Maliki to consolidate his political legitimacy. However, by 2008, tensions between the al-Maliki government and the KRG escalated exponentially, particularly over issues concerning Kurdish autonomy.

**Budgetary Issues:** Though the 2005 Iraqi Constitution (Article 117) recognises Iraqi Kurdistan as a federal region with its parliament and judiciary and Erbil as the regional capital, however, budgetary disputes, particularly over revenue sharing and salary payments, became a persistent issue. Earlier, Kurds demanded a 17 per cent revenue share, but without a formal census in the country, this figure remained contested between Erbil and Baghdad.

The 2017 referendum had a direct bearing on the Iraqi Kurds as the 2018

SUBALTERN REALITIES AS CRITICAL METHODOLOGY:  
RE-IMAGINING KURDISH (STATEHOOD) FROM  
THE LENS OF NON-WESTERN IR

---

national budget reduced the KRG share from 17 to 12.6 per cent. Baghdad has been reluctant to resolve these budgetary disputes, but Prime Minister Abadi stated that his government is willing to cover Kurdish salaries. This is significant given that KRG struggled financially due to falling oil prices, the war on ISIS, and budget cuts since 2014.<sup>23</sup>

**Arms Purchase and Issue on Peshmarga:** The Iraqi central government and the KRG have long disagreed over the size and armament of the Peshmerga forces, which are central to Kurdish strength. As such, Baghdad has consistently pushed for the reduction of Peshmerga numbers. After the 2017 referendum, Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi insisted that the

Peshmarga either be integrated into the Iraqi military or reduced to a small local force.<sup>24</sup> However, despite these tensions, Baghdad did not oppose a reported KRG arms purchase from Bulgaria in November 2008.<sup>25</sup>

**Control Over Oil Resources/Oil Laws:** The KRG's economic base relies heavily on oil, with agriculture contributing minimally to its revenue (see Economic Cost of Referendum for more). Oil has been a major point of contention between Baghdad and the KRG, particularly regarding laws, exploration and revenue sharing. While the 2005 Iraqi Constitution granted the Kurds autonomy over oil exports, Baghdad has consistently ensured it receives a share of the revenues to manage national energy investment. According to Katzman

**Table 3**  
**Results of the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan, 2017**  
**Referendum figures**

Registered Voters	4,581,2251	NA
Total participants in the referendum (voter turnout)	3,305,925	72.16%
Invalid votes	40011	1.21%
Empty votes	9368	0.28%
Exiled/conditional votes	170611	5.16%
Valid votes	3085935	NA
Votes saying YES	2861471	
Votes saying NO	224464	

*Source: The Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission (2017); Lee (2017)<sup>28</sup>*

(2010), Baghdad fears that the Kurdish control of oil resources could bolster Kurdish aspiration for independence. However, the KRG faces a dilemma as “oil exports need to flow through the National oil pipeline grid.”<sup>26</sup> The 2017 referendum has intensified these concerns, further complicating the relationship between Baghdad and KRG.

Issues and Assessment of Referendum 2017: In 2017, the Kurds finally defied the concerns of regional and international powers, including the United States and the United Nations, and took a significant step toward their long-held aspiration for statehood by holding a referendum. Despite being non-binding, over 90 per cent of Kurdish people voted for the independence of Kurdistan. The referendum, conducted through 2065 polling stations, saw 5.6 million eligible voters from Iraqi Kurdistan answer whether they wanted “the Kurdistan region and Kurdish areas outside the region to become an independent state?”<sup>27</sup> This raised alarms in neighbouring Turkey, Iran, and Syria, concerned that the move could inspire their Kurdish minorities to seek independence.

Although the referendum results were later suspended due to threats from Iraq, Turkey and Iran, it created significant regional and international attention. The referendum marked a

critical moment for the Iraqi Kurds, as it hovered over the relations between them and Baghdad. Though the non-binding nature of the vote helped calm the tensions, it internationalised the issue while perturbing the regional players. The immediate impact was negative for the Kurds, with Masoud Barzani resigning from the KRG presidency amid opposition calls for a “national salvation” Government to replace the KRG’s cabinet.<sup>29</sup>

The referendum also heightened tensions in disputed areas, such as the oil-rich province of Kirkuk. Baghdad responded by condemning the referendum and calling for control over international borders and airports. Despite this, Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani defended the vote, framing it as a democratic exercise and calling for constructive dialogue with Baghdad to implement its outcome and secure better relations.<sup>30</sup>

### **Iraq’s Response to Kurdish Referendum:**

Before the 2017 referendum, the KRG President Masoud Barzani urged millions of Kurds to vote, framing it as a step toward future negotiations with Baghdad. However, opposition parties within Iraqi Kurdistan accused him of using the referendum as propaganda to consolidate his power under the guise of pursuing independence.<sup>31</sup> While

Barzani reassured the international community that the referendum would not redraw regional borders, Iraq's central government reacted strongly against it. Despite Barzani's claim that the vote was a democratic expression of Kurdish aspirations, he was open to negotiations with Baghdad to settle the matter.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared the referendum 'unconstitutional', Vowing to protect Iraq's unity and rejecting any attempts at 'disintegration'.<sup>32</sup> The Iraqi government categorically dismissed it as non-binding and unacceptable, with al-Abadi emphasising steps to preserve the country's unity and integrity.<sup>33</sup> Despite Barzani's claim that the vote was a democratic expression of Kurdish aspirations, he insisted that the Kurds were open to negotiating with Baghdad to settle the matter.

The Kurdish government reached out to both Baghdad and the US, advocating for dialogue despite the failed referendum. The Kurdish government reached out to both Baghdad and Washington, seeking dialogue as the referendum ruffled feathers in the region.<sup>34</sup> Further, Barzani framed the vote as a response to the Iraqi central government's violation of power-sharing agreements and the growing sectarianism in post-Saddam Iraq, arguing that the Kurdish autonomy

was under threat and could be salvaged only through independence.<sup>35</sup> The US response also disappointed the KRG. Washington did not support the referendum, prioritising stability in the fight against the Islamic State and regional interests over the Kurdish aspirations.

Barzani faced criticism from within Kurdistan as well, with Srwa Abdulwahid of the Gorran Party accusing him of using the referendum to serve his political agenda rather than advancing Kurdish democracy.<sup>36</sup> Interestingly and in contrast to Barzani's calculations, the referendum's failure bolstered al-Abadi's standing among non-Kurds in Iraq and across the region, as many saw maintaining Iraq's unity as critical to fighting terrorism.<sup>37</sup>

### **Regional Responses and Global Concerns**

The 2017 Kurdish referendum raised alarms throughout the region, particularly in Turkey, Iran and Syria. Despite international and regional objections, including from the United States and the United Nations, the KRG proceeded with the vote. Though non-binding, the referendum fuelled concerns that it could destabilise borders and provoke regional responses, forcing the global powers and multilateral



SUBALTERN REALITIES AS CRITICAL METHODOLOGY:  
RE-IMAGINING KURDISH (STATEHOOD) FROM  
THE LENS OF NON-WESTERN IR

---

cum international agencies to push for restraint from all actors. While the referendum did not immediately lead to secession, it remains a central issue in relations between regional players and unfulfilled Kurdish aspirations for sovereign statehood.

Iran and Turkey: As the KRG proceeded with the referendum, Iran's semi-official *Tasnim News Agency* claimed that Tehran ordered the closure of its Bashmogh border crossing with the Kurdish region in response to the vote. However, the Iranian government denied these claims, stating that only air traffic to KRG-controlled areas was suspended.<sup>38</sup> Additionally, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the elite multi-service armed force directly controlled by the country's supreme leader, apparently conducted military exercises near its border with the Iraqi KRG territory, further escalating tensions, even as its Foreign Ministry continued denying these reports.<sup>39</sup> Interestingly, Tehran claimed that the decision to block the Kurdish airspace was made at the request of Iraq's central government. Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri condemned the vote as sedition, fearing it would encourage Iran's Kurdish population.<sup>40</sup>

Turkey, similarly, also adopted an aggressive stance, including launching military exercises on its border with Iraqi Kurdistan and

blocking several Kurdish television channels from airing in the country. Additionally, President Erdogan even threatened to invade northern Iraq if necessary.<sup>41</sup> Ankara threatened to close the Habur border crossing and block key oil exports from the Kurdish region. Erdogan bluntly warned that Turkey held control over the oil pipeline, stating, "The moment we close the tap, it's done."<sup>42</sup> During his Tehran visit in October 2017, the Turkish president called for punitive measures against the KRG and insisted that they "want security and stability" in the region.<sup>43</sup> While Erdogan warned that stronger steps would be taken to prevent further regional instability, he condemned Israel for supporting the Kurdish referendum even as Iranian President Hassan Rouhani likened it to "a sectarian plot by foreign countries."<sup>44</sup>

Amidst these regional threats, KRG President Masoud Barzani, while admonishing both Iran and Turkey for their century-long oppression of Kurds, declared that Kurds were ready to pay 'any price', including their lives, for the Kurdish independence.<sup>45</sup> As such, this KRG defiance prompted Baghdad to seek control over the international border of northern Iraq, including military outposts and airports and "called on foreign countries to stop importing oil from the Kurdish region" and asked them to deal with and through the

Iraqi central government.<sup>46</sup> Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, while seeking consensus with Tehran and Ankara, demanded the annulment of the referendum by describing it as a threat to Iraq's unity, something no Iraqi would allow.

Syria: On the other hand, Syria's initial reaction was muted. However, Damascus shifted its approach by but later, Damascus shifted its approach by offering further autonomy to Syrian Kurds, who constituted up to 15 per cent of Syria's population before its 2011-12 Arab uprising turned into a civil war. This move by the Syrian government was seen as a strategic gesture, as Damascus had lost control over significant parts of the country following the 2011 Syrian civil war. Syria's foreign minister even asserted that the government of President Bashar Al-Assad would initiate the dialogue over the contours of internal autonomy with the country's Kurdish population "once the military campaign" against ISIS concluded.<sup>47</sup>

Israel: Israel was the only regional country to openly support the Kurdish referendum, driven by its geopolitical strategy amidst shifting dynamics in the region. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly endorsed the Kurdish vote, stating, "The world should take care of Kurds' future. The Kurds demonstrate

national maturity and international maturity." He also expressed sympathy for their aspirations and emphasised the need for global concern regarding Kurdish safety and the future.<sup>48</sup> Interestingly, while the Israeli PM also lobbied with the US Congressmen seeking support for the Kurdish cause,<sup>49</sup> this was mostly perceived as a threat to Tehran and Ankara to draw down on their support to various Palestinian resistance groups battling Israeli occupation of their land.

### **Global Concerns**

Russia: Russia reaffirmed its stance on maintaining relations with Iraq as a unified state, emphasising respect for Iraq's constitution. A joint statement from the Iraqi foreign ministry stressed that Russia conducts its dealings with the central government in Baghdad and not with any separatist entities or actors.<sup>50</sup> Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared that while the Kremlin will continue business interactions with the Erbil-based KRG, these will be only coordinated through Baghdad.<sup>51</sup>

United Nations: The UN described the Kurdish referendum as having a "potentially destabilising effect" (UN News Centre 2017). It offered to mediate between Erbil and Baghdad, contingent on the agreement between these parties.<sup>52</sup> However, the UN

firmly backed Iraq's central government and emphasised its support for the country's unity and the need to resolve disputes in accordance with the constitution. It expressed confidence in the "Iraqi people's determination to maintain their unity, overcome the challenges they face, unite and achieve the greatest victory against the terrorists."<sup>53</sup>

United States: The US, a crucial supporter of the Kurdish people for both strategic and historical reasons, opposed the 2017 referendum, describing it as "deeply disappointing." Although Washington offered to mediate between Erbil and Baghdad, it opposed the joint air blockade imposed by Iraq, Iran and Turkey, which led to flight suspensions to Erbil.<sup>54</sup>

For the US, Kurdistan has been one of the few successes in its broader nation-building efforts in the region. Back in 2014, President Barack Obama even acknowledged that the KRG functioned in Washington's desired way and was a model for Baghdad to emulate.<sup>55</sup> As such, despite their close relations, the US perceived referendum timing as 'problematic' and a strategic misstep that could destabilise the region amidst deepening sectarianism in Iraq and the rise of ISIS. Ahead of the vote, it had even urged its postponement, fearing it would divert attention from its fight against ISIS

and exacerbate ethnic tensions in Iraq.

### **The Impact of Economic Cost of Referendum**

Iraqi Kurdistan's economy remains heavily dependent on oil, with around 90 per cent of its revenue from oil exports, making it extremely vulnerable to external pressures, particularly from its neighbours. Being landlocked, the KRG predominantly relies on Turkey to access the international markets, especially through pipelines transporting crude to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. This economic dependence gives Turkey enormous leverage over Kurdistan's financial stability. As Alex Dziadosz (2017) noted, "Because the KRG's roughly 600,000 barrels per day of oil exports are piped almost exclusively through Turkey to the port of Ceyhan, Ankara has enormous leverage not only over the region's economy, but over the resource-distribution systems underlying social stability, such as the government's ability to pay salaries."<sup>56</sup>

The 2017 referendum created additional risks for the KRG economy, primarily due to strong Turkish opposition to Kurdish statehood aspirations since that has direct geographical implications for Turkey. Given Ankara's vital role in the flow of Kurdish oil and imports, any

SUBALTERN REALITIES AS CRITICAL METHODOLOGY:  
RE-IMAGINING KURDISH (STATEHOOD) FROM  
THE LENS OF NON-WESTERN IR

---

punitive measures, such as closing borders or restricting oil transit, would have a devastating impact on the region's economy. Moreover, KRG's reliance on imports from Turkey and Iran compounded the economic vulnerability further, as blockades or sanctions could severely disrupt supplies of food, medicine, and other essential goods.

Erbil's problems deepened following the vote, with its revenue-sharing dispute with Baghdad worsening as the Iraqi central government took a maximalist position and even questioned the constitutionality of KRG's direct oil exports. Despite its opposition to KRG's oil business, the Iraqi government had previously made budget allocations for KRG and paid salary payments for its Peshmarga force. However, the referendum strained this uneasy compromise, with Baghdad even threatening to seize Kurdish oil fields.

## **5. Conclusion**

Subaltern International Relations (IR) offers an antihegemonic discourse that challenges the Eurocentric concept of the nation-state by presenting an alternative framework for understanding marginalised identities and their struggle for self-determination. The Kurdish question exemplifies this challenge, raising the issue of

whether the centrist notion of the nation-state needs to be reconsidered. Drawing from Gramsci's notion of national consciousness as a pathway to freedom, the Subaltern Studies movement (notably Ranjit Guha's experiences of silent history and Gayatri Spivak's identity and representation) emphasises the unheard voices and suppressed histories of marginalised groups. Spivak's critique of identity and representation underlines how non-Western peoples continue to be dominated by modernist and post-modernist worldviews. This paper integrates these subaltern perspectives into the realm of IR to re-imagine the Kurdish struggle for statehood.

Mohammad Ayoob's Subaltern Realism in IR critiques mainstream theories like realism and liberalism by challenging the idea of the nation-state rooted in European socio-historical experiences. Mohammad Ayoob's Subaltern Realism in IR critiques mainstream theories like realism and liberalism by challenging the idea of a nation-state that is rooted in European socio-historical experiences. As such, in exploring the unresolved Kurdish statehood, Ayoob's perspective offers an alternative that delves into the complexities and conflicts of subaltern groups seeking autonomy in a world still governed by the

SUBALTERN REALITIES AS CRITICAL METHODOLOGY:  
RE-IMAGINING KURDISH (STATEHOOD) FROM  
THE LENS OF NON-WESTERN IR

---

nation-state model. However, the Kurdish referendum of 2017, despite being non-binding, ultimately failed to produce significant international support or alter the status quo. Yet, it did open the door to rethinking the question of Kurdish aspirations and the entrenched dynamics surrounding statehood in the region.

The referendum elicited three distinct responses: First, Turkey, Iran and Iraq categorically opposed the vote, its non-binding nature notwithstanding, and threatened military action if the referendum was used to mobilise support for the creation of an independent state of Kurdistan. Second, the global powers, primarily the United States and Russia, backed the United Nations in calling for negotiations and a peaceful resolution between Erbil and Baghdad while opposing the unilateral declaration of independence of Kurdistan by the KRG. And lastly, Israel stood alone in openly supporting the referendum, driven by strategic considerations in the region. The referendum had two key implications—immediate and future. In the short term, it exacerbated sectarian divisions, especially in Iraq, where Kurdish separation would disrupt the Shia-Sunni balance, as Kurds are primarily Sunni. In the long term, the larger question remains

whether such a vote would impact the region at a structural level and whether Kurdish statehood will ever gain broad legitimacy and acceptance in the region. The Kurdish referendum, while unsuccessful, did reignite the debate over the future of Kurdish aspirations for independence. The enduring proverb, “Kurds have no friends but the mountains,” underscores the isolation the Kurds continue to face post-referendum in their quest for statehood.

Re-imagining the Kurdish aspiration for statehood requires a rethinking of absolutist notions of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and exploring more flexible interpretations of domestic, external and normative ideas. Subaltern realities provide a theoretical opening for the possibility of Kurdish statehood. However, the realisation of Kurdish independence will depend on resolving socio-historical processes, overcoming institutional weaknesses, and navigating regional and international power dynamics that have consistently undermined its Kurdish aspirations. Achieving this will require not only strategic action but also a transformation of consciousness in the Gramscian sense, allowing Kurdish nationalism to evolve into a permanent and recognised statehood. ■

## References

1. Rob Gray, "Rehabilitating Realism through Mohammed Ayoob's 'Subaltern Realism' Theory," *E-International Relations*, (December 23, 2020): p. 1, Available at: [https://www.e-ir.info/2020/12/23/rehabilitating-realism-through-mohammed-ayoobs-subaltern-realism-theory/#google\\_vignette](https://www.e-ir.info/2020/12/23/rehabilitating-realism-through-mohammed-ayoobs-subaltern-realism-theory/#google_vignette) (Accessed 30 October 2024)
2. M. Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism: International Relations Meets the Third World," In *International Relations Theories and the Third World*, ed. S. G. Neuman (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), p. 45-46.
3. Gayatri C. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (London: Macmillan, 1988).
4. M. Ayoob, "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism," *International Studies Review*, 4, no. 3 (2002): p. 28.
5. H. Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," In *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, eds. K. Knorr & J. N. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969): p. 20
6. Op. cit. 4: p. 40
7. M. Foucault, *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings* (New York: Pantheon Press, 1980).
8. A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971): p. 52.
9. *ibid.*
10. David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2007), p. 1.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Between 25 and 35 million Kurds they make up the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East, but they have never obtained a permanent nation state (BBC 2017b). Gunter (2004) finds Kurdish Population at 25 million. McDowall finds 24-27 million. Robert Olson (1992) finds 20-25 million. CIA world fact book (2014) estimates at 30 million.

SUBALTERN REALITIES AS CRITICAL METHODOLOGY:  
RE-IMAGINING KURDISH (STATEHOOD) FROM  
THE LENS OF NON-WESTERN IR

---

13. The Kurdish diaspora during mid to late 1990s can be estimated to be approximately 1.16 million and can be traced to countries like Germany (6.5 lac Kurdish population), France (1.2 lac), Netherlands (80,000), Switzerland (70000), Belgium (60000), Austria (60000), Sweden (30000), Great Britain (25000), Greece (25000), United States (20000), Denmark (10000), Canada (7000), Norway (5000), Italy (4000), Finland (3000). For more, see, The Kurdish Project, "Kurdish Diaspora", 2017, available at <https://thekurdishproject.org/kurdistan-map/kurdish-diaspora/> (Accessed 30 October 2024)
14. Michael M Gunter, *The A to Z of the Kurds*, (UK: Scarecrow Press, 2003), p. xxviii.
15. Op. cit. 10: p. 2
16. The treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920 after the First World War, marking the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The treaty created much chaos and hostility among the Turks. The treaty ultimately led to the signing of the treaty of Lausanne, on 24 July 1923. Treaty of Lausanne was a peace treaty, which aimed to bring solution to the pre-existing conflict between the Ottoman Empire and several other powers like British Empire, France, Italy and Japan. The treaty recognized the Republic of Turkey as a sovereign state. For further reading see, Heather Lehr Wagner, *The Division of the Middle East: The Treaty of Sevres*, (Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 2004).
17. Alan Makovsky, "Kurdish agreement Signals New U.S. Commitment", The Washington Institute, Policy Watch 341, 29 September 1998, Available at: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/kurdish-agreement-signals-new-u.s.-commitment> (Accessed 12 October 2024)
18. Op. cit. 10: p. 1
19. CNN, "Kurdish People Fast Facts," 2 October 2017, Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/18/world/kurdish-people-fast-facts/index.html> (Accessed 20 October 2024); The World Fact Book, "Field Listing-Ethnic Groups," *Central Intelligence Agency*, 2017, Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html#ir> (Accessed 26 October 2024); *AlJazeera*, "Iraqi Kurds vote in controversial referendum," 25 September 2017, Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/iraqi-kurds-vote-independence->

- referendum-170925032733525.html (Accessed 10 October 2017)
20. Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to The Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey*, (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): p. 11-12.
21. Kurdistan National Assembly (Parliament), "Kurdistan Elections," 1992, Available at: <https://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/1154/parl.htm&date=2009-10-25+06:47:13> (Accessed 25 October 2024); Kurdistan Regional Government, "Electoral Commission announces final results of Kurdistan Region elections," 8 August 2009, Available at: <http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?r=223&l=12&s=02010100&a=30895&s=010000> (Accessed 16 October 2024); National Democratic Institute, "Iraq Election Watch: KRG Parliamentary Elections", (November 19, 7th Edition, NDI 2013): p. 1-5, Available at: <https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI-Iraq-Election-Watch-Ed7.pdf> (Accessed 25 October 2024)
22. Shiite Islamist parties, including the Da'wa Party of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and that of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim (who died on August 26, 2009, and has been replaced by his son, Ammar al-Hakim).
23. "KRG welcomes Abadi's offer to pay Kurdish salaries, costs Baghdad \$772m," *Rudaw*, Available at: <http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/011120175> (Accessed 2 November 2024)
24. Ibid.
25. Katzman, Kenneth (2010), "The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq," *Congressional Research Service* (1 October 2010: p. 6), URL <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22079.pdf> (Accessed 20 October 2024)
26. Ibid.
27. Al Jazeera, "Iraqi Kurds vote in controversial referendum," 25 September 2017, Available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/iraqi-kurds-vote-independence-referendum-170925032733525.html> (Accessed 10 October 2024)
28. The Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission, "Primary Results," 27 September 2017, Available at: [http://www.khec.krd/pdf/173082892017\\_english%202.pdf](http://www.khec.krd/pdf/173082892017_english%202.pdf) (Accessed 20 October 2024)



29. Ibrahim Malazada, "Mounting calls to form 'national salvation government' in Iraqi Kurdistan," *Al Monitor* (30 October 2017), Available at: <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2017/10/iraq-kurdistan-national-salvation-government.html> (Accessed 31 October 2024)
30. Al Jazeera, "Barzani to Kurds: Vote in referendum to secure future," 25 September 2017, Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/9/24/barzani-to-kurds-vote-in-referendum-to-secure-future> (Accessed 10 October 2024)
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Op. cit. 27.
34. Martin Chulov, "More than 92 % of voters in Iraqi Kurdistan back independence," *The Guardian*, 28 September 2017, Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/27/over-92-of-iraqs-kurds-vote-for-independence> (Accessed 12 October 2024)
35. Op. cit. 30
36. Srwa Abdulwahib, "In Kurdistan we need change not theatrics", *Al Jazeera*, October 23, 2017 URL <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/kurdistan-change-theatrics-171023111730640.html> (Accessed 25 October 2024)
37. Cockburn Patrick, "Iraq to end decades-old policy of semi-independent rule in Kurdistan, says PM," *Independent*, 31 October 2017, Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/kurdistan-iraq-prime-minister-abadi-interview-independence-haider-baghdad-kirkuk-patrick-cockburn-a8028201.html> (Accessed 1 November 2024)
38. The Jerusalem Post, "Iran Shuts Border with Northern Iraq- Iranian News Agency," 15 October 2017, Available at: <https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Iran-shuts-border-with-northern-Iraq-Iranian-news-agency-507449> (Accessed 30 October 2024)
39. Ha'aretz, "Iran Denies Reports Tehran Closed Border with Kurdish Iraq," 15 October 2017, Available at: <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran-denies-reports-tehran-closed-border-with-kurdish-iraq-1.5457764> (Accessed 28 October 2024)

SUBALTERN REALITIES AS CRITICAL METHODOLOGY:  
RE-IMAGINING KURDISH (STATEHOOD) FROM  
THE LENS OF NON-WESTERN IR

---

40. Zein Basravi (2017), "Haider al-Abadi takes a victory lap in Tehran," *Al Jazeera*, 26 October 2017, Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/haider-al-abadi-takes-victory-lap-tehran-171026135845018.html> (Accessed 28 October 2024)
41. Al Jazeera, "Iraq, Turkey forces in joint drills after Kurdish vote," 26 September 2017, Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/9/26/iraq-turkey-forces-in-joint-drills-after-kurdish-vote> (Accessed 20 October 2024)
42. Op. cit. 27.
43. Ha'aretz, "Visiting Iran, Erdogan Repeats Claims That Israeli Mossad Meddled in Kurdish Referendum," 4 October 2017, Available at: <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.815794> (Accessed 27 October 2024)
44. Ibid.
45. Ellen R. Wald, "How the Middle East Will Respond to the Kurdish Vote for independence," *Forbes*, 25 September 2017, Available at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenwald/2017/09/25/how-the-middle-east-will-respond-to-the-kurdish-vote-for-independence/?sh=2069e1031d08> (Accessed 10 October 2024)
46. Op. cit. 27.
47. *Al Jazeera*, "Syria to consider Granting Kurds greater autonomy," 27 September 2017, Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/syria-granting-kurds-greater-autonomy-170926121821968.html> (Accessed 20 October 2024)
48. "Netanyahu: World should take care of Kurds Future," *Rudaw*, 24 October 2017, Available at: <http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/24102017> (Accessed 28 October 2024)
49. Karzan Sulaivany, "Netanyahu stops government from commenting on Kurdistan referendum vote: officials," *Kurdistan 24*, 2017, Available at: <http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/ed25ade3-a36d-42e2-9f49-963cac1dbaa2> (Accessed 30 October 2024)
50. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Iraq, "FM: Russia deals with the Federal government and opposite the separation of Kurdistan region," 26

SUBALTERN REALITIES AS CRITICAL METHODOLOGY:  
RE-IMAGINING KURDISH (STATEHOOD) FROM  
THE LENS OF NON-WESTERN IR

---

- October 2017, Available at: <http://www.mofa.gov.iq/en/news.php?articleid=2168> (Accessed October 31, 2024)
51. "Iraqi FM says Baghdad seeks broader economic cooperation with Russia," *Rudaw*, 23 October 2017, Available at: <http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/23102017> (Accessed 30 October 2024)
- 52 . Basnews, "UN offers mediation between Erbil and Baghdad," 29 September 2017, Available at: <http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/news/kurdistan/381878> (Accessed 30 October 2024)
53. Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "FM receives the assistant of the secretary general representative of the United Nations in Iraq," 17 October 2017, Available at: <http://www.mofa.gov.iq/en/news.php?articleid=2148> (Accessed 20 October 2024)
- 54 .Op. cit. 34.
- 55 . Dexter Filkins, "The Flight of Their Lives," *The New Yorker*, 29 September 2014, Available at: <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/fight-lives> (Accessed 20 September 2024).
56. Alex Dziadosz, "The Economic Case Against an Independent Kurdistan," *The Atlantic*, 26 September 2017, Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/kurdistan-barzani-iraq-turkey-blockade-oil/541149/> (Accessed 20 October 2024)

---

## **Note for readers and subscribers**

*We are happy to inform you that from January 2009 we have introduced the system of peer review of articles to ensure quality of publications and improve the scholarly value of our journal. We have a renowned group of scholars and academicians associated with our Centre and they are helping us in this process. We are grateful to them for their kind support and cooperation.*

*We would request our readers and subscribers to take note of these changes and we would, as ever, encourage them to send in research articles for publication to us. The manuscripts of research papers submitted for publication should be neatly typed in double space and the length of the papers should be ideally between 3,000-5000 words including the references. They should contain an abstract and a short introduction of the author. The authors should use Chicago Manual Style for their references. The articles can be sent to us in an electronic format, preferably Ms Word. For detailed guidelines they may send their queries to us in the following address.*

## **Journal of Peace Studies Research Section**

**Emails: [cpsndjps@gmail.com](mailto:cpsndjps@gmail.com), [jps@icpsnet.org](mailto:jps@icpsnet.org)**