

**Globalisation and Peace in the next Balance of Power:
The future role of India and China[1]**

Satya R. Pattanayak*

*[*Dr. Satya R. Pattanayak is Associate Professor of Sociology and Director of Latin American Studies at Villanova University, Pennsylvania, USA.]*

The recent US led war in Iraq and its aftermath have the potential to change the world balance of power in the next few years. It certainly has the germ to unleash the most destructive dimensions of globalisation in which the relatively free flow of ideas, information, technology, investments and services has increasingly made the world more inter-tied than ever before. With the proliferation of know-how and weak or failed states still in vogue in much of the world, there is ever increasing potential that the stable inter-state system largely in place since the end of the Second World War may unravel. Globalisation may actually facilitate greater social and political conflict and a lesser sense of security. Much of this insecurity is expected as a result of the efforts of nation states as well as non-state challengers to better negotiate or facilitate social and political conflicts. In so doing, both parties are likely to develop threatening military capabilities.

Of course, middle power dynamic is also expected to undergo transformation. Several nations are likely to be involved in this power game with global consequences. China as the second largest trading partner of the United States is the number one country to watch. India is likely to be a major economic power in less than three decades, thus necessitating a redefinition of the G-6 as the group of the world's most developed industrialised countries. On the economic front, Brazil and Russia are also likely to make a huge impact in about four decades. With so much predicted fluidity in the economic, political, and military powers of so many challengers to the United States it is of utmost importance that collective efforts be made to stabilise and even strengthen the multilateral institutional structures, such as the United Nations. This is all the more important since a greater proliferation of conflicts is expected between the United States and each of the challengers mentioned above. Stronger multilateral structures are better suited to deal with world conflicts more effectively than otherwise. One must hope that the pragmatic leadership in both the hegemon (United States) and the Challenger nations (China, India, Brazil, and Russia) is in place as the world moves toward an increasingly multi-polar power structure. It is against this background, the paper contemplates a series of scenarios in which three of the BRICs nations (China, India, and Brazil) could play a more effective role in the world by the middle of this century.

Why should the Hegemon Decline?

Several studies in recent years have harped on the preponderance of the United States as the only superpower so far ahead of the nearest challenger or challengers in military, economic, technological, and ideological dimensions that a change in the near future is almost unthinkable. The Neo-conservative manifesto of 2002 clearly intends to sustain that with whatever means

necessary, meaning that the US would be willing to undertake preventive actions including military strikes against any nation or nations that in its perception might pose a potential threat. Such bold postures are probably based on delusional understanding of the history of big power dynamics.

To put things in proper perspective, the “declinist” theories about the hegemon have been around for sometime. As part of the declinist theories, the “historical inevitability” hypothesis posits that for a number of external and internal reasons, a decline in the hegemon is expected.[2] For example, as the historian Paul Kennedy has stated in his classic, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1987), all great powers have declined over time, as they take on ambitious military campaigns, become overburdened with debt, and domestic conflict chips away at the general national consensus over major policies.[3] Excessive military spending compromises the non-military part of the national economy, thereby limiting the ability of the US to sustain its hegemony through other means, as militaristic actions erode political legitimacy. The US military is tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan. The nuclear superiority is of little consequence as it is rarely used. The debt level of the US government is at all time high. The per capita consumer debt level is also at its historical peak. On top of that, the US is a debtor nation with almost 46% of its treasury IOUs owed to the Japanese and Chinese central banks.

As Kennedy demonstrates, this has happened to all great powers since Habsburg Spain, Napoleonic France, colonial Britain, and it could happen to the present day United States. To that two other factors can be added: (1) religious (e.g., Christian) fundamentalism in the US that chips away at dissent and suffocates free deliberation of policy and exchange of information necessary to arrive at an effective policy regime; (2) a ruthless non-state enemy in al-Qaeda and its surrogates that operate in fringes of regional societies and eat away at the liberal democratic ethos of the US-led alliance. Inspired by the first and in efforts to neutralise the second, the US follows generally similarly retaliatory tactics of the invisible, non-state enemy, disregards international law, and the institutional foundations that it had helped assemble since the Second World War. In the process, it is indeed undermining its own democratic foundation. All these factors are currently at play, hence the need to speak in terms of hegemonic decline and possible change in the future balance of power.

The second variant of the declinist school argues from a different perspective. It underscores the fact that in order to be recognised by the world community, a hegemon has to offer public goods of consequence. But this very act of supplying public goods helps facilitate the rise of competing powers over time.[4] As the hegemon’s economic ability is eroded over time, non-hegemonic powers claim status in the new political formation which includes balance of power. For example, Kindleberger had argued that since the end of the Second World War, the US had been providing the protection of security by ensuring law and order in the multilateral system to much of the world.[5] The US had also been a creditor of last resort, bailing out failed economies across the globe by providing economic assistance. Here is the inherent problem that arises: over time, the free rider problem, so eloquently proposed by Mancur Olson appears, as the cost of providing such economic, military, and credit protection falls disproportionately on the shoulders of the hegemon.[6] With regard to the “free rider” issue, Calleo puts in succinctly:

“...Eventually the hegemon is no longer powerful enough - relative to others - to maintain its old primacy. Its beneficiaries challenge it, further increasing the burden of hegemony, and hastening the hegemon’s decline...”[7]

Others countries, middle-powers for example, gain in relative strength over time, as they ride with the US. In the aftermath of the Second World War, US protection permitted Japan and Germany to become formidable economic powers while generally accepting the primacy of the US in political terms.[8] But in recent years, the integration efforts across the Atlantic have facilitated the rise of the European Union. The bi-polarity in economic power has already happened in the economic arena as the European Union rivals the US in economic might.[9]

The former Eastern-bloc countries were also riding free on the shoulders of the Soviet Union, thus making the cost of providing that blanket of protection unsustainable over time. Historically, this had also happened, only exposing the structural weakness of the hegemon in periods of military conflict and crisis: British-led Pax Briannica in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with its ideological underpinning of liberalism helped Germany to rise up and challenge its supremacy in the First World War, and left it considerably damaged. The Second World War ultimately paved the way for the passing of Pax Britannica into the orbit of Pax Americana.[10] The current military conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are draining valuable resources from the US treasury, thus affecting the role of providing security, credit, and other public goods to the rest of the world. Other competing and aspiring powers are likely to take advantage of this hegemonic decline. A second military conflict in the next decade or so is likely to expose this creeping weakness of the American hegemon.

Similar arguments have been made by others referring to the fact that “competitive decadence” affected both military superpowers with the Soviet Union collapsing sooner than the US, largely due to its own overstretched military and political regime and the role it played as a provider of security and credit in its sphere of influence, as well as in other areas that it was trying to create its sphere of influence, such as Cuba in the Western Hemisphere.

Notice that both variants of the declinist school use the relative economic insecurity argument to promote hegemonic decline. It is true that although it constitutes the world’s biggest economy, the US faces formidable economic constraints. Its national debt has increased from 4 trillion in 1992 to \$7 trillion currently, amounting to about 64% of the US GDP. But this is expected to exceed 10 trillion in 2009, thus putting additional burden on the US to pursue its currently seemingly aggressive military policy and expenditure patterns. But publicly at least, such debilitating forces are not discussed in the US media, which continues to play a “cheerleader” role to any of the officially aggressive postured vis-à-vis Iran or North Korea. What describes such a misfit between economic and political-popular rhetorics?

The Moral Dilemma

The structural weaknesses of the hegemon have been in the works for at least a decade or so, but the military efforts in Iraq exposed such weaknesses as blatant. The war in Iraq was consistently characterised by the Bush Administration as a moral cause. The United States and its allies, as we were told, took a moral stand against a brutal dictator who had defied the UN

since the end of Gulf War I in 1991.[11] The official logic was that unless dealt with immediately, Iraq was likely to use its suspected vast arsenal of biological, chemical, and possibly nuclear weapons and could strike at the heart of the United States either directly or through others like Osama bin Laden's notorious terrorist organisation-Al Qaeda.

The British Prime Minister Tony Blair even predicted a scary picture in which Iraq was indeed capable of striking its western enemies with the weapons of mass destruction in a matter of only forty-five minutes. But as a consequence of this "either or" logic, nations that did not support a pre-emptive military strike against Iraq were demonised not only by key members of the Bush administration but also by the media, in particular the major television networks based in the United States.[12] Of course, the Bush administration probably believed that once the Iraq issue was dealt with in moral terms, then, nations would have to take a stand, and the expectation was that they would support the military campaign.

In order to mobilise a sufficient number of nations behind its military policy in Iraq, or an alliance of the willing, the Bush administration put considerable pressure on many countries. Of course, nations with veto power in the UN Security Council (France, Russia, and China) could not be persuaded to back a military strike against Iraq. But intimidation was pursued as a strategy. The Bush administration used intimidating language through public announcements by some of the key members of the administration. The characterisation of Germany and France as "Old" Europe and being less relevant to the US contributed to a Trans-Atlantic impasse between Washington on the one hand and Berlin and Paris on the other, not seen since the Suez Crisis in 1956. Of all nations that were against the immediate military strike in Iraq, France in particular was subjected to the most embarrassing negative campaign in the US. Even the speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert, advocated a boycott of French products in the US. But this was only the tip of the ice-berg of a "we don't really need any of them" attitude.

Countries not as economically or politically powerful as Germany France or China were subjected to more open political and diplomatic intimidation by members of the Bush administration. In some instances, financial incentives were offered to stand in line behind the US military strike in Iraq, which was subsequently characterised as one intended to liberate the Iraqi people from a cruel and brutal dictatorship. The US pressure on Mexico and Chile was well known. Major newspapers reported belligerent statements by the US ambassador in both countries. In the end, both Chile and Mexico could not be persuaded to go along. This was a sign that even the hegemon has limited arsenal vis-à-vis countries in the same hemisphere. Both Chile and Mexico in early 2003 were members of the UN Security Council, so their support was critical for the US resolution to declare war against Iraq.

If a given nation considered important by the US administration did not openly commit itself to stand behind the US in this simplistic but monstrous battle of Biblical proportions between "good" and "evil," then, a significant portion of the media in the US characterised that country as a "traitor" to the cause of Western civilization.[13] Of course, in general most foreign opponents were vilified, but In particular, Canada as the immediate neighbor was put in a really difficult situation. In many ways, the Iraqi problem posed a moral dilemma for many countries around the world.

Based on the newspaper and television coverage around the world about the US-led war in Iraq, one could say that the public sentiment in the rest of the world was strongly anti-war. In general, the polls around the globe "... found American foreign policy overtly aggressive and thought American leaders took... (them)... for granted." [14] But on the other hand, a significant number of respondents characterised themselves as friends of the people of the United States, but not its government. This dichotomy is critical since it occurs at a time when anti-Americanism (with regard to the US official policy) appeared to have been growing.

This dilemma of major nations around the world was sustained by several hard facts: (1) A strong historical commitment to using multilateral forums to resolve international disputes in an effective way; (2) collective forums are probably better to neutralise a hyper superpower in the United States than dealing with one-on-one; and (3) the US is a major trading and investing partner of almost all of these nations.

But in general the feeling of the medium powers was in favor of using multilateral forums of negotiation and bargaining, and not hard military power. In that context, China, Russia, France, as well as many other countries insistence that the US use the United Nations in its quest for international legitimacy did not come as a surprise.¹⁵ But when that did not materialise, largely due to the intransigence of the US diplomats, many countries leadership found itself in a difficult situation. For example, in early February of 2003, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien delivered a major speech at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations which clearly reflected the sentiments of the majority of nations. In this speech, Chrétien had advised that in spite of US frustrations with the UN, "the long-term interests of the United States would be better served by acting through the United Nations, than by acting alone." [16] In this sense, Canadian preference to act through multilateral organisations, such as the United Nations, was quite similar to that of Germany, France, China, Brazil, and India. The Prime Minister's speech turned out to be prophetic by the summer of 2003. Due to sustained hostilities to the US military presence and casualties in Iraq, the American Secretary of State Colin Powell returned to New York to ask for the UN support so that the problems in administering a fragmented Iraq can be minimised. It is to be noted that the same US Secretary of State had admonished the UN a few months earlier, when the war talk was heating up in Washington, for not acting on its resolutions aggressively.

Evidence of Hard Power

According to many scholars of the US security policy, this divergence between the US and the other powers could be explained on the basis of stark differences in hard power. [17] After the end of the Cold War and the realignment of the East Bloc countries, the former Soviet Union produced neither an economic nor a political challenge to the United States. In addition, the gap between the major NATO countries and the US also widened, more starkly so since the late 1980s. These vast differences could be explained in terms of the respective perceptions of threat and priorities. [18] While the NATO and its European member states focused on creating a European economic powerhouse that would rival the economic dominance of the US, they had indeed neglected the military component of such power base. That disparity has only increased in recent years. [19]

According to the World Bank 2000 World Development Report, the US economy is about one-third of the world economy (31.5%) while it caters to a population of 282 million, which is 4.6% of the world population. The ratio of share in the world economy to the share in the world population, then, is 6.85, a much more favorable ratio indicating a more solid hard power base than many rival European powers.

Of course, this asymmetry in hard power became much too large to ignore if the preponderance of the US military power were to be taken into account. For example, after Gulf War I, the US military spending declined somewhat until 2000 but in the aftermath of September 11 of 2001 it increased significantly. Based on the 2003 estimates, the US military spending is now about 40 to 45% of the world military spending.[20] In fact, it is more than half if the homeland security and the Department of Justice (DOJ) portion of security related spending are included.

The US enjoys a disproportionate amount of advantage vis-à-vis Germany and France as well. For example, the economies of Germany and France together constitute about 10.1% of the world economy, which is about one-third of the US economy. Germany and France cater to a combined population of 141 million, amounting to about 3.3% of the world population. The ratio of the world economy share to the share in the world population amounts to 3.06. For comparison sake, the US population is more than twice the combined population of Germany and France, but its economy is about three times that of the two economies put together.[21] This power asymmetry is magnified when the military dimension is added. While the NATO economies have been intent on stabilising or reducing military spending in the aftermath of the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the US has indeed consolidated and actually augmented its military striking power vis-à-vis the rest of the world combined, commensurate with its unchallenged superpower status.[22] Hence, in the US thinking, military option is likely to be entertained sooner, as only the US has the capacity to intervene and neutralise threats to its security across this universe, in multiple places simultaneously if necessary. In this instance, it is playing its role of providing public good, which is in this instance security, although many people had questioned equating US national security narrowly defined by the Bush administration and world security.

Vis-à-vis China, the following currently exists: Chinese economy (including Hong Kong) accounts for about 4% of the world economy; the US economy is 31.5% of the world economy, thus about 8 times larger than the Chinese economy. But China has 1.26 billion people, 20.8% of the world population. The ratio of the world share in economy to population for China, then, is .19. In the case of India, the disparity is even more apparent: Indian economy currently is about 1.53 percent of the world economy with a population of over 1 billion, which amounts to 16.8% of the world population. India currently has an economy to population ratio of .091. In the case of Brazil, its share in the world economy is 1.57% with a population of 170 million, about 2.8% of the world population, so Brazil has a more favorable ratio of .56, much higher than China or India. Under such a scenario of drastic imbalance of hard power, what could lesser powers with great power ambition possibly do?

The Future Balance of Power Several Possible Scenarios

(1) A possible scenario could develop in “Old Europe.” The demonising of France and, to a lesser extent, Germany by the Bush administration and the popular American media in light of the gridlock in the UN Security Council over Iraq is only a small problem compared to what might develop in the next several years in the form of a competing power bloc, a real counter weight to the US in the world balance of power.

Since the demise of the Cold War, the successive US administrations from Bush I to Clinton to Bush II have created an aura of invincibility around themselves. That aura is sustained by default, meaning that no real competition exists in terms of any worrisome challenge to the US dominance in economic, technological, and military matters. That is at least the perception perpetuated by the hawks in the Bush administration, which has also contributed to an extraordinary amount of arrogance, but not statesmanship and diplomacy. Of course, by comparison with the current Bush administration, the Clintonians look like the nicest people on earth. But if memory can be long to remember the hawkish posture of the former Secretary of State Madeline Albright over the war in Serbia, one could make the argument that there has indeed been a greater willingness on the part of the US policy makers in recent years toward a military solution to a crisis overseas. But that is nothing compared to what might unravel because of an apparent lack of understanding of or patience over the intricacies of international diplomacy.

The temporary spring alliance of France, Germany, Russia, and China, countries that had opposed the US-British-Spanish proposal in the UN Security Council to wage war in Iraq could very well become a real, strategic economic, technological, and military alliance. This has even a greater potential as a rival power bloc if Japan joins them in the next few years. Japan has been quite uncomfortable with the current situation in Iraq, and its continued dependence on the Mid-east oil complicates the issue. Japan has been quietly but seriously interested in signing contracts with Russia that, once successful, would build pipeline from the Russian oil-rich provinces to the eastern ports, and then on to Japan.[23]

Economically, the alliance of France, Germany, Russia, China and Japan will be as powerful as that of the US-led alliance. Based on the 2002 data, France and these allies would account for about 30% percent of the world economy while the US-led alliance (US-UK-Spain) will control 37% of the world economy. Spain has since opted out of this alliance for all practical purposes. Technologically, this rival alliance will have the German, French, and the Japanese know-how, and although it may be slightly behind that of the US in some areas, is quite at par in electronics, robotics, and communication. Militarily, the US cannot really threaten the alliance, as Russia still possesses at least as many, if not more, nuclear weapons as the US.[24] The Chinese armed forces by most accounts are the largest in the world. This alliance, if it takes shape, would indeed become a competing power block in all major dimensions of power — economic, technological, military, and political. With the exception of China, the US-led alliance cannot claim that the competition is between democracy and free market versus totalitarianism and state socialism.

(2) The second possible scenario will have the most lasting effects in by the second half of the twenty-first century. Using reasonable assumptions of capital accumulation rate, demographic shift, and pro-growth policies by the respective governments, investment risk analysts have predicted that there would be a radical redrawing of economic power in the world by 2040. The combined economies of the BRICs countries GDP (Brazil, Russia, China, and India) in dollar terms are expected to be larger than the current G-7 economies of US, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy, and Canada.[25] By 2032, India's economy could be larger than Japan, thus making it the third biggest in the world.

By 2041, Chinese economy is expected to overtake the US in overall size in dollar terms. In fact, by 2015, China is expected by most to overtake Japan as the second biggest economy. By 2050, the largest economies in the world are expected to be: China 45 trillion, US 35 trillion, India 28 trillion, Japan 7 trillion, Brazil 6 trillion, Russia 5.5 trillion, and the top four economies of Europe all amounting to 4 trillion or less. By that year, the combined economies of US, Japan, UK, Germany, France, and Italy (G-6) will be about 78% of the combined economies of China and India.[26] This economic leverage of BRICs economies will have ramifications for the exercise of hard power.

It is true that in per capita terms, except for Russia, the economies of China, India, and Brazil will be poorer than US or the top European countries. Only Russia's per capita is expected to match the poorer of the G-6, such as Italy. China's per capita is expected to be what the average OECD GDP is currently, which is about 30,000 dollars. By 2050, India would have about 56% of this as its per capita amount. Still at 17,000 dollars, it would be more than twenty-fold increase.[27]

Several important points need to be made here about this second scenario. First, about two thirds of the increase in GDP of China, India, and Brazil would come from higher growth and the other one-third from the currency appreciation. Second, the important assumption is that the countries of China, India, and Brazil would continue with their supportive government policies for growth. But, of course, changes in the political dynamics in any of them could thwart the growth predictions. And third, of the four BRICs nations, only India is expected to continue to grow at a rate higher than 3%; Brazil would still grow at a faster rate but slower than India; the rest of BRICS would slow down as demographic pressures stabilise. Chinese GDP growth rate would dip below 3% by 2045. The Indian growth rate would be sustained by the fact that 60% of its population would still be between 15 and 60 by 2050, a luxury not afforded to either China or Brazil, although Brazil's share of working people in percentage terms would still be higher (56%) than China (53%). Also, as late industrialisers, certainly China, India, and Brazil have an added advantage that they could catch up quickly with the G-6 countries. Simple extrapolation may be inappropriate, as countries slow down in terms of their growth rates as they peak and mature, which had happened in the past to Japan and Germany.[28]

But the societal carrying capacities of China and India would help them generate greater overall funds for defense and other communitarian activities. Societal carrying capacity refers to internal ability of a society to withstand crisis.[29] Older civilizational societies create and sustain this in a variety of cultural, tradition-based factors. The Mobilisation of resources under a higher carrying capacity would be comparatively easier in order to achieve greater defense and

technology-based expenditure patterns and achieve big power status. This second scenario is expected to take shape gradually but surely.

(3) Within the Western Hemisphere, an alliance of Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela (and perhaps Brazil) could develop along the energy lines. Unless, a radical behavioral and policy change is experienced in the US, it will continue to be energy dependent on foreign sources. Despite its limits in terms of the economic and military power, Canada is no ordinary country for the US. It is the biggest trading partner for the US, but looking at it from the Canadian perspective, the United States imports more than 80% of all Canadian exports, leaving it vulnerable to possible reprisal from Washington. The economic stakes have been ominous in the pronouncements by prominent members of the Canadian political landscape.[30] For example, Canadian Alliance Leader Stephen Harper and others had repeatedly asked that Canada should support the American plans for military strikes against Iraq regardless of whether or not it had UN support. These tensions have strong economic undertones. The world's longest open border is also the world's busiest. Despite the dilemma in moral terms, Canadian leaders are aware of the negative economic implications of any protracted disagreement with the US.

Canada could play an effective bridge between the two power blocs mentioned in scenario 1, thus becoming more important than at the present for the US policy makers. With its close political contact with European nations, in particular France and the United Kingdom, this is a likely scenario. The second possible scenario for Canada, although not as glamorous, could be effective as well. Since Canadian refineries process a significant amount of crude oil destined for the US market, it would make prudent sense for the Canadian leadership to work closely with Mexico and Venezuela in the area of oil exploration and distribution. In fact, the recent US Department of Energy data show that Canada, Mexico, and Central and South America together account for more than half of the daily oil imports to the US.[31] A coordinated platform of Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela together with continued US dependence on foreign oil is bound to accord Canada a greater weight than it currently gets from the US. A concerted effort to bring Brazil on board of this energy-based alliance would be quite useful. Since Brazil is the second biggest consumer of petroleum-based products in the Western Hemisphere after the US, the bloc would carry considerable weight in the minds of the US policy makers.

As things stand at this critical juncture, there are very few takers of US arrogance internationally. It defies logic when the US administration declares a deadline on Iraq and asks the UN Security Council to vote on it and yet threatens reprisal for non-support. For example, the US ambassador to Mexico hinted at possible reprisals when Mexico could not make up its mind on the US-led proposal.[32] When nations are insulted and taken for granted, they are likely to organise and make efforts to change the balance of power. And that would spell bad things for the real US national interest. But it could make things more interesting for Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela (and Brazil) in a more positive way.

What Happens to Political Freedom and Civil Rights?

Since the world has been experiencing a democratic revolution, at least in the electoral arena, it is inevitable that questions concerning political freedom and civil rights will be raised. Given the fact that the Freedom House ranks China as a not-free country and that Russia has withdrawn

some of the earlier advances in political rights, this is an important question. Our prediction is that in China, a limited civil rights regime will reign. In the case of India, political freedom in practice will be compromised to the extent that insurgency and communalism threaten its body politic. Since civil liberties and political freedoms are also being eroded in practical terms in the US, a limited version of political rights and civil liberties would be the dominant model in the years ahead. Since these three countries would be the top three economic powers by the year 2050, so this interpretation seems quite feasible.

The basic argument here is that the leading economies influence the definition of a major public good they advertise to the rest of the world in order to cement their new found status in the international power structure. When China becomes the leading economy and if its current political regime continues unabated, then, much more progress can be expected in arenas, such as civil liberties under a due process of the law, and a limited political freedoms regime. China will sell that model, and with a greater economic weight behind, it could afford to promote such a model overseas. In the case of India, it will be the other way around, ensuring greater political rights for all but a discriminating practice of civil liberties for reasons of competing influence emanating from sub-cultural, cultural and ritualistic hierarchies. What will happen, then, to the US and its universal campaign for political freedom and civil liberties? If the constricting of political freedom and dissent continues internally, then, it would also back away from promoting a rhetorical level of political freedom and civil liberties overseas. After all, it has long tolerated such restrictions in countries that are friendly to its interests like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and hostile to limited restriction on such public goods like Russia.

The discussion above on political freedoms and civil liberties would implicitly mean that the greater sense of national security would prevail, and the top economies eventually would reach a compromise of a rather limited version of political freedom and civil liberties. In other words, in the face of terrorism fears from non-state entities, a conditional availability of such freedoms and liberties would be most likely the norm.

In a Post-War Scenario

What is contemplated in the earlier section is in theory. Of course, the assumptions of modeling may change, and factors unaccounted for can cause much error to enter into the calculation. Scholars writing on the international balance of power among states have consistently predicted the rise of a rival power bloc from an essentially uni-polar world, due to a number of game-theoretic calculations toward gaining economic, political, strategic, and diplomatic advantage over rival states.[33] We had deliberated a number of these arguments in the beginning of this essay. But there are signs that many of the members of the contemplated rival power bloc are intent on mending fences with the US. The UN Security Council voted overwhelmingly in Mid-August of 2003 to recognise the Iraqi Governing Council and get involved in some significant way in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. Canada has already manifested its willingness to work with the US in the post-war reconstruction efforts. Although these do not include the sending of Canadian soldiers, the Canadian leadership has promised significant help in some key areas. For example, the Canadian Prime Minister has promised significant help in infrastructure building, humanitarian help, and educating Iraqis in democratic governance.[34]

Both France and Germany are on a “kiss and make up” mode. Both President Chirac of France and Chancellor Schroeder of Germany have been publicly sympathetic toward offering a helping hand in the rebuilding of Iraq. The United States is also facing a rising opposition to the fast increasing human and financial costs of rebuilding in Iraq. As US soldiers die almost daily in scattered resistance and the cost of maintaining an administration and military presence amount to 4 billion dollars a month, popular opposition is showing signs of emerging. The Democratic Party has also picked up on its opposition to the post-war developments. In this changed scenario, it would also be advantageous for the US administration to get some support from both the UN and its former opponents of its pre-war policy. The presence of US Marines in Liberia along with West African peace keepers certainly opened up, briefly albeit, possibilities that maybe the US administration has also learned its lesson from the diplomatic fiasco over the war in Iraq. In such a situation, it is quite easy for Canadian policy makers to forget the long term repercussions of the US-led war in Iraq without the UN Security Council mandate and concentrate on the good things it shares with the US, albeit in an asymmetrical fashion.

The relations with China are a mixed bag. The rhetoric has increased against China’s controlled foreign exchange rate which is considered artificial by the US. The case of Taiwan has remained a thorny issue. With India and Russia the relations of the US have been generally good, although in the case of Russia it intermittently flares up with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue and/or that of Russian crackdown in Chechnya.

It is true that without publicly acknowledging it, the US administration has been campaigning for a multilateral military force that would slowly relieve some of the work now being done by the British and American forces. The Central American countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua have recently sent about 900 soldiers to join the military peace keeping operations in Iraq.[35] Soldiers from the former Soviet Republic of Georgia are already on the ground. With the UN resolution now sanctioning in favor of a multilateral involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq, it is entirely possible that countries such as Jordan, Turkey, Bangladesh, and India could send their military personnel to Iraq to relieve some members of the US forces. It seems there is a grudging acceptance by both sides of the pre-war debate of the new ground realities in post war Iraq and do the best they can to mend fences with the US and get some benefit from it. The post-war Canadian overture to help out the US in supplying transport aircraft, disaster management assistance, and even hard dollars in the amount of 106 million in Iraq indicates that perhaps the larger relevance of the multilateral conflict management through the UN might be compromised for a quick “kiss and make-up” session with the United States.

Although these “kiss and make-up” events skirt the real underlying currents in international relations that change is underway and more of it is on its way. Regardless of how the European and American centers of power behave, whether in concert with each other or in antagonistic terms, the flattening of the world in the technological arena has unleashed forces that cannot stop China, India, Russia, and, to a lesser extent Brazil (in Western Hemisphere) in becoming major powers in the next several decades.[36] When it happens, it would effectively undermine the Pax Americana that has been so much in vogue in political terms at least in much of the world in recent years. Since the uni-centered power structure in place from the early 1990s has given

nothing but greater instability and conflict, it is our sincere hope that a multi-centered future balance of power would facilitate relative peace and political stability in the world.

1. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the 37th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, Stockholm, Sweden, July 5-9, 2005.
2. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).
3. Also see Niall Ferguson, "Hegemony or Empire?" *Foreign Affairs* September-October 2003; also see N. Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin, 2004).
4. David Calleo, *Hegemony and Decay, the American Case at Turning of the Century* (2003); also see Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
5. Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression: 1929-1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).
6. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
7. David Calleo (2003).
8. R. Nelson and G. Wright, "The Rise and Fall of American Technological Leadership: The Postwar Era in Historical Perspective" *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. 30, 1992, pp. 1931-64.
9. It is worth mentioning that Bush administration withdrew its tariffs in 2004 on steel as the European Union threatened retaliation on a wide range of US products entering the union markets. Similarly, the Boeing-Airbus rivalry is all too well-known.
10. In this regard, see Patrick O'Brien, "The Imperial Component in the Rise and Decline of the British Economy", in M. Mann and F. Halliday (Eds.), *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1991).
11. President George W. Bush's televised address to the nation, *ABC News* March 17, 2003.
12. The Fox network and the MSNBC have been notorious in this regard, in particular the former.
13. In this regard, talk shows like "O'Reilly Factor" on Fox network are openly anti foreign countries that did not wholeheartedly support the US position at the UN Security Council.
14. Clifford Krauss, "Canadians of Two Minds Over Neighbor to the South", *The New York Times* (March 27, 2003), A10.
15. "<http://www.recorder.ca/cp/national/030320/n032099A.html>

16. CBC News, taken from "<http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/02/13/chretien030213>
17. see Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003)
- 18 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", *Foreign Affairs* 78, March-April 1989, pp. 35-49.
19. Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York, Public Affairs, 2003), pp. 448-9.
20. http://www.fas.org/asmp/fast_facts.htm, 1-8
21. All calculations are made by the author from data presented in *World Development Report* The World Bank, 2002, pp. 234-9.
22. Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrens Dorf, *Justice among Nations* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999), pp. 200-02.
- 23 La Reforma, Mexico City, February 2003, several issues.
24. Anthony Cordesman, *The Global Military Balance* (Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2002).
25. Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, "Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050", *Global Economics Paper No: 99* (Glodman Sachs, www.gs.dom, 2003)
26. Goldman Sachs, *Global Economics Paper No: 99*, p. 3.
27. Goldman Sachs, *Global Economics Paper No. 99*, p. 9.
28. Goldman Sachs, *Global Economics Paper No. 99*, pp. 6-8.
29. Edward M. Crenshaw referred to such a concept in his cross-national studies. See E. Crenshaw, "The Cross-National Determinants of Income Inequality: A Replication and Extension using Ecological-Evolutionary Theory," *Social Forces* 71 (1992), pp. 339-63; also see E. Crenshaw, M. Christenson, and D. Oakey, "Demographic Transition in Ecological Focus", *American Sociological Review* 65 (2000), pp. 1-19.
30. <http://www.globeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/front/RTGAM/20021002/schr1001/fr>
31. www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis-publications (1996)
32. Evening News Coverage, Channel 2 (Mexico City, March 4-5, 2003).
33. See, for example, Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook and Gregory F. Rose, *The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

34. <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/200304/29/75736-cp.html>
35. La Nacion, San Jose, Costa Rica, August 14, 2003, pp. 25-28.
36. Thomas Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2005).